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BROWNSON'S

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VOLUME III.

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BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1855.

ART. I. — *Philosophie. De la Connaissance de Dieu.* Par
A. GRATRY, Prêtre de l'Oratoire de l'Immaculée Con-
ception. Paris : Charles Dunoioi ; Lecoffre et Cie.
1853. 2 tomes. 8vo.

M. GRATRY has here attempted a work of the highest importance, and much needed to meet the moral and intellectual wants of our times. No higher subject than God can occupy our thoughts, and no knowledge can compare, in dignity, interest, and value, with the knowledge of God. Indeed, as without God there is nothing, for all things are by him, in him, and for him, so without knowledge of him there is no knowledge at all. He who knows not God knows nothing, and hence the deep significance of the Holy Scripture which calls him a fool who denies God, — *Dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus.* The highest wisdom is to know God, and the supreme good is to know and love him. The greatest service, therefore, which can be rendered to genuine science and to mankind, is to furnish solid instruction as to the means and conditions of the knowledge and love of God, and to stimulate men to seek him as the "first good and the first fair."

A service of this sort is attempted by the learned, pious, and philosophical author in these profound and highly interesting volumes. Whether he has succeeded in all respects or not in accomplishing the end he proposed to himself, he has certainly made an attempt in the right direction, and the most considerable attempt that has been recently

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made. His work may not be faultless, it may fail in some respects to satisfy the truly philosophic mind, but it is full of rich and suggestive thoughts, and well fitted to raise modern philosophy from a dead scholasticism, and to breathe into it the breath of life, — to give it a living soul, and to render it vigorous and productive.

The author enters his protest against the dead abstractions of the schools, against the dry and barren logic of mere speculative reason, and rejects all speculation that leaves out the heart and its wants, as well as all philosophy detached from theology. He seeks to rehabilitate reason indeed, depreciated by modern sceptics, sentimentalists, and traditionalists, but also to give the heart a place in our speculations, and revelation its share in raising us to a knowledge of God. He calls his philosophy *Theodicy* (from *θεός*, God, and *δικη*, justice), the Divine Justice, in order to show that our primary and chief knowledge of God is under the relation of morality, as the object of the heart, rather than of the pure intellect. If we understand him, we are first moved to seek God by a moral want, and we recognize him first in the heart as the object to which it tends, under the relation of good, or beatitude, and our knowledge of him increases in proportion as the heart becomes pure, and its love free and strong. But as the desire of beatitude cannot be satisfied without the intuitive vision of God as he is in himself, which is not naturally possible, there is necessary to complete the knowledge of God craved by the soul supernatural revelation or faith, and ultimately the *ens supernaturale*. In other words, as the soul cannot find the beatitude it desires in the natural order, a philosophy confined to that order, or detached from supernatural revelation, can never be adequate to its wants. The soul taken in its actual state has, so to speak, a natural want or desire of the supernatural vision of God as the complement of its beatitude. The supernatural is not naturally attainable, and therefore a purely natural or rational philosophy, since by its own nature confined to the natural order, is inadequate even to the natural wants of the soul. Hence its deficiency must be supplied by supernatural philosophy, or the Christian revelation. The author takes here philosophy as the answer to the moral wants of the soul as well as to its intellectual wants, and includes under it what is supplied supernaturally as well

as what is supplied naturally, or by our natural reason and strength. He therefore labors to enrich philosophy by introducing the element of love, and to complete it by supernatural revelation. Certainly we are not the man to complain of this. We applaud the attempt with all our heart. It is a work of no slight importance in our day to restore reason to its rights, and to recall the age to its dictates. The author is perfectly right when he maintains that reason is at present more in danger than revelation. Men, we mean the men who represent the age, have lost their faith in reason, and will not use it reasonably. One class distrust it, and tend to universal scepticism. They do not believe that anything can be known; they despair of all certainty, fall into religious indifference, and live and die as the beasts that perish. Another class, and much more numerous than is commonly believed, decry reason in order to exalt sentiment. These are such as decry doctrine and praise feeling, and say, "Away with your dogmatic theology, your philosophical abstractions, and your ethical rules, and give us the heart," — the modern cant of your Evangelicals, Methodists, and Transcendentalists. You cannot reason with these people. If you address their understanding, they fly to feeling; if you address their feelings, they fly to understanding. Sustain your positions by logic, and they tell you that the logic of the heart is far above the logic of the head; bring forward evidence that no reason can gainsay, and they remain unmoved, for they do not *feel* with you. Another class decry reason in order to exalt tradition, and, like Kant in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, "demolish science to make way for faith." These have honest intentions, are moved by praiseworthy motives, but they damage the cause they have at heart; for never can we build faith on scepticism, or science on faith. Revelation presupposes reason, and in denying reason you deny equally revelation and the possibility of revelation; for revelation can be made only to a rational subject. It is well against these to assert reason, and to let all the world know that in asserting revelation we presuppose reason instead of denying it.

This point is capital. Man is a rational animal, and reason is his characteristic, as well as his noblest attribute. He cannot suppress his reason without suppressing his humanity, without foregoing his manhood and making

himself practically a brute. We do not, by asserting that God has made a revelation to man, supersede reason, or forbid him to exercise it. The revelation assists reason, it does not annul it. It brings to reason a higher and purer light than its own, but removes none of its laws, abridges no sphere of its activity, and impedes in no respect its free and full exercise. It elevates it, clarifies it, and extends its vision, but does not deny, enchain, or enslave it. The authority which the Catholic claims for revelation, or for the Church in teaching and defining it, does not enslave reason, or require it to surrender a single one of its original rights; it enables it to retain and exercise all its rights, and to attain lovingly to a truth higher and vaster than its own. Man is naturally bound to receive and conform to the truth, and is it to offer an indignity to his freedom to present him more truth than he is naturally able to apprehend? Does the astronomer complain of the telescope, because by it he explores vast fields of the heavens invisible to his naked eye? Is his natural eye superseded or closed, because, in order to see more than it can attain, a telescope must be used, or because he must govern himself by what he sees through his telescope as well as by what he sees without it? Why then complain of revelation, that it is derogatory to reason? or of the assertion of its authority? Is not truth always authoritative? Why should revealed truth be less so than natural truth? The astronomer would be as angry at us were we to deny the objects revealed by his telescope, as he would were we to deny the objects visible to his naked eye, and he would call us fools for disputing them, because visible only by means of the telescope.

The author has also done good service to the cause of truth by introducing the element of love into philosophy. It cannot be denied that the tendency of scholasticism, with its dry abstractions, its syllogisms, and subtile distinctions, is to lose sight of the true under its form of the good and the beautiful, as addressed to the heart and the affections. Man is not pure intellect, any more than he is pure sentiment. He is body and soul, and his soul is endowed with the power to know, to love, and to will, and his need to love is greater than his need to know, and indeed he needs to know only in order to love and obey. Knowledge distinctively considered is never the end. It is

but a means to an end. The end is to love and enjoy, and the beatitude of the soul is rather in the supernatural possession of God as the object of its love than as the object of its intelligence. The knowledge of God and Him whom he has sent is not a knowledge separate from love, but a knowledge which includes love and is informed by it. Love is the distinguishing mark of the Christian. "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye love one another." Love is the fulfilling of the law, the bond of perfection, the evidence that we have passed from death unto life. The Gospel is addressed to the heart, and the whole law is summed up in supreme love to God, and the love of our neighbor as ourselves. The age in which we live adopts as its watchword Love, and certain it is that if we would reach it, make a favorable impression upon it, or recall it to faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, we must recognize its craving to love, and show it the object it ought to love, and which is adequate to all the wants of the heart. There is, however, as we shall by and by show, a serious danger in all this to be guarded against. We must certainly take care not to separate love from intelligence, or to run into sentimentalism, which loses sight of moral obligation or duty, — of obedience to law. We must remember that Christian love is a rational affection, not a blind instinct, sentiment, or feeling; but we must not forget that faith is in order to charity, and that no philosophy, no religion which does not meet the craving of the heart to love, is of the least conceivable value. The moral wants of the soul, as well as its intellectual wants, must be met and answered. We are happy to see that our author has fully recognized this fact, and endeavored to conform to it. He recognizes the two wings of the soul, spoken of by Plato, by which it rises to God, that is, science and love, and insists that we are led to God by the heart even more than by the head.

Starting from the wants of the heart, from the natural desire of the heart for beatitude, the author finds that this desire can be satisfied with no created, with no limited, with no natural good, but demands a supernatural good, the possession of God as he is in himself. Hence a complete theodicy, a theodicy adequate to the wants of the soul, cannot be constructed by natural reason alone; for natural reason is by its own nature confined to the nat-

ural order, and cannot present the supernatural. Hence no adequate philosophy detached from supernatural revelation. This is in its terms what we always ourselves assert, although we probably do not maintain it in the precise sense of the author. He seems to us to suppose that natural or rational philosophy may begin and go a certain length alone, and only needs supernatural revelation to complete the knowledge of God or to reveal to us by faith God in the sense in which he is the adequate object of the soul's craving for a supernatural beatitude. He in this does nothing to reconcile the rationalists and traditionalists, but takes the ground of the rationalists, and differs essentially in no respect from Father Chastel, the unrelenting opponent of the erudite Bonnetty. We take a somewhat different view. We do not assume revelation as necessary simply to elevate reason into the supernatural order properly so called, but also as necessary to enable reason to explain and rightly understand even the first principles of rational truth. Reason and revelation must go hand in hand from the first step to the last, and there is no philosophy, in any stage, independent of revelation. Philosophy is nothing but the rational element of supernatural theology, and is incomplete on every point if detached from the supernatural light reflected from revelation. Nevertheless, the principle we contend for M. Gratry concedes, and if there be any difference between us, it is merely one of application. Perhaps, after all, the difference is not even so much, and may be resolved into one of mere expression.

The central principle of the author's doctrine is, that God is apprehended primarily by the soul as the object of its moral wants, its craving for beatitude, and that the soul attains to a knowledge of him by love, by an interior movement or spring by which it passes at once from the finite to the infinite, — a process which he labors to prove is purely geometrical, of which geometers in the infinitesimal calculus make merely a special application. In this he thinks he is borne out by all the great philosophers, theologians, and sublime geniuses of all times. In order to prove it, he gives us a learned historical sketch and a masterly analysis of the theodicy of Plato and Aristotle, St. Augustine and St. Thomas, Descartes and Pascal, Malebranche and Fénelon, Bossuet and Leibnitz, Petau

and Thomassin. His work is valuable here as a history of philosophy, from Plato to Leibnitz, if for nothing else. He finds, or thinks he finds, in all these sublime geniuses the same method, the same conclusions, the same theodicy, substantially his own. He places St. Thomas of Aquin at the head of the list, and considers him greater than St. Augustine by the addition of Aristotle to Plato. We are not quite prepared to accept this estimate, as much as we reverence the Angel of the Schools. St. Thomas knew Aristotle thoroughly, and followed his method, though in some points rejecting his conclusions; but his knowledge of Plato was less complete. He added Aristotle to St. Augustine, but he did not add Plato to Aristotle. In his *Summa Theologica*, and especially in his *Summa contra Gentiles*, he is as nearly an Aristotelian as a Catholic theologian can be, and if he departs from the Aristotelian method at all, it is where he is forced to do so by his Catholic faith and his profound reverence for St. Augustine, who, we dare hold, combined in himself all of both Aristotle and Plato that is of permanent value.

We are somewhat surprised that M. Gratry omits from his list of sublime geniuses St. Anselm of Canterbury, — the sublimest genius, the profoundest and most original philosopher of the Middle Ages, who by his own thought and contemplation reproduced all of Plato that is worth reproducing, and to whom M. Gratry is apparently more indebted than to any other philosopher for his own theodicy. There is here either strange injustice or a still more strange forgetfulness. We cannot excuse an author who includes Descartes, Pascal, and Petau in the list of sublime geniuses and profound theologians and philosophers, and excludes St. Anselm from it. St. Anselm was, so far as we are aware, the first who adopted the method of demonstrating the existence of God from the idea of God, which is the method M. Gratry himself insists upon and follows.

We are not prepared, moreover, to admit that all these great and sublime geniuses adopted the same method, and attained to their theodicy by one and the same process. We have no disposition to speak slightly of Plato, the "divine Plato," as some of the Fathers call him, and who in our judgment stands at the head of all Gentile philosophers; but we think M. Gratry makes him talk quite

too much like a Christian philosopher. We think that, in his translations of the passages he extracts, he gives him a meaning far more in accordance with Christian thought than Plato himself entertained, and interprets not unfrequently his mythology in a non-Platonic sense. That Plato clearly and distinctly taught the unity of God in the Christian sense, we do not believe. He held substantially the Pythagorean doctrine of the eternity of matter, had at best only a confused conception of creation, and though he asserted the immortality of the soul, he was ignorant of the future life and beatitude brought to light by Christian revelation. How, then, he could have a sound theodicy, as far as it went, is more than we are able to understand. But be this as it may, how does our author know that Plato attained to the great truths which he unquestionably held, and those still greater which he supposes him to have held, by the sole virtue of his dialectic method? Was there no tradition in the age of Plato, no wisdom of the ancients which had come down to his time? May not Plato have been indebted for these truths to tradition, to the primitive revelation, which was made to our first parents, and handed down in its purity through the patriarchs and the Synagogue, and in a corrupt and fragmentary form through the Gentile sacerdocies and philosophies? Is it certain that all in a theodicy is attained to by the method professed by its author? Have we never known honorable inconsequences, sublime inconsistencies? How many Christian philosophers do we not meet, in whom faith triumphs over their philosophical method, and who give us sound and sublime conclusions never attained by their method of reasoning, and which they hold only at the expense of their logic? We are far from being willing to ascribe all we find in Plato to the virtue of his dialectic method, and we have not the least doubt that the sublime truths contained in his theodicy were borrowed, directly or indirectly, from the primitive revelation preserved in its purity and integrity in the Synagogue. He himself, if we recollect aright, ascribes them to tradition, to the wisdom of the ancients.

We cannot agree that Aristotle follows substantially the method of Plato, whom he continually combats and is perpetually misrepresenting, or that St. Thomas, who follows the method of Aristotle, follows the method of Plato,

St. Augustine, and St. Anselm. His method is very nearly the reverse of theirs. He combats, and in his school is held to have refuted, St. Anselm's famous demonstration of the existence of God. St. Thomas follows the syllogistic method throughout, and nowhere, so far as we have been able to discover, does he adopt the dialectic method, — the method insisted on by our author, and represented by him as that adopted by all the great philosophers and theologians in every age. Descartes, Fénelon, Thomassin, Malebranche, Bossuet, and Leibnitz follow, perhaps, the dialectic method, but Pascal did not, and, though an able geometrician, he was no philosopher. He was a sceptic, and founded his dogmatism on the denial of reason, and religion on despair. He was a brilliant genius, if you will; he had many profound thoughts, and has left behind him many pregnant remarks; but he should never be named with the great philosophers and theologians of mankind. Pascal was indeed a Frenchman, but we do not know that we are for that obliged to cite him as one of the great men of the earth. He belonged to Port-Royale, and with it we would leave him to pass into forgetfulness, or the execration he deserves for his *Provincial Letters*.

But leaving all considerations of this sort by the way, we are not quite sure, after all, what it is that M. Gratry means by his dialectic method. He says reason has two processes or modes of operation; the one he calls the syllogistic, the other he calls the dialectic, and represents the former as deductive and the latter as inductive. We think we understand what Plato means by the dialectic method, for with him it is based on his doctrine of ideas, and is explained by his doctrine of reminiscence. According to Plato, the soul existed prior to its connection with the body, in close union with the Divinity, and its knowledge here is a reminiscence of what it knew by virtue of that union in its pre-existing state. By being clothed with a material body, it lost in great measure its previous knowledge, and can recover it only in proportion as it detaches itself from the body, and rises on the wings of love and contemplation to union with God, in whom are the ideas or archetypes of all things, the only objects of real science. The way for the soul to know here in this state is to recover its former knowledge, and the way to do that is by moral discipline to recover the lost union with God,

in whom the real objects of science are open to the soul's contemplation. The soul must detach itself from the body and all material things, ascend by its love and contemplation to the empyreum it originally inhabited, and there contemplate in calm spiritual repose the first Good, the first True, and the first Fair. Or, in other words, the soul must enter into itself, and silently contemplate its own reminiscences of that ideal world from which it has been exiled. Setting aside the doctrine of reminiscence founded on Plato's doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, there is no doubt a shadow of truth in this; but it would then resolve the dialectic method into the contemplative, and assert that the object obtained is obtained by intuition, not by induction. M. Gratry must reject the doctrine of reminiscence, and therefore, it seems to us, must mean by the dialectic or inductive method, as distinguished from the syllogistic or deductive method, that of simple contemplation; in which case all he says of the infinitesimal calculus avails him nothing.

But contemplation of what? Of God? Then he must concede that we apprehend God intuitively, or at least apprehend intuitively that which is God. But this he seems to deny, or to be afraid to assert. Of the creature, or the finite, as he would seem to hold? Then he attains to a knowledge of God, if at all, by reasoning, and by reasoning which in no respect differs from the syllogistic or deductive reasoning, which he rejects. He says we dart at once from the finite to the infinite by mentally suppressing all conception of bounds and limitations, as in the infinitesimal calculus; that is, by abstraction of the finite, and consequently by deduction, or syllogistic reasoning. But this is not all. If the author means by our darting at once to the infinite, that the infinite is immediately and simultaneously apprehended in the apprehension of the finite, we accept it, but the process is then intuitive, not dialectic. But if he means, as it would seem, that we attain to the infinite by a process, however rapid, of abstraction, his infinite is only an abstract infinite. Abstract from the finite its finiteness, or suppress mentally its bounds and limitations, and you suppress the finite altogether, annihilate the whole object, and there remains not the infinite, as supposed, but simply nothing.

M. Gratry professes to adopt the method of the geom-

etricians, and says formally, that the process by which all men, learned and unlearned, philosophers and poets, attain to a knowledge of God, is precisely the method of which the infinitesimal calculus, invented by Leibnitz, is a special application. He labors at great length to prove that the demonstration of the existence of God is strictly geometrical. In this consists the original and novel part of his work. Others have indeed asserted it, but he is the first who has demonstrated it. But, with all deference to the learned and scientific author, we must say that the God he demonstrates by his geometrical process is simply zero. Mathematics is a mixed science, at once ideal and empirical. The mathematical infinities belong to the ideal, and the ideal is always God as the intelligible; for, as M. Gratry well maintains, the infinite is God, and there is no infinite separate or distinguishable from him. At the bottom of all your mathematical infinities, as the plane, so to speak, on which they are projected, is the intuition or conception of God, without whom they could not be conceived. Take away from the human mind the intuition of God, which accompanies all its conceptions as their ideal element, and the infinitesimal calculus would not only be an error, as Berkeley maintains that it is, but an impossible error; for there is and can be out of God no infinitely little or infinitely great, even in thought. St. Thomas, we believe, somewhere says, an atheist may be a geometrician, but without God there can be no geometry. We will add, that without the intuition of God as infinity no man can be a geometrician. Having through that intuition the conception of the infinite God, the conception of the infinitely real, we can speak of mathematical infinities, for in so doing we only make a special application of that conception. But these infinities are purely ideal, not empirical, and aside from their reality in the essence, wisdom, or power of God, not distinguishable from God himself, they are nothing, simply zero. But as we always have that conception, though we do not always take note that it is conception of God, we take it into our heads that mathematical infinities are something, and conceivable outside of God, which it is certain they are not. The suppression, empirically considered, of all bounds, limitations, or fixed, definite, or determinable quantity, gives us not infinity, but simply zero, which is nothing at all. Between

zero and a determinable number, between nothing and something, there is no medium. Zero multiplied or divided by zero gives simply zero, and hence, regarded in the concrete order, the infinitesimal calculus of Leibnitz, as the fluxions of Newton, is only a superb error, and harmless mathematically only where the error is equal on both sides, which is by no means always the case. Mathematicians do not detect its fallacy, because there is in their minds the intuition of the real infinite, in which their imaginary infinities have, so to speak, a basis or support.

But M. Gratry cannot have so much as this, for he professes to dart from the finite to the infinite without a previous intuition of the infinite, by simply suppressing or disregarding in the finite apprehended its bounds, limitations, or determinable quantity. But this is a complete abstraction of the finite, and the remainder is simply zero, not only empirically but even ideally; for the very conception of the finite is the conception of a fixed or definite quantity. Remove that conception, and nothing remains; for, according to the hypothesis, there is no previous or concomitant intuition of the infinite which, as in mathematics, survives, so to speak, the suppression, in thought, of the finite or determinable quantity. M. Gratry, then, by his process, that of abstracting the finite or disregarding the determinable, attains for his God simply zero, *das nicht-seyn*, and, strangely enough, finds himself in perfect accord with Hegel, whom he ridicules without mercy. It would perhaps not be difficult to show that his dialectic method is at bottom identically the *constructive* method of the Hegelians. We must say, therefore, and we do so with profound respect, that we do not think he has added anything valuable to philosophy or theodicy by his geometrical demonstration, for the alleged demonstration, strictly taken, is an error even in geometry, inasmuch as it starts with the assumption that zero is not nothing, but something.

It may be our own blindness and stupidity, but we confess that we do not understand how there are or can be two distinct methods of reasoning, and we have never yet been able to see wherein Aristotle erred when he termed induction an imperfect syllogism. Reason has two very distinct modes of operation, which we term intuition and reasoning or ratiocination. It is intuitive and discursive. But all discursion, all reasoning, is, as far as we are able

to understand it, syllogistic ; and all induction, in so far as it is a logical process at all, may be reduced to a regular syllogism, as all the old masters of logic have taught. We agree entirely with M. Gratry, that we do not and cannot obtain our principles by syllogistic reasoning, for the principles must be given prior to reasoning. The office of the syllogism is not to discover new principles, or to extend science to new matter, but to clear up, systematize, and confirm what in some form is already held by the mind. Principles, or the matter from which and on which the syllogism operates, must be furnished prior to and independent of it. These, according to Plato, the soul brings with it, and are reminiscences of its knowledge in its pre-existing state, or previous life ; according to us, they are furnished objectively by intuition, and reach us through simple intuitive apprehension. To extend our knowledge in this direction, Plato recommended silence and recollection. We recommend tranquil contemplation, or observation. Beyond these two methods, which differ from one another only as seeing or beholding differs from remembering, we are unable to conceive any other. A dialectic or inductive method, which is neither intuitive nor syllogistic, we cannot understand, and a logical process distinguishable from intuition, by which the reason can be furnished with principles, is to us inconceivable. M. Gratry is frequently on the verge of the truth, but seems either not to apprehend it, or to fear to assert it. What he wants is, to perceive that what he calls dialectic is, so far as distinguishable from the syllogistic, intuitive, and that the infinite is affirmed to us in direct intuition ; not attained by a logical process, or by way of abstraction of the finite. He is probably afraid to do this, because our theologians have, as it were, appropriated the term intuition of God to express the beatific vision of the Blest, the vision of God in his essence, or as he is in himself, which is not naturally possible, and is attainable only by the supernatural light of glory. He fears, most likely, that, were he to say that we have intuition of God here, he would fall into a condemned heresy, and be thought to teach that we are naturally capable of the beatific vision, and may even naturally enjoy it on earth. But we think this fear is groundless. To have intuition of God as the ideal, the intelligible, is, in our judgment, something very different

from having intuition of him as he is in himself, or in his essence, and we think may be asserted without danger to faith; for it is asserted by St. Augustine, St. Bonaventura, Père Thomassin, and Cardinal Gerdil, and implied by St. Thomas, and in reality by M. Gratry himself.

Nevertheless, M. Gratry is not, as a matter of fact, deceived in supposing that, after suppressing the finite, he has not zero, but the infinite, present to his apprehension. His mistake lies in supposing that he in that way obtains it, or attains to a conception of it. The fact is, in every intuition we have direct and immediate intuition of both the infinite and the finite, of the necessary and the contingent, of God and the creature, and by disregarding or mentally suppressing the finite we only detach the infinite from the finite presented along with it in the same intuition, and turn our minds to its direct and distinct consideration. We do not thus obtain it originally, but we thus obtain it as a distinct conception. If we suppose the mind destitute of all intuition of the infinite, the method proposed by our author would give us simply zero, as we have said, not the infinite, for the infinite is not deducible from the finite; but since we really have all along the intuition, as a matter of fact the infinite by the suppression of the finite remains present to the mind, and is, what it was not before, distinctly apprehended. The fact is as the author asserts, but his account of it is not correct, for the idea is not obtained in the way he supposes. It is not obtained by his dialectical process; it is only made an object of distinct recognition and contemplation.

M. Gratry will permit us, however, to say, that he seems to us, throughout his work, to confound two things which in our judgment are very distinct; namely, the process by which we know that God is, with that by which we learn what he is. That God is, we know intuitively, in that we have direct and immediate intuition of real and necessary being, which is God; but what he is, what are his moral attributes, and what are our relations to him, we learn only by a process similar to that which he calls the dialectic. His work is less a demonstration of the existence of God to those who deny it, than a discourse to advance in the knowledge and love of God those who, though they deny not that he is, have no lively sense of his existence, and seek their beatitude, not in loving and serving him, but in

loving and serving the creature. It is philosophical, indeed, but practical rather than speculative, and moral rather than metaphysical. We complain not of this in itself, but the author does not avow it, or seem to be fully aware of it. He seems to proceed on the assumption, that both objects are to be effected by the same process, and to regard his work as fitted alike for both speculative and practical atheists. He would have us believe that he is writing a purely metaphysical work, demonstrating and elucidating the first principles of all science, as well as inciting to growth in the knowledge and love of God. There is, therefore, to us some discrepancy, in his work, between what he really does and what he has the air of doing, or of supposing that he is doing.

We think M. Gratry makes a mistake in regarding metaphysics and theodicy as precisely one and the same thing. We cannot for ourselves consent to resolve ontology into theodicy, for we believe that in our intuition God is presented as the object of the intellect prior to his being presented as the object of the will, and therefore as the *summum Ens* or *Verum* before he is presented as *summum Bonum*, or as the True before being presented as the Good. We have duly considered what the author says to the contrary, but it does not convince us that the heart darts away to God as the object of its love or its beatitude before he is presented as the object of the intellect. The heart has its movements, its affections, and these may urge the soul to action, yet without the light of the intellect they are mere blind cravings, torment the soul, and render it restless and incapable of repose; but they are all interior, and can fasten upon this object only as intellectually apprehended. The age experiences these cravings, and is crying out day and night for some object on which to fasten, and which shall be adequate to its wants and fill its empty heart. Hence the universal unrest which is its grand characteristic. It craves it knows not what. The intellect does not present the object that could satisfy its vague longings, and in which its heart can find repose. Its malady is moral, but also intellectual. The author, undoubtedly, wishes to render his philosophy living and practical, adequate to the wants of the heart as well as to those of the understanding. He wishes to give fair and full play to the moral feelings. He thinks they ought to count for more

than they do in our modern scholastic philosophy; that there is a logic of the heart which is, perhaps, superior to that of the head, and he endeavors to prove that we first know God as the good, first apprehend him in his moral attributes. If we understand him, the intellect apprehends God as the True because the heart has already apprehended him as the Good and the Beautiful. Hence he resolves, virtually, philosophy into ethics, and makes its first division theodicy. But the soul, though endowed with several faculties, is a simple spiritual substance. It has the power to know, to will, and to feel, but it cannot act as the one power without also acting in some degree as the other. It has no cognitions without volitions and emotions, no volitions or emotions without cognitions. It acts never as three distinct activities, but as a simple *vis activa* with a threefold capacity of acting. Now suppose the heart apprehends God before he is apprehended by the head, must it not still apprehend him intellectually? If the heart, that is, the power either to will or to feel, taken distinctively, is blind, it cannot apprehend anything. Has it then some other light or medium of placing itself in relation with its object than the intellect? M. Gratry, indeed, speaks of a "divine sense," a "divine instinct," by which the soul is drawn to and placed in relation with God as the Good, as the adequate object of its love; but is this divine sense or instinct intelligent? does it present its object to the soul's contemplation? How then distinguish it from reason or intellect? If it is not, how say that by it the heart *knows* God? If it is not intellect, it must be will or feeling, and if simple will or feeling, it is in itself blind, and has no light to know except from the intellectual faculty itself; for to know is one and the same phenomenon, whatever its conditions, its region, or its degrees.

We confess that we distrust this talk about a divine sense, or divine instinct, which is supposed to be distinguishable from our common intellectual faculty; and when we find an author placing in the acquisition of knowledge the heart above the head, we are tempted to suspect that he does not himself very well understand what he is about. We very readily concede that the end is not simply to know, and that all knowledge should be in order to love or charity; and in this sense we place the heart above the

head. But the heart taken distinctively for the affections or emotions is not a light, is but a blind craving to love, or aspiration to our Supreme Good, which it sees not, and finds not by any light of its own. The heart craves beatitude, and torments itself till it finds it; and from this we may learn that it wants what it has not, and may conclude, if we already believe that a good God has made us, that there is a beatitude for us, and which we may attain unless we have forfeited it by our fault; but the heart itself, regarded as unenlightened by natural or supernatural intelligence, cannot tell where its beatitude is to be found, or in what it consists. Its supposed divine sense or instinct is in reality intellectual intuition, or an obscure perception of God as the Supreme Good, as St. Thomas teaches when he says the soul has an obscure apprehension of God in its desire for beatitude, which is to be found only in God.

We are ourselves supposed to have no heart, and are regarded as a mere logic-grinder, logic-chopper, or dialectic gladiator; and therefore our inability to accept M. Gratry's doctrine will most likely be ascribed to our own psychological defects. But be this as it may, we can understand very well the cravings of the heart, its deep power of love. We know very well that man is not all dry intellect. We can imagine that he has a heart, and that this heart craves beatitude, — nay, that its deepest want is to love, and that all love seeks to lose itself in the beloved. We can very well understand that God is the only adequate object of the heart, and that he only can satisfy its love. The heart was made for God, and nothing less than blessed union with him, the full possession of him as the beloved, can fill it, give it fulness of joy, and sweet repose. Here we should be sorry not to be able to go all lengths with the Christian mystic; but it is through the understanding, by natural and supernatural light, that God as the adequate object of the heart, or as our Supreme Good, is presented to the soul. Without this light presenting the object, the heart's love fastens upon nothing, or fastens upon low and unworthy objects, which serve only to disappoint or to disgust it. God, then, as the adequate object of the heart, must be presented as the adequate object of the intellect, as the *summum Verum*, prior to being apprehended as the *summum Bonum*; and therefore metaphysics should precede in our philosophy theodicy, as it does with

nearly all our theologians. We prize Plato very highly, as we have always said, but we do not think him always a safe guide. It is worthy of remark, that all the mystagogues of the Middle Ages were Platonists, and setting up Plato against Aristotle was the signal of rebellion against the Church, which has resulted in modern Protestantism. Plato is the favorite author of our Transcendentalists, and was the philosopher of predilection of the Patarins, Cathares, or Albigenses, and the followers of the Gospel of Love, so widely asserted in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, against the Papacy and Catholic theology. We cannot think that this is purely accidental. Plato, though he mitigates the Oriental doctrine that matter is evil and the source of evil, still holds it, and teaches that we attain to a knowledge of God and divine things only in proportion as we trample on the body. We must despise it, and practically disengage ourselves from it, and rise on the wings of pure spiritual contemplation and love into intimate union with God. This is a satanic imitation of the Christian doctrine of charity and mortification; and so close is the resemblance, that it deceives not a few, and never was there an age in a more fitting temper to be deceived by it than our own. Christianity does not place the origin of evil in matter, nor regard matter either as evil or unclean; for it teaches the resurrection of the flesh, honored by its assumption in the womb of the Virgin by the Son of God. It sees evil only in sin, and sin only in the perverse will, or abuse of our moral freedom. Its works of mortification are not performed in hatred of the body, nor to release the soul from it, but in honor of the sufferings of our Lord in the flesh, and in purification of the soul from its own fleshly desires; for these desires are not, as with the Platonists, the desires of a sensual soul distinct from the spiritual soul, but are desires of the spiritual soul itself united to the flesh. By mortification the Christian purifies his soul and sanctifies the body, and keeps it holy as the temple of the Holy Ghost. He rules the body, but loves and cherishes it. The Platonist contemns it, and seeks to act as a spirit without a body. He falls back on the spirit, which in his view is separated from God only by the body or material envelope. He regards his purity and holiness as independent of the body, as dependent solely on that higher, or, as Plato calls it, demonic region of the soul, in

which it is still united, or attached perhaps substantially, to the Divinity, and therefore treats what concerns the body as wholly unconnected with the moral state or character of the soul. Hence the lawlessness and irregularities of the body, its wild disorders and debaucheries, have nothing to do with the soul's purity and holiness. They belong, as it were, to another person, and no more defile the soul than the filth on which it shines defiles the sun's ray. Hence the Patarins or Cathares, while claiming the greatest spiritual purity, abandoned themselves to the grossest sensual indulgences, and practised such abominations, that the Church, in order to save Christian morals and prevent the dissolution of society, was obliged to proclaim a crusade against them, and to call upon the secular princes to exterminate them, as we shall have yet to do with our Mormons.

The doctrine of Plato, that we attain to a knowledge of God by love, is also liable to a gross abuse, as we see in the same heretics. Who has not heard of the old minstrels, Troubadours, and Trouvères? Their songs, ballads, lays, sirventes, fabliaux, seem to us in these days mere songs in honor of the poet's lady-love; but the love they sang, at least they who sang in Provençal and Italian, is the heretical Love of the Cathares and other sects. The Beatrice of Dante and the Laura of Petrarca only symbolize the Gospel of Love, the Johannine Gospel as distinguished from the Petrine and Pauline Gospels, so boldly proclaimed by Schelling a few years since at Berlin, defended formerly, we are ashamed to say, by us, and still by Chevalier Bunsen, as the basis of the Church of the Future. The doctrine is, that the Church is progressive, at first authoritative with Peter, then intellectual with Paul, and now is to be love with John. In the thirteenth century this doctrine was widely diffused, and was cherished and defended by secret societies all over Europe, especially in Northern Italy and Southern France. The sect held that love alone was required, and that authority and dogmas were not only superfluous, but absolutely repugnant to the spirit of true Christianity. This love, the Platonic love, is the *love* that was sung by the Provençal and Ghibbeline poets, whose real purpose was to corrupt the people, to detach them from the Holy See, and to carry on the wars of the Emperors and secular princes against the Papacy. The

readiness with which Plato's doctrine could thus be turned against Catholicity, as it was by Jews and Greeks, as well as the Patarins, is probably the reason why St. Thomas attached himself so rigidly to the Aristotelian method. It was the only way in his time to escape the abuses of the Platonic method, and to combat with success the heresies which then prevailed.

We avow our preference in many respects for Plato, but we dare not take him for a master. The Fathers to some extent were Platonists, but none of them followed him throughout, and St. Augustine, the greatest of them, always masters him, and never suffers himself to be mastered by him. Such men as St. Augustine are in no danger from Plato, but in the hands of men of more erudition than genius, or more imagination than judgment, Platonism has almost invariably led to heresy, to moral abominations, and armed its followers against the Church of God. We therefore fear that M. Gratry, in following Plato, and giving us theodicy for metaphysics, and love for science, may be opening the way to errors and disorders which no man would deplore more than he. He is a mystic, and writes from the mystical point of view. But though there is a true mysticism, and though the highest and deepest knowledge of God is the mystic, yet the line which separates true from false mysticism is so subtle, that it is easily mistaken, and none but the spiritually enlightened in an extraordinary degree can be sure of not mistaking it. We are afraid, if we give way to the mystical tendency, and undertake to substitute mysticism for scholasticism in popular philosophy and theology, we shall only be making bad worse. While we would by no means exclude or discourage the mystical, while we would study the Blessed Henry Suso, St. Catharine of Genoa, and St. Theresa, we would retain the speculative, and study diligently St. Thomas; we would aim at exact science at the same time that we gave way to the motions of the deepest and most burning love.

These criticisms we have felt it our duty diffidently to offer on M. Gratry's remarkable book, for we look upon its author as one of the few living men of our times, and as one from whom much is to be expected. He is full of life, zeal, and energy; he is learned, pious, and endowed with a philosophical genius of a high order. He writes

with freedom, strength, and eloquence, and wins our heart and kindles our enthusiasm. The defects of his work are comparatively few; its merits are many and great, and to these we shall return in another article, especially to the part of the work that treats of the supernatural, of the higher demands of reason which only the supernatural can satisfy, and of God as the adequate object of the wants of the soul. In the mean time we would direct our readers more particularly to meditation on the adaptedness of our holy religion to the wants deeply felt by all men. The age in which we live is to be pitied rather than declaimed against. It is restless and unhappy. It is seeking rest and finding none. Its heart is loving, but has no object it can love. It is empty and desolate. Its song is the low, melodious wail of sorrow, or the wild lament of despair. Can we not speak to this age a word of hope? Can we not give to these sorrowing souls the object their hearts crave? We have that word of hope. We know what their hearts need, what it is, and where it is to be found. Their sorrow has been ours, their despair we have felt, and in their unrest we have shared. We have found faith, we have found hope, we have found a sweet, ineffable repose. Why can we not aid them?

The Catholic has, and he only has, what this age needs, what especially our own countrymen want. Is there no way in which we can convince them of this? Is there no way in which we can speak to their hearts, and be to them messengers of love, joy, and peace? Alas! we feel at times that we have been too ready to despair of them, and too distrustful of the Divine assistance. We fear that we have suffered our hearts to grow cold towards them, and to forget the good which Almighty God may have in store for them. We have been too easily overcome by difficulties, and have been too loath to make sacrifices to bring souls to God, or rather to persuade them to let God come to them. But it is not too late to redeem the time, and we trust thousands and thousands of young Catholics are growing up among us, who will never be content to let our countrymen perish for the lack of the bread of life.

ART. II. — *The History of Ancient Philosophy*. By DR. HEINRICH RITTER. Translated from the German by ALEXANDER J. W. MORRISON, B. A., Trinity College, Cambridge. Oxford: Talboys. 1838. 4 vols. 8vo.

MUCH of the erudition of German scholars has of late been devoted to the investigation of the history of philosophy. Of all the works which have appeared on this subject, none can compare in both size and learning with that of Dr. Ritter, in twelve volumes, octavo. The works of Brandis, Deutinger, Rixner, Marbach, Zeller, and Schwegler are smaller and inferior in talent. Brucker's large History has the merits of diligent research and extensive learning, and has been of great service to all who have since written histories of philosophical systems, but is wanting in critical judgment. It is an immense mass of individual and isolated facts, collected by a man of erudition, but not a philosopher. Hegel was a philosopher, but his own peculiar ideas run through his whole work, and color and distort the history to such a degree as to render it almost useless to the student of this branch of history. Ritter is the only one who has produced a history of philosophy which unites great learning and clearness of exposition with considerable philosophical judgment and discrimination, and we do not hesitate to award him the first place among the German historians of philosophy.

Mr. Morrison's translation includes only the Ancient Philosophy, which reaches to the close of Neo-Platonism. The other and better half of the work has not been translated. Of the translation we shall say nothing. We cannot praise it, and to blame it were now useless, as the translator before this time must be aware of its demerits. It seems a little strange to see a work in bad English coming from a member of Trinity College, Cambridge; but of all the translations we have ever seen, we remember none which reads so badly in our language, except, perhaps, the Oxford translation of Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.

In the Introduction, the author explains what he considers as strictly belonging to the history of philosophy. He imagines that he is writing a history of a steady progress of philosophical thought. What in earlier times would be

regarded as belonging to this history, as being a problem or new evolution of philosophy, afterwards becomes blended with the general mass of traditionary knowledge, and is no longer an ingredient in the history of philosophy. This tradition has its origin in the first discoveries of philosophy. Regarding all the truths of philosophy, that is to say, all those truths which reason can explain or verify, as discoverable and actually discovered by reason, the history of philosophy is with him a history of the attempts of the human mind to discover these truths. The sum of these truths constitutes the mass of tradition, the vantage-ground, as he calls it, for further improvement. On this principle, the mass of tradition would be so increased by the accumulation of so many ages, that little would remain for philosophy at the present time, and the questions now discussed by philosophers would be far in advance of the earlier problems of philosophy. But the starting-point of philosophers is now what it was in the earliest infancy of science, unless indeed more be now denied, and more consequently is to be proved now than then. The history of philosophy is a history of the failure, rather than of the success, of the human mind in the attainment of truth. The discovery of truth by the unaided natural reason of man is neither a fact nor a possibility. It is not a fact, for if it were, it would be necessary to admit that man, or the human race in the beginning, was without any positive knowledge. Whereas the tendency of the nations from the very earliest times has been to depart from and lose sight of the primitive tradition made by God to man. Neither is it possible for the unaided reason of man to advance its stock of knowledge. Reason has but two modes of operation, — the one intuitive, the other reflective. The intuitive faculty is the same in all men, and can discover to one man no more than it does to another. It does not present the intelligible to the mind under a sensible form. The intelligible perceived in intuition cannot become the object of distinct apprehension, or of reflection, until sensibly represented in language. Words are the sensible signs of intelligible truths, and in the revelation of language is included the revelation of intelligible and necessary truth, which, although intuitively evident to reason, is not distinctly apprehended by it without the sensible sign thus revealed. We do not therefore agree with Dr. Ritter in

his theory of the spider-like evolution of philosophy by the human mind, but hold that the necessary truths which constitute philosophy were originally revealed to man. That they are apprehended by reason, and are intuitively evident to it, we also maintain, and when represented by the sensible sign of language, they are the object of reflection. Hence we admit no progress, in a strict sense of the word, in philosophy. For man originally possessed all the truths of philosophy. That one particular nation, or one particular school, may have made progress, cannot be denied, but this is only a particular progress, and is more properly a returning to the wisdom of those who went before, than an advance towards something new. The human race is continually advancing and receding. There is a progress at one time, and a retrogression at another. One epoch may be regarded as the result of a progress in relation to another, but, if compared with some other still earlier, will be found to be no progress. In Plato and Aristotle we find Greek philosophy far in advance of what it was a century before, but in the later philosophers of Greece we see it decline to the lowest state of its previous existence.

The history of Greek philosophy begins with Thales. He was the first to inquire into the origin of the universe. Greek philosophy first spoke in maxims and gnomes, in fables and dogmatical precepts. Its earliest language was poetry, its character was practical. Of the *seven wise men of Greece*, six acquired that name by mature experience and the practical wisdom resulting from it, by their prudence and skill in the affairs of state. Thales was the first to give it a distinct form, and to detach it from the poetical mythology and dogmatical morality with which it was before him so identified as to lose all claim to the character of philosophy. Thales was of the Phœnician family of the Thelidæ, who deduced their origin from Cadmus and Agenor. Some of the ancient writers call him a Phœnician, but he was born at Miletus on the Menander, at that time the most important city in Ionia. His birth is placed in the first year of the thirty-fifth Olympiad (640 B. C.). It is asserted with much probability that he travelled into Egypt and there learned the mathematical sciences. He is said to have introduced astronomy into Greece, and to have divided the year into

three hundred and sixty-five days. He counselled the Ionians to form a confederacy against the menacing power of Persia, and to make Teos the head of the union. Herodotus says that he accompanied the Lydians in the war against the Medes, and when Cræsus was at a loss to know how to transport his army across the river Halys, in order to penetrate into Persia, Thales relieved his difficulty by saying that he should make the river, which was in front of them, flow behind them. This was done by making a semicircular canal, to turn the river from its former bed and pass in their rear; and thus they found themselves on the opposite side of the river without crossing it. He predicted the eclipse of the sun which occurred during the same war. Foreseeing a great abundance of olives, he bought up all the oil-presses in the country, and by means of his monopoly acquired great wealth; but, as some one has remarked, philosophy does not find the same facilities now-a-days. When contemplating the stars, he fell into a ditch which he had not observed. A Thracian servant who attended him tauntingly told him that he should first observe those things which were before his feet, and afterwards he might aspire to the knowledge of those in the heavens. His death is placed by some in the seventieth, by others in the ninetieth year of his age. While viewing a gymnastic contest, he was overcome by the heat of the place and the infirmities of age. Diogenes Laertius cites Lobon of Argos, who says that Thales left two hundred verses; but these were probably nothing more than certain pithy sayings such as were attributed to all the seven wise men.

The great problem of philosophy with him was to determine the origin and cause of the universe. All things, he argued, are nourished by moisture, and even heat is produced from humidity, and nourished by it. Also the seed of all things is humid, but water is the principle of the humid. Therefore, since all things arise from and are preserved by water, it must be the principle and cause of all things. That water was the cause of all things was a very ancient opinion in Greece. Homer says, *Ὠκεανὸς δῶκερ γένεος πάντων τεύχευται*, and the ancient fable taught that Oceanus and Tethys were the parents of generation. Thales gave the universe a soul or principle of motion, and regarded the whole world as a living being. By the

human soul he understood the principle of motion in man, and in the same sense he is said to have maintained that amber and the magnet have a soul, because they possess a moving force. The universal soul of the world he called divine and eternal, but he did not regard it as a divinity distinct from water, but as an inherent quality of water. The original water, which he regards as the principle and cause of all, is possessed of this divine soul, which is the principle of motion and is identified with it, and it is by this moving force of the water that all things are evolved or generated from it. Such atheistic physiologizing might perhaps be regarded as unworthy of the name of philosophy, and it might be asked what Thales did for science. But there are two things in the philosophy of Thales which are of importance. The first is the doctrine of the unity of the First Cause; and the second is, that, in attempting by argument to establish his position, he cut himself off from the mythological poets, and founded the philosophy of Greece.

Thales was followed by a succession of philosophers in Ionia, who did little more than continue his inquiries into the origin of the universe. The oldest of these was Anaximander, born at Miletus, in the second year of the forty-third Olympiad (607 B. C.). He was the friend or disciple of Thales, who was thirty years his senior. To Anaximander is commonly ascribed the invention of the sun-dial, though Pliny says it was discovered by Anaximenes, and Herodotus says it was brought into Greece from Babylon. He wrote his philosophy in verse, and although it was soon afterwards lost, it may very probably have been seen by the earlier writers. Anaximander is said to have been the first to use the Greek word ἀρχή to designate the principle or origin of things. This he placed in the infinite. By the infinite he understood a mixture (μίγμα) of all the elementary parts. He calls the infinite divine, eternal, and imperishable, and endows it with a necessary and inherent motion, whereby the elements of the infinite separate themselves from one another. The infinite with Anaximander is a unity, but contains the multiplicity of elements out of which things are composed by separation and combination. On the decomposition of the infinite, the cold and earthy were separated from the warm. The former constitute the earth, the latter the heavenly bodies, which

he regarded as balls of fire surrounded by air, and emitting light through apertures, so that, when the aperture of the sun is shut up, its light is no longer visible, thus causing an eclipse. The primal mixture of the cold and watery was to a certain degree dried up by the constantly increasing heat of the sun, thus forming our globe in its present condition. The first animals issued from the moisture which was dried up by the sun, and came forth covered with a prickly rind or shell, which they afterwards burst and appeared on the dry ground. The first birth of animals was very imperfect, but as the earth grew dryer by the action of the sun it became capable of producing more perfect animals. Man was the last of these productions, and being in need of great assistance in his infancy he was first formed in a fish-shape, and after he became able to assist himself he was thrown upon the land and took his present form. The effect of the sun's heat upon the earth is to dry up the cold elements of which it is formed, leaving only the warm. Therefore he said that the earth will be destroyed by fire, and again return into the infinite, to be again separated and evolved into combinations similar to the present. He said the stars were gods, and were produced from the infinite and returned to it, and were absorbed in it at long intervals. In this doctrine of Anaximander we find the old fable that all things in the beginning were chaos, an opinion which seems to pervade almost all the older philosophy of Greece. Admitting no divinity, for the stars, which he called gods, were the production of the infinite, he attributed a self-moving force to the infinite, by which are produced the many changes which it continually undergoes. This was the prevailing doctrine of atheists, and hence Aristotle, to prove God, refutes this argument; and by showing that whatever is moved is moved by another, he deduces the necessity of a first Mover, unmoved, which is God.

Anaximenes, the third in order of the Ionian philosophers, is generally regarded as the disciple of Anaximander. Dr. Ritter brings two objections to this. He thinks he discovers a greater resemblance to Thales in the doctrine of Anaximenes than in that of Anaximander. To this we attach but little importance, for the scholar does not necessarily follow the precepts of the master, and, moreover, the doctrine of Anaximander is not so different from that of

Thales and Anaximenes as to warrant the denial that he may have been the pupil of the one, and the teacher of the other. The other argument, which he deduces from chronology, is not more conclusive.

"The usual chronology," he says, "does not in any wise consist with the supposition that Anaximenes was the disciple of Anaximander; for although widely different dates are assigned for the birth of Anaximenes, the more credible account of Apollodorus places the event in Olympiad 63, whereas Anaximander died shortly after the fifty-eighth Olympiad." The account of Apollodorus, which he calls "the more credible account," says that Anaximenes was born in the sixty-third Olympiad, and died at the time of the taking of Sardis. Sardis was captured by Cyrus, 548 B. C., and the sixty-third Olympiad began 528 B. C., which would place the death of Anaximenes twenty years earlier than his birth. Such a contradictory statement can hardly be called "the more credible account." Ritter remarks, that "the statement in this tradition, that he died at the time of the capture of Sardis, originated apparently from some inadvertence." It is equally possible that the other part of the statement, that he was born in the sixty-third Olympiad, may have "originated from some inadvertence," and we reject the whole statement, as being both contradictory to itself and to the other writers. Origen* says he flourished in the first year of the fifty-eighth Olympiad (548 B. C.). Suidas says he was born in the fifty-fifth Olympiad (560 B. C.), which would make him forty-seven years younger than Anaximander. Besides other authorities, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, Eusebius, Clemens Alexandrinus, and Cicero, all call him the disciple of Anaximander.

Anaximenes taught that infinite air is the principle of all things. The air is infinite, but the objects which are produced from it are finite. The gods and the human soul are the purest productions of air, and approach nearest to the nature of the infinite air. He differed from Anaximander in determining the nature of the infinite, which the latter considered as a mixture of all the elements. Like him, he makes motion an inherent quality in the primary substance. When rarefied, the air becomes fire; when condensed, water; water condensed becomes earth

* *Philosophoumena*, c. 7.

and stones. His physical doctrine or explanation of the natural phenomena is exceedingly rude and simple, though quite in accordance with his theory. Thus, he said, earthquakes are produced either by too great dryness or too great moisture in the earth, caused by excess of heat or rain. Anaximenes left two disciples, according to the general opinion, Anaxagoras and Diogenes.

Anaxagoras was born at Clazomenæ, in Ionia, in the first year of the seventieth Olympiad (500 B. C.), according to Apollodorus, and died in the eighty-eighth (428 B. C.). He inherited an easy competency, which he renounced in order to apply himself wholly to the study of nature. He visited Athens at the age of twenty years, but seems to have returned to Ionia, and there taught philosophy for some time after the death of Anaximenes. He afterwards established himself at Athens, where many distinguished men are said to have been his disciples. Among these are mentioned Archelaus, Socrates, Empedocles, Democritus, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Thucydides, Pericles, Themistocles, Euripides, and Æsop the tragedian. That he taught philosophy publicly, at Athens, is contrary to the assertion of Diogenes Laertius, who says that Archelaus, his disciple, was the first to bring the natural or physical philosophy of Ionia to Athens. In his old age, Anaxagoras was accused of impiety towards the gods, and exiled from Athens. He then retired to Lampsacus, where he soon afterwards died. His memory was held in great veneration in that city, and, in accordance with a request which he made the magistrates before dying, the anniversary of his death was granted as a holiday, and was still kept in the time of Diogenes Laertius. The doctrine of Anaxagoras is that all things are formed of infinitely small particles, infinite in number. Nothing begins or ceases to be, for all generation is a mixing together or aggregation, and all corruption is a separation of the original particles. These particles are called *ὁμοιομερῆ* or *ὁμοιομέρεαι*, or similarly disposed parts; but whether Anaxagoras used this term may be doubted. Ritter thinks Aristotle was the first to use it. This whole mass of commingled and disorderly elements or particles was brought into order and formed into the world by the action of intelligence. He rejected chance, and fate he declared to be only an empty name. He seems to have regarded in-

telligence as wholly distinct from matter and opposed to it. "Intelligence," he says, "is infinite; it rules by itself, and is mixed up with nothing, but is alone, in and by itself; for if it were not by itself, but mixed up with something else, it would have a part of all things, if mixed with any. For in all there is a part of all, as we have said." Our souls are participations of the infinite intelligence which pervades all, and animates and informs the material world. The peculiar operation of intelligence is in the arranging and disposing of the elementary particles. It differs from the motive force of Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes in its nature, but not in its effects. The latter is a quality or attribute of the material element, whereas the former is a distinct and immaterial substance, although the nature and power of this immaterial principle were not fully understood by Anaxagoras, and were developed only by later philosophers. Still, in asserting the immaterial, he merited well of philosophy, and stands considerably in advance of his Ionian predecessors.

Diogenes, the other disciple of Anaximenes, was born at Apollonia in Crete. He is said to have succeeded Anaxagoras in the chair of philosophy at Miletus, and to have visited Athens, where Demetrius Phalereus says he excited such envy as to be in danger of his life. He wrote a work on nature, of which some fragments have been preserved by Simplicius and others. He followed Anaximenes in making air the principle of whatever exists. Air is with Diogenes an eternal and immortal body, and is possessed of rational intelligence; and here he gives it greater perfection than was accorded by Anaximenes. The latter admitted life and motion in air, but did not consider intelligence as its essential property. With Diogenes the main idea is that of intelligence. He considers the universe as arranged in the most perfect harmony and order, and from this infers the necessity of intelligence. The human soul is of this nature, and is a participation of the original infinite air.

The Ionian school came to a close in Archelaus, a disciple of Anaxagoras, and according to the most probable authorities an Athenian. He is said to have taught philosophy at Athens, and to have been the master of Socrates. He endeavored to unite the infinite air which Anaximenes and Diogenes made the principle of all things with the intelligence and *homœomeriæ* of Anaxagoras, and to have

regarded this intelligence as material, and of the nature of air. His doctrine of ethics was, that right and wrong are not so by nature, but by law, or, as Ritter understands *νόμος*, by the distribution and arrangement of the elements.

Heraclitus the Ephesian is usually classed among the Ionian philosophers, chiefly because he can be ranked with no other school. He flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad (500 B. C.). He was of a gloomy and melancholy disposition, treating with contempt the opinions of all the rest of the world, and therefore the more attached to his own. He has been justly surnamed *the obscure*, and compares himself to the Sibyl, who, he says, "speaking with inspired mouth, smileless, inornate, and unperfumed, pierces through centuries, by the power of the god." Like his predecessors of the Ionian school, Heraclitus busied himself with the attempt to discover the elementary principle of things, and his conclusion was, that "no one of the gods or men made this world, but it was, is, and always will be an ever-living fire." The harmony of the world proceeds from conflicting impulses, as that of the lyre, or the bow, and the strife between opposite tendencies is the cause, the *parent*, of all things. Everything is composed of contrary and opposing elements; the same thing is both good and evil, young and old, though not at the same time, or under the same aspect. He dwells much on the continual change which is found in everything. We cannot go twice to the same river, for different waters are constantly flowing down, and we ourselves are not the same, but are subject to a continual change. Men are mortal gods, and gods immortal men: the death of one is the life of the other. This, taken in connection with another expression of Heraclitus, that death is in our life, and life in our death, shows that what he calls gods are men rendered immortal by death. He adduced no arguments to prove his assertion that fire was the principle of all phenomena, and there is so much that is dark and figurative in the expressions of this philosopher, that many have thought that by fire he did not mean the element which we call fire, but that he used the word in a figurative sense, to express the one living essence, absolute life and motion. He endowed fire with reason, and maintained that man is naturally irrational, and becomes rational only through the fire which embraces all. The delusion, that he has a rea-

son of his own, arises from ignorance, and although reason is universal, the majority live as though they had an intelligence of their own. Wherefore the criterion of truth with him is the universal and divine reason. That which appears the same to all is to be believed, for it rests on the authority of the universal reason; but the particular opinion of any one person is not to be trusted for the opposite reason. The universal Heraclitus considers as the true, the divine; and the soul inhaling the breath of life, which is the fire that pervades all, receives the universal life within itself.

The idea of the unity and divinity of all is a characteristic feature of the Ionian philosophy. Here atheism and pantheism seem to meet and combine in almost equal parts. In one the atheistic element slightly predominates, in another it is the pantheistic which is the more apparent, but both are everywhere discoverable in their philosophy. We find in none of them an individual and determinate divinity, but they all hold to a universal soul animating and informing all nature. Starting from the sensible phenomena it was impossible to get to the purely intelligible. There is no logical process by which they could pass from the creature to the Creator. But however little importance we may attach to their physiological investigations, we must remember that they began the philosophic movement of Greece, and opened the way for others. Their doctrines hardly deserve the name of philosophy. Endeavoring to explain the growth or development of the world from the original, eternal matter, one thought it proceeded from water, another from air, a third from fire, and a fourth, rejecting all these, maintained that it proceeded from a mixture of all the elements. Their philosophical investigations were nothing more than a physiological inquiry into the method of the production of the universe, very much like the learned researches of modern physicists, who endeavor to explain the formation of the world out of the gases. But in their rude and half-formed doctrines we behold the dawn of philosophy upon Greece. Slowly breaking forth from the dark night of poetical idolatry and mythical superstition, the spirit of inquiry spread over Greece, and prepared the way for a brighter age. As a modern writer well observes, "Without the errors of Thales, Socrates might have spent his life in spoiling mar-

ble, Plato might have been only a second-rate poet, and Aristotle an intriguing pedagogue."

About the same time with the Ionian school flourished the Pythagoreans. Their founder, Pythagoras, was a contemporary of the earlier Ionians. He was born at Samos in the forty-ninth Olympiad (584 B. C.). The fabulous legends of which he is the subject are nearly as ancient as history itself.

"All the fables and anecdotes recited," says Dr. Ritter, "reveal to us the saint,—the worker of miracles,—the teacher of a divine wisdom; his very birth is marvellous and wonderful; some accounts making him the son of Apollo, others of Hermes. Wherever he appeared, a divine halo shone around him; he is said to have exhibited a golden thigh; Abaxes the Scythian came to him flying on a golden arrow; he was seen at different places at the same time; wild beasts were obedient to his call; the river-god held converse with him; he received from Hermes the gift of the recollection of his previous existence, and the power to awaken the same remembrance in others; he heard the harmony of the spheres; and his sayings passed for unerring wisdom. Who now will wonder that he received from the Crotoniats the title of Hyperborean Apollo?"—Vol. I. p. 330.

Almost all authorities agree that Pythagoras travelled into Egypt, but it is less certain that he visited the Magi of Persia and Chaldæa, or the Gymnosophists of India. Dr. Ritter attaches very little importance to his foreign travels, and thinks he learned very little from the Egyptians. Although Pythagoras may not have been initiated into all the secret lore of the priests of Egypt, there is much in his doctrine that he must have brought from that country, and also much that would confirm the assertion that he visited India. The resemblance between the Pythagorean and Egyptian symbols is far from inconsiderable. The funeral customs were the same, and both the Egyptians and Pythagoreans abstained from particular sorts of food. The doctrine of metempsychosis or transmigration of souls was taught by the Egyptians. On his return from Egypt, Pythagoras opened a school at Samos and taught his doctrines in a symbolic form. He is said to have received his moral maxims, which he called *divine precepts*, from Empedoclea, the priestess of Delos, and to have visited Crete, where he was admitted into all the mystical secrets of the caverns of Ida. From Crete he went to Sparta, to Elis, and to Phlius. At this latter

place he was asked by King Leon what was his profession, and, disclaiming the title of σοφός, or wise man, which was borne by those before him who gave themselves up to the study of wisdom, he called himself φιλόσοφος; a lover or seeker of wisdom, which was afterwards used by all who cultivated wisdom. From Samos he migrated to Croton, in Magna Græcia, about 540 B. C. Here he assembled a large number of disciples, on whom he enjoined a particular mode of life. Dr. Ritter tells us:—

“The association founded by Pythagoras appears to have been a secret society: several traditions refer to this, the greater part of which were, however, in later times, exaggerated into the improbable, if not the impossible. The complete initiation in the orgies, as in all similar institutions, was preceded by certain courses of probation and minor inductions. A peculiar practice is imputed to Pythagoras; that he first of all examined the physiognomy of the candidates for initiation; he then habituated them, during the period of probation, to a long silence (ἐχεμύθια). The periods of the several initiations are given differently, and indeed in such matters we must not expect to be able to speak with positive certainty. It is probable, however, and indeed consistent with the general constitution of such associations, that the Pythagoreans were divided, according to the grade of initiation, into different classes, the denominations of which we are utterly ignorant of, except the very general classification into *Exoterici* and *Esoterici*. In such holy fraternities it is not surprising that much should have been supported by an appeal to the respect entertained by the associates for the original founder; and this, in all probability, is the explication of the far-famed αἰὲρς ἔφα of the Pythagoreans. There is, moreover, nothing remarkable in the admission of women to the mysteries,—those much-famed female Pythagoreans. The institution was maintained by its members living in common, by common customs, by bodily and mental exercises; there were certain precepts for the direction of the associates delivered, partly in symbolical aphorisms, the import of which may indeed be guessed at, but cannot be accurately given; partly in plain and clearly expressed rules of conduct, some of which, it is not unlikely, have come down to us in the so-called golden verses of Pythagoras. To the community of living practised by the Pythagoreans belonged the common meals (συσσιτία), for which particular sorts of food appear to have been enjoined by their first founder; though, indeed, the statements on this point are far from unanimous. Lastly, they had also certain peculiar ordinances to be observed in the burial of adepts. The asserted community of property looks like an exaggeration of later days; for it is contra-

dictory of many anecdotes of the private wealth of individual members, which are more probable than the general accounts." — Vol. I. pp. 339 – 341.

The doctrines of the Pythagoreans were introduced into Greece Proper by the dispersion of the society, which is thus related by Ritter.

"The Pythagoreans, we are told, (for the truth of all particulars we cannot pretend to vouch,) had acquired considerable influence in the politics of Croton, and given to its constitution an almost perfect form of aristocracy. Their influence is also represented as extending to Metapontum, Locri, Sybaris, and Tarentum, and as especially inimical to all tyrannical governments. About this time one Tetya had established himself in the tyranny of Sybaris, and the unfriendly nobles had fled to Croton. The refusal of the Crotonians, at the instance of the Pythagoreans, to deliver up the fugitives when demanded by Tetya, occasioned a war between these two neighboring states; the Crotonians, under the command of the Pythagorean Milo defeated the once powerful but effeminated Sybarites, and destroyed their city. Their success, however, entailed the ruin of the Pythagoreans. In the division of the spoil a dispute arose from among the popular party, led on by Cylon, who had, it is said, on account of the impurity of his morals, been refused admission into Pythagorean society. The discontented attacked the Pythagoreans, who were assembled in the house of Milo, where the greater number were slain. Pythagoras himself is represented as having escaped the danger, and fled into other cities of Lower Italy; but as the persecution of the Pythagoreans rapidly extended thither also, he met his death, according to the story, at Metapontum, B. C. 358.* After his decease, his memory was held in the greatest respect by the Italian Greeks; and even in the time of Cicero, the spot was pointed out where he was said to have perished.

"This persecution of the Pythagoreans was followed by a great political movement throughout all the Italian states. Everywhere the Pythagorean houses of assembly were burnt to the ground, and the leading citizens banished; until at last the friendly intervention of the Achæans effected a reconciliation of parties, and an Achæan constitution, i. e. a democracy, was introduced. In all likelihood, this persecution of the Pythagoreans and their political principles was the cause and occasion of the appearance of so many philosophers of this sect in Greece Proper. Some, however, remained in Italy, and there enjoyed for the most part high political consideration." — Vol. I. pp. 344 – 346.

* This date is incorrect. The attack on the Pythagoreans by Cylon was 504, B. C.

The teachings of Pythagoras were preserved and continued through the sect of the Pythagoreans, without any remarkable change, for a long time, and we learn what these were from the writings of his followers. The first who gave a written expression to their doctrines is said to have been Philolaus, fragments of whom have come down to us, and have been collected and proved genuine by Böckh, in a small book published at Berlin in 1819. Philolaus lived at Thebes, and was the teacher of Cebes and Simmias, who afterwards left him and went to Socrates. Lysis of Tarentum, another of the most distinguished of the sect of Pythagoras, lived also at Thebes, and was the instructor of Epaminondas. Clinias, also of Tarentum, lived at Heraclea, but neither he nor Lysis appears to have written anything. Archytas, born at Tarentum about 440 B. C., was a distinguished general as well as philosopher. He was never defeated in battle, and enjoyed the confidence of his fellow-townsmen, and was celebrated for his moral virtues. He was also skilled in mathematics, in music, and wrote several works; but whatever we possess that is attributed to him is generally considered spurious, as are also those attributed to Timæus, Eurytus, and Ocellus Lucanus. Of the Pythagoreans prior to the time of Socrates we have no historical information, and have no knowledge of any work earlier than Philolaus. It is very uncertain how much of the Pythagorean doctrine was taught by the founder of the school, and how much belongs to his successors. Ancient writers more frequently speak of the doctrine of the school in general, than of Pythagoras, and we are obliged to consider the doctrines of the whole sect very much in the same manner that we would those of a single individual. The writers subsequent to Aristotle, often confound the later doctrines which succeeded those of the ancient Pythagoreans with those which were old and genuine, whereas they were wholly distinct, and had nothing in common but the name.

The first thing to be considered in the Pythagorean philosophy is the formula, "Number is the essence and first principle of all things." All realities are numbers, and are evolved from one, the monad, or unity, which contains the essence of all numbers. This *one* is used by the Pythagoreans in two distinct senses. In one sense it is the essence of number, sometimes called by them the even-

odd, as being both even and odd, or more properly, as containing in itself the essence of oddness and of evenness; of oddness, inasmuch as, added to the even, it makes the even odd; and of evenness, because, added to the odd, it makes it even. In the other sense in which they use it, it is the first number, unity; as such it is odd, and stands opposed to the first even number, two, the dyad. The one, the even-odd, contains in itself perfection and imperfection and all contrary and opposing qualities. Among the primary principles contained in the one, Aristotle enumerates the finite or limited, and the infinite or unlimited; the odd and the even, the one and the many; the right and the left; the male and the female; the quiescent and the moving; the right line and the curve; light and darkness; good and evil; the square and the oblong. These principles are ten, or the sum of the first four numbered, the tetractys. Philolaus begins the exposition of his doctrine by attempting to show that all things are formed of the limited and the unlimited. Whatever can be known must be limited, must have a beginning, a middle, and an end. The beginning and the end are the limiting or the limits, the middle is unlimited. In corporeal things the limits are spacial points, units or monads. These monads, or numerical units, are not bodies, but are incorporeal and strictly mathematical points. By means of the unlimited or the interval, these points form lines, the lines surfaces, and the surfaces solids or bodies. The interval or unlimited, is negative, a void or vacuum which, as Aristotle says, "separates the numbers, and determines their nature and the place of things." The limiting and the unlimited, and all the other primary principles of things, are in the one, and are everywhere pervaded by it, being evolved from the one and again returning to the one. The evolution of the world is caused by the contrary and opposing principles in the one; the monad or odd, which is perfect and positive, and the dyad or even, which is imperfect and negative. Hence number is the essence of things. All reality is number, but exists only in so far as united with the void and unlimited.

That by the One the Pythagoreans understood God, is evident from many of their expressions; and when stripped of the symbolical terms, there will be found two elements in their doctrine of the origin of things. The one is the

Indian doctrine of emanation ; the other is peculiar to their school, and consists in regarding number as the essence and reality of all things. The resemblance to Indian pantheism in the doctrine that all things are evolved from the original one, is seen on a very slight comparison of the two systems. The philosophers of India place the germ of the multiple in the first being, as Pythagoras includes the dyad in the monad, which is at the same time odd and even, unity and number, the one and the many. The first being is one, eternal, and most simple ; and when the Pythagoreans attribute to him contradictory qualities which mutually destroy one another, they start with an impossible being, a being which is, and yet is not. Without doubt they sought to avoid Oriental dualism by placing the opposing principles in the same being ; but they thereby destroyed all being, and made the very ground-work and starting-point of their philosophy an error. The other point, which is the peculiar feature of the Pythagorean philosophy, and which has been thought by many to be a consequence of their mathematical and musical studies, is the introduction of number into their system as the essence and reality. It is very possible that, from their mathematical studies, they came to attach greater importance to the consideration of the one in its opposition to the multiple. From this they proceeded to the position, that whatever is or exists must in some manner be contained in the first cause ; and, regarding God as the one, they concluded that the realities of things which are contained in the first cause, in the one, must be numbers, and that they are contained in God, in the manner in which numbers are contained in the one or the unit from which they are evolved. Some similarity to the opinion that all things are numbers may perhaps be discovered in the ancient belief in incantations and invocations, which supposed that things bore a necessary relation to words or numbers. The numbers of Pythagoras appear to have played the same part in his system as ideas in that of Plato, though more clearly understood and more fully and philosophically developed by Plato than by the Pythagoreans.

Pythagoras held the soul to be incorporeal and immortal. But not admitting that it could exist otherwise than joined to and inclosed in a body, he taught the migration

of the soul from one body to another. The body with which the soul is clothed in this life is called earthly or terrestrial, from the predominant element; but if it be so purified from the grosser elements that the predominant substance will be air, then we shall have an airy or pneumatic body, which they call also a luciform body. They regarded the soul as an evolution or procession from the universal soul, which, before entering its terrestrial body, possesses a subtile, airy body, of the same nature of the bodies of demons. The soul may be separated from the earthly body, or pass from one body to another, but can never be free from all body. For the soul is the harmony of the body, and for its activity is dependent on the bodily organs. The opinion that the soul is inseparable from a body is a most ancient opinion, and in later times has been held by many Fathers of the Church. Origen* says that after death the soul subsists in what is called a luciform body; and that it was the opinion of the Jews that souls after death had certain bodies united to them. Tertullian† and St. Irenæus‡ also seem to hold the same doctrine. St. Paul, in speaking of the body in its future state after the resurrection, uses the same expressions as many of the Pythagoreans in treating of the body with which the soul is clothed after death. And as the doctrine of the resurrection of the body was known to the Jews, it is very possible that the Pythagoreans were not ignorant of it, and may have adopted a part of the doctrine into their philosophy.

The soul was divided by the Pythagoreans into the rational and irrational parts. The rational is peculiar to man, the irrational is possessed also by the brutes. Another division attributed to them is into reason (*φρένες*), intelligence (*νοῦς*), and desire (*θυμὸς*). Closely connected with the division of the soul into the rational and irrational parts is their doctrine of morals. They taught that virtue was a harmony which they regarded as the agreement of the rational and the irrational in life. Justice they defined to be a similarly similar number, by which we are told they meant to convey the maxim that every one should receive his deserts. They insist upon moderation in the

* *Adv. Celsum*, Lib. II. p. 97.

† *De An.*, Cap. VII. p. 165.

‡ Lib. II. cap. xxxiv. p. 168.

desires and the passions, and the endurance of hunger and thirst, and every kind of hardship; so that it was a precept with them, that the sufferer should not lessen, but rather add to, his burden. Their command over anger is justly celebrated, and an example of their observance of faith and friendship is shown in the well-known story of Damon and Pythias, who are numbered among the Pythagoreans.

Perhaps not the least merit of Pythagoras and his school is in the method of their philosophy. The Ionian school followed the inductive method. Pythagoras, on the contrary, held to the deductive. The Ionian philosophers observed the cause of life or motion in particular cases, and by induction concluded that the same was the cause of life to the whole. They were led to this by their attempts to explain the phenomena of the universe. Induction is only allowable in physical science, but not always even there may it be used. The science of the Ionians was purely physical, and they followed the rules of induction, and yet did not reach the truth. The Pythagoreans, on the contrary, adhering to the deductive process, sought to deduce their metaphysics from the principle, "Number is the essence and reality of all things." Admitting the truth of this principle, we must admit all that can be logically deduced from it. But this formula, taken in its literal meaning, is not true, though the method is the correct one. Intellectual intuition furnishes the mind with the necessary truths. These are the premises and the data of philosophy. Whatever may be deduced from them is true, for it is contained in them. It is a conclusion from the universal to the particular, and the truth of this conclusion is evident to reason. If, however, instead of taking our premises from reason, we endeavor to obtain them from observation and induction, we reverse the order of reason, and arrive at no certain conclusion. The inductive method is so much followed in our own days, that a few remarks on this subject may not be misapplied here. Though old as the oldest philosophy of Greece, we are nevertheless told that it is an invention of modern times, and constitutes the great superiority of modern science over that of the ancients. By it we are to get our premises, we are to discover universal principles. But if these are furnished by induction they are conclusions and not premises. Every induction must be an induction from something, it must have a *ter-*

minus a quo which is prior to the principles which are induced. Consequently, the first principles with which the inductive philosopher starts, and from which he reasons, are first principles *ex hypothesi*, and are not first principles because there is something prior to them. Aristotle stigmatized induction as an imperfect syllogism, and says that it produces certainty only when the enumeration is complete. But this is never complete, and consequently the conclusion is never certain. There is more in the conclusion than in the premises, and this vitiates not only the syllogism, but every other process of reasoning. One of the conditions of induction is that the *genus* or kind should be known previous to the induction. This cannot be discovered by observation and experiment, for observation and experiment can only be made upon physical beings, or beings actually existing, whereas the kind or *genus* is neither a being actually existing, nor is it a quality of an actually existent being. Inductive philosophers here fall into a vicious circle, making the kind to be established by induction, and yet preceding induction as a necessary condition, which if not previously known, all induction is impossible. Nor would they help themselves by saying that it is obtained by reasoning, for then reasoning would be prior to induction, from which it takes its premises. As a process of reasoning induction does not give certainty, and on this ground, were all other reasons wanting, it should be rejected from philosophical science, which deals with certainty, not with opinions. It may lead the naturalist to new truths, provoke suspicions whereby he is influenced to make new observations, but it has no office in philosophy. The mind does not take its principles from induction, but, as we insist and repeat, "in season and out of season," the first principles of reason are intuitively evident. Furnished to the mind by intuition, these truths are the matter of reflection. The mind may analyze them and dissect them, may turn them over and regard them under various aspects, and may deduce from them what is contained in them, but it cannot get from them what is not in them. Whatever principles the mind receives from another source are either intuitively evident, or are accepted on the authority of the teacher. None are obtained by a process of reasoning. Philosophy taken in its strictest sense is the science of reason, and under this view is not

distinguishable from logic. Its object is necessary truth, and the method of reasoning from this truth. But philosophy has always been joined with other sciences, most frequently with mythology and theology. It is not sufficient of itself to lead man to a complete knowledge of even natural truth. It requires the aid of revelation to be a full and complete guide to man, and has always been more or less closely connected with it; and where revelation has been corrupted and to a great extent lost sight of, as was the case with the Gentile world generally before the coming of Christ, philosophy is insufficient to lead men to the truth, but, taking its doctrines from adulterated revelation, it is wholly employed in confirming an erroneous tradition, or in deducing from it new errors. This was the case in ancient Greece, where the traditions of the original revelation had become so corrupted that it is difficult to trace in its teachings the original dogma from which they were corrupted. For many of the errors of these philosophers were travesties of some great truth which had been revealed to man in the beginning, but by the lapse of time, the small number of learned men, and the absence of ancient writings, became transformed into a new expression, little resembling its original meaning. It is not to be wondered at that men living in the midst of Pagan nations, themselves Pagans like those around them, should fail in their attempt to seize the truth in all its plenitude. They erred, as it was but natural they should. But their errors may be of service to us if we but distinguish in them the true from the false, holding to the true but rejecting the false. The history of their errors would be to us as the chart to the sailor in an unknown sea, pointing out the rocks and shoals on which he may strike if not warned. The history of philosophy, regarded in this light, is not a barren study, but is as useful as any other branch of this science. If histories of philosophy were written by men who have correct views, and who would labor to point out what is good and separate it from what is bad in the system of each philosopher, such books placed in the hands of youth would do more towards the reforming of philosophy than the countless volumes on abstract theories, written in scarcely intelligible German or inaccurate and unphilosophic French, with which our libraries are filled.

ART. III. — *Gesammelte Schriften*. Von J. V. RADOWITZ
Berlin : Georg Reimer. 1853. 5 Bde. 16mo.

IN the last number of this Review we offered some remarks upon a work by Radowitz concerning Church and State. For the purpose of rendering our readers still more familiar with the writings of this author, we now turn to his collected works, published under his supervision a short time before his death. The last two volumes, which contain short fragments, particularly engage our attention at present. He here treats almost every subject of interest, or offers a few remarks as he proceeds on all the matters agitated for many years past. They are collected together in the order in which they were written, and therefore with little or no connection of subject, except that the fragments of the first volume are classed under the head of doctrines of politics and right, and those of the second are divided into religious or philosophic and literary or artistic. We propose to translate here some of the fragments of the first volume, which contain the political doctrines or opinions of Radowitz.

Though we rarely disagree with the views of this distinguished author, we sometimes dislike his expressions. And yet even when this is the case, we can hardly find fault with the man. Firmly attached to his faith as a Catholic, he wished to be as gentle towards those who differed with him as he could consistently, and although he is not afraid to avow boldly his convictions, he is unwilling to wound unnecessarily the feelings of others. This is a laudable feeling, and we honor it. The expressions of such a writer should be taken in their strictest sense, while most readers would construe what he says in the most broad and liberal, and might interpret him as asserting or admitting what he would reject and deny. In reading his works, we often experience an unpleasant apprehension that we shall stumble upon an erroneous expression or false proposition, which, although quickly dispelled, destroys much of the enjoyment we should otherwise find in the perusal of his works. This objection, however, applies less to the present volume of his works than to any of the others.

The first of these fragments which we wish to lay before our readers is on the most general "View of Politics."

" All must return at last to this great question : Does the individual personality end with this life, or does it not ? If the first is true, this life is its own end ; if the second is admitted, this life is only a passage to, and preparation for, that which is to follow.

" Whoever asserts the former must suppose that the human mind is of itself capable and sufficient to know the full truth as regards that end and its destiny. He stands upon the autonomy of reason. The destiny of this present existence can then be no other than the happiness, the well-being, of all men. The realization of this end is subject to a twofold natural limitation ; first, as regards the amount of happiness, and second, as regards its participation by all. A more exact enunciation would therefore be : The greatest possible good for the greatest possible number. These limitations must, however, be only such as proceed from the nature of this life, and are unchangeable. Besides the natural limitations, let there be no other proceeding from any human regulations, and no hindrance coming from the order of the State or of religion. As man himself is composed of two parts, soul and body, so also his happiness is twofold ; spiritual and corporeal. His happiness under the first aspect is exhibited in self-direction, freedom ; his corporeal happiness consists in physical well-being. A political order of things aiming at the first only would be abstract democracy. A political order regarding only the second would run into a centralized despotism, for only in such an order is there complete unity of action. Both together constitute the problem which socialism strives to solve. Let society have absolute possession and unlimited power, but let its will proceed from the will of all. Identify freedom and constraint, state and religion, right and law, faith and morals.

" All other political forms are then merely intermediate degrees, and approach nearest to one or the other of these terms. They obtain rule through accidental facts and temporary opinions ; they have logic against them, and for them they have the antipathy to the naked truth and the anticipated impossibility of calling into life the consequences of the system.

" But if, on the contrary, this life is not sufficient for itself, but is a passage to another, the human mind does not possess in itself absolute truth, since it is organized only for this life. Therefore we must distinguish between the truth and the consequent necessity of revelation. The end of this earthly existence can therefore only be to live for the revealed order ; or, as we may also express it, rightly to understand the contents of the Christian revelation in relation to the political order. The highest disclosure of revelation is that the destiny of man is to become happy, and that this life has no other object than to serve as the means to this end. Further examination shows that this means appears in a different form for the life of every individual, and there-

fore it is the way assigned for each particular person. The rich and the poor, the high and the low, the healthy and the sick, the ingenious and the simple, the fair and the ugly, must each receive in this their special property the same proportion of means for arriving at the same goal of their earthly life. Even in a merely human consideration we find these conditions of life well balanced. Each has its advantages and its disadvantages for procuring the happiness of the soul; each has its aids and its temptations, and in the position of the person towards these aids and these temptations consists freedom of choice, on the use of which it depends whether he arrives at the goal of his earthly life, which is happiness, or not.

“Regarded from this point of view, the general, political aspect is changed. The State, the form of the collective body, has nothing to do with procuring the earthly well-being of the individual. This, which is only one of the forms of individual life, and as such is no more regarded than any other, is given to one and withheld from another, according to the plan and the will of God, which is manifested in the whole course of the destiny of man from his birth to his death. The duty of authority is only to provide that this natural development, which appears in the condition of each individual, shall never be disturbed by the violence either of the subjects of the same state or of a foreign enemy. It should protect lawful freedom and maintain internal and external peace.

“This thought is the basis of a system in which only one side of human life is referred to the State; the other is referred to the Church.

“An inquiry is here raised in which we must not fear to go back to the ultimate principles. I ask what would be the form of the mutual relations of man, if he had remained in the condition in which he first issued from the hands of his Creator? As long as man remained in full intercourse with the Lord, he was perfectly free and perfectly unfree. In this state there could be no talk of *mine* and *thine*; for the separation of man from his neighbor is the first consequence of his separation from God, and the first product of egoism. Right or property of any kind cannot be thought of under that supposition. The dominion over nature, which was bestowed on the human race by its Author, would have remained common to all, since every motive was wanting for regarding one's neighbor otherwise than one's self. This opposition began with the Fall, in the flesh. Man thereby cast himself off from the society of God, and placed himself under his own direction. He now has property, but, since every one else can and will have property also, the conflict of interest begins and the need of peace. This peace is granted the sinful and self-seeking race by the command which the Lord has at different times given to all nations: *Thou*

shalt leave to every one his own. From this command proceeds all private right, originally as an immediate divine direction, as in the Mosaic legislation and in the oldest traditions of law in every nation. Here also is the revelation from Sinai the most complete, for it not only forbids to take away or steal the goods of another, but it also prohibits the desire of them. This is the divine side of right, laid down for nations in revelation, for the individual in his conscience, independent and out of the reach of every human will. Immediately connected with this is the historical side of right. What is particularly to be regarded as belonging to any one as his justly acquired property, can be decided only by the conviction living in the lawful consciousness of a particular time and of a particular people. Historical right is no more than divine right a creation of human arbitrariness, but may in some sense be called a product of nature. It proceeds from the collected development of the social life and state of cultivation of a nation, and appears in its practice and in the laws which, as to their true nature, are nothing more than the written expression of the common feeling already living in their habits and wants. The right position of a nation, therefore, rests upon the sanctification of the divine command, and the veneration for its representation in history. For the maintenance of this position, for the preservation of internal and external peace, the state is instituted among men by God, as a defence for the weak and a restraining power for oppressors. This is the high and distinct duty of authority; where it is fulfilled, the country is free, for he only is free who can be held back by no one in the pursuit of that to which he has a just right. In the human race in heathendom, this form of true freedom is found in the greatest purity among the Germanic nations; their state was entirely and exclusively founded on the immunity of the rights of the natural man. This immunity is, however, only negative by the nature of the law which lies at its bottom, and therefore the state also is negative. It teaches and prevents only what must not be done, and never goes beyond this limit.

“How would the life of man appear, if based only on the principles of law and right? One man has an account against another: he is rich and the other poor. What to him is but a little ruins the other; still the authority has no choice; the right of the rich man is incontestable and must be defended. Another, by the exercise of his right, would bring loss and want on many of his fellow-men. He may labor to raise the price of the indispensable means of subsistence and fuel, still no one can disturb him in the free pursuit of his right. A third refuses to assist in an undertaking upon which depends the good or ill of many. A street or a canal is to be made, and a part of his land is needed. Who can without injustice enforce his consent?

"At this point Christianity comes into the world and gives a new command: *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself*. It is not enough to leave him what he already possesses, but thou shalt moreover help him, assist him, and support him. It teaches the faithful that they should *possess as though they possessed not*. Similar sympathies have always been found in the consciousness of every nation, but Christianity raised them to precepts. It allowed property, but at the same time required that its possessor should regard himself as only the steward or administrator, and divide its enjoyment with all men. While the law of right allowed every one to assert that he exists for himself, the law of love commands him to use what he possesses as though he existed only for his neighbor.

"But wherein do the direction, the obligation, and the penalty of this new command consist? The business of the State is only with right and its maintenance. Whatever lies beyond the limits of natural justice is also beyond the question and reach of the State. Here the Church comes in, established upon the earth to direct Christians with the Spirit of God, and to break down their selfishness, she says in the above case to the rich man: 'Thou shalt forgive thy brother, the poor man, the debt which he owes thee. Thou shalt forego the exercise of thy right which oppresses thy fellow-men. Thou shalt, even against thy inclination, do whatever the love of thy neighbor requires, all for the sake of thy eternal salvation.' In all this she does not place the title of the rich man in question, she does not deny that the State must defend him, if he requires it; but she subjects him to a higher command to which the lower must yield. She does not use external means to compel the obedience of his unwillingness, as the State does and is ordered to do. She takes to herself no office of judge, mindful of the words of Christ to the man who came to him for help against his unjust brother: *Man, who hath made me a judge or a divider over you? Take heed and beware of all covetousness; for a man's life doth not consist in the abundance of things which he possesseth*. So also the Church turns only to the inward man. Knowing well that if sin, the root of evil, be successfully combated within him, the external manifestation in life will be in accordance. The pillars, the sources of a Christian's natural right, are the Church and the State. All order in human and divine things depends upon their remaining within their own proper spheres. To confound them together is as improper and as dangerous as to deny either of them. The imperfection adhering to the fallen nature of man does not suffer the Church and the State, each for itself and in their mutual relations to each other, to appear in entirely pure and undisturbed activity. There is neither an example in the past, nor to be expected in the future, of a race which follows out the precepts of both the laws of love and of right. But the Middle Ages of

Europe, at least, lived in the consciousness that both laws were of importance, that the office of worldly authority was only to protect lawful freedom, and that whatever lay beyond this belonged to the Christian Church. The latter appears as the counterpoise to the bare principle of right, and only from this point of view can we understand their struggle against the distinction of castes, against slavery, against the German *lex talionis*, and innumerable other abuses. Not without historical grounds, but with full knowledge of the whole question, has the part of the Church in the Middle Ages been compared to that of philanthropy in modern times." — Vol. IV. pp. 117 – 127.

Modern philanthropy may indeed be compared, or more properly contrasted, with the spirit of love taught by the Christian Church, but it gains not much by the contrast. The aim of philanthropy was to supply the place of Christian charity; it originated in infidelity, in the disbelief of the latter, and attempted to do by human means what the Church was instituted by God to do. Philanthropy is a mere natural sentiment; charity, a supernatural virtue. Poverty in the eyes of philanthropy is the worst of evils. Philanthropy set itself at work to abolish poverty and give to all men an abundance of wealth, and so begat socialism, and socialism begat revolution. Order overthrown, and society shaken to its foundations, industry discouraged, trade diminished, commerce threatened, pauperism increased, the rich made poor, the poor and wretched made more poor and wretched still, — such are the fruits of philanthropy.

In the eighteenth century philanthropy rejected the doctrine of the fall of man, and set itself to preach the perfectibility of human nature. The world, according to philanthropy, had been all wrong from the beginning. "What right had man," it asked, "to punish his brother man?" Jails were barbarous, the gibbet was eminently barbarous; men were to be governed by reason and by love, and men who loved one another would no longer stand in need of jails and gibbets. Such was the philanthropic cant of the day, and philanthropy went to work to reform, — on a large scale; for philanthropy scorns small beginnings, and proposes always to commence operations on the masses. Of this new philanthropic gospel, Robespierre was one of the most ardent apostles; his first appearance in public life was as the author of a tract against "Capital Punish-

ments," and Robespierre the philanthropist had many colleagues almost as active, and quite as consistent, as himself. And so punishments were relaxed, and the reign of love and universal brotherhood commenced. Alas! man would not love his brother. In spite of that brother's alternative,—"Love me or I will cut your throat,"—love and reason seemed as far from the earth as ever. As punishments were mitigated, crime was strengthened. Under the influence of philanthropy, Europe became one vast slaughter-house; kings and nobles, bishops, priests, and nuns, old men and young women, were dragged to the scaffold, and the reign of love was drowned in torrents of innocent blood. Philanthropy could not bear to see the criminal hung, but wept maudlin tears over the blood-stained villain about to expiate his crimes and terminate his infamous career on the gibbet; but it had not one sigh for the victims of the criminal's brutality, not a feeling of compassion for the family which, by the ruffian's crimes, had been bereaved of its head; it had no time to think of the anguish and desolation which the cutthroat had brought upon the innocent sufferers. The sympathies of philanthropy were all for the criminal, and the greater the rascal, the more intense its sympathy. Thus, by its morbid sentimentality, philanthropy has taken from vice all its horrors, and opened the floodgates of iniquity. "The worst use you can put a man to is to hang him," says philanthropy. It is not true; the very best use a man can be put to, in certain cases, is to hang him.

But charity works not so. Charity sees that all these evils over which she weeps proceed from the heart of man. Charity, therefore, makes no associations, deals not with committees, attends not meetings, and is not to be seen on platforms, moving or seconding high-sounding "resolutions," but addresses herself to the heart of man; for charity is not puffed up, and seeks not to make a noise in the world. Charity is quiet and long-suffering; she seeks to win back man's heart to God, to implant therein the love of justice and the love of God, for he who loves God will always love his neighbor as himself; and charity knows that, when once the heart is right towards God, her work will have been accomplished. Without the aid of statutes, charity knocked the fetters from the slave; silently, yet most effectually, she abolished serfdom throughout

Europe. The Catholic redemptionist sold himself into slavery, that the captive might go free; the frothy declamations of philanthropists have but made that condition more abject still. But we return to the author.

“From the sixteenth century the power of Christianity gradually decreases among the people. In the eighteenth century infidelity carries away great multitudes in the higher grades of society. As the Church hereby loses the means of forming the necessary counterpoise to the demands of mere right, an immeasurable want is seen in the collective life of men. The notion that there is something to which even right must yield, cannot be thrown aside; where this comes into direct opposition to the feelings, a higher resort must be at hand to dissolve this dissonance. The age would not admit that this salutary force in the mild yoke of Christ had been thrown off. This disposition was seized by the state, driven partly by necessity, and partly in consequence of the materialistic doctrines, which, like a mental pestilence, overran Europe in the last century. The wish to solve the problem of Christianity by purely earthly means and institutions had in it something alluring for all those who place the bounds of all that can be known or attained to in this life. It was a theory as well as a practice, that the legislation of the state was above all right, or rather that all right was a consequence of the law. The princes and their counsellors first introduced this doctrine, both in words and in actions, often with good intentions and in good faith, but also very often as a cover to darker motives. Afterwards governments and subjects were united in the conviction, that, in the place of right and love, earthly prosperity must be regarded as the highest precept for human society. Hence arose the idea of an *absolute state*, the direct contrary of the Christian German state of the Middle Ages, which was based on private rights and duties. This unlimited power, which made the protectors of right its originators, and raised all authority subject to human frailty to be the voice of God, cannot possibly remain undisputed. If the law is to be taken as the true source of all that men are to prize as right or good, it must proceed from the collected will and knowledge of all those for whom it is to be binding. This was the indisputable theory of the Revolution of 1789, of all later revolutions, and it is still so for the immense majority at the present time. The destruction of all justice latterly is a consequence of the rejection of the commands and designs of the Christian Church in the state. From the moment that the state no longer regarded itself as the protector of the freedom of right, but considered this as subordinate to a pretended higher end, of which the state was the representative, began that political chaos which characterizes the history of Europe for the last fifty years. It is the ideas of enlightenment,

of universal good, of the efficacy of absolute rationality, or some other aim, which are now substituted for the state, and raised to the highest principles: Still must the rights, the duties, and the freedom of every individual, whether the lowest subject or the prince, be denied or dissolved in their essential nature, to make way for the new erections. Hence this inquietude, and the impossibility, in the convulsions of the present, to obtain a true peace.

"This political doctrine is, in its deep significance, a caricature of Christian truths; the ancients, therefore, could not know it. The equality before the Eternal Judge, the liberty of the children of God, the omnipotence of pious discipline, are the conceptions of which it has formed its idols, distorted until they can no longer be recognized, in the base service of which the living race are deceived in the dearest desire of their heart. In these specious grounds of an eternal want of humanity lies the whole strength of the modern doctrine of politics, and its danger." — pp. 127 – 130.

We find among these fragments some very just remarks on Louis Napoleon, and his usurpation by the *coup d'état* of December, 1851, which we extract.

"This last proceeding in Paris finishes a series of historical events which for three years furnish an argument for the assertion, that at the present day in Europe, England excluded, there are only two material forces actually at work; the army and democracy. Only these two can bring about visible changes; as soon as those who wish to make use of them simply deny the moral element, these are also in reality made null. Only soldiers, it is said, are of use against democracy. What is most to be lamented is, that many middle parties, and even a great portion of the constitutionalists, who have been clearly shown what weakness is inherent in all relations of right and contract, are soon enough found to say, 'Only democrats are of use against soldiers.'" — pp. 256, 257.

"If any one should ask my opinion of the different parties struggling for power in France, I should answer, that all those opposed to the President have more right than he has. Each of them has a higher principle legally as well as morally. Each stands on a better ground, the Legitimist, the Orleanist, or the Blue (*Republique honnête, Cavaignac*). The basis of the President is nothing else than the most foul and censurable ambition of one man.

"If he should further ask for whom I wish the victory, I must answer, For the President. This is perfectly clear; for none of the parties, which are in the right with relation to the President, can really succeed, or place France upon their ground. If the President fails, the Reds, whom I distinguish from Democrats in the old sense of the word, will be the rulers of France. In this certain

answer lies my whole feeling concerning the present. Right, reason, and morality have lost their power, only crude material force remains. What Charles the Tenth and Louis Philippe could not do, what none of the present parties in France can do, Louis Napoleon has done, for however long or short a time it may be.

"Is our experience of late years in Germany really different? Who has grown into the possession of the internal power? Democracy and the reaction. They who strove for a truly lawful and reasonable end remain without power. Who has gained in the German question? Who decided the fate of Schleswig and of Hessen? And the representatives of the ideas of right, of nationality, and of honor must confess their complete impotence. No wonder that it is so when they honor the victory of force over '*la phrase*.'" — pp. 257, 258.

This certainly is the only ground on which we can regard with favor the government of Napoleon III. It was necessary for France to choose between two great evils. By accepting Napoleon as the sovereign, she escaped the rule of Red Republicanism. It is a sad condition, however, for a country, when its only hope of safety is in yielding itself up to the unrestrained ambition of a single man; its only security against civil despotism, the simple will of a man whose aim is absolute power; the only guaranty of the freedom of the Church, confidence in a monarch whose pleasure may be, and, if he follows the example he has chosen for his imitation, *will* be, to use the Church as the tool for working out his designs.

A short article on the Turks will suffice to show how Radowitz loved and admired those *good* people. He says:—

"It is a most wonderful occurrence, that the speech-makers of our days swear by the standard of the cross, and, while they revile and slander the Christian spirit of the Middle Ages, would fain even now begin a new crusade to drive the Osmons from Europe. In accordance with all their principles and opinions, they should be enthusiastic adorers of the Turks, in whose political life a great part of their ideal is realized.

"In the first place, they have a religion which is substantially pure deism, without the burdensome demands of self-abnegation and penance, and consistent with all the pleasures of the world. Then they have a state without hereditary nobility or privileges of any sort. Perfect equality before the law. Every office and dignity is open to every individual, the lowest as well as the highest; personal servitude equally unrecognized, so that every porter may

hope to become Grand Vizier, every Toptschi may aspire to the horse's tail. Besides this, there is the unlimited power of the state, in the face of which not only no privilege, but not even any private property, can stand; the last man and the last asp are at the free disposal of the political power. What the Hegelian philosophy aims at, that every one acknowledge in the state, as reasonable and proper, a power against which no individuality can prevail, is there realized through the Koran, which is both the code of morals and of laws (*Iman* and *Din*) in a degree far in advance of the modern European states.

"Will mere cutting off the head, or strangling, be so much considered, when weighed with all these eminent advantages?" — pp. 12–14.

On the policy of Prussia he has the following remarks:—

"What is the general line of politics which Prussia ought to pursue? To those who direct the helm of the government, such a question may seem idle, since they know no other political wisdom, than to steer according to the wind that blows, and drive on, whether good or bad, whatever the moment brings about. That such proceeding denotes a real statesman, I cannot concede, but rather maintain that he should acknowledge leading ideas for the order and progress of affairs, and should always return to this aim, undisturbed by the fluctuations of the moment. Prussia is a European, but before all, in her internal nature, a German state. By the course of events she has entered into the Pentarchy, and, with France, England, Austria, and Russia, she has a voice in the management of the affairs of the whole world. She should use this influence for a good end, but should not sacrifice to the European position nearer and much more important interests. The policy of Prussia should be thoroughly German. Whether Don Carlos or Isabella shall reign, whether Mehemet Ali shall be hereditary Pacha of Egypt, is, irrespective of the principle involved, of relatively little consequence; it is not necessary that she should play an important part in settling these affairs. But what occurs in Dresden, in Stuttgart, or in Hanover has the most distinct importance for us. Nothing essential should be done in the internal or external arrangements of the cabinets, nothing changed in the temporal or spiritual condition of the German states, without our voice being heard and respected. Austria cannot for any length of time dispute this influence with us. She is too closely entwined in the affairs of the whole world, too foreign to all the peculiarly German questions, joys, and sufferings, to be able to limit herself to such a line. However it may hinder and restrain her, Prussia must remain foremost in all German affairs. This does not prevent, but is quite consistent with, her directing the influence she thus obtains

to the general interests where a universal point of view is introduced. The distinct aim of Prussian politics must be to obtain and preserve an indubitable supremacy in Germany. In order to this, it is requisite that the princes as well as the people should be won in favor of Prussia. A lasting position will be established when every one finds it quite in order that the highest interests of Germany should be settled at Berlin. The cabinet must be firmly persuaded that the independent action of even the smallest members of the confederation has its firm and constant support in Prussia. It is not enough that all fear of our aggrandizement should vanish, but it is also necessary that every one should feel that the political mission of Prussia is found in this multiplicity of territories, which give her so many points of contact with the rest of Germany. She can be strong only by close union with her German neighbors. This thought is the less difficult to call into life, because it is entirely true. The affection and confidence of the cabinets towards Prussia is by no means sufficient, but the public opinion is of greater importance for the establishment of a true supremacy. Germany must become accustomed to see Prussia precede in all that concerns the spiritual and temporal welfare. In a material aspect, the Zollverein was an important step; the same principle of community in all essential things must incessantly be carried out, and no sacrifice feared, to introduce the same money, measures, and weights in literary intercourse.* Common institutions of every sort are formed, even when they bring but little material gain; the feeling of community is invaluable. But the main point, to unite public opinion with Prussia, can only be done by the defence of law. We cannot follow the common liberalism, and in this way seek popularity. But we can and ought to set ourselves up as the defence and shelter of every good law; we can use the influence which the articles of the confederation allow us, so that every complaint shall be heard, every claim tried, and there shall remain in Germany no one who cannot pursue his strengthened right against all the power of the state. The next thing required for this is, that precisely the contrary of what has heretofore been should be done. Whoever knows the course which the Diet pursues, knows that its practice is to send back every dispute between subjects and governments. All ingenuity is employed to establish an incompetency, to discover some ground of nullity; they turn and waver over the letters of the constitution of the confederation, until a way is found out to prevent all consequence of the difficulty. The harm which the Diet has thus done itself is beyond all measure. Every one

* "The tourist in Germany who only learns to count his money in *Thalers* and *Groschen*, by the time he has to use *Kronthalers*, *Gulden*, and *Kreutzers*, which again differ in value as he comes to Austria, would, we are certain, consent to the introduction of a uniform coinage for all Germany."

who means well for Germany must wish that the contrary were the rule; that every one who finds no law in his home should go to the Diet, and that no one should return without being helped, or else convinced of the unreasonableness of his demand. This would be peculiarly the part for Prussia, and of incalculable importance for her moral position in relation to the German nations. Only now and then one dares to strive against the government; but if it were clear that only objective justice could prevail, no evil would be durable. There certainly has not often been a worse time than the present for the position of Prussia with relation to Germany. The Catholic Debate and the Hanover Question have wounded us deeply. By the first, Prussia has not only lost the affection of a great number of her own subjects, even of whole provinces, but has also suffered great prejudice to her reputation with the German cabinets for intelligence and circumspection. They see us in embarrassment, and fear to be drawn in with us; and it is not Bavaria alone which we have cut off from us, but our conduct is also blamed at other courts. By the Hanover Question no one has suffered more than ourselves. From Austria nothing else was expected; whether Germany thereby falls morally to the ground or not, is equally acceptable and welcome to that cabinet. From us, on the contrary, a different course was expected than that we should merely follow behind, and co-operate in bringing quite naked to light the emptiness of the defence of law which the confederation secures. Here also should have been done precisely the contrary of what was done. The confederation should have brought the whole affair before its *forum*, and there judged what had passed. The king of Hanover should, for his own safety, have been forced to bring the dispute to the decision of the Diet; if it were then really found that many points of the constitution of 1833 were incompatible with the respective articles of the confederation (Art. 37 of the Treaty of Vienna), a decree should have been passed by which the confederation abolished the objectionable articles of that constitution; but the king should still be allowed to adhere in all else to the ordinations of his predecessor. The gap which this would cause should be filled up by a free agreement between the king and his estates, and the result placed under the guaranty of the confederation. This is what Prussia should have done; even the Liberals would have applauded such a course, and a great advance would have been made on all sides." — pp. 97 – 102.

In another place Radowitz endeavors to show that, should Prussia obtain the pre-eminence he desires for her, no danger to Catholicity would ensue from her religion. We think otherwise, but we give his arguments.

"If it were possible," he says, "to ruin the position of Prussia for the great future of Germany, it would be brought about by those persons who, urged by narrow-minded particularism and Protestantism, are never tired of representing Prussia as the champion of Protestantism in Germany. Even reasonable and moderate men fall into this foolish declamation. No greater prejudice can be done to the great mission of Prussia, than to ascribe to her this aim. Her Austrian and Bavarian, Rhenish and Westphalian enemies, would then be perfectly right in doing all in their power to prevent at any price the union of Germany under a Prussian head. That such a thought has in past years been entertained by German Catholics is plainly the cause of the inexpressibly sad position of the so-called German Catholic party on the German Question; a fact for which Germany and the Catholic Church will yet suffer severely. This thought is altogether false, however loudly it may be proclaimed in either camp. The position and mission of Prussia is never Protestant, nor even ecclesiastical, but is exclusively directed to the political union of the nation. Whoever would wish to heal the wretched and dangerous condition of this great ruling people, to establish a true community in the centre of Europe, and to solve the problem of the future, will start with the actual and authorized juxtaposition of both confessions, and hold unchangeably to it. The most perfect independence on both sides is the only possible relation of the State to the Church in Germany, and more especially so in Prussia than elsewhere. Any attempt to use the state and its means for the external aggrandizement of either of the Christian confessions, must invariably end in the ruin of both parties. Would to God this truth could penetrate men's minds! It is confessed in the moment of danger, but immediately denied as soon as any chance appears of drawing advantage from that alliance." — pp. 236 – 238.

This will at least justify the author in his desire to establish the supremacy of Prussia in Germany, although it may not convince his readers of the advantage of that measure. For ourselves, we are unwilling to see a Protestant power possessed of so great influence in Germany, and although we may agree with Radowitz, that the true relation of the Church and State is perfect independence of one another, we cannot but be suspicious that such might not be the case. That it should be so, we concede; but that it would be so, we hesitate to affirm. Abstracting all considerations of religion, we cannot deny that, viewing the sole political and temporal welfare of Germany, the prevailing influence in German affairs would be better placed in the hands of Prussia than

in those of Austria. Prussia is, as he says, more closely connected and identified in all its interests with those of the rest of Germany, whilst Austria has comparatively little in common with its German neighbors. Still, believing as we do that Catholicity is immeasurably superior to all other forms of religion — or rather the only one that is of any avail — for the political welfare and prosperity of any country, we raise our voice against the too great influence of Prussia; and whether the influence of the Catholic powers may be extended or not, we are unwilling to see that of the Protestant powers increased.

We next turn to some remarks intended to serve for the *History of the State*.

“In every form of government, in whatever manner it is constituted, there are always two parties; the governing and the governed. The appointment of the governor may be deduced and established in different ways; from the patrimonial relations, — the family and its head; from the theocratic, — the nation and the divinely appointed ruler; from the warlike, — the chieftain and the army; and from the delegated, — the citizens and those called by them to preside over their affairs. These principles have been more or less brought into combination in the historical manifestation, and have decided the form of the state. In the earliest times the patrimonial principle prevails as the patriarchal government. In the ancient kingdoms of the East is found a combination of the patrimonial and theocratic elements. In Rome, after Cæsar, the empire was a combination of the warlike and the delegated. In the Middle Ages in Germany the warlike was at first predominant; afterwards the patrimonial element entered, by the consolidation of the state, and formed the feudal system. In the seventeenth century the territorial lordship was constituted from the patrimonial and theocratic elements, but not without great distortion. In the government of Louis the Fourteenth and its imitations, the doctrine of a presumed delegation of the people is added. In the eighteenth century the state was in theory established on this principle of a supposed indorsement on the part of the citizens, and a corresponding theory of contract. The Napoleonic state is an intermediate anomaly, in which the warlike element is again introduced. The latest attempts, as the natural reaction against the doctrine of the eighteenth century, are to establish the state upon a combination of the theocratic and patrimonial principles (Haller, Maistre, and their followers).

“A second consideration arises from the relations of the governed under different forms of the state. The ancient republic rests upon the actual community of all the citizens governing itself.

The basis of the Oriental kingdom is the unrestrained sovereign and his absolute subjects, who may thus sink to the condition of mere slaves. Religion and morals form the only bounds and security, and this only so long as the ruler observes them. In the state of the Middle Ages, the warriors stand as free people by the side of the chieftain; by more fixed confirmation they become territorial lords within the patrimonial state, first as free possessors, afterwards as feudal tenants. The towns join them with their own rights. The clergy also retain their rights. From this grows the system of estates, in which the sovereign must obtain the consent of his estates, if he wishes to impose anything on them, or to demand anything from them. From the old estate system proceeds the representative state in various gradations. Its peculiar nature is that the estates represent not only themselves and their rights, but the collective nation, and that their consent is necessary not only in whatever immediately touches their rights, but also in all the acts of government. In the first form, which is found chiefly in England, these last developments are only partially discovered. Only in later times, as in the further imitation on the continent of Europe, is the abstract representative system fully carried out. The government here becomes only the executor of what the representatives of the people either decree on their own motion, or to which they give their consent on the motion of the government. Whether this government is to be vested in an hereditary race of princes or not, is merely a question of prudence. With intelligent persons the decision will always be in favor of the hereditary line. The extent and manner of the exercise of the power of the government form also a question of expediency. The government has never any right of its own in this matter, but fulfils a charge confided to it by the members of the state. In substance the abstract representative state is a republic with an hereditary supreme magistrate at the head of the government. I know that the term representative system is not always understood in this sense, and that by many these last developments are not admitted. The adoption of an absolute veto, which is a distinct anomaly in this system, shows it. But the fundamental principle of the system leads to these last points. If I wish to place my own opinion, already indicated above, in opposition to this, I must certainly go further back. If I weigh all accessible sources of knowledge, I can stop neither with the mere natural process, nor with any relations of conformity and utility, but the synthesis must demand this inseparable element in the state. The end of the state is the realization of right. Right appears under two forms; as freedom and as order. The state must preserve both; it is the office of authority to guarantee and maintain these two conditions. It fulfils this office by its own right, or, more properly, by its own duty: in this consists

the true nature of authority. Whether this authority is hereditary in a line of princes, or is elective in any form, is in itself of no importance. Even those who are elected to this office are the authority in the full sense, and not merely officers who execute the will of another. That the authority in the administration of its office does not lose other rights, or usurp other privileges, is a further condition. The sum of the regulations how the authority is to be invested, and where and how in the administration of the government it is bound to the co-operation or consent of the governed, is the constitution of the state. What this should be in a particular instance depends wholly on particular circumstances, or on the nature of the contract. No universal direction for this can be taken from reason nor from the immediate precepts of God, but is determined by the facts in the particular case.

"This is no contradiction of the divine government of the world, which is manifested in the history of nations. I see clearly enough the general form of the state, though not the particular details, for Prussia, and for the middle of the nineteenth century. The Prussian monarchy has been established by intelligence and war; it is less the result of a natural growth than of a creation. Therefore on one side it is further removed from the conditions of the patrimonial state, and on the other it partakes more of the nature of a centralized government. What the Prussian monarchy loses in material strength in comparison with the other members of the Pentarchy, it must repair by the constant readiness of all its force. The finances and the army must be greatly attended to, and be always at its disposal. Hence the necessity of a strong government on the one hand, and on the other that it proceed in constant unison with the governed. And because the strength of all its subjects is more to be exerted in the field, than is the case with any other state, a necessary condition of its life is the representation of the country. The constitution of Prussia flows from the position of a free people under a free king. The question is next raised as to the manner of the representation. I do not hesitate to maintain, that the true aristocracy are the proper representatives of the nation. But can this be the old representation of the estates? With my hand on my heart, I answer, No. The old estates are blotted out, and the new provinces of Prussia consist of quite different elements. The aristocracy of the present day is based on three things,—office, intelligence, and possessions. The first can clearly be only a secondary element of the representation against the government. Here it has influence, not as a consequence, but as a thing compatible with it; and it is a dangerous misconception to confound these points. To find the proper position of the second requires a closer analysis, which I shall consider elsewhere. The most important force is in the third, the posses-

sion of the land. It is undeniable that the opposition between city and country, between trade and agriculture, is no longer what it formerly was, but is undergoing a profound change.

"The second question is to establish the privileges of the national representation. I distinguish the direct and legal from the indirect and moral activity. There is very little difference as to the first. The representation takes its place in the legislature, where without the consent of both the free factors nothing has the force of law. The representatives grant whatever comes from the pockets of the subjects. It would be of great importance for Prussia to determine the precise limits between the ordinary necessities, which remain the same for a greater length of time, and the extraordinary expenses, which are brought up at every session. The first requisite is that the course of the political life of Prussia should never stagnate, but be above the dissensions of the moment.

"But it is difficult to define the indirect activity of the representation, by which external politics are principally treated. The king cannot act, nor direct the great destiny of Prussia, against the public opinion of the nation; but neither can mere party voice nor momentary excitement be taken for the expression of this public opinion. The chambers are only one of its elements, the other is the press; and all the organs through which the voice of the people is declared have an equal claim to be heard and respected. This most profound of all relations between the governing and the governed cannot be reduced to formulas. Nothing can compensate for the loss of the mutual good-will of both parties. The constitution can only multiply and secure the means for the public voice to express itself free and pure, but cannot use compulsion on one side or the other without destroying the Prussian monarchy." — pp. 271 – 280.

We take great pleasure in laying these extracts before our readers, and doubt not that, while they admire the profound and solid views of so great a statesman, they will join with us in regret at his loss. Never was Germany, and Prussia in particular, more in need of all her great men than at the very time he was taken from her. Had he lived a year longer, he would undoubtedly have exerted a great influence on the course of Germany in the present war. His sympathies were not with the Turks, and he doubtless felt as the king of Prussia is said to feel, that Christian nations might do better than to form an alliance with the infidel against their fellow-Christians. Once before, though long ago, — and those times and their spirit have long since passed away, — once before did France and England form an alliance, and send their

armies to the East, and those armies were blest by the unanimous voice of Christendom, and prayers for their success arose from every church and monastery. Now their object is different, and few can pray for the success of either side; perhaps the prayer that will be heard is that justice may prevail.

There is much more in these volumes equally worthy of being extracted, but here we must close, recommending the careful study of the writings of this lamented author to all our readers acquainted with the German language, without, however, joining in all his sympathies, or indorsing all his political views.

ART. IV.—*History of the Life, the Writings, and the Doctrines of Luther.* By M. AUDIN. Translated from the last French Edition, by WILLIAM B. TURNBULL, Esq. London: Dolman. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1854. 2 vols. 8vo.

THE Life of Luther, the first volume of which, as translated by Mr. Turnbull, we have received through Messrs. Murphy & Co., is the first of four very interesting and important biographies published by the late M. Audin, and which taken together form a passably complete popular history of the Protestant Reformation, admirably adapted to counteract the bad effects of such publications as M. Merle d'Aubigné's widely circulated romance on the same subject. These biographies, after that of Luther, are the lives of Calvin, Leo the Tenth, and Henry the Eighth. Of these, that of Pope Leo the Tenth is generally regarded as the best, and we are surprised that it has not yet been translated into our language. In composing these works the author had access to the original documents preserved in the archives of the Vatican and the libraries of Florence and Bologna, to the historical collections of Strasburg, Lyons, Mayence, Cologne, and Wittenberg, and to almost any number of German and Latin pamphlets of the time. He made a diligent and conscientious use of the materials at his disposal, and has cleared up many obscure passages in

the history of the period, and presented many of the actors in the movement, Catholic as well as Protestant, in a new light. He has robbed the chief Reformers of the unmerited glory with which their partisans had invested them, and presented them to the world in all their native weakness and deformity. He has vindicated the Catholic party of the time, and rescued the principal Catholic opponents of the Reformers from the aspersions cast upon them by their unscrupulous adversaries. He is candid and impartial, and, so far as we are able to judge, has produced a very reliable, as well as a brilliant and interesting, popular history of the more prominent characters and events of the terrible Protestant movement in the sixteenth century. We hope the whole four works, making nine volumes octavo in the last edition as revised by the author, will be translated into our language, and circulated widely wherever it is spoken. They will make an important addition to our meagre English Catholic library, and contribute much to a right appreciation of the Reformers.

M. Audin, born at Lyons, 1793, originally studied for the priesthood; but not taking orders, he turned his attention to law, and was admitted to the bar. He does not appear, however, to have practised his profession, and he devoted his life to literature, as an author and a bookseller, till his death, which took place February 9, 1851. He was a sincere and earnest Catholic, and has rendered no mean service to religion and historic truth by his works on the Reformation. No man out of Germany, even if in Germany, has done more to separate or disentangle in the popular mind that mingled yarn of history and romance, of truth and fiction, which Protestant authors for these three hundred years have palmed off upon the credulous, not of their own communion alone, as the authentic history of the Protestant movement. He is conscientious and painstaking, but we cannot regard him as very sagacious or profound; and under the relation of style and manner he is not sufficiently grave and dignified to suit our taste or to inspire us with full confidence in his judgment. He takes too much pains to be striking and brilliant, and appears to weigh the phrase more than the thought. One feels that he was writing in the bosom of a frivolous community, for readers who draw their instruction from the saloon, the theatre, or the feuilleton, and are

to be arrested only by a *tableau* or a dramatic representation of historical events.

Regarded as popular works, as they probably were designed to be, we esteem very highly Audin's biographies; but regarded as *studies* on the Reformation, they are deficient in philosophical depth and comprehensiveness. They take, in our judgment, quite too narrow and too superficial a view of the great Protestant movement, and afford us very little aid in understanding its real causes and internal character. The author has rendered a tardy justice to the Catholic party of the time, and proved its immeasurable superiority in solid and polite learning, in civilization and refinement, in virtue and manners, to the party of reform, and has shown to the last degree of evidence that the Reformers were coarse and brutal, false and hypocritical, proud and selfish, lustful and ambitious, who shrunk from no baseness, and scrupled at no arts or falsehood that seemed likely to serve their purposes against the Church. This, no doubt, is much, but it is not all that we have the right to expect in times like ours from a Catholic historian of the Protestant Reformation. It is far too little and too superficial to enable us to explain that event. These Reformers had all been reared in the external communion of the Catholic Church, and were many of them priests who had served at her altar. Whence came it that they were capable of such baseness and iniquity? Whence came it that their baseness and iniquity were capable of detaching nearly half of Europe from the faith in which they had been reared, and of founding a party which for three hundred years has been able to dispute the dominion of the world with Catholicity? Here is a grave problem to be solved, and which M. Audin does not solve, or furnish us the means of solving.

Indeed, taking the Reformation as M. Audin leaves it, it must have been an impossible event, — an event which never happened, because it never could have happened. We can find in his pages no sufficient reason for it, no adequate means of effecting it. The Reformers were inadequate to the work ascribed to them; all the elements of success were against them. Authority, tradition, learning, culture, talent, habit, manners, customs, all were against them. They were worsted in argument by their Catholic opponents; they had no clearly defined system of doctrine, no well-

concerted plan of action ; they were unable to agree among themselves, were torn by intestine divisions, were compelled to blush at the licentiousness and impurity of their disciples, and rendered ridiculous by their continual variations and self-contradictions. There was nothing in their speculations or opinions calculated to impose upon the understanding of a moderately instructed Catholic, or in their practice to win the affections of a single really Catholic heart. Their preaching and writings were fitted only to shock sincere and earnest Catholics, or to disgust and repel them. How then could they succeed ? Yet succeed they did. They baffled princes and nobles, kings and Cæsars, popes and cardinals, bishops and doctors, and gained over the multitude in more than a third part of Europe. How explain this fact ? By the depravity of the Reformers ? But that depravity itself needs accounting for ; and, moreover, on what principle explain its tremendous power ? We know that evil naturally triumphs over good, but how can evil joined to weakness triumph over virtue joined to strength, and that even supernatural strength ?

It is clear to the philosophical historian that we cannot explain the Protestant Reformation by the baseness, the iniquity, the corruption, or the ability of the Reformers themselves. No result of such magnitude could have been brought about by some scores of apostate priests and renegade monks. The reform must have sprung from deeper, broader, and mightier causes. It must have already been prepared in the public mind and heart, and Luther can be regarded only as its leading representative, not as its author or founder. He simply gave expression to what was already a general thought or sentiment. Without the pre-existence and prevalence of that thought or sentiment, he and his associates would, with all their efforts, hardly have produced a momentary ripple on the surface of European society. There must have been a preparation earlier even than that effected by the quarrels of the Schoolmen and the Humanists, and the labors of those whom Protestants call "the Reformers before the Reformation," such as Reuchlin, Erasmus, and Ulrich von Hutten. Some of the Humanists became Protestants indeed, but the more distinguished leaders and the bulk of the party, as M. Audin proves, remained faithful to the communion of the Church. The Greek language never fell under the anathema of the

Church; she had always accepted it, and consecrated it by using it in celebrating throughout the East her sacred Mysteries. It was the official language of the Greek Church before the Greek schism, and is used now in celebrating mass by the United or Catholic Greeks, as well as by the schismatic. Latin is not, and never was, the only official language of the Church. How then could Reuchlin, by insisting on its study, favor the Protestant movement? * What was it that pointed the wit of Erasmus, that Voltaire of the sixteenth century, and enabled him to cover the monks with ridicule, and to destroy their character in the public estimation? What was it that rendered effective the dull, filthy, and disgusting *Epistolæ Virorum Obscurorum* of Ulrich von Hutten? The public must have been previously prepared for these, as well as for the Reformers themselves.

Nothing is more unphilosophical than to ascribe great events, whether good or bad, to petty causes. The effect cannot exceed the cause, any more than the stream can rise higher than the fountain. There must have been operating in the sixteenth century some cause of the Protestant Reformation adequate to its production,—equal in magnitude to the effect produced. What was it? In our judgment, while the magnitude of the Reformation is not overrated, we are too apt to overrate the magnitude of the work done by the Reformers. It is a mistake to suppose that Protestantism in any of its essential features was a product of the sixteenth century. That century was by no means as Catholic in its beginning as is commonly imagined. Luther found, he did not create or introduce, his Protestantism. Protestantism, if analyzed, may be reduced to four elements; — 1. The rejection of the Papacy; 2. The rejection of the Christian priesthood or sacerdotal order; 3. The denial of all dogmatic theology; and 4. The adoption of religion as a mere sentiment of the heart,

* Reuchlin also was the great patron of Hebrew. The study of Hebrew, however, meant in his mind not so much the study of the Hebrew language as intercourse with the Jews and study of the Jewish writings, which were Antichristian in their doctrine and tendencies. It is not impossible, moreover, that the Jews and the occult heretics of the time had a very good understanding with one another. Were not the *virī obscuri* of Ulrich von Hutten so called, to intimate to the initiated a relationship to the secret heretical organizations?

called by some Love, by others Faith. We do not, of course, pretend that all Protestants go the full length of these four elements, but these four elements embrace all of Protestantism. Luther did not formally reject all dogmatic theology, but he did reject the Papacy and the Christian priesthood; for his principal spite was directed against the Pope, and he maintained, as the great body of Protestants do now, that under the New Law every believer is a priest and a king. His doctrine of justification by faith alone is the virtual rejection of dogmatic theology; for it is with him the essential element of the Gospel, and faith in his sense is simply a sentiment of the heart. Some Protestants go further, much further, in the developments of Protestantism, than Luther and his brother Reformers went, but none of them go further than the four elements we have specified, and these elements may therefore be said, though not embraced by all Protestants, to embrace all Protestantism.

Now all these elements were held in Christian Europe by vast multitudes, many of them in the external communion of the Church, passing themselves off as Catholics, though in fact occult heretics, centuries before Luther was born. At no period was Christian Europe, in point of fact, as Catholic as first appearances indicate, and at no period were all the real heretics outside of the external communion of the Church. Protestants cannot, indeed, maintain for their party or doctrines an apostolic origin, but they can trace their succession from the apostolic age. Through the Bohemian Brethren, Lollards, Beghards, Cathares, Patarins, Albigenses, Bulgarians, Paulicians, Manichæans, and Gnostics, they can ascend to the very times of the Apostles. These sects were all of the same family, and were all essentially Protestant. They were all condemned, indeed, by the Church, but by means of secret organizations and outward conformity to Catholicity they always contrived to maintain themselves to a fearful extent in her external communion. From the twelfth century to the sixteenth, Europe to the superficial observer was, save in the East, exclusively Catholic; but in point of fact she was little more Catholic than now. Catholicity was indeed the official religion, but even in the thirteenth century, regarded by a modern school as the culminating point of the Ages of Faith, virtual Protestantism was hardly less rife than in

the sixteenth, and there was, we verily believe, more real Catholicity in the seventeenth century than in either the fourteenth or the fifteenth. Whoever would explain the origin and causes of the Protestant Reformation must study profoundly the heresies, political movements, and social changes of the last three centuries of the Middle Ages. They will find its origin and causes in these heresies, and in the growth of nationalism* and royalism, or absolute monarchy, more especially in Germany, France, and England. These heresies, essentially Protestant, were then, it is true, openly professed by a smaller number than in the sixteenth century; but there is no lack of evidence that they were professed in a secret society, which spread over a large part of Europe, and to which belonged kings and emperors, princes and nobles, bishops and presbyters, courtiers and bards, lawyers and counsellors of popes and of monarchs,—nominally, sometimes ostentatiously, Catholic in public, before the Church and the world, enjoying her honors, fattening on her revenues, and using their position to undermine the Papal authority, and to render Catholicity odious. So were organized, and so acted, the formidable body of heretics known in history as Patarins, Cathares, or Albigenses, now conceded to have been Manichæans, and therefore a branch of the old Gnostic family, and whose abominable doctrines and abominable practices are still far in advance of the great body of modern Protestants.

* It may be necessary to say here to those who misunderstand, and insist on misunderstanding, our remarks on Native Americanism in our Review for last July, that we mean here nothing against the preference of our own nation, and conformity to its general spirit and character, in subordination to the law of God. In our remarks on Native Americanism we merely spoke against offering a gratuitous offence to the American nationality, and attempting to subordinate it to a foreign nationality. In relation to foreign nationalities, be they what they may, we assert the right of American nationality to reign on American soil, and insist on the duty of all naturalized citizens to conform to it, and of all foreign residents to treat it with respect. But in relation to religion, to the law of God and its requirements, we know no nationality. So long as nationality confines itself to the temporal order, we respect it, and are, perhaps, as intensely national as any one; but when nationality seeks to enter into the spiritual order, and to make itself supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals, we call it *nationalism*, and oppose it as hostile to religion, which, if religion, is and must be Catholic, not national. By nationalism we do not understand the love and support of our own nation in preference to every other, but that abuse of the national spirit which would subject everything, religion as well as politics, to itself, which is simply gentilism.

We regard modern Protestantism as the lineal descendant of the Patarin or Albigensian heresy of the thirteenth century; in fact, as only a continuation, with various modifications of ancient Gnosticism, which at different epochs showed itself openly, and at others concealed itself in the bosom of the Church as an occult heresy, wearing the external garb of Catholicity, and speaking its language, though with a sense of its own, as in the *Divina Commedia* of Dante, the Sonnets of Petrarca, the Lays and Roundelays of the Troubadours of Provence, and the poems of the Ghibelline poets generally. It was obliged to conceal itself during the Middle Ages, because nationalism and royalism were too weak to permit them to set at defiance the public law and the Catholic organization of Europe. In the sixteenth century this ceased to be the case, and they could openly avow themselves. Through their own secret exertions, the natural course of events, the efforts of the German Emperors, and the sacrilegious attacks on the Papacy in the person of Boniface the Eighth by Philip the Fair of France, who appealed to the French nation and invoked the States General to sustain him, nationalism, that is, gentilism, was revived, and royalism, or centralized monarchy, was introduced and consolidated. Royalism became independent, and the way was prepared for monarchy to become absolute. The Emperor and the Ghibelline princes rendered Italy a scene of anarchy and confusion, of rapine and bloodshed, and compelled the Popes to seek security by deserting Rome and taking up their residence at Avignon. This brought the Roman court under French influence, filled the Sacred College with French cardinals, and prepared the way for the great Western schism, which greatly impaired the power of the Holy See, depreciated the Papacy in the popular estimation, and gave to nationalism and royalism the predominance throughout Christendom. We see this in the Council of Constance, where princes and their ambassadors play so distinguished a part, and where in the earlier sessions the unheard of anomaly is introduced of voting by nations. The Papacy, it is true, was not without lustre under the pontificates of Martin the Fifth, Eugenius the Fourth, Nicholas the Fifth, and Calixtus the Third; but it never, till after the Reformation, if even then, recovered its former splendor, and Julius the Second is obliged to place himself as an Italian prince at

the head of his troops, to defend the patrimony of St. Peter against the professedly *Catholic* invaders. Nationalism was so strong and royalism so much in the ascendancy in 1517, the date of Luther's thesis against Indulgences, that heretics, as to this world, had little to fear from any source except the temporal prince — in his heart anti-Papal, and supporting Catholicity, if at all, only from policy — and the national sentiment, always, in so far as national in spiritual matters, anti-Catholic. They were then in most places free to throw off the mask, and to do openly what they had long been doing, not without success, in secret; and it is probable that the open position assumed by Luther really weakened their power, and served, instead of injuring, the cause of Catholicity.

The Protestant Reformation, as we regard it, was not so much a falling away from the Church of those who were really Catholics, as the coming forth from her communion of those who had previously been in it without being of it; and we must explain the rapid and almost marvellous diffusion of Protestantism as soon as publicly proclaimed, by the occult heresy, more or less developed, with which the population that voluntarily embraced it were already infected. Whether the secret organization of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries continued down to the sixteenth, we are unable to say; but that it did to some extent is probable, and hence, perhaps, the reason why the reform broke out on so many points of Europe almost simultaneously. But be this as it may, the enemies of the Church certainly had not decreased in number during the wars and revolutions of the fifteenth century, and this much must be conceded, that Luther found a large part of Europe either totally ignorant of the Catholic religion, or but feebly attached to it. The intelligent Catholic of to-day can see nothing in the doctrines or the practices of the Reformers calculated to make a favorable impression on a Catholic mind or heart, and he is unable to believe that they ever gained one real convert to the reform. Protestantism promised something to the licentious, to populations impatient of restraint, weary of fasts and vigils, of works of mortification and penance, and who wished to find an easier road to heaven than that of self-denial and the crucifixion of the flesh, or of that inward purity and sanctity, sound faith and true charity; but its doctrines, together

with the arguments by which the Reformers sustained them, never could have produced any serious effect, or served any other purpose than that of shocking or disgusting the Catholic who understood and was attached to his religion. Indeed, sincere and intelligent Catholics were shocked and disgusted, and in no instance attracted or captivated by the Reformed religion. They could hardly believe the Reformers to be serious, or be brought to put forth their full force in combating them. This is evident from the conciliatory policy pursued towards them by Pope Adrian the Sixth, and which, if we were to judge the policy of the Vicar of Jesus Christ after our human modes of judging, which we do not allow ourselves to do, proved so disastrous. It is therefore quite evident to us, that the mass of those who joined the Reform movement of their own accord, without being forced to do so by the civil authority, were already heretics, or heretically inclined, — were already anti-Papal and anti-Catholic.

The remote causes of the Protestant Reformation were of course in the general causes of all heresy, as well as of ancient Gentilism; but its proximate and more special causes, regarded simply as an anti-Catholic outbreak, are, we think, to be found historically and philosophically in the growth and ascendancy of royalism and nationalism from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, or, in one word, in what in more recent times is called *Gallicanism*. The Christian religion is catholic, cosmopolitan, and takes its stand on an elevation above all particularism and all nationalism. It has no distinctive nationality, and the believer, as a disciple of Jesus Christ and member of his mystical body, has no national character, and no country, no *patria* but heaven, from which he regards himself as an exile, and to which he longs to return. On this earth he has no home, no abiding-place. He is a pilgrim and a sojourner here, seeking a city whose builder and maker is God. Catholicity rising thus above all national distinctions, and thus condemning all nationalism whenever that nationalism would rise above the temporal order and interfere with things spiritual, has naturally for its enemies all in whom the spirit of nationality predominates. We see this in the Jews who appealed to the sentiment of Jewish nationality against our Lord, saying, "If you let this man go on, the *Romans* will come and take away our name and nation."

Every nation is by its own national spirit exclusive and tyrannical. It seeks to render all that concerns it national, and labors incessantly to be a world in itself, to have a religion, as well as laws and institutions, manners and customs, of its own. We see this in the history of Gentilism, in which each nation had its peculiar national religion, and every one was required to conform to the religion of his nation. Nationalism, through the influence of the Church, the kings and emperors of the Carolingian race, during the centuries commonly called the "Dark Ages," — so called because religion took precedence of politics, and Catholicity of nationalism, — was kept subordinate, and was unable to exert any controlling influence on politics or religion. But as the irruption of barbarians ceased, and the nationalities long held in abeyance began to declare themselves, and national governments were formed throughout most of Europe, it escaped from its subjection, and became in some sense, as it had not been before, the basis of the political order.

In the governments organized under the auspices of the Church after the downfall of the Roman Empire of the West, monarchy indeed had a place; but not monarchy in its modern sense. In them all, it was tempered by estates and corporations. It was in all cases elective, and restricted in its powers by the rights of the municipalities, and by the nobles or vassals of the crown, often in wealth and power hardly inferior to the suzerain himself. We pretend not that this constitution was perfect; no political constitution ever yet existed without its imperfections. The barons often, no doubt, oppressed the people, often were turbulent and abused their power, while the monarch was too weak to restrain or to punish their violence. But if it did not guard against the evils of weakness in the crown, it did avoid those of a centralized royalism. In no instance under that constitution could any sovereign say, with Louis the Fourteenth, "I am the state." But in the thirteenth century we see a movement on the part of the sovereigns to get rid of this constitution, and to centralize the power in the crown. This movement in France begins with the reign of Philip Augustus, the real founder of the French monarchy. A similar movement is made by the German Emperors, which only partially succeeds, and by the English kings, which succeeds only under

the Tudors in the fifteenth century. The aim was to centralize and consolidate the monarchy, and to render the monarch absolute, after the model of the Byzantine or Eastern Emperors.

The chief obstacle the monarchs, as well as nationalism, had to overcome in this enterprise, was in the Papal constitution of the Church. To attain their end, they must trample on vested rights, rights of the Church herself, rights of their vassals, and rights of the municipalities, and the Church always and everywhere insists on the inviolability of all rights, whether natural or acquired. The first thing to be done was therefore to break the power of the Church, which could be done only by destroying or abasing the Papacy. Hence the sovereigns, for centuries, with varying success, but with little relaxation, carried on a war against the Papacy, the divinely instituted guardian of all rights, and thus gave to royalism an anti-Papal character, and made the temporal sovereign the antagonist of the Pope. In this sacrilegious war they appealed to national pride, national jealousies, prejudices, ambition, and intolerance, to sustain them. They placed the nation before the Church, and studied to make themselves national. They appealed to the sentiment of national independence, national power, and national glory, and made of royalism, as representing the nation, a species of popular idolatry. Courtly prelates held their peace, or smiled assent, and courtly lawyers searched the Institutes, Pandects, and Codes, and turned over Ulpian and Papinian to find, which was not difficult, maxims favorable to the royal power. Whoever refused to bow down and worship the new idol that was set up was declared disloyal, an enemy to the king, and worthy of exile or death. *Quod placuit principi, id legis habet vigorem*, became the fundamental maxim of the new Cæsarism, as it had been of the old, and the pleasure of the prince was to be done, let the Church say what she might to the contrary. The Church was in the royal and popular mind subordinated to the nation, and the Pope to the temporal monarch. The head of the Church must give way to the pleasure of the head of the State, and the good citizen or subject, in case of conflict, must obey the king in preference to the Vicar of Jesus Christ. The lawyers and courtly prelates and doctors even found out that a Catholic, at

the command of the king, might lawfully bear arms against the visible head of his Church! The person of the king was sacred and inviolable, but not that of the Pope, at least in the estimation of the degenerate grandson of St. Louis and his courtiers, as was proved in his treatment of Boniface the Eighth.

The monarch, in carrying on his war against the Papacy, used both the Lords and the Commons. The feudal lords, being in their own feudal territories petty sovereigns, imagined that their interests and those of the monarch were the same, and they sustained him, till he felt himself strong enough to attack them in their privileges, and then they found that they were too weak to resist him. The people, finding often a protector in the king against their more immediate masters, and being the depositaries of all that is exclusive in nationality, supported him with right good will, — their time to set up for themselves, and to treat him as he treated the Pope, not having yet come. Thus aided, royalism emancipated itself from all spiritual direction, and supplanted in the national mind and heart the Papacy. Those who adhered to the party of the Pope against the party of the king were, as a term of reproach, called *Papists* or *Papists*. Royalism encroached everywhere on the spiritual power. The king obtained the nomination of bishops, and filled the sees with his creatures; he passed statutes of *præmunire* and against *provisors*, and dictated the terms on which he would tolerate the Church in his dominions. He denied the authority of the Church over her own temporalities, and, as far as was possible without open schism, deprived her of all external authority. He made her all but national in his kingdom, and himself her external head, very nearly her Pontifex Maximus. It would seem that in all, save mere form, the bishops depended on the sovereign, and in no case were they to obey the Pope without the royal permission. Hence the Church in each nation seems to hold from the temporal lord, and to be bound to consult the royal pleasure. It is royal, not Papal, and it is only by the royal condescension that the Pope is permitted to interfere in its affairs. The people look no longer to Rome for direction; they look only to their sovereign, and care little what they do or believe, if sure of his approbation or connivance.

Such was the state of things throughout no small part
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of Europe at the epoch of the Reformation. Luther hesitates not through fear of the Pope, or dread of spiritual censures, at which he mocks, but only through fear of his temporal sovereign; and he speaks out boldly as soon as he has made sure of the protection of the powerful Elector of Saxony.

The great majority of European sovereigns for three centuries had been anti-Papal. By the centralization and consolidation of royalism, and the control they usurped in spiritual matters, they had succeeded in making large numbers of the people virtually Protestant, and formally Gallican. It is to be remarked, that, though the very soul of Luther's movement was hostility to the Papacy, his Catholic opponents hardly attempt its defence. They seem willing to let controversy turn on dogma, to be decided by an appeal to the Scriptures. It was the Gallicanism of the secular courts, that is, the ascendancy of royalism and nationalism, that prepared the way for the Protestant movement, and rendered it feasible for the occult heresies of ages to throw off all disguise and to avow themselves openly; as it was the Gallicanism, the royalism and nationalism, of Louis the Fourteenth that emboldened Jansenism, that subtlest form of Protestantism, to declare itself, as an able writer in a recent number of *The Dublin Review* historically proves. Even the great Bossuet, who drew up the Four Articles, while he leaves no stone unturned to procure the condemnation of certain inaccurate expressions in the *Maxims of the Saints*, writes a preface to a new edition of the *Moral Reflections*, and treats the Jansenists with great consideration and tenderness, though himself no Jansenist.

We agree with Protestant historians, that society in the sixteenth century was in a most wretched state, and that, though not in their sense, there was a loud call for a reformation. The ascendancy of royalism, and its anti-Papal tendency, had interfered with ecclesiastical discipline, had favored false and dangerous modes of thought and expression, and prevented the Church from applying in the proper place and at the proper time the appropriate remedy. Rome taught one doctrine and the courts another, and the latter were believed instead of the former. The people to a fearful extent were taught only a mutilated Catholicity, because the temporal authority would tolerate no other,

because pastors neglected their duty ; bishops and priests turned against the Pope, and found in their royal masters a ready support in their opposition. The mass of the people throughout no small part of Europe knew hardly the simplest elements of the Catholic religion. They may have been able to recite the Apostles' Creed and a prayer or two, but beyond they knew little or nothing. Even in the theological schools of Germany theology could have been but imperfectly taught, if we may credit at all Luther's own account of his doubts and scruples. His doctrine of justification by faith alone betrays an ignorance of Catholic theology as great as that which it betrays of the Holy Scriptures. So far as Catholic doctrines are concerned, all religiously-minded Protestants to-day would pronounce them infinitely more solid and reasonable than the opposing Protestant doctrines, if they only thoroughly understood them. The faithful and the great body of the clergy seem to have been taken by surprise, and not to have known how to meet the Reform movement ; and, notwithstanding all M. Audin says to the contrary, we cannot help thinking that the controversy, at least in the beginning, was to a great extent blunderingly conducted on the side of the Catholic party. Evidently there was a great ignorance of Catholic doctrine at the time upon the part of the clergy, or a great want of belief in Catholicity. In Germany they were lamentably defective. Many of the bishops even suffered themselves to be carried away with the movement, and of those who remained faithful, not one whose name has reached us proved himself equal to the emergency. In England all the bishops, save one, the Bishop of Rochester, yielded to the demand of the lustful Henry, and even he at first gave his assent to the royal supremacy, — an assent which every tyro in Catholic theology knows could not be given without a virtual renunciation of Catholicity, a renunciation never for a moment contemplated by the noble Bishop, as his subsequent conduct amply proves. His assent, though subsequently retracted, shows how little even the better class of Catholics in that age were accustomed to study the Papal constitution of the Church, and how far they were from regarding that constitution as essential to her existence, and to her unity and catholicity. The truth is, the mass of the Catholics in the sixteenth century, and even long before, had ceased to be genuine Papists ;

they were royalists, preferring, save in the internal order, royalty to the Papacy, and therefore, where royalty commanded them to break with the Holy See, and throw off its external authority, they either obeyed, or remained at a loss to know on what ground to defend their disobedience.

This state of things, so disheartening to the Catholic and so favorable to the Reformers, we attribute, after the depravity of human nature, to the growth of nationalism and the ascendancy of royalism, which prevented the Church from duly instructing her children, and from freely and fully exercising her spiritual discipline. St. Liguori somewhere says, that from the tenth century to the sixteenth, those who received Holy Communion even once during their whole lives were rare exceptions. Very few except religious ever approached the sacraments. We may judge from this in what moral and spiritual state the monk Luther found the Catholic world. And yet these were called the Ages of Faith, as Dante, Petrarca, and the Provençal Troubadours are called *Catholic* poets and bards! All went wrong as soon as kings undertook to be fathers of the Church, and began to support her, if at all, from state policy, instead of honest principle and pious affection; and precious little gratitude does the Church owe to royalism, which has often oppressed her, often persecuted her, and never rendered her any real service. There never was a greater mistake than that committed by modern liberals in alleging that royalty and Catholicity are natural allies. For these six hundred years scarcely a European court has rendered the Church any service but at the price of some concession from her, which weakened her power and strengthened that of her royal rival. To the officious support and officious interference of royalism, as well as to its arbitrary measures against her, we owe most of the scandals which stand out on the canvas of her history, and which are so often and so maliciously cited against her. In a spiritual as well as in a temporal point of view, royalism for six hundred years has been the curse of Europe, and that it has not been a still greater curse is owing to the superhuman struggles of the Papacy against it.

In relation to what went before it, we can hardly regard the Protestant Reformation as an untoward event. In it the peccant humors which had long infected the Catholic

body came to a head, broke, and were carried off. From the day that Luther, amid the crowd of his students and followers, burnt at Wittenberg the Papal Bull, the heart of the Catholic began to beat more freely. The class who had impeded the exertions of the Church went out from her, and sound doctrine and holy discipline became once more possible. They who would not become heretics, were forced to take the Catholic side in downright earnest. Royalism itself, as after 1848, became frightened at the revolutionary character of the Reformation, as exhibited in the insurrection of the Westphalian peasants, and felt it necessary to allow the Church, for a time at least, a freedom of action which it had hitherto denied her, and to suffer her to teach the faithful a sound and un mutilated Catholicity. The holy Council of Trent, that great fact of modern history, was convoked, and a Catholic reaction commenced, and, aided by the brave and persevering sons of Loyola, continued without interruption, till checked by nationalism, represented by that unfaithful prince of the Church, Cardinal Richelieu, who dragooned the Protestants into submission in France, and aided them with his policy and troops to subject Catholics in Germany, and by royalism in Louis the Fourteenth, who opened the way for Jansenism, infidelity, and the Revolution of 1789.

The whole history of the Church proves that there is little to fear from heresy, when unaided or unprotected by the civil power. Every heresy that has made much progress has been a heresy that enlisted on its side either royalism or nationalism, and found some temporal prince or authority to protect it, if not openly, at least secretly. The history of the Reformation proves that heresy is formidable only when it assumes the form of royalism or nationalism, and appeals to national exclusiveness and temporal supremacy. Nearly all heresy seems to know this by instinct, and hence the point first attacked is not the Church in her dogmas, her sacraments, or her worship, but the Church in her polity, as the visible kingdom of Christ upon earth, instituted by him for the government of all men and nations in all things pertaining to eternal salvation. The Papal constitution of the Church gives unity and strength to the spiritual authority, and makes the Church one and universal, and in all that is highest and best obliterates all national distinctions, and disregards all the prejudices of blood and

diversities of race. Royalism — by which we mean not precisely the monarchical constitution of the state, but the assertion of the monarch as the state — and nationalism are by their own nature hostile to it, and consequently are the two things against which the Catholic must always be on his guard. Without the Papacy the Church cannot be maintained as one and catholic. Destroy the Papacy or reduce the primacy of Peter to a mere primacy of order, and you cannot prevent religion in any particular nation from becoming a purely national religion, and therefore the slave either of the state or of the national sentiment. It was the national pride of England, wounded by belonging to a Church whose visible chief resided out of the realm, that led her into schism. The Church in England, yielding to this national pride, became a national church, a snug little English Church, as if there had been a particular English God, and an English Jesus Christ, and in so doing lost her independence, and became the slave of the state, and her chief function is to wait upon gentlemen's younger sons, and provide them with fat livings. Wherever the Church throws off the Papacy it becomes national, and wherever it becomes national, it falls under the secular authority or the tyranny of public opinion. Nationalism and royalism gained the ascendancy in the Eastern Empire, and induced the Greek Church to deny the supremacy of Peter. From that moment the Greek Church became the slave or the tool of the Byzantine court, — as infamous a court, perhaps, if we except that of Russia in the eighteenth century, as ever existed in a nominally Christian country. Wherever a non-Papal religion is established, it is bound hand and foot by the secular order. So it is in Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, England, Scotland, Holland, Prussia, the Swiss Cantons, and the smaller Protestant states and principalities of Germany. Catholics themselves do not seem to us to be always sufficiently aware of the absolute necessity of the Papacy to the maintenance of the unity and catholicity, and therefore the freedom and independence, of the Church. They hold, of course, that the Church is Papal, for they could not be Catholics if they did not; they admit that the Papacy is highly useful in maintaining unity of doctrine and worship; but many of them do not seem to us to perceive that it is essential to the very being of the Catholic Church, and to the freedom

and independence of religion in its conflicts with the powers of this world. Yet they should infer this from the fact that every heresy instinctively makes war on the Papacy. All the great heresies which have prevailed began by disregarding the Papacy, or by attempting to deprive the Holy See of the affection due it, or of some of its prerogatives; and we ought, whenever we meet a disposition to restrict the Papal power, whether in favor of the Episcopacy or the Presbytery, the secular authority or the brotherhood, to suspect it of an heretical tendency. Our Lord founded his Church on Peter, and Peter lives in his successor. *Ubi Petrus, ibi Ecclesia*. We cannot conceive how, without the Papal constitution maintained in its full right and vigor, it would be possible to preserve the Church as a polity, as the visible kingdom of Christ on earth, or the natural supremacy of the moral order in the government of the world.

We have nothing here to say of what is called the temporal power of the Popes, but it were to deny us the right to assert Catholicity itself, to command us to refrain from asserting on all occasions the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, which is nothing else than asserting the freedom of religion and the supremacy of the law of God. The Lord God omnipotent reigneth, King of kings, and Lord of lords, and his will is the supreme law for all persons and dignities, for all men and nations, and in all the relations of life. The Pope and the believer, the bishop and the presbyter, the prince and the subject, the nation and the individual, are alike under this law, and bound to obey it in all things whatsoever. We were false-hearted atheists, we were base recreants to Almighty God, and miserable cravens, if we denied this eternal truth, or feared to assert it. No power, no man, no body of men, has the right to forbid this assertion, for in making it we do but assert the supreme and universal dominion of God, the basis of all authority, of all duty, and of all religion. Even heathen morality itself asserted as much, and it is a sad day if a Christian may not assert as much for the supremacy of the moral order as was asserted by a Socrates, a Plato, a Confucius, or a Cicero. We must assert as much, or assert no morality, no moral obligation at all. The moral order is a real order, it is by its own nature supreme, for neither men nor nations have the right to do wrong. The Church, in regard to this world, was introduced

and constituted to assert and uphold the supremacy of the moral order, and without her that order cannot be effectively asserted or upheld. As long as the Church stands in her freedom and independence, there is one friend to the soul of man, one protector of moral ideas, one shelter to which they who would follow the spirit and live for God can flee from an all-invading and all-absorbing materialism. We, who have been reared in the world outside the Church, feel, perhaps, as those who have been Catholics from their infancy do not and cannot, the incalculable value of this. We have known by bitter experience how the world mocks all our finer and nobler moral aspirations; we know how it chills the soul, and reduces us to a dead and deadening material life. How have we in our non-Catholic days mourned over the hollow morality of the non-Catholic world, its low and unspiritual aims, its want of disinterestedness and love! How have we been frozen by its heartlessness, and its indifference to all that constitutes the true dignity and glory of man! The body and its wants in our non-Catholic world engross every thought, and the soul and its wants are only subjects of pleasant or bitter mockery. In the Church we find all our nobler aspirations respected and cherished, our moral wants are met, our souls are quickened and invigorated by a supernatural spiritualism. We find the supremacy of the moral order asserted, practically asserted, and a man's spiritual worth made the criterion by which his rank is to be determined. All men and things are judged either by the great law of charity or by the eternal law of right and wrong. All the factitious distinctions of rank and race are discarded. All men are brothers, and the poor African slave stands on a level with the most lordly Kaiser, if his equal in spiritual worth. Right and goodness are honored in the lowest, wrong and iniquity are condemned and denounced in the highest. Humble virtue has a friend and protector; haughty vice a stern and inexorable censor. Conscience is respected, and he who acts from it is honored, not scorned or jeered.

We hear in our days much about religious liberty, but few in the non-Catholic world seem to have any understanding of what it means, or of the conditions in God's providence of its maintenance. Religious liberty, if it means anything, means the freedom and independence of the moral order, its emancipation from materialism, — free-

dom of religion, that is, freedom to worship God and to do in all things what he commands, without let or hindrance from kings or Kaisers, princes or nobles, sects or parties, nations or individuals. In this sense we claim religious liberty as the indefeasible right of all men. It is our solemn duty to assert it for every man, and to maintain it against all odds for ourselves. We hold this liberty from God; it is implied in our obligation to worship him, and no human power has the right to restrict it, or in any way to intermeddle with it. It is the right of rights, the liberty of liberties, and we can never consent to part with it. We will carry it with us in poverty and exile, in the dungeon, to the scaffold or the stake; but surrender it we will not. It is the only thing we can call our own, and with it we have all riches, as without it we have nothing. This is the religious liberty which makes martyrs and confessors, and hallows the earth with the blood of the righteous. It is true religious liberty, and the Catholic who will not assert it, and die for it, is a moral coward or a moral traitor, — a Protestant or a Know-Nothing in his heart. As a Catholic, we disown him.

But on what conditions can the external practice of this liberty in such a world as ours be secured? The world, the flesh, and the Devil are opposed to it, princes and secular authorities hate it; for it is something above their power, which they cannot bind by their enactments or subdue by their arms. The flesh detests it, for it is its crucifixion; the world abhors it, for it tramples on the world; the Devil is enraged against it, for it scorns his temptations and defeats his wiles. We can die at its bidding, and conquer them all, and gain a more than royal crown, even the crown of eternal life, bestowed upon us by the right hand of Him who is Lord of all. But, nevertheless, all these make war upon it, and seek to deprive religion of external freedom, that is, *to prevent the maintenance of the moral order in the affairs and government of the world.* To be able under this point of view to withstand them, religious liberty needs an external organization. Conscience must have a visible polity, that is, the Church, the visible kingdom of God on earth. Now, how without the Papacy, with all its rights and prerogatives, can you maintain the freedom and independence of the Church? and how without the freedom and independence of the Church as the

organized protector of the rights of conscience, are you to maintain the freedom of religion in the external affairs of the world? We do not forget that the Church is Episcopal as well as Papal, and that ordinarily it is through the Episcopacy that the Papacy speaks to us; but the Episcopacy without the Papacy were a mere rope of sand. The bishops having no head, no political bond of union, would be obliged to succumb in the first conflict with the secular authority, or with the prejudices of the nation, and would be reduced to the necessity of teaching what the state or nation dictated, and of doing what the state or nation chose to command. Bishops are equal, and each, without the Pope, would be supreme in his own diocese, and exposed to be influenced, even controlled, by the national spirit and character. Who could then call him to account if he was, or if he encroached on the rights of his spiritual subjects? Or where would be the protection of religious liberty against his spiritual tyranny? Who, moreover, would protect him against the lawlessness or rebellion of his flock, and assist him to maintain his proper episcopal authority? Shall he appeal to the temporal power as the proper judge in the case? That would be to subordinate the spiritual to the temporal, and to deny religious liberty in its most essential principle. Certain it is, that religion under the Episcopacy, without the Papacy binding together in one polity all the bishops of all nations, forming thus a universal spiritual kingdom superior in dignity and broader in extent than any earthly kingdom, and organizing through them all the faithful of all nations into one vast spiritual union, as under Presbyterianism, Congregationalism, or individualism, could have neither the moral nor the physical conditions requisite to the maintenance of her freedom and independence. Without the perpetual intervention of miracles, the Church, by ceasing to be catholic, would become enslaved to the temporal order. She would, as the race, be broken into nations, each nation would have its snug little national church, and we should have, as in the ancient Gentile world, as many religions as nations. This is evident from what we see in those European nations that have cast off the Papacy. In those nations there is no religious freedom, except the freedom to die, as under the Pagan Emperors, for religion. Let the national church of any Protestant nation attempt to

assert the freedom of religion, or the supremacy of the moral order, against the national sentiment or the secular authority, and it would soon be made to feel the chains, all gilded as they may be, which bind its limbs. Who has forgotten Queen Elizabeth's letter to her Bishop of Ely? "Proud prelate, I made you, and if you do not stop your insolence, by God, I will unmake you." Let the Anglican, the Prussian, the Danish, Swedish, or Russian Church, dare take a stand in favor of outraged right against the queen, king, or emperor, and it would soon receive a rebuke from royal or imperial lips that it would long remember. Having no support above or beyond the national authority, it has and can have no power to resist that authority, and maintain its freedom in spite of it, unless it be when the secular authority itself has lost its hold upon the nation, and the national sentiment is against it, as was the case in England under James the Second. When the national church can ally itself with the national sentiment against the prince, it may, no doubt, maintain itself against his authority, but it only changes masters; for it then becomes the slave of that same national sentiment which it has invoked to its aid.

It would be the same in Catholic states and nations without the aid derived from the Papacy, and even with all the aid thus derived, it is often very nearly the same. Let the Church in France assert the freedom of religion and the supremacy of the moral order against the French sovereign, and it would be obliged to succumb to the state, and do his Imperial Majesty's will, if it had no reliance on some power out of France. Nothing but the Papacy, strengthening the hands of good Catholics, and thundering its anathemas against the constitutional church and clergy, saved Catholicity in France during the old French Revolution.

In this country, we have no royalism in name, and no national church so denominated, and so far we have an advantage over others. The laws and the national administration recognize true religious liberty. But the laws and administration are for the most part impotent with us against popular sentiment, which can change them at will. Religious liberty here, as a matter of fact, lies at the mercy of the mob. We are a very religious people in our own way, almost every man having a religion of his own; but

the predominant religion, being non-Papal, with no chief and no support independent of the country, is obliged to follow instead of leading, much less resisting, popular sentiment or caprice. All religions are tolerated in so far as they are considered matters of no importance, and in so far as they are by their constitution flexible to public opinion, but no farther. None of the sects is able to assert with any effect the inflexible moral law against the caprices of public opinion, or a public opinion hostile to it, and they all sustain themselves by their suppleness, and extend themselves by adroitly availing themselves of some local or general popular excitement. Against popular opinions, though in favor of truth and justice, the most powerful of them are impotent, and their denunciations are a mere *brutum fulmen*. There is outside and independent of them a power greater than theirs, which says to them, "Thus far you may come, but no farther." Democracy with us takes the place of royalism in the Old World, and THE PEOPLE usurp the functions of the Church. The people make the laws. Any religion may be professed which does not deny their supremacy; but none which by its own constitution and laws is beyond their control. They will permit no church that is incapable of becoming a national church, or that receives its constitution and laws from another or a higher than an American source. Hence their peculiar hostility to the Catholic Church. The madmen leading on the war against her do not know how to state their own objections. They oppose her as anti-American, and as incompatible with the republican form of government, which is ridiculous and absurd. They pretend that we Catholics cannot be loyal citizens. As if our obedience to the Pope was incompatible with our allegiance to the state! Poor fools! they only echo the worn-out allegations of royalism, under cover of which it trampled on all rights, human and divine, natural and acquired, and established pure centralized despotism. The real ground of their opposition to us is, that our Church, being Papal, and therefore essentially one and catholic, cannot be a particular national church, independent of all extra-national ecclesiastical authority. Such is the character of our religion, that it is and must be independent of every national authority, and inflexible before public opinion. It is not that our religion is anti-American, or hostile

to the political institutions of the country, but that it is not and cannot, without losing its identity, be made the slave of the popular will, and alterable at its caprices. It is above the popular power, and does not derive from popular sovereignty. It asserts boldly in the face of the sovereign people, of statesmen, politicians, and demagogues, that God is God, and to worship the king or the people as God is foul idolatry. This is what gives offence and excites the Know-Nothing, or so-called American movement against us. We are members of an invincible and inflexible Catholic Church, teaching all nations and subject to none. We cannot, then, be flexible to all the variations and caprices of "progressive Democracy," and we have a criterion of duty not founded by the people,—a standard of right and wrong not alterable by the variations and changes of sects and parties. It is because we are Papists that we are opposed. If we would give up the Pope, or reduce his primacy to a mere primacy of order, the Know-Nothings would have no serious objection to us, and would count us nearly as good Americans as the Mormons, the Methodists, the Presbyterians, or the Universalists. But the assertion of the Pope as visible head of our Church would excite no hostility against us, did they not see that, as long as we adhere to the Pope, we maintain the supremacy of the moral order, the freedom and independence of religion. They see that our religion cannot be subject either to the national government or the national sentiment; that it is above all secular control, and cannot be reduced to slavery. As their opposition to us is avowedly to us in our character of Papists, it should teach us that the Papacy is the grand support of religious liberty, and that its preservation is the only condition of maintaining the ascendancy of the moral order in the government of the world, or of practically asserting the supremacy for all men and nations of the law of God. This should be enough to bind us to the Holy See, and to induce us in all cases and under all circumstances to rally around the successor of Peter.

The assertion of this doctrine may be offensive, and tend to increase, rather than abate, the hostility already raging so fiercely against us. But the truth is the truth, and it is strong enough to sustain us. We must assert religious liberty, we must assert the independence and

supremacy of the moral order. We must assert Catholicity against nationalism, if we would assert our religion at all, or anything above the materialism of the age. If ever there was a time when it was necessary to make this assertion, it surely is now, when materialism pervades everything, and popular idolatry supersedes the worship of God. Shall God have no voice in this land to speak out in clear and fearless tones for him? religious liberty not a single heroic defender amongst us? A persecution, a bitter persecution, no doubt, awaits us. We have long foreseen and predicted it; but Catholic truth is worth dying for. We are not disposed to court martyrdom, but if it comes, we hope we shall have the grace to meet it at least with resignation. Never yet did the Church flourish in a country till its soil was well watered with the blood of martyrs. The Christians conquered the Roman world not by slaying, but by being slain; and it is only in the same way that the cross will ever become triumphant in this country. Let the Know-Nothings burn our churches, desecrate our altars, mob or massacre our religious, deprive us of our political rights, reduce us to the condition of bondsmen, or shoot us down in the streets or in our houses; they will only hasten, by so doing, the day of our triumph and of their discomfiture.

We might as well be Protestants at once as to waive the Church as a spiritual kingdom or polity, and attempt to escape persecution by explaining away the Papacy into an inoffensive primacy. To do so were to betray the moral order, and to prove ourselves unworthy of the Catholic name. There is little merit in asserting the truth when nobody questions it, or in boldly defending what no one assails. The merit is in defending what is assailed, and in being always ready to assert, if need be with our lives, that precious truth which is the most strenuously denied. It is precisely where the enemy seeks to make a breach that we should take our stand. We are Americans indeed, but we are also Catholics; and as Catholics we are members of a commonwealth broader than that of Massachusetts, than that of the American Union, than all the nations of the earth joined together, — a spiritual commonwealth superior to all others, and to which is due our first and deepest love. Religion is the supreme law, and represents the highest and best. In this spiritual common-

wealth we are all members of Christ's mystical body, and members one of another. Not one of those members can suffer without all the members suffering with it. In this order, this spiritual kingdom, we are not at liberty to think, debate, or vote by nations. We are Catholics, not nationalists. We are not to consult what a narrow and exclusive nationalism demands or would impose, but what is due to our brethren in all countries of the world and in all times, and especially what is due to our Lord who has redeemed us. Everywhere the Church, whose function it is to introduce and sustain the supremacy of the moral order in the government of the world, has to struggle against nationalism and royalism, or the tyranny of the temporal order, which would oppress and enslave her. Everywhere, then, it is necessary to assert and sustain for Catholics the authority of Peter in all its plenitude; for just in proportion as that authority is impaired in the convictions or the affections of the people, is impaired the power of the Church to maintain her independence, and to vindicate the supremacy of right. It is the good of Catholics, the interests of Catholicity everywhere, not merely in our own or any other particular nation, that we are to consult. We are in religion, in all that belongs to the moral or spiritual order, to consider all Catholics as constituting one people, and to know no diversity of race or distinction of nation; for true religion is one for all men, and truth and justice are the same in all ages and in all quarters of the globe. In religion we are and must be Catholics, as our very name asserts, not Americans, Englishmen, Irishmen, Frenchmen, or Dutchmen.'

If this offends American nationalism, it is not our fault; for the moral and religious order is above and paramount to every nationality, and what we thus give to our religion never was and never can be due to any nationality whatever. If a Know-Nothing nationalism takes umbrage at this, and persecutes us for not being national in our religion, it may do so, we cannot help it. Our religion is older and broader than Americanism, and we know no peculiar *American* religion, unless it be Mormonism, — the only religion we know of that can boast an American origin. Catholicity is worth living for and worth dying for. If we are persecuted for asserting it, let it be so, and let us rejoice and be exceeding glad that we are counted wor-

thy to suffer for our Lord Jesus Christ, who gave his life for us. They who persecute us wrong us, and it is better to receive wrong than to do wrong. If we desert Peter, we lose all our support, and can expect no Divine protection; if we adhere firmly to him, with a loving heart, with filial affection and obedience, we know that we are in the way of our duty, and that nothing whatever can harm us; for the words of our Lord are true: "Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock will I build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." All ecclesiastical history proves that the Divine protection never fails those who rally around the Vicar of Jesus Christ, while they who desert him, or depreciate the Papacy and seek to deprive it of its prerogatives, are abandoned to the tender mercies of the enemies of God and his Church.

Neither here nor elsewhere is it possible to conciliate the opposition to Catholics. The pretence is here and everywhere that Catholics cannot be loyal subjects, because they are obedient to the Pope, who must when he commands be obeyed in preference to the state. It is of no avail for us to seek to refute this charge by loud professions of our loyalty, by abusing the Pope hypothetically, or by ransacking history to find instances of Catholics disobeying the Papal mandates. These instances our enemies are sharp-sighted enough to see are not Catholic precedents, and were in violation of Catholic principles. Our enemies do not doubt our loyalty to the state in so far as the state commands nothing contrary to the law of God as interpreted by our Church, that is, in all things temporal. They know that our religion itself commands us to be loyal thus far; but that is not enough for them. Our very offence is, that we do and must make a reservation in favor of spirituals, for they will have the state supreme in all things, and suffer no citizen to recognize in any order any law higher than that of the state, or any authority that does not emanate from the state or is not subject to it. We cannot as Catholics and friends of religious liberty, we cannot as men who understand the rights of the moral order, make the concessions they demand. We must deny the competency of the state in spirituals, and assert the freedom and independence of religion. We do not owe, and cannot honestly profess, our unqualified allegiance to the state, and till we can, we

cannot conciliate our enemies. We may think to do it by professing extreme Gallican views, but the history of the Church proves that Gallicanism, if we so explain it that it remains Catholic, contains the offensive reservation of the freedom and independence of the spiritual order. If we so explain it as to yield that reservation, we explain away our Catholicity itself. Conciliation is therefore impossible, and the opposition must remain and be faced till the state consents to retire within its own sphere, and is content to be supreme in its own order only. This lies in the nature of the case, and as the state will never do this, as it will always be encroaching on the rights of the spiritual order, the life of the Church in this world, as that of the individual Christian, must be an incessant warfare. Here she is and must be the Church Militant. She can throw off her armor and find repose only as she becomes the Church Triumphant in heaven. The only Christian, the only wise or manly course for us, is to stand firm to our principles as Catholics, to be ready to confess Christ whenever called upon, to put our trust in God, and never to fear what an arm of flesh may do to us. God will sustain his Church. He will protect Peter, and reach forth his hand to save him, if apparently sinking in the waves of persecution; he will protect us too, if we bind ourselves to Peter by our filial love and unreserved obedience.

We believe there is to be a trial for Catholics in this country which there is no way of escaping; but we do not fear it. If God be for us, what is there for us to fear? In our patience, let us possess our souls. Persecution will try our faith, but it will bind us Catholics together in a more ardent charity. It will render us less worldly, make us more sober, more devoted to the things of God, and less to the things of sense. It will serve to obliterate the distinctions of race which now produce divisions and uncharitableness among us, and detach us from the debasing world of politics, which has held too prominent a place in our affections. The cold and tepid will be warmed into new life, and demagogues will cease to be rivals of the clergy in their influence over us. Under every point of view we shall gain by what is intended to ruin us, and when the storm of Know-Nothingism, or a despotic nationalism, passes over, which it may do much sooner than most of us expect, the Church will be more firmly established

here than ever. It may be that we need chastisement, and that nothing but a severe chastisement can remove scandals from amongst us, and prepare us to exert that moral weight in the community to which our numbers entitle us.

But we have been betrayed into a line of remark which is somewhat foreign to our main purpose, which was to throw out some suggestions as to the origin and nature of the Protestant movement in the sixteenth century. We certainly have not read all that has been written either by Catholics or Protestants on that movement; but as far as we have read, we think the deeper philosophy of it has not generally been seen, and that a real philosophical History of the Reformation is a desideratum in our literature. We think that it has been regarded too exclusively as a theological movement, and not enough as a movement of royalism and nationalism against the Papacy and the unity and catholicity of the Church as a polity or kingdom. It was an attack on special dogmas, indeed, but still more an attack on the essential and fundamental constitution of the Church, as the divinely instituted kingdom for the assertion and maintenance of the supremacy of the moral and spiritual order in the government of the world, and therefore was, in so far as it succeeded, as Heinrich Heine, that Protestant of the Protestants, has most truly said, "the triumph of sensualism, or the sanctification of the flesh." Regarded in this light, the Protestant movement becomes only a special phase of the general war of the temporal against the spiritual, the flesh against the spirit, the world against God, which has raged from man's first disobedience, and will end only with his last, as we have on so many occasions endeavored to prove.

We have wished also to show that Protestantism was only a development of the anti-Papal doctrines held by nearly all the European sovereigns and court lawyers, whether nominally Catholic or avowedly heretical, from the reign of Philip the Fourth down to the sixteenth century; and therefore for Catholics to defend those doctrines, or to cite the examples they authorized as precedents, is only to play into the hands of our Protestant adversaries, and deprive us of our principal means of support. In the long contests, often severe and bloody, between the Popes and Emperors, between the Holy See and the European monarchies, it should be seen and felt that the Popes were simply the assertors of the supremacy of the law of God,

or of the moral order, and defenders of the freedom and independence of religion, that is, of true religious liberty. They warred for the freedom and independence of the soul against the tyranny of the body, of spiritual liberty against material despotism, and therefore are entitled to the gratitude and love of all who have any just conceptions of what it is that constitutes the true glory and dignity of man. Hence we, as Catholics, instead of being half ashamed of their deeds, apologizing for them, or timidly defending them, should exult in them, and appeal to them as our titles to the gratitude of mankind. Instead of sympathizing with the materialism, the royalism, and nationalism which opposed them, and finally carried away half of Europe from the Church, we should look upon these things as the most dangerous enemies of mankind, as well as the individual soul, and oppose to them a hearty love to the Holy See, and a steady and persevering obedience in all things spiritual to the successor of Peter.

ART. V. — *Russia and the Western Powers.*

A DISTINGUISHED Scottish gentleman, with an historical name, and for whose character, intelligence, and noble purposes we entertain the highest respect, has written us a long letter, complaining of our supposed Russian partialities, and endeavoring to convince us that, as a Catholic in religion and a conservative in politics, we ought to sympathize with France and England in their efforts to resist Russian aggression. We attach so much importance to his communication, and are so willing to listen to all that can be said against Russia from the Catholic and conservative point of view, that we most cheerfully comply with his request, so modestly and respectfully presented, to lay the copy of the communication made to ———, which he incloses, and the more important passages of his letter, before our readers.

“LA RUSSIE UNE PUISSANCE REVOLUTIONNAIRE.

“Le sous-signé ne doute pas que plusieurs des considerations suivantes n'aient déjà fixé l'attention de ceux qui occupent des

places éminentes dans les différents états de l'Europe. Malgré cela il croit remplir un devoir en venant exposer brièvement ses convictions sur ce sujet.

“ Il commencera par faire mention de ses propres expériences.

“ Il y a environ 15 ans que l'Angleterre fut ouvertement menacée d'un mouvement révolutionnaire dans les villes manufacturières, dans le pays de Galles, dans d'autres districts qui abondent en minéraux, et à Londres même. Le mouvement eut lieu de part des *Chartistes*, c'est à dire des ultra libéraux parmi la classe ouvrière. Subitement partout les préparatifs cessèrent sans arriver à aucun résultat excepté dans quelques parties du pays de Galles. La conspiration fut rendue vaine par l'influence d'un très petit nombre de messieurs qui s'étaient familiarisés avec la nature de l'action Russe en Grèce et en Orient. Ils étaient convaincus que non seulement les troubles de l'Occident étaient favorables à la Russie, mais qu'ils étaient fomentés par elle, et ils soupçonnoient même que dans ce cas ci il fallait reconnaître un exemple de son activité.

“ Pleins d'inquiétude ces individus mirent de côté toute repugnance personnelle et visitèrent les principaux chefs *Chartistes*. Ils leur parlèrent franchement du caractère et de l'étendue de l'ambition Russe, et réussirent à intéresser leur patriotisme et leur intelligence. Le chef des *Chartistes* de Londres fut le premier à partager leurs sentiments, — quelque d'autres du Nord suivirent son exemple, et c'est ainsi que toute la conspiration se trouvait paralysée. En un mot plusieurs d'entre eux remirent à ces messieurs quelques portions de leur correspondance secrète, *leur chiffre, et sa clef*.

“ L'origine Russe de ce mouvement était ainsi bien claire. Le chiffre étoit le même que celui dont s'étaient servis les agents Russes en Grèce, et celui qui avait fourni le chiffre avait été quelques années auparavant un agent Russe en Grèce, en Egypte, et en Pologne.

“ Ces messieurs n'ont pas cessé de suivre le sujet afin de le connaître plus à fond. Le sous-signé présente quelques uns des résultats de leurs études, de leurs voyages, de leurs dépenses, et de leurs travaux.

“ Il affirme que la révolution de la Hongrie fut fomentée par la Russie avec l'intention d'affaiblir l'Autriche afin de la mettre ensuite sous le joug d'obligations imaginaires, et avec d'autres vues qu'il serait impossible de détailler ici.

“ On tient aussi les preuves que les agitations politiques de l'Italie sous le règne de Grégoire XVI. furent fomentées par les instruments de la Russie, et qu'à une date antérieure elle avait les Carbonari à sa disposition, au moins depuis 1813-14.

“ L'alliance de l'Angleterre et la France même après 1830 a été rendue — rapport à son but principal qui était d'arrêter la Rus-

sie — presque nulle. L'attention de ces nations fut attirée à des objets erronément choisis, la Russie ayant préparé d'avance des tentations suffisantes. En *Europe* le principal de ces champs d'action fut la Péninsule. La France et l'Angleterre tantôt séparément, tantôt ensemble, furent engagées dans *l'Intervention* et en chaque cas — comme prévu — le résultat fut la dissension mutuelle.

“ Or une telle chose n'était possible que par un grand développement de certains éléments de discorde dans l'Espagne et la Portugal. Ce s'est effectué par un principal événement, c'est à dire, par le soulèvement militaire et libéral de *l'Île de Leon* en 1819. Il y a des preuves suffisantes que ce commencement des troubles de l'Espagne fut entièrement le fruit des intrigues et des dépenses de la Russie.*

“ L'Occident étant ainsi occupé de lui même et ses gouvernements affairés et affaiblis, tout ce qui concernait les buts de l'ambition Russe fut laissé libre pour elle, et, pire encore, fut abandonné entre ses mains par ceux qui étaient en connivence avec elle.

“ Le sous-signé pourrait bien faire mention d'une autre série de résultats, mais il n'en parlera maintenant. Il se contente de diriger l'attention. . . . Il n'entrera dans des explications sur le rôle de plusieurs Anglais qui, généralement supposés d'être stimulés par le zèle libéral, n'ont été en vérité que les instruments du Cabinet Russe.

“ Il n'est donc pas de péril plus grand pour un gouvernement que celui de croire la Russie une puissance qui *craint l'esprit révolutionnaire dans les autres états*. Dans son action extérieure le contraire la caractérise aussi décidément que l'autocratie le fait dans son système intérieur. L'emphase de ses déclarations dans un sens opposé est simplement un voile jusqu'à présent impénétrable du moins pour l'Angleterre. Par ce double caractère son profit est en même temps grand et facile. En secondant les factions, en organisant les conspirations elle occupe les peuples, et en même temps rend les cours ses clientes par ses professions amicales et conservatives.

“ On prend facilement en bonne foi ces professions, puis qu'on la voit elle même despotique. Mais elle a bien calculé son jeu, elle connaît bien sa race, différant tant des autres peuples de l'Europe en langage, en religion, en degrés de culture, et en espoir de do-

* After creating the revolt, all her efforts were bent towards the French Intervention, — which she carried despite the opposition of Louis XVIII. What she feared and what Russia desired was almost accomplished, — the reopening of war between France and England. When the Duc d'Angoulême entered Spain, the liberals in both houses offered to stand by the ministers in a war with France on the Spanish question. The temptation was great, and nearly yielded to.

mination. Les serfs ne sont pas susceptibles des influences qu'elle emploie pour agiter l'Europe, et c'est dans son calcul qu'ils resteront ainsi jusqu'à ce que l'Occident sera devenu, non un exemple qui attire, mais un leçon qui détourne, c'est à dire, corrompu, épuisé, et vassal.

"Le sous-signé ne prétend pas donner des conseils. Il vient simplement déposer ses expériences et ses convictions aux pieds de

"Il n'est poussé que par la connaissance qu'il a de cette conspiration dirigée contre la vie des nations et par la certitude qu'il a que tant que le pouvoir Russe ne sera rompu il n'y aura ni paix pour les sujets ni sécurité pour les trônes.

"(Signed,) _____.

"*Juin, 1854.*"

"*Sept. 8, 1854.*"

"SIR, — On my return from a lengthened tour on the Continent, I have addressed myself to a hasty review of some portions of the Catholic literature produced during my absence. You will not, I trust, think that I flatter, when I say that your Review was turned to by me with eagerness.

"It is seldom indeed that I find any occasion for hesitating to follow the path chosen by you. On one matter only do I venture to do so, — and that is a subject to which I happen to have devoted very many years, and in connection with which I have made many sacrifices.

"A conservative in politics, and, by God's good grace, a Catholic in religion, and personally acquainted with many eminent persons in various states, I trust you will listen to me with more patience than it is in general very easy to accord to the representations of a stranger. I put forward, however, my acquaintance (I might almost say more than acquaintance) with Dr. Newman as a claim to consideration more likely to tell with you than the intercourse which has been allowed to me with many statesmen, — from the late Sir Robert Peel and others in England, to Cardinal Antonelli and various diplomatists, either at this moment or lately in important office in England or on the Continent. Finally, as an English University man, you will perhaps allow to my few words that tentative acceptance which you might possibly refuse to an unknown person speaking on a class of subjects beyond the as yet familiar matter of politics.

"I allude to your estimate of the character of Russia.

"You, like the majority of my countrymen, think her *conservative*, an element among the nations of obedience, — of permanence, — of respect between man and man, — of faith and worship, and all that is warred against by the Revolution.

"I *know* her to have labored in the opposite sense.

"Schisms, heresies, false and wild speculation, civil and religious discontents, conspiracies, outbreaks, revolutions, — these have been the familiar weapons for her use and profit, for *at least* twenty years previous to the great French Revolution down to the present hour. I repeat with confidence that the corruption of Europe has, more than any other department of activity, been pursued without cessation, and with scientific judgment, by the power to which we were complacently condescending to impart what we thought a boon, — our polish, our 'civilization.'

"By sufficient research you will find that she it was who ripened the seeds (certainly of themselves sufficiently vigorous) of 'the' French Revolution. I am myself personally cognizant of some portion of her share in various subsequent convulsions. But it is vain to enter into such a subject by any ordinary correspondence.

"Permit me to send you a miserably meagre outline of some only of its branches. It is a paper very slightly modified and curtailed from one which I drew up for ———— some time ago. . . .

"This, sir, is a very serious and weighty subject. It lies at the very root of modern events, and is the key of history for many years. If I am wrong, how greatly and how perversely so! If right, how fatal to Europe and to more than Europe the error that interior despotism and a high tone of absolutism are a guaranty that the great Russian power is a defence to *us* of order and of traditions? If we think so, while she is in reality industrious and inventive on the other side, — while she is in reality laboring for the dissolution and mutual collision of states, — she is mistress of the game, and can scarcely fail to work out of it her objects of national ambition.

"There is, sir, only one element tending to mould events which Russia has not taken thoroughly and justly into calculation. She has not believed in, and therefore not appreciated as an element, the *Church of God*. She has not believed in the supernatural working for the Chair of Peter, — using insignificant instruments, — turning the moments of the Church's apparent defeat into the occasions of her success.

"But for this, were it only the human material of opinions, passions, forms of government, conspiracies, armies, the press, and all the rest, Russia would be right in all her hopes, her immense designs would be very far from insanity. And it is not that Catholics any more than others see and understand her; it is simply that God's good providence must in the *ecclesiastical* field secure her defeat, though whether before or after the further downfall of nations, I in no degree pretend to calculate.

"I will not enter into the question of the justice or injustice of her present attack on Turkey. Most sure I am that it is unjust, but it must rest undiscussed. Nor will I touch on the question

whether the Turk is at present the power against whom the Church and the State of Christendom have to be *especially* on the alert, or whether his past and present sins directly concern us in the same way, and to the same degree, with those of Russia; whether it is the Turk or the Russian who is braced to deeply laid designs against the independence of states, — against the security of Rome, — against the order and the strength which do not oppose vast aspirations for dominion; for I know that the most perfect exposition of these topics would give but a barren result in the way of convincing a mind which had honestly set itself to the contest with revolution, and at the same time fancied that Russia had *hitherto* been a fellow-laborer in the same cause. The erroneous sympathy would practically prevail over all logic and all facts.

“Allow me to suggest one consideration. The line upon which you have entered is in opposition to what I knew of the thoughts of many of the best Catholics and wisest men. It is in opposition to that of most worth naming in Rome, I may almost venture to say of the Holy Father himself. It is in opposition to that of the majority of the French Bishops and a vast number of the clergy, — I should suppose of far the greater number. It is thoroughly in opposition to that of the Bishops of Austria and Prussia. But you are in the same line with the ultra *Protestant* and ultra *Russian* organ of Berlin, the *Kreutz-zeitung*, — with that of the precisely similar organ in Holland, — with that of the extreme revolutionists of Italy, France, and Spain. That all these *should* take the line which they take is no surprise to me. That the true leader of the Greek schism should stir heaven and earth against ‘the Latins’ is natural, — that he should try to weaken and corrupt that Europe which otherwise would be tenfold too strong and too clear-sighted and upright for him, — all this is natural; it is natural, too, that the other enemies of ‘the Latins’ and of the existing order of the state should be his instruments and allies.

“Russia would not enter Constantinople to-morrow if the Turk wished him. She knows that Europe would not bear it. Europe therefore must be brought to the condition where she will bear it, — that is, after more wars, more revolutions, more exhaustion, more dreams, and more despair. This is the simple key to Russian policy.

“It would oblige me if you would read the inclosed paper. It, or a nearly similar document, has been received with interest by more than one personage of some experience in European affairs. I would almost ask you to print it in your Review as a fair tribute to opposite views, and as a paper which, as a fact, has been respectfully acknowledged in high quarters. Any passages in further illustration of the side of the question from my letter are also very much at your service.

“I remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant.”

We think our Scottish correspondent has not quite understood our position with regard to Russia. We are not, and never have been, the partisan of the autocrat, and whoever will do us the honor to read the first article in our Review for January, 1852, will perceive that resistance to the further advance of Russia was a leading feature of the policy we ventured to recommend to the Catholic statesmen of Europe. That article, we may remark by the way, was written and in type before Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* of December, 1851, when the more immediate danger seemed to be from the temporary triumph of demagoguery, of which France was the focus. The policy we recommended had for its object to resist, on the one hand, the advance of the demagogic despotism, or centralized democracy, — what in this country we call radicalism, — and on the other, centralized royalism, or the monarchical absolutism represented by Russia. This end, we contended then, and contend now, can be secured only by strengthening Austria as the great central power, so as to render her able always to mediate between Russia and the Western powers. We made Austria — we should have said Germany, if German unity had not been lost — the pivot of our European policy, and not Turkey, an infidel and barbarous power. We are, then, Austrian rather than Russian. But we are Austrian only in the respect that Austria happens to occupy a central position in Europe, and is for that reason fitted to mediate between the East and West; not because we prefer Austrians to Frenchmen or Englishmen, or have any partiality for what has been the general policy of Austria for the last hundred years.

We have never relied on Russia as a conservative power in Europe, or as a bulwark against the demagogical party; for she inherits the old Byzantine politics, and carries with her that imperial despotism or Cæsarism, wherever she goes, which we hardly prefer, perhaps which we do not prefer, to Jacobinism itself. We have always been aware that Russia is a schismatic and strongly anti-Catholic power; but we have never regarded the Greek schism as worse than English or Scottish heresy, or Russia as more decidedly anti-Catholic than Great Britain, or than even the French government has often proved itself. Every absolute or despotic government is hostile to Catholicity, and in regard to religion even the English government, through

its intense nationalism, is despotic. Indeed, we hope nothing for Catholicity from any European government, for the secular courts have long since ceased to be governed in regard to religion by any other views than those of state policy, and religion suffers nearly as much from those whose policy leads them to protect it, as from those whose policy leads them to oppose it. They will all sustain the Church so far as they can use her; none of them will do it any further, if they can help it, or hesitate to oppose her if they find her in their way. Catholicity, we therefore considered, could gain nothing in the struggle, whichever party might triumph, and would suffer about equally whether the Western powers or Russia were defeated.

We, of course, treat with great respect the opinion of the bishops and clergy of Europe, which our correspondent cites against us, but we suppose the question is one on which we are free to form our own opinion. What the opinion of the Holy Father is, we do not think is known by any one, and till it is officially expressed, we can make no use of it one way or another. His position is a delicate one. There are Catholic interests to be looked after in Russia as well as in France and Great Britain, and it is not the part of good Catholics to do or say anything that might embarrass him in regard to them anywhere. We have not understood that a crusade has been preached against Russia, and we do not think Great Britain likely to enlist in a war for the promotion of Catholic interests; we agree, however, that at the present moment Russia is a more formidable enemy of the Church than Turkey, but whether she is more so than Turkey would be under the tutelage of the British government, and administered by the British minister resident at Constantinople, may well be a question. The worst enemies of the Catholics in the East are the Protestant missionaries, and these are under the special protection of the British government. The policy of the British government in the East is to Protestantize it, or, what is nearly the same thing, to render it indifferent to all religion, whether Christian or Mahometan. The *civilization* it is urging upon the Turks places the Bible and the Koran in the same category, and rejects both as of no more value than the last year's almanac. The French government, through fear of disturbing the *entente cordiale* between England and France, will favor the same policy.

We have yet to find an instance in which the French government ever supported Catholic interests at the hazard of political interests. It sacrificed the Jesuits and their missions among our North American Indians to its political policy, as it favored them only as a means of extending French influence with the Indian tribes.

Our correspondent gives us some evidence of Russian intrigues with the revolutionary party in Europe, which had not reached us before; but in so doing he only proves that Russia is in this respect no better than England or France, which we are not disposed to dispute. If Russian intrigue has produced many of the troubles in Italy during the last twenty years, English and French intrigue has probably produced many more of them. Our correspondent should not forget Lord Minto's mission to Italy in 1847, designed, by appeals to the revolutionary party, to thwart the efforts of France under Guizot to introduce the political reforms needed in the Continental states through the legitimate and orderly action of the sovereigns, nor that England is the home of Kossuth and Mazzini, whence they organize their revolutionary plans against the peace of Europe. Ever since 1822, Great Britain has been the well-known ally of the revolutionary party on the Continent. The Russian interference in Spain was doubtless intended to disturb the union of France and England, formed, avowedly, in an interest adverse to Russia. Why she attempted the Quixotic enterprise of revolutionizing England through a contemptible Chartist insurrection, we do not know. If she did any such thing, she acted without her usual shrewdness. If she interfered in Belgium, and induced the Belgians to revolt against William the First, she did what we as a Catholic dare say was a good act. Our correspondent cannot approve the act of the Congress of Vienna that annexed Belgium to the Dutch Netherlands, or really think that the Catholic interests of Belgium have suffered by being emancipated from the oppressions of the bigoted Calvinistic king of the Netherlands. For our part, we think the Belgians needed very little urging from Russia to seek to throw off an oppressive rule, which had been imposed upon them without a shadow of right, by a most arbitrary exercise of power.

Indeed, we cannot but suspect that our correspondent attributes to Russia too large a share in the revolutions of Europe, and has seen her hand sometimes where it was

not. We would as soon believe that she induced the British ministry to adopt the policy of raising a revenue from the Colonies, and then stirred up the Colonies to resist, and thus brought about our independence and the establishment of American republicanism, as that she by her intrigues brought about the French Revolution of 1789. The French revolutionists were no more moved by the instigation of Russia, than ours were by the instigation of France. In both cases there were internal causes operating adequate to the effect produced.

That Russia has at the present moment a good understanding with the ultra revolutionists of Italy, France, and Spain is very probable, as it is equally probable that the Western powers have a good understanding with the revolutionary party in Germany, and the disaffected among the Poles; but in the beginning of the struggle, the sympathies of the revolutionists were everywhere with the Turk. If not, why did they flock to his support, and seek service in his armies? That, since liberty is crushed in France, and there is some prospect that Austria, whom the liberals hate far more than they do Russia, will make common cause with the Western powers, the revolutionists have been willing to communicate with Russian agents, we can believe, and that Russia should seek through them to impede the operations of the Allies against her, is not at all unlikely. It is no more than is customary in time of war, and no more than the Allies themselves would do, were they in her place, and she in theirs. The first aim of Italian liberals, and that in which nearly all Italians are agreed, is to drive the Austrians out of Italy, and to reserve Italy for the Italians as an independent state. This is a patriotic aim, and could we see any prospect of a united Italy under native rulers, competent to protect really Italian interests against France and Austria, and, above all, against the anti-Catholic demagogues of the peninsula, we should approve it with all our heart. But such an Italy is an impracticable dream. Italian unity has no existence. But that Italians should be impatient of foreign rule is not strange, and in the present aspect of affairs Russia is the only power to which they can look for sympathy. France, anxious to be on good terms just now with Austria, will not interfere in their behalf, and if she did, it would only be to supplant Austrian by French Cæsarism, not to liberate the Italians.

Thus much we have said, to show, even conceding all that is alleged against her in the communication sent us, that Russia, if not much better, is not much worse than her neighbors. It must not be forgotten that there has been among the Western powers, since Russia advanced to the Black Sea, much intriguing against her, and therefore that it is natural that she should intrigue against them; and the only difference we can see between them is, that she has for the most part been more successful in her diplomacy than they in theirs. That she had something to do with the insurrection of the Greeks which resulted in the establishment of the kingdom of Hellas, we do not doubt, but that insurrection is one which we cannot condemn. And we believe England also had something to do with it. Her ships took part in the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino. That Russia has long contemplated the destruction of the Ottoman Empire may be true; but France, in 1824, agreed with her on a plan for the division of a large portion of its territory between themselves and Austria, and it is well known now that Russia and England had, in 1844, a mutual understanding that, when the time should come, there should be a friendly and peaceful agreement between them as to the division of Turkey. That an end ought to be put to the Ottoman Empire we fully believe, and we have no fault to find with Russia for seeking to do it. That Turkey is not to-day a formidable power to Christian Europe, we owe to the successes of Russian arms against her. But we see as clearly as any one the danger to the rest of Europe in allowing Russia to annex the principal parts of the Turkish dominions to her already overgrown empire.

In the present war, the Western powers, as between them and Russia, appear to us to be in the wrong. They may have sufficient reasons for desiring the power of Russia to be weakened, but they have not, as far as we can judge, alleged a justifiable cause of war against her. They profess to be at war with her as the allies of Turkey, for the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But the maintenance of the independence and integrity of that empire is not, of itself, an object that Christian powers may lawfully undertake; for Turkey is the common enemy of Christendom, and can be supported only as a means of accomplishing an end that

may be lawfully sought independently of her. The Allies cannot plead her quarrel in their justification. They may use her, if they think proper, but only against an enemy with whom on their own account they would have just cause of war. The merits of the dispute between Turkey and Russia cannot enter into the question between them and Russia. Even if they could, it would avail them nothing, for both France and England have acknowledged that Turkey played false, and that Russia had just cause of complaint against her. But, aside from that dispute, the Allies have no legitimate cause of complaint. Russia has done them no injustice, violated none of their rights, broken no obligations contracted with them, and shown no hostile disposition towards them. They are really fighting her, not to redress injuries received, but to prevent injuries which she has the power to do them on some future occasion, although she has shown no intention of doing them. They are acting on the principle of the Connecticut deacon, who called up his sons one Sunday morning and flogged them, not because they had broken the Sabbath, but because he foresaw that they might break it during the course of the day.

The fact is, that in the race for empire Russia threatens to come in ahead of the Western powers, or to be too strong for their interests or policy. But we have no more right to go to war with a nation because it is too strong, than because it is too weak. However formidable may be the power of Russia, the Western powers cannot lawfully declare war against her, unless she abuses her power in regard to them, breaks her obligations to them, and invades their rights, or proves by her conduct that she disregards international law, and will be bound by no faith of treaties. Mere power, however great it may be, cannot outlaw a nation. Russia may have displayed on various occasions an aggressive spirit, but not more so than the Western powers themselves; and since the accession of the present emperor she has manifested very little disposition to extend her territory at the expense of her neighbors, — far less than has been manifested by either France or England. If Nicholas aims to be supreme on the land, Great Britain aims to be supreme on the sea, and we know not why it is not as lawful for him to extend his possessions in Turkey and Persia, as it is for her to extend hers in India, or for France to colonize Africa. Few acts of Rus-

sia can be alleged more in violation of the laws of nations than the destruction of the Danish fleet at Copenhagen by England when professedly at peace with Denmark, or the part she took in the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino, when she was professedly the ally of the Turk. If the past acts of Russia are to be cited, the past acts of France and Great Britain must also be cited; and the aggressions on land of the former, especially under Napoleon the First, and the aggressions of the latter on the sea for a hundred and fifty years, will fully offset those of the Muscovite.

That Russia has attained to an enormous growth, and threatens to exercise a dangerous influence on the internal and external affairs of the rest of Europe, we have no disposition to deny; we are neither her admirer nor her apologist. But we think this is less her fault than the natural result of her advantageous position, and the divisions, political and religious dissensions, and national and commercial rivalries, of the other European powers. We see not how, without a self-restraint, and a chivalric sense of justice, which no nation has the right by its own practice to exact of her, she could help acquiring a preponderating influence in European affairs. Great Britain is strong enough on the sea, but not on the land, and France is too remote to form a sufficient counterpoise to her power. We regret it, for Russia couples with her temporal ambition a fanatical zeal for the Greek schism, and is apparently determined to carry it with her wherever she goes, and to make her national church universal. The Czar aims to be pope as well as autocrat, and supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals, and hence his influence is and cannot but be inimical to religious liberty, the first of all liberties, and the basis and guaranty of all others.

Since Ivan the Third wiped out the last traces of the Tartar conquest, and Ivan the Terrible completed the subjugation of the Church in his dominions to the State, Russia has been steadily developing her internal resources and extending her power and influence abroad. She now embraces, we are told, one seventh of the whole territory of the globe, and a population of sixty millions, — the great bulk of whom are of one and the same race, and speak, with slight variations of dialect, one and the same language. On the north, her empire very nearly belts the

globe; on the west, she touches Norway, Sweden, and Denmark; on the east she touches China, and from Khiva is supposed to menace British India; on the south, she borders on Germany and Austria, and menaces the Bosphorus and the Persian Gulf. She lies, so to speak, in the rear of both Europe and Asia, and may assail either, without being liable to be assailed in return, save at a fearful disadvantage. She has, or threatens to have, by means of the Baltic, the Euxine, the Caspian, the Aral, the Persian Gulf, and the rivers flowing into them, command of the shortest and most desirable routes of the commerce of Europe and Asia. Already has she reduced Sweden and Denmark to mere ciphers, absorbed Poland, broken the Ottoman power, humbled Persia, and almost obtained the tutelage of Germany. Hitherto she has advanced uninterruptedly, and every effort made to check her progress has turned to her advantage, as in the case of the advance of ancient Rome to the empire of the world.

A glance at the map of Europe and Asia will show at once how advantageous is the position of Russia, and how menacing her attitude. Let her become, as she has since Peter the First been laboring to become, a great maritime power, as formidable by sea as by land, and she governs the politics, the commerce, and, aside from the Catholic Church, which she persecutes, the religion of the world. She would be what Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second wished to make Spain, and Louis the Fourteenth and Napoleon the First aimed to make France, and what Great Britain has for nearly a century been and is as to the sea. We are strongly opposed to this, not because this mighty power would be more dangerous in her hands than in those of France, Austria, Prussia, or Great Britain, but because it cannot but be dangerous, in whose hands soever it may be. We are opposed to the maritime supremacy of Great Britain, and we have always hailed with pleasure the growth of the French and Russian navies, as a counterpoise to her. The actual maritime preponderance of Great Britain is really as hostile to the best interests of the human race, as the threatened preponderance of Russia. The British mercantile system, sustained by her naval power, is more hostile to the freedom and independence of nations, than any preponderating influence that can be long exercised by Russia. It enslaves the world to Mammon,

the meanest of the angels that fell, and is more corrupting to the soul, and more perilous to its salvation, than any system of secular despotism ever devised. Though, therefore, we have in this contest no sympathy with Russia, we have just as little with Great Britain, fighting simply to maintain her mercantile system, and to keep the world enslaved to her low and grovelling system of materialism, threatened by the advance of Russia to a command of the great routes of commerce. We like not the attitude of Russia, and for religious rather than political or commercial reasons we wish her permanently humbled, and are as unwilling as our Scottish friend and correspondent to see her influence extended.

But we cannot regard the attitude of Russia as the result of any extraordinary fault of hers. Aggressive she may have been; but the other powers of Europe are more to blame than she, for she has but availed herself, for her own aggrandizement, of their crimes and blunders. It was their national rivalries, schisms, heresies, and wars with one another, that gave her the opportunity, and invited her to become what she is. They abandoned the defence of Christendom against the Turk, quarrelled with the Pope, despoiled the Church, made war on religion or on one another, and left Russia to fight the battles of Christian civilization against Mahometan barbarism, and to strengthen herself by so doing. England, under pretence of protecting the Protestant heresy, joined with her in preparing the way for the partition and suppression of Poland, that great crime as well as great political blunder; France, by an alliance with the Turk first, and afterwards with Gustavus Adolphus and the Protestant princes of the empire, prevented the restoration of German unity, broken by Luther's Reformation, and thus destroyed the only European power that could impose an effectual restraint on Russian ambition in the West. These powers, therefore, must blame themselves, not her, if she avails herself of the advantages they have afforded her, and leaves them to reap the fruits of their own madness and folly.

The real object of the Allies in the present war is, no doubt, to restrain the power of Russia, and to prevent her from obtaining those commercial advantages over them, which seem to be all but within her reach. Are they likely to gain this object? We think not, for they cannot strike

an effectual blow at the heart of her power, and we can conceive no practicable political combinations by which they can render permanent any advantages they may obtain by the fortune of war. We would not exaggerate her military strength, or underrate theirs. The Allies may gain the victory in battle, they may take Sebastopol, the whole of the Crimea, Finland, the Caucasian and Transcaucasian provinces, and for a time close to Russian ships the commerce of the Baltic and the Euxine, but Russia will not even then be essentially weakened. She may be thrown back upon herself for a time, but that will not harm her. She will turn her attention to the development of her internal resources, to the construction of roads and railways, and to completing a system of internal communications, which will prepare her for carrying on any future war with greater ease and expedition. No arrangement that will be made will prevent her from ultimately recovering the provinces that may be wrested from her, and standing before Europe, after a brief delay, stronger than ever.

If no territory be taken from Russia, and if she at the conclusion of peace retain all her present territorial advantages, nothing will have been gained by the war. If she is to be dismembered of a certain number of her provinces, the grave question comes up, What is to be done with them? The Allies cannot annex them to their own respective states, because they are not contiguous, and their defence would cost more than they are worth. They could be retained only by keeping their fleets and armies all the time on the war footing, and rendering war the permanent state of Europe. They cannot, or will not, annex them to any adjoining state strong enough of itself to retain them. They may restore to Turkey the provinces taken from her by Russian arms, but this would not form a bulwark against the future advance of Russia. The Allies cannot expect to reduce Russia lower than she was at the accession of Peter the Great, or to render the Ottoman Empire stronger than it was at the same period. Turkey will therefore be no more able to retain them, than she was to prevent their original loss. Besides, if Turkey, a Mussulman power, were rendered strong enough to stand alone against her Northern neighbor, she would herself be, as she was but recently, a more formidable enemy to Christian civilization than Russia, for the lowest form of Christian civilization

is infinitely superior to the highest Mahometan. France and England might, indeed, guarantee the possession of the restored provinces, but such a guaranty would be vexatious to them, and would after all prove ineffectual. Russia might seize the opportunity, when they were at war with one another, or otherwise sufficiently employed, to recover those provinces. Finland, Livonia, and Esthonia might be given to Sweden, but Sweden would not be strong enough to keep them, any more than she was formerly to prevent Russia from taking them.

The Allies, supposing the fortune of the war favorable to them, might reconstruct the kingdom of Poland, provided they could, which is not likely, gain the consent of Prussia and Austria; but they cannot reconstruct a Poland strong enough to stand alone even against the Russia that would remain. You cannot reconstruct a Poland that will be stronger or more united than was the Poland of the beginning of the last century, certainly not strong enough for the purpose, as experience has proved. There is no Poland now, except with the Poles abroad. Russianized, Prussianized, and Austrianized as the Polish people now are, they cannot form a united and independent kingdom, able to stand alone. If Russian Poland is detached from the Czar, it must be annexed to some German power. But this would be a source of weakness rather than of strength, because the Poles, though they love not Russia, hate the Germans, and, if they cannot be independent, would prefer being an integral element in a great Russian empire to being a part of a German state, alien to them both in blood and language. It would always be a field for Russian intrigue, and afford an opening not only for Russia to recover it, but also to subject the German power to which it was annexed.

Even if the Allies should succeed in arms, which it is possible they may do, it would be next to impossible so to reconstruct a map of Europe as to prevent Russia from speedily recovering the provinces taken from her, and repairing her losses; for she is an agricultural rather than a maritime power, and has her resources within herself. Her present position and strength are not an accidental result, due to a temporary policy or to brute violence. They are less the result of violence than of the natural course of events. No doubt she could, and even ought, to have resisted that course, but that she has not done so is no more

to be censured, than that the absorption of India by the British East India Company was not resisted by Great Britain. In modern times, at least, nations consult their interests, not what a high sense of justice or a nice sense of honor would dictate. Few, if any, of the wars which have resulted in the aggrandizement of Russia have been begun by her, or if so, without as plausible pretexts as conquering or growing nations usually have. Most of her acquisitions have been either the recovery of old territory possessed by her before the Tartar conquest, or made from barbarian tribes with whom peace was impossible. She is the natural centre to which gravitate all the members of the great Slavonic family, and has been for a long time in a position in which she could hardly help profiting by the divisions, wars, and rivalries of the other European nations. Her growth being in the natural course of European and Asiatic events, a natural, not a forced growth, it is no easy matter for the rest of Europe, by any new political or territorial combinations, to prevent her from recovering whatever she may lose by the fortune of war, or from ultimately obtaining those commercial advantages which would enable her to reduce France and Great Britain, especially Great Britain, to the rank of second or third rate powers, leaving for the first rank only herself and the United States. She is a vast centralized power, animated by a single spirit and moved by a single will; they are divided into separate nations and states, distracted by diversities of race, religion, and interests, and led on by various and conflicting counsels and policies. In the actual state of things, she is stronger than any one of them, and it is out of their power to form a permanent league against her. They might about as easily form themselves into a single federative state, and each give up its autonomy. They can never agree among themselves to do anything of the sort.

The attempt to resist effectually the natural progress of any great living national power by leagues, coalitions, or alliances between feebler states, has never yet succeeded. Where the end is to overturn a dynasty, or to dethrone a prince, no longer national, or to effect a purpose which can be gained by a battle or a campaign, coalitions may answer. They answered in the long run against Napoleon the First, for though he attracted the admiration of the French, he was not the living impersonification of the French people; he was not rooted in the national heart,

and could count on being supported only so long as he was successful. He became nationalized, so to speak, only after his death, by the contrast of his reign with that of the effete Bourbons. But where the force needs to be constant and permanent, it must, in order to be effectual, be that of a single nation, strong enough to stand alone. If Great Britain were as strong by land as she is by sea, and if her dominions lay alongside of Russia, or if Russia were merely a commercial power, she would, perhaps, be able single-handed to cope with her. If France adjoined Russia, she would also, we think, be able to cope with her. But neither is the case, and no single power contiguous to Russia is or can be made strong enough to stand alone against her, unless it be Austria.

The danger from Russia to the West is only as by her advance in the East she deprives the Western powers of the commerce of Asia. She cannot advance with advantage to herself any farther westward than she has already done. Germany prevents Russia from laying her empire alongside the French, as much as Germany prevents France from laying hers alongside Russia. The two empires cannot, even by the conquest of Germany, become contiguous. Napoleon the First had the command of all Germany, but France did not leap the Rhine, as he found to his bitter discomfiture on his retreat from Moscow. The autocrat of the Russias, were he to command all Germany, would find that Russia would not leap the German frontiers. Germany would be in his way as much as she was in Napoleon's. The great danger is to Austria, regarded as separate from Germany. The German element is not the strongest in her empire, and she lacks unity and compactness. Half of her population have more sympathy of race with Russia than with her, and it would not be difficult to detach from her Bohemia, Galicia, Hungary, Croatia, and her Italian possessions, leaving her only the Tyrol and her hereditary Duchy. Through the disjointed nature of the Austrian dominions, and the heterogeneous character of her population, she is not able to stand alone against Russia, who can in spite of her continue to advance in the East, swallow up Armenia, Anatolia, and Persia in Asia, and the whole of Turkey in Europe, and the greater part of her own empire, in case she attempts resistance. Here is the danger.

Now it is idle to think of galvanizing the dead carcass of the Ottoman Empire into sufficient life and activity to afford a safeguard to Europe. The only power to be relied on is Austria; and the true policy for the Western powers is to strengthen her, and render her powerful enough to check Russian advance in the East. If anything effectual is to be done, she must be permitted to extend her territory through to the Black Sea, by annexing to her empire Moldavia, Wallachia, and the greater part of Bessarabia. To pacify Italy, and soothe the jealousy of France, she might be required to exchange her Italian possessions, which should become independent under native princes, for Servia, Montenegro, and all of Turkey north of the Balkan. As a large portion of the population she would thus receive would by religion and race sympathize with Russia more than with her, she must, in addition, enter the German Diet with her non-Germanic provinces. Since Turkey must fall, transfer the Hellenic kingdom to Constantinople, and annex to it all that would remain of Turkey in Europe and Asia, to the borders of Syria and Palestine, which last might be formed into the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, in the house of Savoy, the heir, we believe, of the title.

Something like this would raise up a barrier to Russia without reconstructing the map of Western or Northern Europe, or creating in the East a power strong enough to harm the legitimate commerce of the Western powers. But we are not so silly as to suppose that European statesmen will entertain such a project for a moment. They would fear the predominance of Austria. We therefore see no prospect of the war terminating to the advantage of Europe. One thing is certain, that Russia will not yield without an obstinate struggle. If Austria and Germany do not engage in it, the Western powers will be worsted; and if they do, they will have to bear the brunt of the war, and all Western and Central Europe will become in addition the scene of a civil strife with the revolutionary party, encouraged and sustained by Russia, from which Italy and Austria will be the chief sufferers. In the former case Russia gains the victory, and resumes with redoubled ardor her policy of getting the control of the East, and of hostility to the Church. In the latter, Germany will be ruined, and Austria disabled, and both will fall a prey

to Napoleon the Third or his successor, and France will become once more the terror of Europe on the land, while England will continue with more insolence than ever to sing, —

“Britannia rules the wave.”

We do not wish to see Austria and the Germanic states under the tutelage of Russia, — a tutelage as incompatible with their true interests as with their dignity, and we should be most happy to see them escaping from it, and reconstructing a united and independent Germany, so essential to their own well-being and to European society. But, alas! it is impossible *revocare defunctos*. German unity becomes every day more and more difficult, and is well-nigh as impracticable as Italian unity. The sovereigns do not wish it, Russia is opposed to it, France and England will protest against it, and the German people, separated by political and religious differences, have no power to effect it. It is possible that an alliance with France and Great Britain would emancipate them from Russia, but it could only be by making of her an eternal enemy, — in a critical moment more dangerous as an enemy than she is as a friend. It does not do to overlook the internal state of Germany, or to forget that there is a powerful and increasing revolutionary party in her bosom, holding the most frightful principles of socialism and atheism, — a party almost strong enough in 1848 to overthrow all authority, and introduce the Saturnalia of Jacobinism. Only by the utmost vigilance of the governments and by strong repressive measures are they prevented from open insurrection. The danger from them is not over, and we have not seen or heard the last of them. Though Russia may appeal to the revolutionary element against powers hostile to her, we know not where but to her the German governments could look for aid in case of a revolutionary outbreak. Great Britain could not be relied on; she is half a democracy already, and her government must obey popular opinion, and popular opinion is and will be on the side of the revolutionists. France would render no aid, because she would hope to find in the revolution the means of re-establishing the empire of Charlemagne, the dream of the founder of the Napoleonic dynasty, — a dynasty that establishes itself by professing liberal ideas and practising despotism.

Looking at the subject from this distance, and as impartially as we can, we see nothing hopeful for Old Europe. She has thrown away her opportunities, and we see no happy issue for her. Let the present war terminate as it may, we see no good likely to result from it. Indeed, wars undertaken from policy never end well, and there is no country that politicians will not sooner or later ruin, if abandoned to their lead. It is long since the European courts abandoned principle, justice, good faith, and religion, for simple state policy, and order is now nowhere maintained on the Continent but by armed force. There is hatred between nation and nation, and war between the ruled and the rulers. There is no reliance to be placed on the courts, none to be placed on the people. The courts became corrupt, and have corrupted the people, as the demagogues are corrupting them here, and there is only one point in which the people and their sovereigns agree, and that is in hostility to the Church, the only source of help for either. The one shows its hostility in trying to make her a tool of their despotism, and the other in seeking to crush her, and to substitute for the worship of God the worship of humanity.

Nevertheless, we may take too desponding a view of European affairs. Who knows the designs of Providence, whose prerogative it is to bring light out of darkness, and order out of confusion? Who knows but the celestial Spouse of the Church is about to interpose for the joy and glory of his Bride? It may be that Providence has suffered Russia to grow up and to become strong as an instrument for punishing the nations of Central and Western Europe for having abandoned him and betrayed the trust he confided to them. If so, we can only say the judgments of God are just, and his chastisements salutary. He may use Russia as the instrument of his justice, and dash her in pieces when he has served his purpose with her. She may cause much suffering to Europe, much injury to religion, but she will never realize the dream of universal monarchy. If she should overrun Western and Central Europe, she could not hold it in subjection, and her triumph would probably be as short-lived as was that of France under her great Napoleon. She may plant herself on the Bosphorus, and command for a time the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, the commerce of

India and China, but she will not be able to hold all Asia under her sway for many generations. Her power, unlike ours, is weakened by expansion, and she will have enemies enough rising up in every quarter to compel a division of her territories. Moreover, her advance southward and westward may operate through the grace of God her conversion, and thus what forebodes only ruin become the means of infusing fresh blood, young and vigorous, into the veins of those old populations that have so long proved themselves unworthy of the privileges bestowed upon them. It may be, that Almighty God intends visiting these old nations in mercy, and that he intends to use Great Britain, so long the bulwark of the Protestant heresy, to break the head of the Greek schism, and deliver his Spouse. Perhaps he remembers her hospitality to his bishops and priests, exiled from France by his Jacobinical enemies, — a noble hospitality, hardly ever equalled in the annals of any nation, and marvellous in an heretical and commercial nation, wellnigh devoured by materialism, — and is determined to lead her by a way she knows not back to Catholic unity, and to make her once more an *insula sanctorum*. Who can tell what may be the effect of her alliance with France, and the union of their arms in that old mystic East? Man proposes, but God disposes; and as the union of these two powers against the crescent failed, so their union to uphold it may also fail, and result in the restoration of the cross. We are shortsighted mortals. We see but a little way before us, and that but dimly. What we are ready to exclaim is against us, may, as in the case of the patriarch, turn out to be for us. *Spera in Deo*. We have always this consolation in the worst of times, that the Lord God reigneth, and can make the wrath of man praise him, while, if we are faithful to him, no evil can befall us, for the only real evil in God's universe is sin.

Our correspondent will perceive that we are not the strong partisan of Russia he supposes, and that we do not regard her as a peculiarly conservative power. But he must bear in mind that we are American, and as much attached to our country as he is to his. Now his country, Great Britain, is the one whose supremacy is likely to prove the most offensive to Americans. We trust we have no uncatholic feelings towards his country, the land of our

ancestors, and with which, through our literary recollections, we have so many and so dear associations, but we must tell him that we Americans are as much disturbed to see Great Britain mistress of the seas, subordinating everything to her commercial and manufacturing interests, as he can be to see Russia mistress on the land. We have more to apprehend from Great Britain than from Russia, and we have, looking to our own interests, no wish to see Russia weakened as a maritime power. Great Britain will no more suffer, if she can help it, a great maritime power to grow up to dispute her naval supremacy, than Russia will a great empire by the side of her own, able to interfere with her projects in the East. Great Britain is our rival, and now that she and France act as one, Russia is our natural ally, and the only first-class power in Europe that is. Naturally, then, should we Americans incline to the side of Russia in the contest now going on. We wish no harm to England or France, but we wish, for our own sakes, just as little to Russia.

We cannot hope that what we have said will satisfy our highly esteemed correspondent, but it will prove to him and our friends in the United Kingdom, who we hope are many, that we are willing to let those who think differently from us be heard, and that it is not rashly that we differ from many excellent Catholics and intelligent gentlemen on the Eastern Question. In point of fact, we are on neither side, and we dread the success of either party, of one just as much as of the other, unless it be that, if one side must get the better, we would rather it should be the Western powers than Russia, especially just now, when the odds seem to be against them, and their army is struggling so bravely against superior force.

ART. VI. — *Message of the President of the United States, Washington, December 4, 1854.*

IN the first annual Message of President Pierce there were several things against which, as our readers will recollect, we spoke with great severity. Time and events

have not justified all our fears, and the national honor has been far less compromised than we thought it might be. With the President's last annual Message we have no serious fault to find. It is a calm, dignified, and statesmanlike document, well written and well reasoned, generally just in its remarks and sound in its principles. As far as we can judge, it has given very general satisfaction to the sober men of all parties.

We have no room for an analysis of the Message, or remarks on any of the important questions it treats; for our present purpose is simply to use the occasion to offer some observations on certain recent political manifestations in the country, in their bearing upon Catholics and the Catholic interests in the United States. It may readily be conjectured that we refer to the success in the late elections, in a large number of the States, of the Know-Nothing, or so-called American party.

We consider ourselves bound, as a Catholic journal, encouraged and supported by the bishops and clergy for our devotion to the interests of Catholicity, to abstain, as a general rule, from all intermeddling with party politics.

We do not think it fair or honorable to use the influence we may acquire among Catholics, as a religious journalist, against or in favor of any political party. We have no right to commit, or to try to commit, the bishops and clergy who support us to one party or another. They in their official capacity do not enter into the political conflicts of the day, and tell the people of their charge with what party they must or must not vote, in order to discharge their duties as Catholics. We have had good opportunities of knowing their views on this subject, and we do them only simple justice when we say that they wish to keep the Church and Catholic interests in the country free from the passions, conflicts, and interests of political parties.

Believing such to be the policy of the ecclesiastical authority, and believing it the only wise or prudent policy for Catholics in this country, we have always set our faces against the formation of a Catholic party in politics, and studied to make it manifest, as far as our Review could be regarded as an organ of the Catholic body, that Catholics are as free as any other class of citizens to belong to which of the great parties of the country they see proper, and that it is no more nor less a mark of Catholicity to support the

Democratic party than the Whig, or the Whig than the Democratic. We have felt ourselves at liberty to discuss the great principles of government and administration, to treat of the *morality* or the philosophy of politics, but not to take sides for or against any party, which recognized loyalty to the Constitution as a duty. In this the recognized organs of the Catholic body have, with scarcely an exception, fully agreed with us. No Catholic journal, recognized officially as an episcopal organ, has suffered itself to be a partisan journal; and we may say that it is and has been the settled policy of the Church in America, and of all who in any way may be regarded as expressing her views and wishes, to keep Catholic interests independent of the conflicts of political parties, and to leave all Catholics in their quality of citizens free, saving loyalty to the Constitution, to vote for such party as they in their conscientious convictions think best. As a matter of fact, though the majority of foreign-born Catholics, for reasons very distinct from their Catholicity, have usually voted the Republican or Democratic ticket, Catholics, like other citizens, have always been more or less divided in their political preferences.

In Ireland, and some countries on the Continent, we have seen a Catholic party in politics; but there have been reasons for such a party there which have not existed with us. There Catholicity has been connected in some way with the state, either as the object of its patronage or of its hostility, and Catholics have been obliged to enter the arena of politics, not as citizens only, but as Catholics, in order to defend the freedom and independence of their Church, to repeal or prevent the passage of persecuting statutes, and to defend or to obtain equal civil rights with non-Catholics. Such was the case in the struggle for Catholic emancipation in Great Britain and Ireland; such was the case in the long struggle in France for the freedom of Catholic education, and such will always be the case where the government undertakes to legislate in reference to Catholic interests, either for or against them. But in this country the government professes to let the Church alone, and not to legislate on religion at all. So long as it does let the Church alone, and leaves her in her own sphere, and in regard to her own children, free to follow her own constitution and laws, and protects Catholics in

their equal rights, as men and citizens, there is and can be no justification of a Catholic party in politics. To attempt to make it a Catholic duty to support one party and oppose another, would be little less than madness, for it would make, not unreasonably, bitter enemies of the party opposed, without securing the friendship of the party supported. Besides, it would be a sort of secularizing of the Church.

Undoubtedly, there have been journals circulating chiefly amongst Catholics, and regarded as Catholic by outsiders, and demagogues enough, nominally Catholic perhaps, that have talked in a boastful way of a Catholic party and the great things it would do, and have endeavored to make use of the influence they exerted to commit the Catholic body as such, and to turn over the so-called "Catholic vote" to one party or another. There has been, no doubt, too much of this, and Catholics and Catholic interests are suffering not a little from it. But the Church is not responsible for it, for she never inspired it, and they who have done it have acted without her authority and against her wishes. Her wish is to pursue her spiritual mission in peace, and keep aloof from politics, so long as they leave her the opportunity. Even in Ireland, where the clergy have been obliged, in order to protect their flocks, to assume, in some measure, the position of political leaders, we see, as things settle down into a less abnormal state, a decided disposition manifested by the Hierarchy to withdraw Catholic interests as far as possible from the action of political parties, and thus render them independent of party successes or party failures.

But this wise, just, and prudent policy, which needs only to be stated in order to be approved by every sensible man, is threatened to be disturbed by the new party that has recently sprung up, under the pretence, wholly unfounded, that the Catholic Church has entered the field of politics, and is laboring to control the politics of the country. The Know-Nothings are endeavoring to make the Catholic question a political question, to be decided by the action of political parties. Unhappily, we cannot deny that a few Custom-House Catholics, that is, Catholics who are so only in name, or in the hopes of using Catholicity to help them into some petty office, and some journals that look upon the Catholic body as their stock in trade, have said some foolish things, and done what they

could to make the appointing power believe that there is a "Catholic vote," and that they command it; but these do not represent the Church, and have not, as non-Catholic politicians sometimes imagine, the confidence of the Catholic community. They are so little considered by us that we have not, perhaps, taken sufficient pains to disavow them. But in spite of all these may say or do, we repeat it, the Church has not in this country entered at all into the field of secular politics, and has in no instance instructed her children as to the party they should or should not vote for. Catholic citizens are citizens as much as any other class of citizens, and have the right to vote according to their political preferences. If they have been more subjected to the influence of leaders than others, — a fact which we do not concede, — it has not been by their clergy, nor by appeals to their Catholicity. As a body, whether foreign-born or native-born, they are without exception the most conscientious and independent class of voters in the country. Nevertheless, the Know-Nothings, seizing upon a few isolated facts, which prove nothing against the Church, will have it that she interferes in our elections, and is seeking, by Catholic votes cast under priestly dictation, to get control of the civil power, and massacre all the Protestants and non-Catholics, reduce them to slavery, or compel them at the point of the bayonet to embrace the Catholic faith. They abound in frightful stories about "secret conclaves," "Popish plots," and "Papal conspiracies"; and some men, who ought to know enough to laugh at such things, really run away with a notion that our liberties are in danger, and that our republican institutions are all doomed. Poor men! they never stop to think that liberty is as dear to us as it is to them, and that we cannot destroy the republican institutions of the country without involving ourselves in the same ruin that we should bring upon our non-Catholic fellow-citizens. But the panic is produced, people are alarmed out of their propriety by the "rapid spread of Popery," "the growing influence of Rome," and the Know-Nothings, taking advantage of the excitement which they themselves have fanned, appear resolved to force our religion into politics, and to make it a direct subject of legislation. Let them turn, or attempt to turn, the government against us, and, as little as they know, they must see that they bring Cath-

olic interests into party politics, and force us, if we vote at all, to vote in reference to our own interests as Catholics, and compel the Church, in defence of her own freedom and independence, to do the precise thing they so falsely accuse her of having done.

We regard this as a most grave objection to the Know-Nothing movement. It brings into our politics the very elements which, by recognizing the equal rights of all professedly Christian denominations, and granting special favors to none, it was the intention of our statesmen to exclude from them. The American principle is to leave religion to itself, and each religious community to the voluntary support of its own members, and free to follow with regard to them its own laws and discipline. The intention was to leave to the state, or the members of each religious denomination in their quality of citizens, in which all were equal, only secular affairs to deal with. All being free in their religion, and having all their religious rights protected, it was hoped the citizens might discharge their civil duties, and exercise their civil rights, without introducing into party politics their religious differences. Whether this truly American policy is, abstractly considered, the most desirable or not, it obviously is the only practicable policy in a country like ours, cut up as it is into a multitude of religious sects and denominations. The only sensible rule is either to exclude all religions but one, or to recognize the equal rights of all, and to grant them all equal protection, as involved in the protection of their equal rights as citizens. The former was wholly out of the question with us, and not to be thought of. The latter was the rule adopted, and is the American policy. No class of persons in the country has more cheerfully accepted this policy, or more scrupulously conformed to it than Catholics. It is this policy that the new party, if we understand it, proposes to subvert. It proposes to make religion an affair of state, and the religious differences of American citizens an element in our party contests. In this it is not only not American, but anti-American.

But we are told that the movement is not directed against Catholics as Catholics, but as foreigners. The aim is, that "Americans shall govern America." Why then introduce Catholics at all? All foreigners are not Catholics, nor are all Catholics foreigners. If Catholics

are not to be opposed in their quality of Catholics, or their rights and privileges affected on account of their being Catholics, there is no occasion for dragging them into the discussion, and the declamations against them are not *ad rem*. The majority of persons migrating hither since 1852 are non-Catholics. The emigration from Ireland has fallen off greatly, and instead of being two thirds of the whole immigration, as it was a few years ago, is now not one third. Its proportion will continue to be less and less every year. The great body of the emigration is now from Germany, and three fourths of the German emigrants are non-Catholics. If the movement is simply against foreigners, it must be against non-Catholic as well as Catholic foreigners. Why then is it necessary to attack Catholics as such? Catholics, whether native-born or foreign-born, are as much disposed to maintain the rule that "Americans shall govern America" as non-Catholics are, and perhaps even more so. Indeed, Americans do govern and have governed America, ever since the war of Independence. Foreigners when naturalized, and it is only when naturalized that they can vote, are American citizens, placed before the Constitution and laws on a footing of perfect equality with native-born citizens, and are therefore, in all that relates to governing, Americans, as much so as if they had been born on the soil. If the object is to alter the naturalization laws, and to require a longer residence in the foreigner before admitting him to the rights of citizenship, there is still no need of bringing Catholicity into the discussion. Catholics did not make the present naturalization laws, and are no more interested in sustaining them than any other class of citizens. The country passed them, and if it sees proper to alter them, it can do so. Catholics as citizens may or may not oppose it; but unless they are to be altered to the prejudice of Catholic immigrants alone, they will take no part in the discussion as Catholics. They will enter the lists as Catholics only in case there is an attempt at exclusive legislation, either in form or in fact, against them; and if they do so, then the party advocating it, not they, will be accountable for bringing Catholicity into the field of politics.

But we are told that, though Catholics are not opposed precisely on account of their religion, yet the movement is against them because by their religion they render themselves

foreigners. But this is a distinction where there is no difference. If we are foreigners by virtue of our religion, and it is only because we are Catholics that we are opposed as foreigners, it is idle to pretend that we are not opposed on account of our religion, for it is precisely on that account and no other that we are opposed. The pretence is not true. We are ourselves Catholic, unworthy of the name if you will, yet Catholic we are, and as much so as any man in the country. Nevertheless, we are American, and have proved it, as all must confess, in our articles last year on *Native Americanism* and *Know-Nothingism*. In them we have proved that we are American in feeling and affection, and prepared to risk all our worldly interest in defending true Americanism against every species of foreignism. Did we not call down upon our heads the wrath of every foreign organ in the country, and receive some severe rebukes from a considerable number of our foreign-born Catholic brethren? Since the storm that was excited against us last year, let no one dare accuse us of not being an American. We love our country, and no man in the Know-Nothing ranks has dared as much or made as heavy sacrifices for it as we have, whether wisely and needfully or not. We can show as long a line of American ancestry as any man in New England. We are American by descent, by birth, by residence, by education, by habits and manners, by sentiments and affections, and by the Constitution and laws. We are American in every sense in which any man can be an American. Do you mean, then, to tell us that, in becoming a Catholic, we have forfeited or renounced our Americanism? We deny it. By the American Constitution and law we are as free to be a Catholic as you are to be a Methodist or a Baptist. There is no law in the country, no *lex scripta* or *lex non scripta*, that makes it obligatory on an American citizen to be a non-Catholic, or that declares becoming a Catholic a forfeiture or a renunciation of citizenship. Do not, then, undertake to obfuscate the popular mind on the subject. Say out openly that you intend to proscribe the Catholic religion, to place it under the ban of the law, and establish non-Catholicity as the legal religion of the country. Say out to the world that the profession of Catholicity in America is hereafter to be forbidden under pain of losing the rights of American citizenship and American nationality. But then boast no more of equal

rights, talk no more of founding your government on the rights of man, or of religious liberty.

But "you are Papists, and owe allegiance to a foreign potentate, are subjects of a foreign sovereign, and therefore cannot be American citizens." Know-Nothings indeed you are, if you believe that. Where have you lived that you have not learned to reject this silly pretence, got up by England in those days when she wished to persecute Catholics without incurring the odium of persecution? England persecuted Catholics for years, massacred them, hung them, exiled or imprisoned them, fined them, or confiscated their goods, solely, as everybody knows, because they were Catholics; yet, as she pretended, not on account of religion, but of politics,—because, acknowledging the authority of the Pope, they could not be loyal subjects to the British crown. It was a vain pretext in England, but it had a certain plausibility there that it has not and cannot have here. Catholic England had a two-fold relation to the Pope, that of a Catholic people and that of a fief of the Holy See. The Pope was not only the spiritual head of the Church in England, as elsewhere, but he was also the feudal sovereign of the English state, lord paramount in the temporal order; and when the crown became Protestant, it reverted to the Holy See as a forfeited or lapsed fief. It is true, the suzerainty was not always acknowledged; it is true, that after the Reformation no claim to it was made by the Pope; but it was easy for English statesmen to confound in the minds of the public the Papal rights dependent on the feudal relations of England to the Holy See, and his rights as simply spiritual chief of the Church. But here no such relations have ever existed. This country has never been a fief of the Holy See, and the Pope has no feudal claims over it. His authority over Catholics in this country is simply his authority as spiritual head of the Church,—an authority in an order above the state, and distinct from it. Obedience to it, therefore, can never conflict with any obedience due to the state.

The new party professes to be American, and the whole of its argumentation to prove that Catholics cannot be Americans proceeds on the assumption that Americanism consists essentially in holding American principles. Now any one who will take the trouble to examine our American system will find that one of its characteristic features

is the disclaiming on the part of the state of all authority in the spiritual order, or the recognition of the perfect freedom and independence of religion. The state here does not *tolerate* all religions, for the power to tolerate implies the power to suppress; but it recognizes the equal rights of all religions. Those rights are not grants from the state, they are recognized by it as independent of it, and sacred to it. It does not confer them, it respects and protects them. In acknowledging the equal rights of all religions, the American system acknowledges that the state has no authority in spirituals, and therefore in religious matters has no claim to the obedience or allegiance of any its subjects or citizens. Hence, as the Pope has only authority over Catholics in the spiritual order, no obedience he can exact of them, or which they owe him, can ever conflict with any obedience which the state with us even claims as its due. The party, then, in pretending that the obedience we owe as Catholics to the spiritual chief of the Church is incompatible with our duty as American citizens to the state, not only strike at the root of all religious liberty, but they make war on Americanism itself, and are on their own principles an anti-American party.

This is clear enough to any one of ordinary capacity who will take time to think, and not suffer himself to be imposed upon by the idle declamation and false assertions of anti-Popery lecturers and journals. A friend in Raleigh, North Carolina, sends us the following slip from a newspaper:—

“If the Pope directed the Roman Catholics of this country to overthrow the Constitution, to sell the nationality of the country as a sovereign state, and annex it as a dependent province to Napoleon the Little’s crown, they would be bound to obey.—*Brownson’s Review*, by authority of the Archbishop of Boston, Mass.”

We suppose there are people in the country, not under guardianship, who can believe, not only that we wrote this, but that such is the real doctrine of the Church. Now we never wrote one word of it, nor anything from which it can be logically inferred. The *Brownson’s Review* from which it was taken is as much a nonentity as the “Archbishop of Boston,” by whose authority it is said to be published. There is a Bishop of Boston, but as yet no Archbishop. We suppose we go as far in asserting the Papal

power as any Catholic in the world, but we hold no such doctrine as is here ascribed to us. We believe the Pope is the divinely appointed judge of the law of God for all Catholics, but not the temporal ruler of states. The Constitution of the United States is not repugnant to the law of God, and is one which the people of the United States under that law had a perfect right to establish, and therefore the Pope has and can have no right to command its overthrow. It is idle to speculate what Catholics would be bound to do, in case he should command it, because every Catholic knows that he never can command it. As for annexing our country to the crown of Napoleon the Little, or Napoleon the Big, it is sufficient to add, that "when the sky falls, we shall catch larks." The Papal power lies in the spiritual order, and if he can interfere in temporal matters at all, it is only in the respect in which they are spiritual, and then not for the destruction, but for the protection, of the rights of individuals and nations.

But all this is gratuitous. The power we recognize in the Pope, as regards us, be it more or less, is simply spiritual, and whatever obedience we owe him, we owe to him as the spiritual chief of a spiritual society, or, in one word, as the Vicar of Jesus Christ. Both the power and the obedience are essential to our religion as Catholics, on which we can allow no secular authority or political party to interrogate us. Our religion, be it what it may, is no affair of the state. It is a matter of conscience, between us and God, and to him alone are we answerable for it. If we break the peace, offend *contra bonos mores*, commit crimes against the state, or fail in any of our civil duties, spare us not, but punish us as you do any other class of citizens. We ask no special exemption, or special favor. We acknowledge our obligation to demean ourselves as good citizens; we hold ourselves amenable to the laws, and maintain the right of the state to punish us for any civil offences of which we may be guilty. But there we stop, and there you must stop. You have no right to go beyond, for that we conduct ourselves as good and loyal citizens is all that the state or society has a right to exact of us. All beyond is of the domain of conscience, where the civil power, or secular society, has not the faintest shadow of a right to penetrate. The whole question, then, narrows itself down to this, are we, holding ourselves as other citizens amena-

ble to the laws for all civil or social matters, free, in this country, to be Catholics, or are we not? That we are by the Constitution and laws as they stand, is undeniable. Are we to remain so? If not, the new party are simply, whatever their pretensions or their circumlocutions, warring against religious liberty, and endeavoring to make this hitherto land of equal rights a land of no-rights to Catholics.

Have the so-called American party weighed well the principle they adopt? The same principle that disfranchises us may to-morrow disfranchise the Unitarian, the Universalist, the Quaker, the Congregationalist, the Presbyterian, the Episcopalian, the Baptist, and make the Methodist or the Mormon religion the only religion that can be professed by an American citizen. Once begin to discriminate between religions, and where will you stop? Have the Know-Nothings considered the gross inconsistency they are guilty of in calling themselves the "American party," while they are warring against American principles, and in fact the characteristic feature of the American system, that of leaving all religions free? Have they considered — Protestants as they are, and embodying a goodly portion of Methodist and other Protestant ministers — what an admirable commentary they are furnishing us on the claim set up by Protestants to be the party of religious liberty, — a claim which never had any foundation but the vehemence and impudence with which it was asserted? The only things which would even seem to give a little plausibility to this claim were the religious liberty recognized by our American government, and the Catholic Relief Bill, passed by the British Parliament in 1829. The recent Ecclesiastical Titles Bill has taken away the credit of the latter, and the Know-Nothing movement to disfranchise Catholics must of course take away that of the former. Do not the Know-Nothings see that they are doing precisely the thing required to give the lie to the liberal professions of Protestants, and to confirm all that we have ever said of the intolerant and persecuting nature of Protestantism? Where is Protestant devotion to religious liberty, when it denies the freedom of Catholicity, denies the freedom of the Catholic conscience, and enacts that the American who becomes a Catholic shall lose his rights as an American citizen.

These Know-Nothings — we speak here simply as an American citizen — are bringing discredit on our American institutions, and playing into the hands of foreign despots. The American boast is, that our institutions are based on natural as distinguished from historical right, on the rights of man as distinguished from the rights of castes, orders, or classes, and that they recognize and guarantee the equal rights of all. This is our proud boast in the face of the despotisms, aristocracies, distinctions, and privileges of the Old World. As a necessary consequence of this doctrine of equal rights, we have recognized the equality of all religions, the equal rights of all denominations before the state. It is not by virtue of any positive law, nor by virtue of any recognition of our religion by the state, that it has hitherto been free in this country, but by virtue of the equal rights of all American citizens, coincident, it is claimed, with the equal rights of all men. The state, abstaining from legislating for or against any religion, leaves the religion of its subjects, so far as she is concerned, to their own voluntary choice. The freedom of our religion does not rest on the action of the state, but on the equal rights of all men, which it asserts, and for Americans pledges itself to protect. Now to disfranchise Catholics, or to debar Catholics from citizenship, is the denial of the doctrine of equal rights, which is adopted as the very basis of our institutions, and violates the essential principle of American democracy. It is to recognize in one class of men rights which are denied to another, and to create of non-Catholics a privileged class, a political aristocracy. We commend this to the attention of those members of the new party who claim to be Democrats. What they are doing will not do to tell in aristocratic England, imperial France, or despotic Russia. It will not do, in the face of the enemies of our republic in Europe, seeking every opportunity to bring our institutions into disrepute and to cover the American character with odium or contempt, for the party to war against equal rights, and still call itself "*the American party*." The Philistines would rejoice, and the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph.

Thus far we have considered the party as a party opposed to Catholicity, and proposing to exclude Catholics from the rights of American citizens. As such it is undeniably anti-American, and hostile to both civil and relig-

ious liberty. Not precisely the same is to be said against it, regarding it simply as a party opposed to the naturalization of foreigners. The nation is undoubtedly competent to say whether it will or will not admit foreigners into the bosom of its civil and political society; and if it determines to admit them, it belongs to it to prescribe the conditions on which it will do it. So much is unquestionable. But it is bound to keep good faith with all men, and it has no right to deprive any already naturalized of their equal rights of citizenship, and no right to alter its naturalization laws so as to render it more difficult for those who have already come here, intending to avail themselves of them, to become naturalized. With these restrictions, the country has certainly the abstract right* to modify or repeal its naturalization laws, and there is, no doubt, a very general feeling in the country that it ought to do so. We enter here into no discussion of the subject, for we have heretofore given our views of it at length, and it does not specially interest us as Catholics. It is not in itself a Catholic question. It affects us as an American citizen, as it does all other American citizens, but not as a Catholic, or, if so, only accidentally and temporally.

But we must say, and nobody will suspect us of undue foreign sympathies, that this outcry against foreigners is a little ill-timed, and not at all justifiable. It has been from the beginning the policy of this country to invite immigration from abroad. One of the things set forth by the Congress of 1776, in justification of the declaration of independence, was, that the king of Great Britain had "endeavored to prevent the population of these States, for that purpose *obstructing the laws for the naturalization of foreigners*, refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriations of lands." The laws have been so framed as to attract foreign settlers. Our foreign population may tell us with truth, that, if they have come here, it has been on our invitation, and if they have had facilities for speedily be-

* We beg our readers to observe that we say *right*, not *duty*, for, strange as it may seem, we have encountered a number of persons who think that to say one has the *right* to do a thing is the same as to assert that it is his duty to do it. A man is not always bound to do what he has a right to do. He has the right to redress a wrong done him by a fellow-man, but he is not obliged to do so, and has the right, if he sees proper, to forgive him.

coming naturalized, these facilities have been granted by us as inducements to bring them hither. If they have come in larger numbers than we expected, or even of a different class from what we desired, we must not blame them, for our invitation was to all, and without specification of class. If the laws have been too easy, and their administration too lax, we must remember that we, not the foreigners, have enacted and administered them. If the foreigners have not always conducted themselves to suit us, we have no right to complain, for it was one of the risks we run. The promise on our part was to admit them, with a single exception, on a footing of perfect equality with natural-born citizens. When once naturalized, their rights are equal, and they are no more bound to consult our tastes, habits, sentiments, or pleasure, than we are bound to consult theirs. Whether under this head they have always been prudent is a question on which our views are well known; but it is certain that, being our equals, they owed no more to us than we owed to them. It is wrong now to blame them for doing what we have expressly encouraged them to do, and given them the right to do. Having attracted them hither by the advantages we offered them, and placed them on a legal footing of equality with natural-born citizens, we have no right now to blame them for coming, to endeavor to treat them as inferiors, or to complain of them for doing what we claim for ourselves the liberty of doing. We are in fact unjust to them. The whole movement against them, though not unnatural, lacks justice to them and is dishonorable to us. Whatever is lawful for us is lawful for them, and we turn the equal rights we accord them into a bitter mockery, if we practically deny it.

That foreign-born citizens, coming from the same country, would naturally associate together, and form a foreign party, — an Irish party, a French party, or a German party, — and vote as such in our elections, was to be expected, and must have been foreseen. It was one of the risks we ran, and one of the disadvantages that it must have been decided to put up with for the sake of the advantages we hoped to reap from the migration hither. Men are drawn together by their sympathies, and settlers from the same country have naturally more sympathy with one another than they have with the inhabitants of the new country in which they are settled. Here is the foundation of that

clannishness which we complain of in our foreign-born citizens. Americans naturalized in Great Britain, in France, or in Germany would be equally clannish. That these foreign settlers should retain a lively affection for the land of their birth, and take a deep interest in its affairs, long after having become naturalized, is in the natural course of things. How long did the English colonists regard the mother country as their home, and speak of going to England as of going home? It required all the provocations which led to the war of independence, and all the sufferings, passions, and calamities of that war, to wean our affections from the mother country, and make us feel towards her as towards a foreign nation. Indeed, we hardly feel so even yet. When we meet an Englishman, we do not feel that we meet a foreigner, and when we set foot in England, and hear the familiar sounds of our own mother tongue, we can hardly persuade ourselves that we are not still at home, in the bosom of our own kindred and friends. How much stronger must be the sympathy that binds together settlers from the same country in a foreign land. The emigrant has left the home of his childhood, broken up old associations, and left behind him the scenes dearest to his heart. He finds himself in a strange land. A strange sky bends over him, an unfamiliar sun shines upon him, and unfamiliar stars look down upon him. Strange scenes, strange faces, meet his glance; strange sounds grate on his ear; and all conspires to make him feel that he is a stranger. The lower the class from which he comes, and the less literary or scientific culture he has received, and the fewer resources he has in himself, the more deeply must he feel his distance from home, and his loneliness. Think it not strange, then, that his heart gushes up into his throat and eyes when he meets an old countryman, who speaks in the old, familiar tones, and talks to him of that dear old fatherland, all the dearer for his absence and distance from it. Here is reason enough for the disposition of foreign settlers from the same country to congregate together, and form a foreign party. All this is natural, and must have been taken into the account when the naturalization laws were framed. We may well complain of naturalized citizens, if they set at work deliberately to form such a party, or labor to keep alive their foreignism, or try to prevent the foreign from coalescing with the native population; but we must not blame them

for what grows naturally out of their position, and what in itself is only creditable to their hearts.

Indeed, we ought not to forget that, if the immigrants sometimes try us, we also sometimes try them. They do not find all their expectations realized; and the hardships they must endure under the most favorable circumstances are such as brave spirits might recoil from without disgrace. Let any one look at the poor emigrants as landed on our wharves, crowded into the wretched emigrant cars, and hurried away as so many cattle to the place of their destination, with not a sympathizing look, not a kind tone to greet them, unless they are so happy as to meet a countryman, and who, if he has been here long, is so changed that they can hardly own him, and he will not envy them the few advantages we give them. When we have seen in a Western town a poor woman from Ireland or Germany, with one or two *children* nestling around her, sitting on the wharf or in the station-house, waiting for a steamboat or car to carry her further on, and think with what flushed hopes she left the old country, and how wearied, disappointed, and desolate she now feels, we wonder how her strength can hold out, or her reason maintain its throne. The heedlessness, cruelty, and contempt with which the poor creatures are treated makes our blood boil with indignation at our own countrymen. No one seems to think that they have human feelings, or that life is precious to them. It was our lot recently to be on a train of cars which came in collision with a gravel train, and caused, perhaps, the most serious destruction of human life that has been caused by a collision on any railroad. The greater part of the persons killed and wounded were second-class passengers. The papers in giving an account of them called them *emigrants*. Persons who chanced to inquire of us concerning the particulars, to our statement of the horrors of the scene and the numbers killed and wounded uniformly added, "But they were emigrants," in a tone and manner that seemed to say, "It is no matter, we need n't care for them." This feeling, we are sorry to say, is almost universal among our countrymen, and we confess ourselves shocked at this culpable indifference. These poor emigrants had fathers and mothers, sisters and brothers, as well as we, and as warm hearts in their own country loved them as love us, and as dear friends were grieved at their

death as will be at ours. Life was as much to them as to us, and as tender ties were broken by their sudden death,—we might, in the case to which we refer, almost say *murder*,—as would be by the death of those who look upon them with such extreme indifference. A man is run over. “O, it is only an Irishman.” A man has fallen from a house and broken his back. He is a foreigner, and we “pass to the order of the day.” Need we be surprised if the immigrants do not fall in love with us,—if they do not readily fraternize with us? Love begets love, but hatred or contempt, cruelty or indifference, does not. It is a proof of the good temper and forgiving disposition of the poorer class of immigrants, that they are not more bitter towards us, and that they are, after all, disposed to become Americans. That the foreign immigrants are faultless we do not pretend, and our readers know that we have spared them no more than we spare our own countrymen. They have done, no doubt, many unwise things, many imprudent things, and some of them have done many wrong things; but justice compels us to say, that their account against us more than offsets ours against them, and whatever we may think of the policy of the naturalization laws as they stand, we have much to reproach ourselves with in our manner of treating them, and have no right to raise an outcry against them as a body, or on the ground of their being foreign-born.

It will not do, moreover, to forget that immigration has served to enrich the country, and to enable us to develop its resources. We are not disposed to concede that we owe all to foreign immigrants, or to acknowledge that all the genius, talent, skill, and bravery of the country have been imported from abroad. Some foolish scribblers and babblers have vented in this respect a good deal of irritating nonsense, which has provoked no small portion of the hostility now raging against foreigners as such. The American people are not wise enough or meek enough to be told that they are simply nobodies, without showing a little resentment. But it cannot be denied, and ought not to be disguised, that we owe much to the skill, the industry, and the labor of the foreign-born population. They have added probably six millions to our population, and we dare not say how many hundreds of millions of dollars to our wealth. Without them we could not have become

the great manufacturing people we are, dug our canals, or built our railroads. Without them to supply the demand for labor and to fill the vacuum left by internal emigration, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, and perhaps Illinois, to say nothing of Texas and California, now great and flourishing States, would have remained unsettled, mere hunting-grounds for the native Indians. These things must be taken into the account in deciding whether our naturalization policy is to be changed or not.

Many of the immigrant population are poor, but poverty is not a crime, and without a similar population, who would be our servants, our domestics, our porters, our carriers, our scavengers? Who would do our dirty or disagreeable work? If you have not a foreign population to do it, you must have a native population. They who work at the base of society always are and must be poor, but they are none the less necessary than they who work at the summit, and are no more to be despised. Americans may make good masters, but they make bad servants, and were it not for the supply of servants sent us by Ireland and Germany, we should be obliged to resort to negro slavery, and there would not be a free State in the Union. "But the foreigners introduce vice and crime amongst us." That all foreigners are not saints, we readily agree, that there is a rapid growth of vice and crime in the country, we concede; but it must also be conceded that the natives are not all immaculate. Swartwout, Schuyler, Crane, Gardiner, and some others we could name, we believe were to "the manner born." If we exclude the criminals who fled here as such, or were sent here by their respective governments, making of our country a penal colony, the foreign-born population, taking into consideration their position, the trials they have, the sorrows which afflict them, the disappointments and regrets which sadden them, and the peculiar temptations which assail them, are really less vicious and criminal than the native population, and by far the most moral class in the country. The only reason why an impression to the contrary is entertained is that their vices are not precisely ours, and being different, they strike our attention more forcibly than those of our own countrymen. An impartial observer, considering the immigrants when they arrive, and comparing them with our own countrymen, and with what a large mass of them be-

come after several years of residence here, will come to the conclusion, that the populations of the countries from which they have emigrated are far more moral than the American, have a higher moral standard, and act from deeper and more abiding moral principles. Yet we deny not that there are in the later immigration, especially since the revolutions of 1848, elements that bode no good to the country, for they are elements of which we had in our own national character too much.

Thus far we have thought proper to consider the party as an American party opposed to the naturalization of foreigners. It may be that our naturalization laws are too liberal, and need amending; but this is not the fault of foreigners, and we ought to be on our guard against running to an opposite extreme. There is no cause for wrath or bitterness against foreigners, and if we allow passion to rage, and undertake to legislate against them under its influence, we shall certainly be guilty of injustice. We have long foreseen the crisis that was coming, and have done what we could to soften it; now that it has come, we entreat our countrymen to be calm and dignified, cool and deliberate, just and honorable, as becomes a great people.

Looking at the party from another point of view, we confess that, even if its objects were legitimate and such as we approved, we could not as an American republican or as an honest man give it our support. It is a secret political society, and as such is opposed to the spirit of American republicanism, which demands open avowals and free public discussions. It is hostile to individual freedom, for it demands absolute obedience on the part of its members to their chiefs, who are more despotic in their sphere than any crowned head in Europe. It works in the dark, like the Secret Council of Venice, and is restrained by none of the checks of publicity. It is immoral, because in its very oath it makes falsehood obligatory on every one of its members. Whence comes the name of the party, Know-Nothings? It comes from the answer, I know nothing, which one swears to give to every question put to him concerning the order. The member swears to lie, binds himself to falsehood upon falsehood. Now, the very initiation must vitiate the moral purity of the member, and tend to destroy what little of moral principle we have remaining in the com-

munity. It takes a dishonorable advantage of its opponents. It knows who they are, and what are their purposes, but meanly skulks behind the impenetrable veil of secrecy, and refuses to avow its purposes, or let it be known who are its members. These and a hundred other similar objections should induce honest and sober men to reflect on its character and tendency, and, if they have entered it without consideration, to withdraw from it as speedily as possible. There are no legitimate political objects in this country, where the people are supreme, that require a secret, subterranean organization, or that cannot be obtained openly, in a straightforward and manly way.

As to ourselves as Catholics, we have to meet the movement as well as we can. If reason and justice were likely to avail anything, there would be no ground of apprehension. How powerful is the organization, what are its real purposes, or what are its chances of retaining the ground it gains, we cannot say. That its purposes are hostile to Catholics, especially Irish Catholics, we cannot doubt; whether it will effect anything serious against them is not so certain. However this may be, as Catholics we recognize no distinction of race or nation amongst us, and we are and will be one body, and share together whatever may be intended against any portion of us. There will be here no division amongst us, and as fares the foreign-born Catholic, so must and will fare the native-born. The lot of the one is the lot of the other, and in the hour of trial we trust there will be no desertion of one another, and the blow struck at any member of the Catholic body as a Catholic will be felt by the whole body and by every member. What we had to say of foreignism we said when it seemed not too late to produce some effect; but the movement has gone on, and we have as little wish as power to separate ourselves from the lot of our brethren, whether native-born or foreign-born. We are embarked in the same ship, and none of us will leave it. We must all stand by one another, and share each other's weal or woe.

Yet have we no cause to fear. The enemy can go no farther than permitted, and cannot so much as touch a hair of our heads without the permission of our Heavenly Father. Persecution there may be, chastisement there may be, but we have no fears that the Church will be uprooted

here. We have no belief that God has wholly abandoned this nation. Indeed, we see in these hostile movements against us signs of encouragement. Let us be prudent, and give no occasion to the enemy, and he will not be able to harm us. His power will be broken after a brief while, and a bright day will dawn for Catholicity in this New World.

ART. VII. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *History of the United States, from the Discovery of the American Continent.* By GEORGE BANCROFT. Vol. VI. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1854. 8vo. pp. 528.

THE sixth volume of Mr. Bancroft's History, which was issued by the publishers last October, brings the history of the Revolution down to May, 1774, the eve of the breaking out of hostilities and the war of independence, and develops and details with great fulness, with extensive research and rare sagacity, the causes and events which finally alienated the affections of the Colonists from the mother country, effected a union among the several Colonies, made them resolve on resistance to British authority, and to assert their existence as a free people and an independent nation. The volume is almost entirely written from hitherto inedited documents, and throws much new light on the views of the European cabinets, especially the cabinet of France, and puts the general reader for the first time in a position fairly to comprehend that great event of American Independence. We are gratified to find that, though the author may go further in a revolutionary direction than we may be disposed to follow, he proves that the American people were not revolutionists after the fashion of the present day, and that they defended themselves, not on the ground of the inherent right of the people, or a major part of them, to make a revolution for the simple purpose of changing their form of government, and substituting a new one more to their liking, which is incompatible with the legitimacy of any government at all, but on the ground that the British government violated their most essential rights as British subjects, and thus broke the compact which bound them to the British crown. They proceeded on the principle which lies at the basis of all civil liberty, that the tyranny of the prince absolves the subject. They based their right to resistance on the ground of the violence, usurpations, tyranny, and oppressions of the mother

country, and we are bound to say that Mr. Bancroft has made out a far stronger case for them than we had believed they had. He has relieved us of all our misgivings, and proved to our satisfaction that they were justified by facts as well as by principle. Decidedly opposed as we are to the revolutionary principle, and as staunch an asserter as we are of legitimacy, Mr. Bancroft has proved to us by this volume, not only that we could have taken sides with the patriots, but that it would have been our duty to do so, and that we may glory in many things which we had supposed we could at best only excuse.

In a literary and philosophical point of view we think this volume is superior to any of its predecessors. Its style is graver and has more of the majestic march of history. The volume is more strictly historical, and less speculative. Its tone is deeper and more subdued. Indeed, we see, or fancy we see, a marked progress, as he advances in life, in the tone and disposition of the author. We have observed this more particularly in a very remarkable Address on Progress, which he has recently delivered before the New York Historical Society, and which has produced a lively sensation in more quarters than one. It is outspoken and manly, thoughtful and profound, sincere and earnest, and a most noble and energetic protest against the materialism and scepticism of the age, which, coming from the quarter it does, we hail with no little pleasure and hopefulness. The author may not be fully aware of it, but he has risen to a higher point of view, and entered a very different order of thought, from that in which he, as well as ourselves, was educated, although an order always craved by his deeper sympathies. He evidently understands in a new light the great movements of history, and now sees that the freedom of thought, the development of the race, and the progress of society, to which he early wedded himself, are not after all on the side he at first supposed, and that, with his broad sympathies, his lofty aims, his invincible firmness, vigorous intellect, and ardent hopes, his natural association is on the other side. He has passed beyond, far beyond Gibbon, and sees something more in the controversy between the Athanasians and the Arians, which for nearly two centuries convulsed the world, than a simple dispute about a single diphthong. In that single diphthong, in the question whether the Son was of the *same* or of only a *similar* substance with the Father, was involved the future of truth, religion, progress, liberty, humanity, all of which would have been sacrificed had the Arians triumphed. This Mr. Bancroft has seen. He ceases to idolize humanity, and boldly recognizes that the God of consciousness, of humanity, of history, as well as of theology, is triune. That this truth has burst upon his vision with the full light of day, that he sees all that is involved in it, may not be true, but he has risen to the high standpoint whence

he can behold it rising in the eastern horizon, and dispelling the clouds of night and breaking through the morning mists, and his is neither the mind nor the heart to close itself to its cheering radiance. He is not a man to shrink from following in his own thought truth whithersoever it may lead, or from its open and heroic assertion. We have heard no avowal from him that indicates a tendency to embrace that glorious old Church on whose maternal bosom we have found such sweet and ineffable repose for our long storm-tost and tempest-torn spirit, but we see in him one who believes with all his soul in a moral order, in the reality of truth and justice, and is prepared to do valiant battle against scepticism, indifference, and mere humanism. His mind is religious, his heart craves to love and worship, and his soul feels the need of some support, some stay amid the vicissitudes of life, above the low and transitory objects and affections of this perishing world.

We owe it to ourselves and to Mr. Bancroft to say frankly, that the principal objections which we preferred against his earlier volumes have nearly all disappeared from the present, and we shall wait impatiently for each of his successive volumes. With all the objections that we made, when judged from the Catholic point of view, to the earlier portions, his *History* is undeniably the great fact of American literature, and will hereafter, if it is not already, be recognized as such by all competent judges, both at home and abroad. When it is completed, and has received its last revision, it will remain, we trust, a noble monument to the genius of the author and to the genius of his country.

2. *First Book of History; combined with Geography and Chronology, for younger Classes.* By JOHN G. SHEA. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1854. 12mo. pp. 254.

WE like the style and plan of this *First Book of History* very much, and think the author has been very successful in both. We detect no Peter Parleyism in his book, that most detestable of *isms* in the order of school-books. Peter Parley's books are a downright nuisance, and if our grand juries would do their duty they would be at once presented as such all over the land. The man who composes a good school history, or any other good school-book, deserves our gratitude. Mr. Shea's style is chaste and simple, and his plan is well fitted to fix in the mind of the learner a distinct conception of each particular nation, from its first rise in history to the present, or to its final disappearance, which is a thing of great importance.

Mr. Shea, in his *Preface*, tells us that he has drawn his "matter from original sources." This we suspect must not be taken *au*

pied de lettre, for the original sources of the history of all the nations of the earth, from the beginning down, are not to be found in this country, and no man, unless living to the age of Methusalem, could consult them all. We see no evidence in the book that the author has made any original or any very profound historical researches. In glancing over his pages we find several inaccuracies, some of which may indeed be the fault of the printer, but others are evidently his own. We read, p. 139, that Philip the Fourth was king of France in 1328, and was defeated at the battle of Crecy. This may be the mistake of the printer for Philip the Sixth; but that Henry the Eighth of England did not change the religion of his people, and that he died a Catholic, p. 150, must be an error of the author. Is it no change of religion for a Catholic to deny the supremacy of the Pope and to separate from the communion of the Holy See, involving as it does both heresy and schism? Does the author hold that a king can abolish the spiritual authority of the Pope, separate the Church in his dominions from the centre of unity, make himself its head, and incur the greater excommunication, without prejudice to his Catholicity? or do that and die excommunicated, and nevertheless die a Catholic? Will he tell us, then, from what *original* source he has drawn his knowledge of Catholicity? We observe, p. 106, that in the hands of Mr. Shea the immortal "three hundred" Spartans under Leonidas, who met the Persians at Thermopylæ, grow to six thousand. Has he any *original* authority for saying that Leonidas had with him six thousand *Spartans*? On p. 166, we read that O'Connell, by incessant agitation, obtained, in 1829, the *elective* franchise for Catholics. We had supposed that what O'Connell obtained was not the right for Catholics to vote, which they already possessed, but the right to sit in Parliament and hold offices, without taking the oath of supremacy. We read again, p. 169, that Charlemagne restored the Western Empire. This is a mistake. The Western Empire was restored by the Pope, St. Leo the Third, and conferred on Charlemagne, whom he crowned Emperor. The author, also, seems to imply that the Empire did not become elective till 912; but it was elective from the first, and the Emperor was elective by the Pope in person, or by electors designated or authorized by the Pope to make the election. Mr. Shea knows, if he knows anything of mediæval history and of the relations of the Empire and the Papacy, that much depends on this fact, and that the denial of it would make out the Holy Pontiffs for ages to have been a series of unscrupulous usurpers. A Catholic, writing a First Book of History for younger classes, should be careful how he states as historical facts things fitted to destroy all confidence in the head of his Church. The monster whom Mr. Shea, p. 170, calls Henry the Fourth, and would seem to regard as a very excellent emperor, aside from his disputes with the Pope, never was Emperor. He

was King of the Germans, but not Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, because never crowned by the Pope. We suspect Mr. Shea has not drawn his history from the most reliable sources, even if from *original* sources. It is easy to detect the school to which he belongs, and the masters he follows.

We find Mr. Shea credits the legend of William Tell and the apple, and is a firm believer in the "Gunpowder Plot." He does not appear to think the defeat of Charles the Bold by the Swiss an event in modern history worth alluding to, and appears never to have heard of the battle of Auerstadt, fought by Davoust against the king of Prussia in person, on the same day that Napoleon fought the battle of Jena, and which was more brilliant, and had even more influence in breaking the Prussian power, than the battle of Jena itself. Several other things we have remarked which seem to us objectionable, and which go to weaken our confidence in the author as a reliable historian. Nevertheless, a few corrections in the second edition will render it in the main unexceptionable, and make it a very excellent manual for younger classes, according to its design.

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3. *The Catholic History of North America. Five Discourses. To which are added Two Discourses on the Relations of Ireland and America.* By T. D. McGEE. Boston: Donahoe. 1855. 12mo. pp. 239.

THE title of this volume is liable to mislead. Whoever takes up the volume expecting to find in it a complete history of Catholicity in North America, or a regular history at all, will be gravely disappointed. The work is polemical, not historical, except that its proofs are for the most part drawn from historical sources. The author has the same object in view that the Archbishop of New York had in his interesting and eloquent Catholic Chapter in American History, that of combating those who call this a Protestant country, and contend that Catholics are a sort of intruders or interlopers here. To this end he undertakes to maintain three propositions, viz.: — "1. That the discovery and exploration of America were Catholic enterprises, undertaken by Catholics with Catholic motives, and carried out by Catholic co-operation; 2. That the only systematic attempts to civilize and Christianize the aborigines were made by Catholic missionaries; and, 3. That the independence of the United States was in a great degree established by Catholic blood, talent, and treasure."

The second of these propositions the author fully establishes; the first he establishes to a certain extent, but not so far as to exclude other than Catholic motives in the early discoverers and ex-

plorers, and in their supporters. Still, if Catholicity was not the only motive, it was in most cases a prominent motive, and in nearly all put forward as the chief motive. But we must not be required to place much confidence in the Catholic motives of such sovereigns as Ferdinand of Aragon and Henry the Seventh of England, cold-hearted and selfish, both as men and monarchs. The third and last proposition is proved very much as Mr. McGee proves most of his propositions. There is no doubt that no class of the American population were more devoted, or contributed more in proportion to their numbers and means, to the independence of the United States, than the Catholics, but they could have had no marked influence on the result. Whether the French alliance was so essential to the establishment of our independence as Mr. McGee supposes may be doubted, but that alliance was not prompted by Catholicity or entered into for a Catholic purpose. We owe it rather to *Philosophic* France than to Catholic France. Religion had nothing to do with it. France was governed in it by her own views of state policy. She wished to avenge herself on Great Britain, weaken the power of a rival, establish a controlling influence in the new republic, and secure to herself the chief benefits of its commerce. There were nominal Catholics who sought service in our armies, or volunteered to serve in them, but they were moved by motives which may influence a Protestant as well as a Catholic, and the less we say of their Catholicity the better. We do not think the interests of Catholicity here or elsewhere require us to adopt a line of argument that would include Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, Condorcet, and the whole tribe of French infidels, among Catholics. For ourselves we are not disposed to dwell much on the Catholic character of the French subsidies. We cannot make much out of it, if we try. Arguments like Mr. McGee's weigh much more with his friends than with the great body of our non-Catholic countrymen. The undeniable fact is, this country, as to the dominant sentiment of the people, is more decidedly anti-Catholic than any other civilized country of the globe. By the Constitution and laws Catholics are placed, it is true, on a footing of perfect equality with the rest; but if that sentiment is strong enough to destroy that equality, and to deny in regard to Catholics the religious liberty which Americans have heretofore boasted as their chief glory, nothing we can say of the services rendered to the country in past or present times by Catholics will have any effect, or if any, the reverse of what we wish. The stronger we show our claims to be, the more shall we influence the anti-Catholic sentiment against us. Nevertheless, Mr. McGee's book, so far as devoted to illustrating and proving the three propositions, must be interesting and instructive to Catholics. The book is in general well written, some passages are beautifully and eloquently

written, and no man who has a heart can read them without deep emotion. The appendix will be found to be valuable, and the account of the blessed Catharine Yegharkouita highly edifying. The Two Discourses added on the relations of Ireland and America contain much that is true and important, but there are some things in them which we wish had either been omitted, or differently expressed.

4. *The Catholic Singing-Book, containing the Elements of Music, Progressive Lessons, and Exercises for Singing Schools, a Mass by F. F. Schmid, the Vespers, and other Pieces for the Use of Choirs.* By A. WERNER, Organist of the Cathedral in Boston. Boston: Donahoe. 1853. pp. 96.

THE title-page which we have cited describes accurately the design and contents of this book. It is not primarily a choir-book; it is chiefly intended for singing-schools, as a book for learners. As far as we are able to judge, it is admirably adapted to its purpose. We need not say one word in commendation of the author, one of the best musicians and most successful teachers of music, especially church music, in the country. His taste in church music is correct, and his zeal to improve our choirs is worthy of the devout Catholic. His little publication is modest and unpretending, but it is the very book that was needed for our singing-schools, and we doubt not that it will be approved by all our singing-masters, and put into the hands of all their pupils. If used according to the clear and simple directions of the author, in our schools generally, we shall soon find a very great change in our choirs, and find, what we do not now always find, their performances a help to devotion.

5. *Oramaika. An Indian Story.* New York: Dunigan and Brother. 1854. 18mo. pp. 366.

THIS is a very pleasantly told story, and adds another interesting little work to our Catholic library. It is said to be adopted from the French, though of what French publication we are not told, and we are unable to say. The scene is laid, as near as we can make out the author's geography, in the western part of this State, somewhere in the neighborhood of Springfield, and the characters are Indians, Father O'Leary, a missionary priest, and a whole batch of our stern old Puritans. Several passages in the book remind us of Cooper's *Wept of the Wiston Wish*. The story and the

scene do not very well accord, and the success with which Father O'Leary converts the Puritans surpasses anything recorded in history, and may well be envied by our faithful and hard-working priests of the present day. The book, however, is a good book, and though we do not believe that so many of our Puritan ancestors were actually converted, yet we are sure they might have been, and it was sad for them as well as for us that they were not. We look forward to the time, also, when the conversions of Massachusetts men recorded in *Oramaika* will not seem an improbable fiction to a resident of the old Bay State. Unhappily, never did our people seem further from the door of the Church than now; but "when things are at worst, they sometimes mend." We commend *Oramaika* to all our young friends.

6. *Ida May. A Story of Things Actual and Possible.* By MARY LANGDON. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1854. 12mo. pp. 478.

IDA MAY comes out as a rival to *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. It will not have the sale of that popular work, but it will produce a deeper impression on thoughtful minds, and do far more to damage the institution of slavery. The feeble part of the work is that which relates to the disposition of the slaves in case of their liberation.

7. *History of the Catholic Missions among the Indian Tribes of the United States, 1829 - 1854.* By JOHN GILMARY SHEA. New York: Dunigan and Brother. 1854. 12mo. pp. 514.

It is not easy to persuade one's self that this most interesting and eloquently written volume is by the author of the Prize Essay on Catholic Literature in the United States, which appeared in *The Metropolitan* at the beginning of last year. That Essay was weak and ill-tempered, betraying a petty spite against a writer who has deserved well of the friends of Catholic literature in this country, as well as great want of knowledge of his subject. It gave us a very unfavorable opinion of the author. But this volume, which we have received at too late a moment to read through, and at which we have only glanced, appears to us to be a work of solid merit, and to entitle the author to an honorable rank among our historical writers. Its subject is one of deep and thrilling interest, and the author seems to have caught its spirit, and to have depicted it in a style and language not wholly unworthy of it. The book is a valuable contribution to our literature, and will be read with interest and gratitude by every Catholic in the United States who can read our mother tongue.

8. *The Hundred Boston Orators appointed by the Municipal Authorities and other Public Bodies, from 1770 to 1852; comprising Historical Gleanings, illustrating the Principles and Progress of Republican Institutions.* By JAMES SPEAR LORING. Third Edition, with an improved Index of Names. Boston: John P. Jewett & Co. 1854. 8vo.

THIS work is not an account of a hundred orators, natives of this city, but a collection of extracts from their Speeches and Orations, together with biographical sketches of a hundred different orators who have given orations before the citizens of Boston. It is a very interesting work, and we may find in it matter for some remarks hereafter.

9. *The Prophet of the Ruined Abbey, a Glance of the Future of Ireland: A Narrative founded on the Ancient "Prophecies of Culmkill," and other Predictions and Popular Traditions among the Irish.* By the Author of "The Cross and Shamrock." New York: Dunigan and Brother. 1855. 12mo. pp. 293.

WE have read this new work by the author of *The Cross and Shamrock*. It is in the author's best style. We learn from it that Catholicity is "the *oldest* Christian creed in Christendom," and that Napoleon the Third, to whom the work is dedicated, is the expected conqueror of England, and liberator of Ireland.

But seriously, though the author is undisciplined as a writer, and neither very profound nor very accurate as a thinker, his work possesses considerable merit. Its story is disjointed, and in parts highly improbable; but it contains passages that every reader must admire for their rare beauty and genuine pathos. The author's descriptive powers are far above mediocrity, and some of his characters, as O'Mara and Darby Anglum, for instance, are well drawn, and sustained. That of Captain O'Donnell is not bad. But the author succeeds better with his peasants than with his gentlemen, and with his soldiers than with his saints. He describes with more sympathy and unction the feats of the wild Rapparee than the pious exercises of Father O'Donnell. Father O'Donnell is, of course, a saint, but whether he owes his canonization to his love of God or to his love of country is somewhat doubtful. The author professes to be an O'Connellite, but he writes with the spirit of a Young Irelander, and though he is bitter against the heroes of Slieb na Man, he has a hard struggle to reconcile himself to those Irish priests who preach to their people loyalty to the government,

obedience to the laws, and resignation and patience under their wrongs. He hates Red-Republicanism, but he loves war, and feels a real pleasure when his Rapperee brings down a couple of Orangemen at a single shot.

Whether the author's patriotism is always wise or not, it certainly is intense, and he seems to have discovered a fifth cardinal virtue, namely, hatred of the Saxon. We have no wish to palliate the conduct of England towards Ireland. It admits of no palliation. The wrongs she has inflicted upon the Irish no passion or imagination can exaggerate, and yet we cannot see any justice in anathematizing the whole Anglo-Saxon race. The worst enemies of Ireland described in the author's own book are Irish, not Saxon. We can see no good likely to result from efforts to influence the Irish in this country with hatred to the Anglo-Saxon race. It will not better their condition here, or render them more able to serve their countrymen at home. It seems to us very possible to love and esteem the Irish without hating everybody else. Indeed, we doubt if our religion allows us to hate races any more than individuals.

The author in his *Preface* has some allusions which we are sorry to see. He does great injustice to those whom he designates as "a few fickle-minded spirits," "not numerous nor respectable enough to form a school of philosophy." The passage in our Review on which he no doubt founds his charge against them has no such meaning as he through his morbid jealousy extracts from it. It says not one word against the study of Irish history, Irish antiquities and traditions; it does not tell the Irish that they should forget or neglect them; it does not depreciate their value in themselves considered; it only says, that it is of no use urging them as an argument to remove the prejudices which it is alleged the American people have against the Irish, for the world judges a people by what it is and can do here and now, not by what it once was or once did. We did not pretend that in this the world is right; we only contended that it does and will so judge. We did not say a word against those things which are so dear to the Irishman, and which have a deep interest for every genuine scholar; we only said, that insisting on them was not the most effectual way of combating the prejudices against the Irish in this country, — prejudices, by the way, which we do not and never did share. The whole amount of our passage about Tara's halls was not to find fault with the love of the Irish for their national antiquities, history, or traditions, but to question the practical value of the logic of Thomas Mooney, Esq., in urging upon his countrymen to make a present of his History of Ireland to their Yankee friends, as the best way of removing their prejudices against the Irish. Morbid jealousy finds proofs of guilt in the unconscious expressions of innocence.

BROWNSON'S

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1855.

ART. I.—*Romanism in America.* By REV. RUFUS W. CLARK. Boston: Whipple. 1855. 12mo. pp. 271.

Who Rev. Rufus W. Clark is, we do not know, and have not thought it worth our while to endeavor to ascertain. We presume, however, that he is an Evangelical minister of some sort in this city, and perhaps of high standing in his own sect. His book does not present him in a very amiable light, and from its perusal we should judge him to be more remarkable for his zeal than his knowledge, and more accustomed to hate than to love. He is very ignorant, and even more untruthful. Candor and courtesy towards those with whom he differs are evidently qualities he has not yet acquired, and qualities which we fear he is utterly unable to appreciate. He is both credulous and unscrupulous, and though a Protestant minister, he is wanting in all those amenities and gentlemanly habits which are within the reach of a cultivated Gentile. Yet we are obliged to confess that, however much his book may disgust the better sort of Protestants, it is a fair specimen of the works which issue from the American Protestant press against our Church and the members of her communion. Its only merit is the Satanic cunning with which it appeals to the low and unworthy prejudices of the Protestant *plebs* against Catholicity. It is with great reluctance that we approach such a work, but as American Protestantism seems unable or unwilling to produce anything more gentlemanly, more scholarlike, more

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worthy of the great question at issue, we suppose it would be undue fastidiousness to pass it by without some notice.

The work itself appears to consist of a course of Lectures delivered by Mr. Clark, the last season, in this city, and now published at the recommendation of some of the persons who listened to them. The subjects treated are,— 1. The Origin and Progress of Romanism; 2. Fundamental Principles of Popery; 3. Antagonism between Popery and Civil Freedom; 4. The Order of the Jesuits; 5. The Paganism of Popery; 6. The Persecuting Spirit of Romanism; 7. The Inquisition; 8. The Bible in our Public Schools. These topics are selected with some skill, and give the lecturer an opportunity to repeat the greater part of the vulgar cant and stale charges which form the staple of the writings and lectures of men of his class. The slightest knowledge of history, coupled with a moderate share of good sense, is sufficient to demolish the whole fabric which the author erects, for it is less substantial than ordinary castles in the air. The author seems to have lost whatever original faculty he may have had of telling the truth. The truth itself, when by some rare accident he stumbles upon it, becomes falsehood in his manner of telling and applying it. His whole work is simply a tissue of false assertions, unfounded charges, gross perversions of facts, and unwarranted inductions. We cannot attempt a complete refutation of what he advances against our religion, for we have neither the space nor the patience to quote and reply separately to each separate sentence of his book. We can note only a few of the more glaring of his errors, misstatements, and false accusations. As a specimen of the whole work, we commend to our readers the following paragraphs from the opening Lecture.

“ We would not exaggerate the evils or the strength of Romanism; neither would we utter a word to excite unnecessary alarm with regard to the prevalence of the system in our land. But we contend that a system in the very heart of our republic, deadly hostile to our churches, public schools, and free institutions, that numbers three millions of votaries, and is sustained by nearly sixteen hundred priests, thirty-two bishops, seven archbishops, more than one hundred colleges and seminaries, and seventeen hundred churches, is a system that should not be passed by with a sneer, or treated with cold indifference. The recent aggressions of this

power, the arrogant assumptions of its prominent writers, the astounding insolence of such publications as the *Freeman's Journal*, *Shepherd of the Valley*, and *Brownson's Review*, in asserting that heretics, that is, American Protestants, should be punished by the sword if they cannot be forced into the Catholic Church, should arouse the citizens of this nation, and prompt them to plant themselves at once in opposition to this power. We would deprecate all violence and unnecessarily harsh and denunciatory language; but we would use all the moral means that God has placed in our hands to break down a system that at every point is antagonistic to our dearest privileges and blessings.

"In seeking, however, the destruction of Romanism, we would do all in our power to save the Romanist, not, indeed, as a Romanist, but as a man, as a sinner like ourselves, for whom Christ died. In seeking the annihilation of Popery, we would save the Pope, as one who specially needs the benefits of the atoning sacrifice of Christ. We declare war, not against men, but against principles that are subversive of our liberties and religion. We declare war, and, God helping us, we will prosecute it, against that system which, in the Holy Scriptures, is denominated 'the man of sin and son of perdition,' 'the mystery of iniquity,' 'the mother of harlots and abominations.' And we would break it down that its victims themselves may be delivered from its grasp and saved from its pernicious influences; for a greater calamity could not befall the Roman Catholics than to have Romanism triumph in this nation. Such a conquest would be the destruction of the very privileges and advantages that they have come to our shores to enjoy." — pp. 7–9.

We hardly know how to deal with an author who writes in this way. There is not a word of truth in what he says of *The Freeman's Journal*, *The Shepherd of the Valley*, or *Brownson's Review*. These journals, one of them or all of them, have never, explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly, in form or substance, asserted that heretics, meaning thereby "American Protestants," or any other class of heretics, "should be punished by the sword," or in any other way, "if they cannot be forced into the Church"; nor have they ever asserted that heretics ought even to be, or even may be, forced into the Church at all.

The author says that, "in seeking the destruction of Romanism, he would do all in his power to save the Romanist." This distinction is intelligible, and every man who knows the difference between systems and persons makes it, or professes to make it. We ourselves say, and say truly, that, in seeking the destruction of Protestantism, we would

save the Protestant. "In seeking the annihilation of Popery, we would save the Pope, as one who specially needs the benefits of the atoning sacrifice of Christ." This is well enough. So we, in seeking the annihilation of Protestantism, would save Rev. Rufus W. Clark, "as one who specially needs the benefits of the atoning sacrifice of Christ," not less so, he must permit us to believe, than the Pope. We may cheerfully say, also, with the author, that "we declare war, not against men, but against principles that are subversive of our religion and liberties. We declare war, and, God helping us, we will prosecute it, against that system which, in the Holy Scriptures, is denominated 'the man of sin and son of perdition,' 'the mystery of iniquity,' 'the mother of harlots and abominations,' and we would break it down that its victims may themselves be delivered from its grasp and pernicious influence." He calls that system "Romanism," we call it Protestantism, and are at least as anxious to deliver its victims as he is.

The author would save the Romanist, not as a Romanist, but, we suppose, by converting him from Catholicity to something else. Will he tell us to what he would convert him? To Protestantism? To what form or sort of Protestantism? To Protestantism in that sense in which it is accepted by all who call themselves Protestants? But in that sense it is simply the rejection of Catholicity, and not a religion, but the negation of the Catholic religion. To convert us to Protestantism in this sense would be merely inducing us to give up the religion we have, and to go without any religion,—to live without God in the world, and to die as the dog dieth. We cannot consent to that. We cannot live without religion, and if you ask us to give up Catholicity, you must offer us something better in its place, and something which we cannot have without ceasing to be Catholics.

Have you anything of the sort to offer us? What is it? Reason? But that we already have, to say the least, as well as you. And we have no occasion to go out of the Church in order to exercise it; for it leads us to submit to the Church as divinely commissioned to keep and declare the law of God and dispense the mysteries of the Gospel. We came to her, and we submit to her in all she commands, by a free act of reason, and we could not renounce

her without renouncing reason itself. Nothing strikes us as more reasonable than to believe God on his word, and to submit to him in all things; and therefore nothing seems to us more reasonable than to believe and obey the Church authorized by him to teach and command us in his name, for it is his word we believe and his authority we obey. We submit to the Church, not blindly, but with our eyes open, and solely on the ground that our reason, freely exercised, is convinced that she is authorized by Almighty God himself to speak to us in his name, or rather that it is he, the indwelling Holy Ghost, that speaks to us in her voice, through her as his organ. Under the head of reason, then, you have nothing to give us.

What then have you to give us? The Bible? But we have that without you, and had it fifteen hundred years before Luther. In fact, you have the Bible only as you have got it from us, and you are obliged to take its canonicity and inspiration on the authority of the Catholic Church, or at least on Catholic tradition. Do you allege that we are not permitted to read it? Then you allege what is not true. We are not indeed allowed to regard your mutilated and corrupt version of the Scriptures as the genuine Bible, but we have as much liberty to read the Bible as you have. The free use of the Scriptures has always been permitted and encouraged by the Church; the only thing she prohibits is their abuse. Do you add, that Protestants will allow us to interpret them for ourselves? That is true only in case we do not interpret them differently from the Protestant sect to which we happen to belong. But this is nothing. What is wanted is not the liberty to interpret the Scriptures for ourselves, and therefore to misinterpret them, and make God's word a lie, but the assistance necessary to enable us to arrive at their true meaning. Can you give us that assistance? No? Then in regard to the Bible you have nothing to give us which we have not already as Catholics. In regard to the Scriptures, then, we are at least as well off as you.

What, we ask again, will you give us in exchange for our Catholicity? "The benefits of the atoning sacrifice of Christ"? But how assure us that you have them to give? You probably mean, that you would teach us to rely solely on the merits of Christ for salvation, not on dead works. But this would give us nothing which, as Catholics, we

have not already. The Catholic has always been taught to rely solely on the merits of Christ for salvation, for it is solely by virtue of his merits that we can perform the works to which heaven is promised as the reward. No works of our own, done by our natural strength, are of any avail for eternal salvation. Those works only are available that are done through grace, and the grace which renders them available, or which merits, is a free gift to us, purchased for us by Christ our head, so that all the merits are due to Christ, and all the glory redounds to him alone. It is very considerate, and even kind, no doubt, to propose offering the Pope "the benefits of the atoning sacrifice of Christ"; but it is possible that the Pope can teach you more on that subject than you can the Pope. The Pope knows, without consulting Protestant ministers, that dead works avail nothing, and that we are saved by Christ alone, and that without his grace, purchased for us by his merits, operating within us, and freely concurred with by us, grace moving and strengthening us, we can do nothing in regard to salvation.

Once more, then, we ask, what has the Protestant to give us? The doctrine of justification by faith alone? But the doctrine that we are justified by faith is, and always has been, a Catholic doctrine, and therefore all that is affirmative in this doctrine is ours already. As Catholics, we hold that faith is the root and foundation of every Christian virtue; but we do not indeed hold that faith alone suffices, or that faith without charity can save us; for the devils believe and tremble, and yet continue to be devils. We believe, as St. James teaches, that faith without works is dead, being alone, and a dead faith cannot justify, for in that it is dead it is inoperative. Now what is peculiar to the Protestant, what is distinctively the Protestant doctrine, is expressed by the word *alone*, which is not in the sacred text, and was inserted by Luther in his version on his sole authority, as he himself avows; and it is a purely negative doctrine, merely denying the necessity of charity to justification. It gives us nothing which we have not, and merely takes away something which we have.

Do you tell us that by accepting the word *alone*, and saying that faith alone, that is, faith without love, faith without works, justifies, we should be relieved from the necessity of striving after inward holiness, and of performing

acts of charity, as well as from fasts, penances, and works of mortification? This, if we could be assured of its truth, would no doubt save us some trouble, and bring some consolation to us, while living in a state of sin. But we know not the meaning of a justification without justice, and we are very much inclined to believe that, in order to be justified by a just God, we must be intrinsically just; and the works from which you would relieve us, after all, may be necessary to make and to keep us inwardly just. A justification which leaves us all leprous with sin, and is based on no real justice in us, were a mere sham justification, and our God deals in realities, not shams. At best it would save us from the penalty of sin, without saving us from the sin itself; and with our hearts filled with sin we could have no spiritual life and no communion with God. It were simply a forensic justification, which would leave the intrinsic justification still to be acquired by works of charity, if we were ever to become meet companions for the saints in heaven; and therefore we should have, in order to be saved from sin, to perform all the works from which you propose to relieve us. Now, as we desire heaven more than we fear hell, and as it is from sin even more than from the punishment of sin that we would be saved, we can see no advantage in your doctrine of justification by faith alone, which remits the penalty and retains the sin, which saves from the external hell, but leaves all the inward aversion from God, which is the worst of all hells. Your doctrine is, no doubt, very convenient to those who would sin to their heart's content, and live as they list without fear of hell, without being troubled in their consciences, and with the comfortable assurance that they are saints; but as we do not wish to be of that number, as we wish to be saved from our sins, and to be conformed in our heart to God, and to bear his spiritual likeness that we may enjoy his communion, and hereafter be made partakers of his divine nature, the doctrine would be entirely useless to us, and perhaps even an inconvenience. We cannot, therefore, as at present advised, accept it in place of the Catholic doctrine.

On this as on all other points Protestants can offer us only their belief, whether negative or positive, in place of ours. But wherefore shall we give up our belief for theirs? Are they infallible? Certainly not, for they make it one of

their greatest objections to the Church, that she professes, by the assistance of the Holy Ghost, to teach infallibly what God has revealed to her. No, they answer, we are not infallible, but the Bible is. Conceded. But are you infallible in your understanding of what the Bible teaches? No? Then at the very best your belief is fallible, and may turn out to be false. Why then shall we give up ours for yours? At the worst ours is only fallible, and therefore no worse than yours at best.

We think, therefore, that this arrogant tone of the Protestant minister, and his talk about saving the Romanist, and converting the Pope, and all that, are quite out of place, and should not be indulged in till he has some positive doctrine, some affirmative truth, something more than a bare negation of Catholic doctrine, to offer us. We have a Church professing to teach infallibly what God has revealed, and he proposes that we shall renounce her for no Church at all, or at best for one that confesses herself to be fallible, and without authority to teach us either in faith or morals. Does it never occur to him that our Church, while it is possible, as he must confess, that she may be infallible, and have from God the authority and assistance she professes to have, can at worst be only a fallible Church, and therefore at worst as trustworthy as Protestantism at best? She would at worst only be worthless, and Protestantism, according to his concessions, can at best be no better than worthless. We have a Church, a well-defined doctrine of faith and morals, which tells us distinctly what we must believe and what we must do in order to be saved, — to render ourselves acceptable to God and secure the eternal beatitude of heaven, — and you come to us and ask us to renounce her, to give up our clear, distinct, and well-defined faith, for what? For Protestantism, which, beyond the simple point of rejecting Catholicity, is a mass of crude and undigested opinions and speculations, varying with almost every individual Protestant, and ranging all the way from the High-Churchism of Dr. Pusey down to the rank infidelity of Theodore Parker. First, my brother, go and get Protestants to agree among themselves what Christianity is, and what it demands, and then show us your commission from Almighty God, made out in due form, to preach and administer it. Do that and we will hear you, but till then we must rank you with those prophets of whom

the Lord by the mouth of Jeremy says, "I have not sent these prophets, and yet they run." "They are prophets of the delusions of their own hearts."

The simple fact is, Protestantism in its distinctive character is merely the denial of Catholicity, and on theological grounds cannot sustain itself for a moment. Protestants themselves feel this. They feel that it is incumbent on them, therefore, to bring something affirmative against us; and as they cannot find that in Protestantism as a religion, they would persuade us that they have it in Protestantism as a political and social system.

"I have often wondered why the Romanist did not, in moments of reflection, ask himself these simple questions: 'Why have I left the home of my fathers and the scenes of my childhood, and come to live in this Protestant land, and dwell among these heretics? How does it happen that I have here better food and clothing, higher wages, more constant employment, a more sure protection to my life and property, free education for my children, and far greater facilities for rising in the world, than I had in my Catholic home? Whence this thrift, prosperity, and general happiness that I see around me?'

"It seems to us as though the man who could see the sunlight at noonday could see the answer to these inquiries, could see the world-wide difference between Popery and Protestantism, as elements of civilization and social happiness, to say nothing of the religious and spiritual bearings of the two systems. Yet we are presented with the strange spectacle of a large class of persons, who, after having experienced the miseries of the Papal system in their native country, are here, under the guidance of a corrupt and bigoted priesthood, laboring to break down the very government that affords them protection, destroy the sources of their daily comfort, sweep away the system of public education that seeks to elevate and enlighten them, and annihilate the Protestant faith, that has made America what it is, — the asylum of the oppressed, and the hope of all nations. That this state of things does not prevail universally among the Papal community in our country, we are glad to allow. Some avalanches have slid away from this great Alps of iniquity, which in itself remains as cold and unmoved as ever. In some minds the light has broken, and revealed the error and corruption of the Romish apostasy. But over the mass of the people the cloud of ignorance and superstition is too dense to allow them to see what is so obvious to the enlightened observer." — pp. 9, 10.

The assumption of the author, that the evils of their own country which induce Catholics to emigrate are due

to "the Papal system," is unwarranted. Very few Catholics emigrate to this country from Catholic states, and the great body of them come from countries under Protestant governments. The most numerous body of emigrants are from Ireland, and Ireland is, and for three hundred years has been, a Protestant state, governed by Protestant England through an Irish Protestant faction, which has done all in its power to impoverish, degrade, and brutalize the Catholic Irish. It is not "the Papal system," but the Protestant system of governing Ireland, as everybody knows, that has reduced them to that sad social and temporal condition which makes it desirable for them to emigrate. The next most numerous body of Catholic emigrants are from Germany, and to a great extent from German Protestant states. That it is not "the Papal system" that reduces the Germans to a condition which makes emigration desirable, is evident from the fact that the majority migrating from Germany to this country are non-Catholics.

The other assumption of the author, that the superior advantages enjoyed in this country are due to Protestantism, is equally unwarranted. Our national advantages we owe to the great extent of our country, the cheapness and fertility of our soil, and our vast natural resources. For these we are not indebted to Protestantism. Our political liberty we inherited, to a great extent, from our English ancestors, who themselves inherited it from Catholic England, and the rest we owe to local circumstances, and the long neglect of the colonies by the mother country, which enabled them to acquire habits of self-government. The religious liberty recognized by the Constitution and laws we owe not to Protestantism, for it is repugnant to the very spirit of Protestantism, as the societies and movements of Protestants for the disfranchisement of Catholics, now in full blast, amply prove. There are no Protestant states in Europe that recognize and guaranty religious liberty in our sense of the term. Some of them *tolerate* different worships, but the European states that recognize and guaranty the *liberty* of different worships, such as France, Belgium, and Austria, are states in which the vast majority of the people are Catholics. Protestants rarely understand religious liberty in a sense broad enough to include the freedom of Catholicity, and the Protestant

press of this country, the press which represents the genuine Protestant spirit, is urging upon the country to disfranchise Catholics, and even to expel them from the American territory. We must, therefore, tell our author, that, though religious liberty is recognized by our Constitution and laws, it has been in spite of Protestantism and not by it, — in fact, as a matter of state policy, or, if you will, of necessity, because no one Protestant sect was strong enough to make itself the state religion, and because at the time of our Revolution very few persons thought it necessary to exclude Catholicity, which was supposed, if not dead, to be at least on its last legs. Both of the author's assumptions are therefore false, and his argument concludes nothing, or if anything, it is against the Protestant states of Europe.

But even granting the author his assumptions, he could conclude nothing in favor of Protestantism or against Catholicity, as a religion. Religion is given us as the means of securing eternal salvation, the beatitude of heaven, and we have never understood that to be granted as a reward of temporal prosperity, or to be purchased with worldly goods. The author, unconsciously perhaps, falls into carnal Judaism. He evidently makes the temporal prosperity of individuals and nations the touchstone of their religion. But this supposes that Christ came as a temporal Messiah, and rewards his followers with the goods of this life. This is precisely the error of the carnal Jews. They looked for a temporal prince, and interpreted the promises and prophecies of the Messiah and his kingdom in an earthly sense, and rejected our Lord because he came only as a spiritual prince, declaring that his kingdom was not of this world, and requiring his followers to labor not for the meat that perisheth, but for the meat that endureth unto everlasting life. The author agrees with them in principle, and differs from them only in this, that while they looked to him as a prince who was to restore the kingdom of Israel, and give to his chosen people all temporal power, grandeur, and happiness, he probably regards him as the temporal Messiah for the elect, whether Jews or Gentiles. He is a little more liberal, perhaps, than they, but he does not differ essentially from them in principle.

This is a grave consideration, and we think we see evi-

dence everywhere that Protestants to a fearful extent have lost sight of the spirituality of the Gospel, and in their own minds and hearts secularized and materialized Christianity. We know there are many hearts in the non-Catholic world who have high and noble aspirations, which the literature of the age calls "aspirations after the ideal"; but it is upon the whole low and utilitarian, and places its glory in the production and multiplication of material goods. It is a mercantile age, a shopkeeping world, which hardly recognizes a value which cannot be measured in good current coin. Intellect in that world, to a certain extent, no doubt, is cultivated, but as an instrument of the body, not of the spirit, or of the heart aspiring to the love and worship of "the First Good and the First Fair." Intellect is utilized, if we may use the term, and the heart is neglected, the soul is left to starve; wealth is made a god, industry a religion, commerce a worship, men and nations are measured by the material standard, and trade is regarded as the first of missionaries to the heathen. We do not exaggerate, we only state, or rather understate, the simple truth. In our own country thrift is the first of virtues, and poverty is a crime, and everywhere punished as a crime; for your poor-houses are veritable prisons. In Catholic countries there are many people who are partially idle, poor people who are not struggling to become rich, and who take time to enjoy a holiday, to visit churches and say their prayers, or to go forth into the fields and enjoy innocent rural pleasures and tastes; there are quiet and repose; and there are beggars in the streets importuning you for an alms; and therefore our grave Protestants conclude that Catholicity is false, a blight upon the nations that embrace it. The people may, after all, be happy in their way, much happier than where the English and American system prevails; but how Papacy must have degraded them before they could be contented to remain in their miserable condition, and find pleasure in such trifles as now charm them! Nobody is well employed, in the estimation of our Protestant age, unless employed in making revolutions, finding out new markets for trade, new articles of commerce, inventing new helps to industry, or opening or developing the resources of material wealth; that is, unless employed in making or helping others to make money. Such is that world in which Protestantism predominates. Now this material-

ism of the age has passed into the religion of Protestants. Protestantism — and this is its boast — is not a stationary religion, but a progressive religion, feeling always the impulse of the age, and yielding to its spirit. Just at present, two Protestant countries, Great Britain and the United States, represent the low utilitarian civilization now regarded as the most perfect civilization. They are at the head of the modern industrial and mercantile system, and in relation to this system are unquestionably the two most powerful states on the globe. Hence English and American Protestant authors conclude the truth and superiority of Protestantism. The most, however, that they could conclude from this would be the superiority of Protestantism in the material order. This superiority even we might dispute, but we let it pass for the present. Yet what must be the state of men's minds when they can allege it alone as an argument for or against a religion? The only principle on which they can do it is precisely that of carnal Judaism, and therefore only by directly opposing the essential nature of Christianity. Mr. Clark, no doubt, persuades himself that he is a Christian; and yet, if he understood one word of those Scriptures which he falsely alleges we are not permitted to read, he would see that he proceeds on maxims which are the direct contradictions of those of our Lord and his Apostles. Our Lord nowhere promises the kingdom of heaven to the rich and worldly prosperous. He says, "It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven," and that "blessed are the poor, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." He teaches everywhere self-denial, detachment from the world, and commands us to lay up treasures in heaven, not on the earth; bids us set our affections not on things on the earth, but on things above; to be not solicitous as to what we shall eat, or what we shall drink, or wherewithal we shall be clothed, "for after all these things do the heathen seek." Evidently, to be solicitous for the wants of the body, and to seek after the good things of this life, are the characteristics of heathenism. How is it then that our author, when he takes worldly goods, sensible goods, goods that must perish with this life, as the criterion of our Christianity, does not see that he falls into the precise error that our Lord condemned in the heathen and the carnal Jews? How is

it that he does not see that it is against Christianity itself that he is making war, and that he proves himself a worldly-minded man, a man of the earth, earthy, living after the flesh, not after Christ?

We think nothing is more certain than that the great practical objection to Catholicity, the objection that weighs most with our non-Catholic countrymen, is the supposed superiority in industry, thrift, and worldly prosperity of Protestant nations. Balmes has very well shown that this superiority is not a fact; but suppose that it is, it proves nothing for Protestantism as a religion, and commends it only in the minds of those who set their hearts on this world, and love the world more than they love God and heaven. This very worldly prosperity you boast, this modern system of trade and industry, which absorbs your minds and hearts, and directs all your energies to the *exploitation* of the material order, is itself the principal obstacle to the progress of Christianity, for Christianity lies in the spiritual order, another and an infinitely higher sphere. Mr. Clark himself, when he forgets controversy, and preaches on the practical requirements of the Gospel, will tell you as much, and contradict every principle he asserts in his reasoning against Catholics. Why then does he not see that perhaps the things he condemns in us are more praiseworthy than what he lauds in Protestants? How, if he commends this devotion to the material order which he finds so much greater in Protestant nations than in Catholic nations, does he expect in his practical preaching to wean the affections of his people from the world, to make them despise its riches, to be content with poverty, and to bend all their energies, God helping them, to save their souls? How happens it that he does not see that the objection he urges against our religion is precisely the objection urged against our Lord himself, by those who crucified him between two thieves? The argument drawn from the unworldly and spiritual character of our religion, with which he would overwhelm us, is altogether in our favor, if Christianity be from God; and none but an infidel can with any propriety urge it as an objection. The obstacle Protestants find in the way of accepting our religion is really, if they consider it, that it is Christianity, that it makes little of this world, and renders us comparatively indifferent to worldly goods which perish, and solici-

tions only for those which endure unto everlasting life. It is an obstacle which exists in their own minds, in their own hearts, wedded to the world, not anything wrong in the Church, or that her defenders should seek to deny or explain away. Love not the world, but love God, and you will find that what now is a scandal to you will strike you as a proof that she is God's Church.

The author's theory of the origin and progress of "Romanism," as he has the bad taste to call Catholicity, is an old acquaintance, and has been refuted time and again, and ably refuted in these pages, by one of the ripest scholars and most accomplished theologians in the country, in a review of a work on the subject by the Protestant Archbishop of Dublin. It is unhistorical, unphilosophical, and exceedingly superficial. We let the author state it in his own way.

"While surveying the movements and growth of the Papacy around us, we naturally inquire, in the first place, into the origin and history of this remarkable and mysterious power. A slight examination into the elements of Popery reveals the fact, that it has its source in the depravity of the human heart. It is virtually an embodiment of the evil principles and passions of the human soul. Selfishness, avarice, superstition, and despotism are among its constituent elements; and these, with others, are woven together with such skill, and form a combination of such prodigious strength, that Popery has been properly termed 'Satan's masterpiece.' It contains the principles of other false religions, of Paganism and a degenerate Judaism, all fused into one gigantic system. As an instrument for gaining temporal power and holding in subjection the thoughts and purposes as well as the conduct of men, it has no parallel in the history of religions. As a force destructive to vital piety and the pure doctrines of Christianity, it has no rival.

"During the first three centuries, when the opposition to the Church was from without, and the engines of Paganism were arrayed against her, she yet advanced with wonderful rapidity. With her doctrines pure and her advocates fired with a heavenly zeal, the principles of the Gospel spread throughout the Roman empire, and extended to regions which the sway of imperial Rome had not even reached. Churches arose in the capital of the empire; in the provinces of Asia Minor and in Ethiopia; at Corinth, Philippi, Thessalonica. The principles of the true faith were early introduced among the Gauls, Germans, Spaniards, and Britons. So rapid was the progress of the Gospel, and so com-

plete its triumphs, in spite of the storms of persecution that raged against it, that, in the year 325, during the reign of Constantine the Great, the system of Paganism was demolished, and on the ruins was established the Christian faith. But Satan, unwilling to be baffled in his wicked designs, sought to plant within the Church itself the elements of destruction. Unable to check the tide of blessings that was flowing through the nations, he labored to poison the stream. And as the Church gained in power and outward prosperity, she lost in spirituality, and in the graces of a sincere and ardent piety.

"The city of Rome, around which so many interesting and hallowed associations clustered, became the seat of authority. The bishop, by the strength which his position gave to him, and by being called upon to decide the disputes which arose in churches abroad, as well as at home, gradually gained supreme power. One nation after another submitted to his dictation. What he could not gain by persuasion he secured by the arts of diplomacy, or by the stern mandates of the sword. Over millions of consciences he held undisputed sway. All the avenues of influence centred at Rome, and thence emanated the laws that governed the civilized world.

"As early as during the first and second centuries we can trace the embryo developments of the Papal system. They appeared in many of the Christian churches, disturbing the faith and obstructing the spiritual growth of the members. St. Paul, in his letter to the Colossians, uses the following language: 'Be-ware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.' And again: 'Let no man judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of an holy day, or of the new moon, or of the Sabbath days. . . . Let no man beguile you of your reward, in a voluntary humility and worshipping of angels.' Here we find these primitive disciples warned against the very errors which afterwards gained such prodigious power, and contributed so largely to the secularization and corruption of the Christian Church. The regard which was paid and continues to be paid to traditions; the influence of a vain and deceitful philosophy; the rules respecting meat, and fast and feast days; the worship paid to angels and saints, of which the Romish churches and the Pantheon at Rome bear abundant testimony, — all show the importance of the Apostolic injunctions addressed to the Christians at Colossé.

"In the second century we discover in some minds a tendency towards monastic austerities. The doctrine was advanced, that the virtues of continence and chastity were specially pleasing to God, and that the marriage relation, under the most favorable

circumstances, received but little Divine favor. In the extravagant and unscriptural views advanced upon this subject, we perceive the germ of that system of monasticism, which, with its inevitable perversions and corruptions, overspread in later years a large portion of the Christian Church.

"At this period, also, the vital interests of religion suffered from controversies which arose respecting minor observances, and the disposition which was manifested by some religious teachers to lay more stress upon the 'mint, anise, and cumin' of religion than upon the 'weightier matters of the law.'"

"During this and the following century, several superstitious practices were introduced; such as the use of holy water, and regulations respecting the number of times that the eucharist should be celebrated. Traces of the doctrines of baptismal regeneration, and of purgatory, may be found in the works of some of the distinguished writers who belong to this period."—pp. 11–15.

We concede the disorders of human nature occasioned by the Fall, but we do not concede the physical corruption of the soul. There are no evil principles in the soul physically considered. Sin is the result, not of an original evil principle, as the Manichæans held, but simply of the abuse or perversion of that which is good. False religions do not originate in what is evil in human nature, but in the perversion of that which is good, and constitutes its chief glory. This is what there is of true in the doctrine of those who contend that all religions are to some extent true and good. The false religion is a corruption or perversion of the true, and always presupposes true religion as the condition of its own existence. Now, if you maintain that Catholicity is a false religion, and contend that it originated in human nature, or in the human soul, you must show the true and good principles which it abuses, and a true religion of which it is a perversion. This will trouble you, for it and it alone of all pretended religions accords with the principles of human nature in their true normal development. And a keen examination of all other religions suffices to prove that they are departures from it, and corruptions or perversions of it. In like manner as all Gentile religions are seen to be corruptions or travesties of the original patriarchal religion, so are all the forms of Protestantism seen to be corruptions or travesties of Catholicity. There is not a single Protestant doctrine that does not presuppose the

Catholic dogma, or that is intelligible without it. The man who, from the examination of Catholicity and any form of Protestantism, should pronounce the Protestant opinion to be prior to the Catholic dogma, and the dogma to be formed by a corruption or perversion of the opinion, would be looked upon by sensible men as a greater curiosity than Barnum has in his Museum. From first to last, Protestantism leaves the marks of having originated subsequently to Catholicity, and of being derived from it by way of travesty, perversion, corruption, or denial. Every false doctrine originates in a true doctrine, which it falsifies. We demand, then, in every particular case in which the author alleges that Catholicity is false, that he should state the true doctrine of which it is a falsification. Till he complies with this demand, he has no right to offer us any speculations on the origin and progress of "Romanism." We commend this consideration to all Protestant controversialists. Truth is older than falsehood, which is the denial of truth, and older than error, which misapprehends, misapplies, misrepresents, or perverts it, sometimes innocently, sometimes culpably.

We always view with great distrust all theories which are founded on the supposed intrinsic corruption of the human soul. Nothing that exists is intrinsically evil. Protestants, when they do not deny the Fall, are sure to exaggerate its effects on human nature. Man's nature has become disordered, his understanding darkened, and his will attenuated, by the loss of original justice, but it remains intrinsically good, physically what it was when it first came from the hands of the Creator. It is not totally depraved, it is not wholly corrupt; for if it were, it could not be redeemed and saved. Man's intellect is still adapted to truth, and cannot think without thinking truth on some side; his will still craves good, and cannot operate without on some side willing good. It is in the power of no man to think unmixed falsehood, or to will unmixed evil for the sake of evil. All thought is displayed on a substratum of truth, all will upon a substratum of good. In all error there is a truth misapprehended, misapplied, or perverted; in all evil there is a good misapprehended, misrepresented, misapplied, or abused. Here is the side of truth in your modern Eclectic and Humanitarian schools. All these exaggerated views of the depravity

of human nature should be avoided. The Fathers did not find Gentile philosophy all false and all evil. They studied it, and recommended its study, as containing much that is both true and good. Protestants even are to be judged with moderation and impartiality. It would be as false as illiberal to say that they have no truth. Not all their thoughts are false, not all their judgments are erroneous, not all their volitions are evil. They are men, men as richly endowed by nature as other men, — are not unfrequently able men, highly cultivated and learned men, as were many of the ancient Gentiles. Not even in them has human nature lost all its dignity, or been shorn of all its glory. We should be able to recognize and vindicate, if need be, the dignity and nobility of human nature in the heretical as well as in the orthodox. We render no service to religion by decrying human nature. We are not to destroy nature, as attempted by Calvinists and Jansenists, to make way for grace. Grace does not supersede nature; it presupposes it, accepts it, comes to its aid, strengthens it, and lifts it into a higher sphere. It is what nature wants, what it cries out for, and without which it cannot attain to its supernatural destiny, its supernatural beatitude. This is what Tertullian meant when he pronounced the human heart “naturally Christian.” But we shall have another occasion to develop this thought more at length, and to show that the modern idolatry of humanity which is the characteristic of socialism is only a travesty of Catholic teaching on the dignity of human nature and the solidarity of the race.

That Catholicity contains principles which may be found in Judaism, — even degenerate Judaism, — and in Gentilism prior to the advent of our Lord, we are perfectly willing to concede. The Jews had the true religion, and the Church is only the continuation of the Synagogue under other conditions. Christianity did not come into the world as a new religion, or as a religion diverse from the Jewish. Christ came, not to destroy the Law, but to fulfil it. The faith of the ancient Jews was, though less explicit, in substance the same as ours; only they believed in a Christ who was to come, and we in a Christ who has come. What was purely national in the Synagogue, and what was purely typical in the Law, was abolished by the introduction of the Christian dispensa-

tion, but nothing more. It would therefore be an unanswerable objection to our religion if it did not contain principles to be found in Judaism, and we are not to suppose that even degenerate Judaism has abandoned all those principles. Nor is it any objection, that our religion contains many principles in common with ancient Gentilism. Ancient Gentilism was not all false, and however it obscured, as does modern Protestantism, the great principles of the primitive revelation made to our first parents, it did not utterly reject them. It retained, as does Protestantism, and even more distinctly and in greater purity than do most Protestant sects, many true principles, — principles which must be recognized by every religion, in so far as it claims to be a religion at all. If Catholicity does not include what was true in Gentilism as well as what was true in the Synagogue, it would not be Catholicity, for it is essential to Catholicity that it include all truth in its unity and universality. The point for our author to make out is, not that "Romanism" includes principles found in other religions or in false and corrupt systems, but that it includes the falsity and corruption of those religions. If it includes only what they have that is true, only the principles which they corrupt and falsify, it is an argument altogether in its favor. It is necessary, then, in order to conclude against it, to show that it includes those religions in the sense of their errors, in the sense in which they were corrupt or false. This the author does not do, does not even attempt to do, and this, we venture to say, no man can do.

The author tell us, that, so "early as during the *first* and second centuries, we can trace the embryo developments of the Papal system." Is not this a presumption against him? He must mean that he can trace them, not among the sects, cut off from the communion of the Church, for that would be nothing to his purpose, but in the Church herself. That is, the Papacy, Papal doctrines, and Papal practices may be detected in the Church during the very lifetime of the Apostles and their immediate successors. The author cannot pretend that pure and genuine Christianity was found in any of the sects of the first and second centuries. Consequently, if it remained anywhere pure, unsullied, in its unity, integrity, and catholicity, it must have been during those centuries in the Catholic Church. Then either the Papacy

is not a corruption of Christianity, or there remained nowhere on earth a pure and uncorrupt Christianity at the close of the first century. Which are we to believe? Are we expected to believe, amidst the light of this nineteenth century, so boasted by the friends of progress, that Almighty God, after having descended to the earth and established a religion designed for all men and nations, and intended to endure as the only way of salvation until the consummation of the world, took so little care of it, made such inadequate provision for its preservation, that it failed even in the lifetime of the Apostles, or at farthest in that of their immediate successors?

We grant the errors against which St. Paul warns the Colossians did manifest themselves at that early day among individuals who called themselves Christians; but that is nothing to the author's purpose, for they were not "the embryo developments of the Papal system," since they were not and never have been asserted by the Church. The "embryo developments of the Papal system" are not to be seen in the errors against which St. Paul warns the faithful, but in his assuming authority to admonish the faithful, and to condemn the things enumerated as errors in doctrine or practice; for the essence of the Papal system is the claim of the Pope to Apostolic authority to teach and govern the faithful in all matters of salvation, and to define what is or is not Christian faith and morals,—that is, to do precisely what St. Paul himself did in his Epistle to the Colossians. The author is mistaken if he supposes the errors pointed out by St. Paul were the germs of the Papal system, or of Romanism, for they have never been, in form or substance, doctrines or practices of the Roman Catholic Church, and are and always have been condemned by her, precisely as they were by the Apostle. She says with him to all the faithful, "Beware lest any man impose upon you by philosophy and vain fallacy, according to the tradition of men, according to the rudiments of the world, and not according to Christ." The Apostle does not condemn tradition, and could not, for he elsewhere exhorts the faithful to hold fast the tradition they had received from him;* he simply warns them against being deceived by the tradition of men, human tradition, and the rudiments

* 2 Thess. ii. 15.

of the world ; — perhaps he means the false maxims of this world, or, as we say in our days, “the spirit of the age.” The Apostle bids us beware of being imposed upon by philosophy, and the fallacies of vain understandings, — that is, warns us against such writers as our author, and such books as *Romanism in America*, — and the Church does the same. She bids her children distrust the efforts of human reason to explain the mysteries of the Gospel, and condemns every attempt to substitute the speculations and subtilities of philosophy for the simplicity of faith. The Apostle teaches that the distinction of clean and unclean meats, and that the festivals, new moon, and Sabbaths of the Jewish law, are not obligatory on Christians. The Church does the same. She bids us to call nothing common or unclean, and permits us the free use of all the good things of God, in so far as we use them as not abusing them. She does not prohibit all fasts, festivals, or observation of holidays ; and if she did, we should never hear the last of it from our New England Puritans, who have their annual Fast, their annual Thanksgiving, and their weekly Sabbath, made holidays by the statute of the Commonwealth. The Apostle condemns the unauthorized and superstitious worship of angels or demons, whether good or bad, as practised by the philosophers and Gentiles in ancient times, and by the Spiritists among Protestants in modern times, and so does the Church, and always has done it. These errors have never developed into Romanism, for Romanism [Catholicity] has always excluded them, always set its face against them, and condemned them. It betrays on the part of the author either gross ignorance or gross unfairness, to represent as elements of “the Papal system” what that system has never accepted, what it has always excluded and anathematized. We agree, of course, that “the embryo developments of the Papal system,” to use the author’s very inaccurate language, can be traced in the first and second centuries, but not in the errors or sects condemned in those centuries. They can be traced only in the hierarchical organization of the Church, and in the assumption by its pastors of authority from God to guard the primitive tradition, to teach “the faith once delivered to the saints,” and to condemn as heresies whatever is opposed to it, and excommunicate from the society of the faithful all who

embrace and persist in holding those heresies. It strikes us, therefore, that the fact that these "embryo developments" are found at so early a day in the Catholic Church of the time, should be regarded, to say the least, as a very strong presumption that what the author calls the Papal system is of Apostolic origin, and is to be accepted as the veritable Christian religion. If not, it is certain Christianity at that early day had failed, and its Author was an impostor, or deceiver, for he had declared most solemnly that it should not fail. "Thou art Peter, and on this Rock will I build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." The author, it seems to us, in endeavoring to overthrow *Romanism*, overthrows, if anything, Christianity itself; for if he proves anything, he proves that Christ's promises have failed.

The author concedes the early development of the Papacy, but attempts to explain its origin by the importance the Pope derived from his position as Bishop of Rome, and by his being "called upon to decide the disputes which arose in churches abroad and at home." Rome from the reign of Diocletian, in the third century, ceased to be the seat of the imperial authority, and the church in Rome during the first three centuries was far surpassed in numbers, wealth, and social importance by many of the Eastern churches. The patriarchate of Rome was during those centuries the feeblest of the four patriarchates into which the Christian world was divided. It was not the oldest church, and we cannot see what special strength the Bishop of Rome could derive from his position. If there was nothing in the constitution of the Church or in the primitive belief of the faithful that attached the primacy to the Bishop of Rome as the successor of Peter, it seems to us that the primacy would much more likely have been attached to Jerusalem, as the oldest church, and as the city where our Lord preached, was betrayed and crucified; or to Antioch, where the disciples were first called Christians; or to Alexandria, the seat of the sciences, the erudition, and the philosophy of the Empire. If the Papacy is a usurpation, it is impossible to account for its usurpation by the Bishop of Rome, or to explain how he came to be regarded by common consent as having the primacy. The first reason, therefore, assigned for the growth of the Papacy in the Bishop of Rome, we dismiss as unsatisfactory.

The second reason assigned seems to us to labor under the disadvantage of putting the effect for the cause. The author concedes the fact that the Bishop of Rome in the first centuries was "called upon to decide the disputes that arose in churches abroad and at home," that is to say, in all the churches throughout the world. If, as the author evidently supposes, all the sees were equal in rank and dignity as Christian sees, and the Bishop of Rome by Divine constitution or Apostolic tradition had no pre-eminence over his brethren in authority as well as order, how will he explain the rather remarkable fact, that he was thus called upon. The fact that he was so called upon would seem to indicate that he was regarded as the proper and legitimate judge in the case of those disputes, and the conclusion should therefore be, not that he derived his power from being called upon, but that he was called upon because he had the power, or was regarded as the divinely appointed authority, to decide them.

The author's theory of the gradual development and formation of the Papal power is not even plausible. It is as unhistorical as unphilosophical. From the very age of the Apostles there has been recognized, whether rightly or wrongly is not now the question, a supreme teaching authority in the Church, whose principle has uniformly been to prevent all novelty in doctrine, and to preserve the Apostolic doctrine in its purity and integrity. Whenever any novelty of doctrine was broached, no matter by whom, it was met and marked with reprobation by the Church; that is, either by the Supreme Pontiff, or by the pastors of the Church in communion with him, assembled or dispersed. This in all ordinary cases, without any extraordinary assistance of the Holy Ghost, would suffice of itself to maintain purity and integrity of doctrine. Gradual and all but imperceptible changes of doctrine, we can easily conceive, may be introduced into the creed of a small sect, confined to a single district and subjected to the action of sects or associations with different beliefs; but it is impossible that such changes should be introduced into the creed of a Church spread over the whole world, embracing persons of different races, languages, and nations, under different forms of government, different social institutions, and separated from one another by different manners and customs. How can you suppose the same

causes would be operating at once on all points of the globe in precisely the same manner, and effecting precisely the same changes in all localities? How can this be, when with all, if there be a love of novelty, there is a still stronger aversion to change, and the conscientious conviction that no change is allowed, and no one is permitted to depart from the received dogma, but every one is bound to believe as the Fathers believed, and to hold fast the tradition received from the Apostle? The alleged corruptions or changes of doctrine are in no case historically verifiable, and the more common objection of Protestants against our Church is that she does not change, that she is stationary, immovable in doctrine, and remains insensible to the spirit of the age, the progress of intelligence, and the changes time introduces into human affairs. She is condemned as unprogressive, as being in the nineteenth century what she was in the twelfth, and as asking us to believe now as the faithful did eighteen hundred years ago. The more advanced Protestants are looking with some interest to ascertain whether the doctrine of development, or the one we have opposed to it, is the one the Church approves, and they say there is hope for Catholicity if it turns out to be the doctrine of development. Then, as to the Papal power, the author concedes that it can be traced in the first and second centuries. Its very character is such that it cannot be a gradual introduction. In human governments the monarchical element is never a gradual introduction, and in no instance has the state from a democracy or an aristocracy become a monarchy without a revolution more or less violent. Louis Napoleon did not become Emperor without the employment of force. In the moral order no more than in the physical is there a real metagenesis, or do you find a passing of one species into another. Nobody has ever known the ox develop into a horse, or the hog into an elephant. The germ at least of the Papal power must have been in the Church from the first, or it could never have been introduced without a violent revolution, the traces of which would remain. The Bishop of Rome could never have made himself acknowledged as supreme visible head and governor of the Church, if he had not been from the beginning recognized as holding a primacy of jurisdiction; for otherwise there would have been no foundation on which

he could erect his power, nothing of the same order from which his authority over the Universal Church could be developed. His authority, at least *in radice*, he must have held from the first, and therefore by Divine institution. He could never, as temporal sovereigns may, extend his authority beyond what was fixed in the original constitution, for he has never had any means of doing it but appeals to the conscience of the faithful, which conscience must precede, not follow, the extension. Suppose him to have been ambitious and willing to usurp power, or to give his legitimate authority an illegitimate development, you must still remember that he must have been met by a resistance on the part of other bishops, as well as on the part of temporal sovereigns, too strong for him to overcome. The Papal power has always been the first point of attack, for it is in some sense odious both to bishops and to temporal sovereigns; to the former because it subjects them to a superior authority, to the latter because it gives unity, compactness, and efficiency to the spiritual power, which becomes formidable to them when they would be tyrants. Hence, when not under the influence of conscience, both have always shown a disposition not to extend, but even to restrict, the Papal power. This is verified by all history, ecclesiastical and secular, from the first ages down to our own times. Pagan authors called upon the Pagan Emperors to put down Christianity as dangerous to their power, because Christians were organized under the supreme authority of one man, the Bishop of Rome, in whom the Emperor might find a formidable rival, — the very argument in substance used by the Know-Nothings of to-day. Temporal sovereigns, except when holy men and devout Catholics, which has seldom been the case, have in all times viewed the Papal power with jealousy, and sought to restrict it. Courtly prelates and worldly-minded priests, especially when mixed up with the administration of the state, have always been ready to sustain them in so doing. How, then, we ask, could the Bishop of Rome, having no material force, and, on the author's hypothesis, no moral force, at his command, usurp the Papal power, and get himself acknowledged by bishops and sovereigns as supreme ruler of the Church? The thing is impossible, because it would require weakness to be able to overcome strength, nothing to produce some-

thing. We may therefore dismiss the author's theory of gradual corruption, and conclude that the Church either was corrupt in the first and second centuries, or is not corrupt now.

We cannot follow the author through all his declamation. He finds that during the Middle Ages there was much corruption among Catholics, and that the bishops and priests did not always do their duty, and in some instances were no better in their morals than secular nobles and men of the world. But from whom does he learn this? He cites St. Bernard. But St. Bernard was a Papist, what in our days we call an Ultramontanist, a monk, an abbot, and has been canonized for his sanctity by the Papal Church. This must prove that those enormities of which he complains were not approved either by the Church or by good Catholics, and also that they were not the necessary effects of Catholicity. The Church is that Gospel net which, cast into the sea, gathered fishes of all sorts, both good and bad. All are not of the Church that are in her external communion. Many of them will, no doubt, be damned, as bad Catholics. The rule of judging is to judge by those who, like St. Bernard, conformed faithfully to what the Church teaches and commands, not by those who disregard her requirements, and avail themselves of none of her helps to a holy life. What would the author say of us, should we rake through the scandalous history of our own State, and parade the number of Protestant ministers who, during the last twenty-five years, in this very neighborhood, have been proved guilty of adultery, and even of sodomy, and conclude from their corruption the falsity of Protestantism? Judas was a devil. Were the other eleven Apostles therefore devils, and Christianity a Satanic invention? "Scandals," says our Lord, "must needs come, but woe unto them by whom they come." But why, in view of these scandals, which we neither deny nor seek to disguise, and which you have learned only from their condemnation by Catholics, forget from what depths of vice and corruption the Church has raised modern society? Why forget the example of heroic sanctity she has given to the world, the chaste sentiments she has inspired, the pure morality she has taught, the new dignity and nobility she has bid us honor in human nature? Why forget that, if you are yourselves this day in advance of your pagan and barbarous

ancestors, who rushed down from the North to destroy civilization and brutalize Christian Europe, you owe it to her and the labors of her zealous and heroic missionaries? Why not ask yourselves, if there has been so much evil with the Church and in spite of her, what would have been the condition of the world without her? Why, because you have put out your eyes or distorted your vision, seek you to extinguish the sun in the heavens, and wrap the world in darkness? Blind ye are, or you would see that these very scandals prove that the Church is God's Church, and under his supernatural protection; for if not, she would have been ruined by them, and ceased to exist long ages ago. Do, for the honor of our common humanity and of our common country, try to open your eyes, to elevate your thoughts, and to take broader and more comprehensive views of things. Do try to prove that you have not with Catholicity lost your five wits, and fallen below humanity.

We must pass over the author's two lectures on the "Fundamental Principles of Popery," a subject on which he is not very luminous, and simply delay our readers for a few moments on the "Antagonism between Popery and Civil Freedom."

"I propose, in this lecture, to discuss the bearing of Popery upon freedom, and social and national happiness.

"That we may not be charged with bringing against the Romish Church unfounded accusations, or with dealing with antiquated principles of government which have been abandoned or repudiated, we will quote the opinions which have recently been advanced by the advocates of Romanism in America. And it should be observed, that whatever is said against religious freedom bears with equal force against civil freedom, for the two are inseparably connected. One cannot exist without the other.

"Hear, then, the language used by the 'Shepherd of the Valley,' November 23, 1851: 'The Church is of necessity intolerant. Heresy she endures when and where she must; but she hates it, and directs all her energies to its destruction. If Catholics ever gain an immense numerical majority, religious freedom in this country is at an end. So our enemies say. So we believe.'

"Another authority, high in the Church, has said: 'That popes and general councils have passed the most bloody and persecuting laws against all whom they were pleased to denominate as heretics, is now generally conceded by intelligent defenders of the Catholic faith, and it is maintained, as we have seen, that, if they should ever obtain a decided numerical majority in this country, they will be

bound by the very nature of their religion to act on the same principles, and consequently religious liberty will thus be at an end, "So our enemies say. So say we."

"Listen to the words of Brownson's Review, which is the acknowledged organ of Romanism in this country, and is indorsed by nearly the whole Roman Catholic hierarchy in the United States. Indeed, Mr. Brownson has asserted that he writes nothing without the sanction of his bishop. On the subject of the Pope's authority, he says, in his Review for 1854, page 57: 'We believe in the direct temporal authority of the Pope, as vicar of Jesus Christ on earth.' 'The Church (in the person of the Pope) bears, by divine right, both swords (temporal and spiritual). The temporal sovereign holds it [that is, the temporal sword], to be exercised under her directions.'

"And what, you may ask, is the authority of the Pope, according to the admissions of the Romish Church? The question is answered by the Council of Trent, in the following language: 'Sitting in the chair in which Peter, the prince of the Apostles, sat to the close of his life, the Church recognizes in his person the most exalted degrees of dignity, and the full amplitude of jurisdiction,—a dignity and jurisdiction not based on synodal, or other human constitutions, but emanating from no less authority than God himself.'

"Here we see the most absolute despotism conferred upon the head of the Papal Church, and conferred in the name of Almighty God. Powers the most unlimited, in civil, social, and religious matters, are committed to him, and all the forces and influences at the command of the Church are employed to sustain his supreme authority.

"The sentiments of Brownson, with regard to the Constitution of the United States, are thus responded to by one who signs himself *Apostolicus*: 'I say, with Brownson, that if the Church should declare that the Constitution, and the very existence of this or any other country, should be extinguished, it is a solemn ordinance of God himself, and every good Catholic would be bound, under the penalty of the terrible punishment pronounced against the disobedient, to obey.'

"Bishop O'Conner, of Pittsburg, says: 'Religious liberty is only endured till the opposite can be established with safety to the Catholic world.' The Bishop of St. Louis declares: 'America will soon be Catholic, and then religious liberty will cease to exist.'

"Such are the sentiments which are openly proclaimed in free America, not by men who have been wronged, or who have suffered under our institutions, but by those who have access to all the advantages which the nation affords, and whose lives, property, and right of speech are protected by the very government which they so bitterly and wantonly assail."—pp. 76–79.

The authorities which the author here cites to sustain his accusations against the Church are all pure inventions, if not by him, by some of his friends. The pretended extract from *The Shepherd of the Valley* consists of certain sentences detached from their original connection, and so moulded together as to express a meaning never intended by the writer, and the reverse of the meaning he plainly expressed in the article from which they are culled. The passage ascribed to "another authority, high in the Church," bears on its face the unmistakable evidence of having been written by an enemy of the Church, most likely some pious Protestant. No Catholic ever did, or ever would or could have written it. The two quotations, professing, the one to be from the Bishop of Pittsburg, the other from the Bishop [Archbishop?] of St. Louis, are forgeries. They were never written by either of those distinguished prelates, and they are in contradiction to their well-known sentiments on the subject. We have looked till weary, and have found no such canon of the Council of Trent as is alleged, and it is well known that that Council gave no definition of the Papal power. The first passage from our Review is only a part of a sentence, and is made to convey a meaning which, in the very connection in which the words are found, we expressly deny. For the opinion we expressed, whatever it was, was expressed as our private opinion, not as a Catholic dogma, and whatever we meant by the *temporal* power of the Pope, it is well known to our readers that we have asserted for him as vicar of Jesus Christ no temporal or civil jurisdiction, outside of the Ecclesiastical States; that we fully recognize the distinction of the two powers, the autonomy of the state, and the independence and supremacy of the temporal authority in its own order. The second alleged quotation from us is a pure invention. We never said it, or anything like it. We do not allow ourselves to make impossible suppositions. We do not believe it possible for the Pope to order the constitution of this country, far less the country itself, to be extinguished; therefore we could never have said what we should or should not be bound to do in case he should so order. The Pope cannot dispense from the law of God or a Divine command, and therefore cannot set aside a legitimate civil constitution, for such a constitution derives from God through the people, and exists by Divine right. It is sacred

and inviolable for conscience, and for the conscience of the Pope as well as for the conscience of any other Catholic. It is ordained of God, and can no more be set aside than any other Divine ordination. If any supposition of the sort alleged has ever appeared in our pages, it has been to show its absurdity, and to rebuke those writers and orators who are in the habit of making impossible suppositions, and showing their bravery in abusing the Pope hypothetically. Every Catholic knows that the contingency supposed can never happen, any more than it can happen that God should command us to commit murder; and to believe that it could, would be to disbelieve Catholicity.

Undoubtedly we hold, and so does every good Catholic, that no contingency can happen in which resistance to the Supreme Pontiff, speaking and acting as chief of the Church, can be lawful, for every Catholic believes him to be the vicar of Jesus Christ, and to resist him would be to resist Jesus Christ himself. Thus far, of course, Catholic obedience requires us to go, and if you dislike it, we cannot by denying our faith or by explaining it away relieve you, for "we must obey God rather than men." We do not expect it to please those who do not believe Catholicity, and it would by no means please us, if we did not believe the Pope to be the vicar of Jesus Christ, teaching and governing by Divine appointment. Prove to us that we are wrong in this belief, and we reject the Papal supremacy at once, and refuse as stoutly as you to obey the Pope in anything whatever. But suppose him to be what we believe him to be, and Protestants themselves must see that resistance to him in his official capacity can never be lawful; and they must be as much disgusted as we are with those Catholics who think to reassure them by their big words about what they would do to the Pope in case he should do what they must deny Catholicity before they can believe it possible for him to do, and by asserting eloquently the brave resistance which they are well assured they will never be able to show, except hypothetically.

We cannot comment on all he advances to prove that the Papacy is incompatible with civil freedom. He is, as usual, false in his facts and illogical in his conclusions. The purport of what he would say is, Catholics hold the Pope to be the supreme spiritual chief, and his authority is never to be resisted. Therefore Catholicity is antagonistic to

civil freedom. We concede the premises, but deny the conclusion. Catholics love civil freedom as much as Protestants, and perhaps understand it somewhat better. If the Pope had no divine commission, if he were not instituted by Jesus Christ as his supreme vicar on earth, undoubtedly the assertion of his supremacy would be antagonistic to both religious and civil freedom; but not by any means, if he is authorized to teach and govern in the name of Jesus Christ himself. The Papal government, if not divinely authorized, is a despotism, because then it is not legitimate, is not founded in right; but if it is so authorized, it is no despotism, because despotism is power disjoined from right, from legality. If the Pope governs as the divinely appointed Vicar of Jesus Christ, it is God that governs through him, and his government is the government of Jesus Christ himself. To call his government, in that case, a despotism, would be tantamount to calling the Divine government itself a despotism, which we think our author, with all his temerity, will not venture to do. Before, then, the author concludes that there is anything in the Papacy favorable to despotism, or antagonistic to freedom of any sort, he must prove that the Pope governs by mere human authority, and not as the vicar of Jesus Christ. Till then he only begs the question.

The Protestant is fond of calling us slaves because we recognize the Papal supremacy, and forgets that he, unless he is fibbing, is, to say the least, as great a slave as we. He is no more at liberty to believe or to do anything contrary to the teachings and precepts of the Bible, than we are to believe or to do anything contrary to the definitions and rescripts of the Holy Father. He is as much bound, according to his own confession, to conform in all things to the Bible, as we are to the Church. He asserts for all men and nations, states and individuals, an authority as supreme and as inflexible as that which we assert. How, then, are we less free than he? The only difference between us in respect to authority is that he places it in the record of what God said by men in ancient times, and we in what he teaches and commands through the voice of a living pontiff. If the authority we assert is human because it comes to us through a human organ, then must the authority he asserts be human, for that comes to him

only through a human organ. The Prophets and Apostles were men in the same sense that the Pope is a man, and if God's voice through them is Divine and authoritative, it may be equally Divine and authoritative through him. If he holds that in believing and obeying the Bible he is believing and obeying God's word, so we hold that in believing and obeying the living Pontiff we are believing and obeying God. He asserts an Apostolic authority that was, and we an Apostolic authority that was and is. If we hold a doctrine incompatible with freedom, he holds one equally so, and every argument he uses to prove that the Papal supremacy is incompatible with freedom, civil or religious, and favorable to civil or spiritual despotism, may be urged to prove the same of the Scriptural supremacy which he asserts. He would do well to remember this.

Either our assertion of the Papal authority, which is simply the continuation of the authority held by Peter on earth, that is, of the Apostolic authority, is not, if it be such authority, antagonistic to civil freedom, or the authority which the Protestant asserts for the Bible is antagonistic to it. But he will not concede that the assertion of the Bible as the supreme and unalterable law for states and individuals is incompatible with the full freedom of either. Why should we, then, concede that the same authority, asserted on precisely the same grounds, for the Vicar of Jesus Christ, denies all freedom, and reduces individuals and states to slavery? Civil freedom demands, on the side of the temporal authority, that it be independent and supreme in its own order, and on the side of the individual, that he be guarantied against being required by the civil authority to do or to suffer anything repugnant to the law of God. The Papal supremacy leaves the state free, inasmuch as it leaves it independent and supreme, that is, without a superior, in its own order, and protects the freedom of the individual or subject by asserting the supremacy of the spiritual order, and forbidding the state to do or to require to be done anything repugnant to the Divine law. So far, then, from the Papal supremacy being hostile to freedom, it is its indispensable condition. Civil freedom is and can be violated only by the encroachment of the temporal upon the spiritual, either by the subjects refusing to the state that obedience imposed by the law of God, or by the state commanding things to be done or suffered

which that law forbids. The essential condition of all civil freedom is, then, the assertion and maintenance of the independence and supremacy of the spiritual in face of the temporal. The Protestant, when he is not opposing us, asserts this supremacy as boldly as we do; for he then stoutly maintains that the word of God, as contained in the Scriptures, is the supreme law for both governments and subjects, and that neither have the right to do anything which they forbid. In the Protestant mind, if sincere, a legislative enactment repugnant to the law of God as recorded in the Scriptures would be null and void from the beginning. If the state should command him to become a Papist he would resist it, on the ground that it exceeded its competency. He asserts and must assert a higher law than the state, if he believes in God and the Divine sovereignty. If he asserts no higher law than the state, he leaves the state supreme in spirituals as well as temporals, which is civil despotism; if he does assert it, and leaves it to each individual to determine for himself when the higher law applies, he denies the independence and supremacy of the civil power even in its own order, and falls into individualism, which is anarchy. Here is the inconvenience of Protestantism in relation to civil liberty. If the Protestant does not assert a higher law, he favors civil despotism; if he does, since the Bible does not explain itself, and he has no divinely constituted court for declaring that higher law, he must allow each individual to interpret it for himself, and thus favor anarchy, which is only another name for barbarism. Moreover, if there is no difficulty in ascertaining what the higher law forbids, that is, what the spiritual order forbids, the spiritual power under Protestantism, having no organization, no organs, and no representation, is and must be practically null, and hence it is that every Protestant community always vacillates between despotism and anarchy. The remedy is to be found only in the Papal supremacy, which embodies, so to speak, the Divine authority, and represents God in the government of the world.

If we recur to history, we shall find civil society orderly and free just in proportion as the Papal authority has been recognized and respected. Nations have always, since the origin of Christian nations, had to cast off or explain away the Papacy before they could enslave their subjects. We have yet to find the first free state founded by Prot-

estantism, for our country holds what freedom it has, not from Protestantism, but in spite of it, and Protestantism is doing its utmost to destroy the freedom we have, pushing us on the one hand to social despotism, and on the other to anarchy.

We do not pretend that Catholicity is republican in the American sense, for in fact she is neither republican nor monarchical, and commands us to obey the legally constituted government in all things not repugnant to the law of God, whatever its form. Within the limits of the law of God, the people are free, if they have no government existing, or if the actual rulers have forfeited their trusts, to institute government in such form and with such powers and limitations as seem to them good, whether republican or monarchical. She enjoins on us for conscience' sake to be loyal to the existing legal order, and commands the government, whatever its form, to govern justly, for the common good. She teaches the doctrine which forms the basis of the argument of the American Declaration of Independence, that the tyranny of the prince absolves the subject from his allegiance, and thus condemns tyranny and consecrates freedom. This is all that any friend of freedom can ask. Protestantism, having no loyalty or respect for law, and being in its very origin and nature a rebellion —justifiable or not is not now the question — against the established order, is unquestionably more deeply imbued with the revolutionary spirit than Catholicity, and no doubt will be more ready to overthrow an existing government for the sake of introducing a republican government, if you will; but for that very reason it must be less ready and able to sustain republican institutions where they already legally exist. This, if an advantage, we willingly concede to Protestantism. Catholicity is never good at making revolutions. That loyalty which under a monarchy is given to the prince, under a republic she transfers to the constitution, and this, let us tell our republican friends, is a still greater advantage. Revolutions are violent remedies, and are never proper in the normal state of things. Civil freedom by no means consists in the freedom to make revolutions when one pleases. Governments are not established to be overthrown, but to be preserved and administered for the good of the people. We have had our revolution, we have instituted our government, and our business is now to preserve it, and to secure

its wholesome operation. Our republican friends must permit us to tell them that this can never be done by cherishing the revolutionary spirit, nor without that loyalty to the constitution which Protestantism cannot inspire, and which Catholicity enjoins as a religious duty. In vain will they seek support in selfishness, or in what the French call *intérêt bien entendu*, or enlightened self-interest; in vain will they seek it in constitutional checks and balances, or in attempting to play off conflicting interests and passions against each other. There is no firm basis for civil government outside of morality, and those lofty disinterested principles which are to be found only in religion. The constitution must be engraved on the heart of your people, and they must feel it a moral obligation, a religious duty, to love it, to live and die for it, or it will prove only so much useless parchment. The experience of our country is daily proving to all understandings, that, whatever may be the willingness and ability of Protestantism to make a revolution in favor of republicanism, it lacks the capacity to sustain republican government when introduced.

This is simple enough. The revolutionary spirit is the antagonist of the spirit that is required to sustain an established order. The former is the spirit of destruction, the latter the spirit of conservation. If the object of society were to be always making revolutions and trying experiments, Protestantism would be decidedly the best; but if the object is for society to preserve and develop itself in a fixed and stable order, according to a law of continuity, no man of ordinary capacity can for a moment doubt the superiority of Catholicity. Protestantism has no fixed point of departure, no uniform rule of procedure, and no determinate goal. It is hostile to whatever is fixed and immovable, and demands always freedom to make new experiments. It is always experimenting. It experiments on authority, on doctrine, on discipline, on the state, on society, and never arrives at anything certain and durable. With this spirit, it can be relied on only where there is a work of destruction to be done. It can make a revolution, but it cannot preserve the state. Catholicity, on the contrary, takes its point of departure in what is, and its fixed purpose is to preserve what is good, and secure an end which it foresees, and which for it is clear and determinate. It will amend what it finds that is faulty, but it will do it

always in accordance with the principle and genius of the existing constitution, and always with a view to its preservation and freer and more healthy action. It cannot make a revolution for the sake of introducing a republican government, but it has precisely that conservative spirit and influence needed to save such a government and secure its beneficial operation wherever it exists.

But we own that Catholicity does not lay great stress on mere forms of any sort. She looks to realities, not empty forms. She teaches the great principles of civil liberty, and inspires her children with the wisdom, the courage, and the self-denial necessary to assert them. No Catholic people ever have or ever can be enslaved; they never are, and never can become, servile and sycophantic in their disposition or manners. They may be humble, free from pride, but true humility is compatible with the greatest magnanimity. No Catholic, if really such, can ever lose sight of the true dignity of human nature assumed by God himself, or of the true nobility of the human soul for which Christ has died. Hence under all forms of government true freedom is possible, and Catholicity therefore turns her attention, not to constitution-making, not to changing the form of the government, but to securing its wise and just administration. She weds herself to no form, but makes all forms tolerable.

These remarks on topics which we have discussed in our pages almost to weariness must suffice for the present. We shall endeavor to devote one or two more articles hereafter to the remaining subjects introduced by the author, not for his sake, for we regard him as past help, nor for the sake of our Catholic readers, but for the sake of that large class of our non-Catholic countrymen who love truth and feel the insufficiency of Protestantism. We will not believe that all who sail under the Protestant flag, because they know not under what other flag to sail, are like the author of the book before us, or the common herd of vulgar declaimers against Catholicity. They are too enlightened, too cultivated, too serious and earnest-minded men to be satisfied with any form of Protestantism. Their understandings demand something more logical, more coherent, more complete, and more solid, and their hearts cry out for something more beautiful, more living and loving. They are sick of what Carlyle calls shams, and that Protestantism is a sham they are thoroughly persuaded. The misfortune

with them is, that they suspect that Catholicity is also a sham, a *simulacrum*, and no more solid at bottom than Protestantism. It is of no use for us to tell them that they are mistaken, for they are far enough from being prepared to believe us. We must show them that they are mistaken, by showing them that we have always something solid and real and living to substitute for the dead formulas of effete Protestantism. Our religion at least is not all a mere negation. We have something positive, affirmative, a *credo* to offer to those who come to us.

Protestantism, though dead, has for the moment by means of Know-Nothingism been galvanized into a sort of spasmodic life; but speaking in general terms it is dead, and only waits for its friends to give it a decent burial. The movements we witness really console us. They prove to us that the American mind is beginning to open to something better and nobler than it has hitherto had, and that the shrine-makers for the Ephesian goddess are beginning to be alarmed for their craft. Let none of our friends be disturbed by the crying from morning till night, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians!" More than one heathen god or goddess, more than one idolatry, more than one superstition, has fallen with a crash before the onward march of Catholic truth, and the day of deliverance for our countrymen, we firmly believe, is not far off. Do not let the clamors raised against us make us timid, or lead us to explain away the features of Catholicity most objected to by a Know-Nothing fanaticism. These are no times for trimming or timeserving. It is precisely in these times, when all the non-Catholic world is raising a hue-and-cry against the Church for her alleged Mariolatry, that she defines the immaculate conception of Mary to be a Catholic dogma. It is when the mystery of the Incarnation is denied, that she renders new honors to the Mother of God. Now, when the Papal character of our Church is so rudely assailed, let us hold fast to it, and forbear to abuse our Holy Father even hypothetically.

ART. II. — 1. *Ensayo sobre el Catholicismo, el Liberalismo, y el Socialismo, considerados en sus Principios Fundamentales.* Por DON JUAN DONOSO CORTÉS, Marqués de Valdegamas. Madrid. 1851. Svo. pp. 414.

2. *De l'Humanité, de son Principe, et de son Avenir, où se trouve exposée la Vraie Définition de la Religion, et où l'on explique le Sens, la Suite, et l'Enchaînement du Mosaïsme et du Christianisme.* Par PIERRE LEROUX. Paris. 1840. 2 tomes. Svo.

WE have brought these two works together because, though published at distant intervals, and differing almost as widely as it is possible to conceive, they are on the subject treated the two profoundest works to be found in the whole range of modern literature. Both treat the same subject, Donoso Cortés from the point of view of Catholicity, Pierre Leroux from the pantheistic or humanitarian point of view, and each needs to be read and studied by whoever would understand, either in their truth or their falsity, the Liberalism and Socialism which have made so much noise and stirred up so many commotions throughout the civilized world during the last fifteen or twenty years.

Pierre Leroux has hardly been heard of since 1850. Whether he is still living or not is more than we know; but we remember the time when he was one of the great men of France, and the representative of an important school in philosophy and politics. He belonged originally, we believe, to the Saint-Simonian school or sect, and distinguished himself at a later day as a most bitter enemy of the French eclecticism founded by the eloquent and erudite Cousin. He is decidedly the great man of the modern socialistic school, and the only one with whom we are acquainted who has succeeded in giving it anything like a philosophical basis. He possesses rare philosophical genius, and, though not the soundest, he is the greatest metaphysician that France has produced in modern times, and may as to his genius and erudition take rank with the late Vincenzo Gioberti, who has had no equal since Leibnitz, for we cannot rank very high such men as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Immanuel Kant is the only distinguished German metaphysician in recent times that we

should be willing to name, unless one or two Catholics of Germany are to be excepted.

It may be that we attach an undue importance to the writings of Pierre Leroux, because our acquaintance with them marks an epoch in our mental development, and we owe to them more than to those of any other modern writer. They revolutionized our own mind both in regard to philosophy and religion, and by the grace of God became the occasion of our conversion to Catholicity. But we must be permitted to say, that, though his system as a system does not and never did satisfy us, it contains certain great cosmic and metaphysical truths, more distinctly recognized and more clearly and energetically stated than we find even in the ordinary works on theology, and almost wholly wanting in our ordinary systems of philosophy. His grand error is in his having misinterpreted and misapplied the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation, in confounding the two natures in the one person of our Lord, and in failing to distinguish properly between the natural and the supernatural orders. He starts with the Eutychian heresy, or the confusion of the human and the Divine, and really, though perhaps unconsciously, explains the Divine by the human, and thus reduces Christianity to pure Humanism or Naturalism. The Catholic theologian understands at once the reach of this fundamental error, which vitiates and must vitiate the author's whole system. But, after all, there is a human side of truth, for man is made in the image and after the similitude of God. God is, in the language of St. Thomas, *similitudo rerum omnium*, and hence in all nature there is and must be a certain reflection, so to speak, of the Divinity. God is in some sense mirrored by his works. In man and nature we must find, not the elements of Christianity indeed, for they are superhuman and supernatural, but certain analogies or correspondences, which in human language are expressed by the same terms, and through which the Christian mysteries are rendered in a measure intelligible to us. Leroux certainly confounds these analogies or correspondences in the natural and human order with the superhuman and supernatural dogmas of Christianity; but he certainly has studied them profoundly, and tells us, not unmixd with error, some great and important natural truths, — truths recognized and accepted, indeed, by all

the great scholastic divines, but which these divines do not set forth in that distinct and prominent light in which we find them in the earlier Fathers, or in which it is necessary, perhaps, to set them forth in order to meet the characteristic errors of our age.

The Marquis of Valdegamas has studied the same subject with equal industry, with equal mental strength and acuteness, and with a higher order of genius. He understands it far better, and treats it far more profoundly; for he knows and accepts Catholic theology, which places him in the position to comprehend the natural truth in its true relations with the supernatural, and prevents him from giving a mutilated or distorted view of either. But he writes mainly for the Catholic mind, and is more intent on showing the errors, absurdities, and fatal tendencies of humanitarian or pantheistic socialism to the understanding of the faithful, than he is on distinguishing for the benefit of its adherents the grain of truth in their system, and using it to lead them up to the Catholic doctrine which accepts and completes it. Nothing in the world can be better than his book to guard the faithful against the errors of pantheistic or humanitarian Socialism, or to inspire them with a hearty love of Catholic doctrine and morals; but it is not precisely adapted to the wants of the Socialists themselves. Ignorant of Catholic faith and theology, they will not always be able to find in his Catholicity the truth they are groping after, and which gives to their speculations a value in their own eyes. We, who happen to know both sides by our own experience, can see that he accepts and vindicates in its true light and place what they really value, and which they erroneously conclude cannot be held in the Church, and persuade themselves can be realized without her, and must be, if realized at all.

The noble Marquis also takes M. Proudhon as the best representative of Socialism, and confines himself mainly to the refutation of the Proudhonian theory. Here we must be permitted to differ from him. If we would study the Socialistic contradictions and negations, Proudhon is our man; but if we would study Socialism in its affirmations, in what it has that is positive, in its truths, or half-truths, we must, we think, take Leroux. Proudhon is by turns a deist and an atheist, a pantheist and a Manichæan, but generally a denier, whose business it is to break

with the whole past, to reject all that has hitherto been regarded as sacred, in a word, to destroy all that has been or is. Would we know whither all false theories, religious, political, and social, lead, we must study Proudhon, who under this point of view is the great man of the Socialistic and revolutionary world. But Leroux has some religious instincts, is not the veritable Apollyon, and attempts to give the positive or affirmative side of Socialism. If we would know the truth which misleads the Socialists, which they misapprehend and misapply, but which nevertheless is the element which commends to their own judgments and hearts their Socialism, Leroux, not Proudhon, in our judgment, is the great, "the representative man."

We say not this to depreciate the work of the lamented Spanish nobleman. We have heretofore expressed our opinion of his remarkable essay, than which, we are assured by those who are more competent than we are to judge, there is nothing more eloquent in the noble Castilian tongue. We are not, we confess, of his political school. We have more confidence in constitutionalism or parliamentary government than he appears to have had. We hold that parliamentary or constitutional government, though by no means perfect, though not all we could wish, and far enough from being all that its partisans pretend, affords the only political guaranty of liberty, civil or religious, which, after so many social changes and revolutions, is now practicable. Certainly it is to it, not to absolute monarchy, that Catholicity owes the immense progress it has made in Europe during the last fifty years. We have seen nothing in the revolutionary developments during late years to shake our early faith in representative and parliamentary government, and we are satisfied that the Spanish statesman rendered no service to his country by his war against constitutionalism and parliamentary discussion. The great error of the European liberalists is not, in our judgment, so much political as religious. We find no fault with them for seeking what are called checks and balances, or attempting to found government on compromises; for government is a practical affair, and cannot be carried on without an adjustment of opposing interests, which more or less offend theoretic unity. We censure them not for this, but for supposing that these compromises, these balancings of principles and interests, and play-

ing off of one against another, can alone suffice for the maintenance of authority on the one hand and individual freedom on the other. We accept them as far as they go, but we expect no valuable results from them when substituted for religion, or even when intended to operate without it. We do not, therefore, agree with the illustrious author, whose loss the Catholic world justly deplores, in his anti-parliamentary politics and monarchical theory.

But aside from his politics, in which he was more Spanish than American, we have had in modern times no Catholic writer more free and bold in his speculations, more original and brilliant in his genius, more comprehensive in his thought or spirit-stirring in his eloquence, or in general more remarkable for his depth and soundness. He formed himself by the study of the Holy Scriptures and the great Fathers, rather than the modern theological compendiums, or the great scholastic doctors; and while for that reason he speculates more freely, and writes with more freshness and vigor, he is less exact in his doctrine and less accurate in his language. There are expressions in his Essay, which, if detached from their connection and understood without reference to the obvious intention of the author, are certainly inexact, and perhaps even heretical, as has been shown by the Abbé Gaduel; but if fairly and honestly interpreted by their context and the general scope of the argument, by a liberal-hearted criticism which seeks to unfold the large and comprehensive thoughts of a writer rather than to display its own microscopic accuracy, no very grave objections under the point of view of Catholic doctrine can be sustained against the book. In this Essay the author has attempted and executed a work that was much needed in the present time, that of carrying back the faithful to the deepest and most living mysteries of the Catholic faith, and showing the origin and support of human society in God. Starting with the principle already asserted, that God is *similitudo rerum omnium*, or the likeness which all created things copy, and therefore that all things have their ideas or archetypes in his Divine essence, he shows that true human society has its origin in the Divine society of the Ever-adorable Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three persons in one nature or essence. In this Divine society, whose characteristic, as he not very accurately expresses

it, is unity in diversity and diversity in unity, he finds the original type of all society, and therefore all true human society must reflect this Divine society, as all creation reflects the Creator. Here is the fundamental conception, the leading thought, of the Essay on Catholicity, Liberalism, and Socialism. This thought, which is profoundly Catholic, as well as profoundly philosophic, reproduces what is deepest and truest in the Platonic philosophy, although it is perhaps foreign to the Aristotelian. We find it in the Holy Scriptures, we find it in the early Fathers, we find it in Catholic theology of all times, but we do not find it always in what passes for philosophy in the schools. The Platonic philosophy is no doubt exposed to dangers from which the Aristotelian is free. It is less rigid in its method; it is more daring in its scope, and opens a wider and richer field to speculation. It gives more play to our emotions, affections, and imagination, and therefore exposes us to greater mental aberrations. It brings into play the mystic elements of our nature, and opens us on that side on which Satan can best approach and seduce us. But there can really be no question that it is far profounder than the Aristotelian philosophy, and penetrates to an order of ideas to which Aristotle was a stranger, and which cannot be brought within the comprehension of a rigid Peripateticism. Peripateticism, considering everything under the form of abstract thought, loses sight of life, of the real living universe, and therefore is unable to detect in the natural order the analogies, resemblances, copies, or reflections, without which this supernatural would be in every sense inapprehensible to our intelligence. Hence it never enables us to connect the intelligible and the superintelligible, and embrace the natural and the supernatural as one harmonious whole, having its unity in the Divine Essence. Donoso Cortés has done a noble service to religion and society by reviving, what was almost lost sight of in popular philosophy, the profound thought of the Fathers and the great scholastic doctors, and showing us that even the natural order demands its complement from the supernatural, and that the profoundest mysteries of our faith are the source of all that is true and good, sound and healthy, in our natural life, or, in other words, that the natural has its root in the supernatural, and derives its sap from an order deeper and higher than itself.

He thus connects human society with the Mystery of the Trinity, which is its norma or type. As all in Catholicity has its origin in the Mystery of the Trinity, so all true human society must have its origin and type in Catholicity. This thought reaches far, and must be fully recognized and well understood before we fully comprehend Christian society, and are able to oppose it successfully to the refutation of humanitarian or pantheistic Socialism, so rife in our times. Those who seek to do this must study profoundly the Essay of Donoso Cortés.

But our purpose at present is not precisely that of the illustrious Spaniard. We have already discussed in our pages the errors and dangerous tendencies of Liberalism and Socialism; we have pointed out what they have that is opposed to Catholic faith and theology. We wish now to draw attention to what they have that is true. All systems, however erroneous or false, as we have intimated in the foregoing article, have an element of truth, because the human intellect, being created in the image of the Divine, and made for the apprehension of truth, can never operate with pure falsehood. To rightly comprehend a system is not simply to detect its errors. We understand not even an erroneous system till we understand its truth; and its real refutation lies not so much in detecting and exposing its fallacies, as in detecting, distinguishing, and accepting the truth which it misapprehends, misinterprets, or misapplies. Socialism commends itself to the intellect of its adherents only in the respect that it is true, and to their hearts only in the respect that it is good; for the intellect, St. Thomas teaches, can never be false, nor the will will evil. Both falsehood and evil are privative, neither is positive. Error is in the defect of truth, and evil in the defect of good. We must say this or assert falsehood as a real entity and evil as a positive principle, and thus fall into Manicheism. We must beware of the Calvinistic doctrine of total depravity, or total corruption by the fall of human nature. If man cannot embrace pure falsehood nor will what under some aspect is not good, it follows that in every erroneous or mischievous system there is and must be an aspect of truth and goodness, and it is only under this aspect that the system is dear to its adherents. If we wish to produce a favorable effect on them, and to refute their system for their sake, we must begin, not by denouncing their

error, but by showing them that we recognize and accept their truth.

Our own views of both Liberalism and Socialism have so often been expressed in these pages, that none of our readers can suspect us of any undue bias in their favor. We have, as it is well known, no sympathy with them or the movements they have inspired. No one has denounced them in stronger terms, or more strenuously opposed them. But our pages bear ample evidence that we have never denied, or pretended to deny, that each has something true and good in its order. We are not unfrequently accused of being one-sided, narrow-minded, and disposed always to push the principle we may happen to adopt to extremes. Nothing is more untrue. An opposite charge might with far more propriety be brought against us. In our war against the Red Republicanism of Europe, we were never known to push our defence of order and authority so far as to express an opinion favorable to absolute monarchy, or to deny the natural equality of all men. We have always made it a point, in combating erroneous or mischievous systems, to recognize the fact that they contain something that we should be sorry to combat, and if we are or have been to a certain extent unpopular with our countrymen, it is precisely because we have never shown ourselves exclusive. But when erroneous systems are in arms or arming themselves against society, we do not think it the proper time to draw attention to their side of truth and goodness, for it is then a more urgent duty to defeat them, and save society from the ruin they threaten, than it is to labor to convert their adherents from their errors. One course is proper when conversion is the end to be sought, another is proper when it is necessary to guard people against falling into error. To have dwelt in 1848 on what there is in Liberalism and Socialism that may be accepted, would have tended to give the people a false direction. We could not then stop to analyze and distinguish. An imperious duty made it necessary to expose the dangerous errors and tendencies of the revolutionary systems and movements. But in 1855, when the danger comes from the opposite quarter, we are free to labor for the conversion of those whom these false systems have misled, by distinguishing and accepting the truth or half-truth which they misapprehend and misapply. There is a time for all things, and our motto should be, Everything in its time.

The Liberalists and Socialists are not true Christians, but it would be unjust to deny that there are individuals among them who have generous, noble, and even spiritual aspirations, which Christianity teaches us to accept and respect. Much at least of what is most living, least groveling, least servile, most manly, and most elevated, outside of the Church, is found to-day in their ranks. We are never to judge individual members of political and social parties by their mere doctrinal formulas, for men's heads and hearts are often far apart, and sometimes strongly opposed one to the other. Liberalists and Socialists are to be judged, under the point of view we wish now to consider them, not solely nor chiefly by their abstract doctrines, but by their sentiments, their cravings, affections, and aspirations. Liberalism and Socialism, like all false systems, end at last in pure Gentilism, and yet in their modern form they could have originated only in a community which had once been Christian, and which still retained a tradition of the Christian doctrine of love. They originate in philanthropy, the love of mankind, the form, and the only form, which what is purest and best in religion can assume outside the Christian Church.

We condemn as heartily as any man the Liberal and Socialistic revolutions of Europe during the last sixty or seventy years, but we cannot deny that those revolutions have to some extent had a philanthropic origin, and have all been prosecuted with the intention of doing for this world by the state through philanthropy what the Church has done or shown she can do through Christian charity. All these movements to popularize government, to mitigate penal codes, to redress political and social grievances, and to elevate the poorer and more numerous classes, although for the most part failing in their object, have originated in benevolent sentiment, though perverted to base, selfish purposes by their chief managers. In their writings at least, in their speculations, the philosophers of the last century overflowed with generous sentiments, and if they attacked old systems, and demanded radical changes in social or religious institutions, in laws, manners, and customs, it was always in the name of virtue, and always for the purpose of realizing, as they pretended, often believed, something better for the nation or the race. No small number of the friends and supporters of the old French Revolution were moved by a

warm and diffusive benevolence; and we envy not the man who can see nothing not bad in the generous enthusiasm of a very considerable portion of the French people in the early days of that revolution. The state of things which obtained in France prior to the Revolution was not so bad as that which the Revolution itself introduced, but it was such as no man of a sound mind and an honest heart can approve. The evils may have been exaggerated, but no one can deny that they were great and deplorable. The court and upper classes were corrupt either in their principles or their manners, and the great body of the people were oppressed with burdens too heavy to be borne, and looked upon as born only to minister to the wants and pleasures of the idle and luxurious few. How could men who have the hearts of men be otherwise than indignant, when people were sent to the Bastille for venturing to attack the king's lackey or the king's mistress,—when the king abandoned himself to the most debasing and criminal sensuality, and a painted harlot, a Pompadour or a Dubarry, was virtually the first minister of state, and dispensed the favors or determined the appointments of the crown, while the toiling multitude were overloaded with taxes, reduced to penury, to absolute destitution, and received in answer to their petition for bread “a new gallows forty feet high”? Revolutions are serious things, and no people can be stirred up to make a social revolution against all that they have been accustomed to hold sacred, till they feel the pressure of want, and see gaunt famine staring them in the face. Nations, humanity at large, must bear some traces of that Divine similitude which all things more or less faithfully copy, and can no more act without some aspect of truth or shadow of good than individuals; and though it may be generally more in accordance with the fact to say, *Vox populi, vox diaboli*, than *Vox populi, vox Dei*, yet there is a sense in which it will not do to deny that “the voice of the people is the voice of God.” The old French Revolution found at least a pretext in the vices of the court, in the corruption of the noblesse, in the dissoluteness of a portion of the clergy, and in the general neglect and distress of the people. And things were not much worse in France than in other European countries at the same time, if indeed they were so bad. It were idle to deny the existence of the evils, or to hold it to have been criminal, or

otherwise than praiseworthy, to attempt to redress them. It was a sacred duty, imposed alike by charity and philanthropy, to undertake their removal, though of course not by unlawful means, certainly not by a revolution, which could only make matters worse.

Of course we have no confidence even in philanthropy, when acting alone, to effect anything good, for it seldom fails to make matters worse; but we have very little sympathy with the ordinary shallow and selfish declamation of conservatives against modern revolutionary movements. The only conservatism we can respect is that which frankly acknowledges the wrong, and seeks by proper means to redress it wherever it finds it. It is, after all, less against revolutions that we would direct the virtuous indignation of our conservative friends, now that the reaction has become strong, than against the misgovernment, the tyranny, the vices and the crimes, the heartlessness, the cruelty, the neglect of the poor by those who should love and succor them, or the wrongs inflicted on them, which provoke revolutions, and give Satan an opportunity to possess the multitude, and pervert their purest sentiments and their most generous enthusiasm to evil. Revolution was no fitting remedy for the evils which the system of secular government, attained to its full growth in Louis the Fourteenth, had generated. It was the remedy of madness or wild despair. But the evils had grown beyond all reasonable endurance. They outraged alike natural benevolence and Christian charity. Let not the friends of religion and order have censures only for those who sought madly to remove them by revolutions, and none for those whose vices and crimes caused them, lest they render religion and order odious to all men of human hearts.

Philanthropy is a human sentiment, and by no means Christian charity. We know it perfectly well. But it corresponds to charity as the human corresponds to the Divine, copies it as nature copies or imitates God, and we never need persuade ourselves that what is repugnant to it is pleasing to charity. *Gratia supponit naturam*. How often must we repeat, that grace does not supersede nature? St. Ignatius Loyola did not seek to destroy the natural ambition of young Francis Xavier; he accepted it, and sought simply to direct it from earthly to heavenly glory. No wise master of spiritual life ever seeks to root out nature; his

aim is always to accept it, and direct it in right paths towards God, the true end of man. Calvin and Jansenius, those subtle enemies of Christ, have done more injury to religion, a thousand times over, than Voltaire and Rousseau, for they placed nature and grace in opposition, and denied nature in order to assert grace. Not enough have been appreciated the services rendered to religion and humanity by the sons of Loyola, in combating as they did, in the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, the degrading and demoralizing, though specious, heresy of the Jansenists. Nobly did they defend the freedom, the dignity, and the glorious destiny of human nature. The infamous *Maxims* of Rochefoucauld, once so celebrated, were Jansenistic, not Catholic, and were conceived in the spirit of Port Royal, not of the Church. They could have been inspired only by a heresy that places grace in opposition to nature, and thinks to exalt the one by degrading and annihilating the other. The Catholic honors nature, and asserts for it a more glorious destiny than do they who madly assert that man in his developments may grow into God. No, we repeat it, God is the similitude of all things, and the human has its type, its exemplar, in the Divine. The Divine is mirrored, reflected, by the human; grace, therefore, by nature. The natural sentiments of the human heart are below the infused graces of the Christian, but they are not opposed to them. Philanthropy, or the natural benevolence of the human heart, cannot rise to the elevation and power of Christian charity, or aspire to its eternal reward; but charity no more opposes it, and can no more dispense with it, than revelation opposes or can dispense with reason. What is opposed to benevolence is even more opposed to Christian charity. It is a great mistake to suppose that simple human benevolence or philanthropy is sufficient of itself to redress either social or individual grievances; but it is a still greater mistake therefore to condemn it, to neglect it, to make no efforts to redress the grievances, or to deny them to be real grievances, because they can be effectually redressed only by benevolence exalted to Christian charity. Not all the works of infidels are sin. Works of humanity, of genuine human benevolence, which are not always wanting in non-Catholic society, cannot indeed merit eternal life, or even the grace of conversion, for *gratia est omnino gratis*; but they

are not sinful; they are good in the natural order, and merit and shall receive in that order their reward. The men of our times, who have lost the sense of Christian charity and seek to substitute philanthropy for it, do yet honor that charity in its pale and evanescent human reflex, and so far have just sentiments, and are unchristian rather than antichristian.

The doctrine of equal rights, so energetically asserted, a few years since, by "the Workingmen's party," insisted on under one of its aspects by Abolitionists, and by the democratic party throughout the world, is not all false nor all antichristian, and after all faintly mirrors the Christian doctrine of the unity and solidarity of the race. There is truth in the Jacobinical doctrine of "fraternity," and in Kossuth's doctrine of "the solidarity of peoples." The workingmen's party is dead now, and buried in other parties which have absorbed it, but it had a great truth for its basis. It asserted the natural nobility of all men, the nobility of human nature itself, as worthy of our reverence in the humble artisan or laborer as in the titled noble.

"The king can make a belted knight,
A marquis, duke, and a' that;
An honest man 's aboon his might,
Guid faith! he maunna fa' that."

There is something that it will not do to sneer at in that free and noble spirit that seeks to break down the artificial barriers which separate man from man and nation from nation, and melt all into one grand brotherhood. If there is any one thing certain, it is that the Church has always asserted the unity of the race, and the natural equality of all men. Man equals man the world over, and hence, as Pope St. Gregory the First teaches, man, though he has received the dominion over the lower creation, has not received dominion over man, and princes are required to govern as pastors, not as lords; for since all men are equal by nature, the governed are as men the equals and brothers of the governors.

We are a little surprised to find the historian of the United States, in his earlier volumes, disposed to regard Calvin as in some sense the champion of equal rights, and to give Calvinism credit for the principle of political equality on which our American institutions are based,

for his own doctrine is as repugnant to the Calvinistic, as light is to darkness. Calvinism asserts only a negative equality. It reduces all to a common level, we grant, by asserting the total depravity of nature, and therefore the nullity of nature in all men; but this is the equality of death, not of life. All are equal, because all are nothing. But it does not elevate all to a common level by the assertion of a positive equality, an equality founded on what all men are and have by nature. Moreover, Calvinism is unfavorable, nay, decidedly hostile, to that doctrine of equality which Mr. Bancroft so strenuously maintains. By its doctrine of the nullity of nature and particular election and reprobation, whereby only a certain definite number can be elevated by grace, it founds an aristocracy, the aristocracy of the saints, or the elect. Asserting the moral nullity of nature, it necessarily founds the political order on grace, as it did in Geneva and the early Colony of Massachusetts, and excludes from all political rights all whom it does not count among the saints. Maintaining the total depravity of nature, it must deny to nature all rights, and can assert rights only for those who are assumed to be in grace; and hence only the saints have or can have the right to govern, — one of the heresies of Wiclef, condemned by the Council of Constance. Nature being null, there can be no rights under the law of nature, and if no rights, no possessions. Consequently, they who are counted among the non-elect have nothing which the elect are bound to hold sacred and inviolable. They are at the mercy of the saints, who may at pleasure despoil them of all they call their own, and take possession of their political and civil powers, their houses and lands, their goods and chattels, their wives and children, and even their very persons. Logically and consistently carried out, Calvinism therefore founds, not monarchy indeed, but the aristocracy of the saints, that is, of Calvinists, the most absolute and the most odious aristocracy that it is possible to conceive.

Undoubtedly the regenerate, those who are in grace, alone have rights in regard to eternal salvation, for certainly no man can have a natural right to supernatural beatitude. We are saved not by our natural merits, or merits under the law of nature, but by grace merited for us by Christ our head. The error of the Calvinist does not lie

in founding our titles to eternal life on grace and grace alone, but consists in denying the natural law, that man retains all his original rights in the natural order, and that in the natural order all men have equal rights, which even the elect or those elevated by grace must respect as sacred and inviolable. God in promulgating the law of grace does in no respect abrogate the law of nature, nor in the least modify the rights or obligations of men under that law. Hence the Apostle recognizes the legitimacy of the temporal power of his time, and bids the faithful to obey for conscience' sake the Roman Emperor, though a Pagan, in all things temporal. Hence the Church recognizes and always has recognized the rights of infidel and even heretical princes to the temporal obedience of their subjects, even when those subjects are Catholics, who can be absolved from their allegiance only in case their princes forfeit their rights *by the law* under which they hold. Hence the Church forbids infidels, Jews, or persons who have not come under her spiritual jurisdiction, to be forced to accept the faith. Hence, too, she recognizes the natural rights of life, liberty, and property as fully in infidels and heretics as in the faithful themselves. Here is the grand difference between a positive and a negative natural equality, between the natural equality asserted by Catholicity and that favored by Calvinism. Calvinism asserts the natural equality of all men, by denying alike to all men all natural rights, assuming all rights to have been forfeited by the Fall; Catholicity asserts the natural equality of all men, by asserting that all have equal natural rights, and denies that any natural rights were forfeited or lost by the transgression of our first parents. The rights lost by the Fall were supernatural, not natural rights, — rights held under the law of grace, not rights held under the law of nature; for it was by grace, not nature, that man was placed prior to the Fall on the plane of his supernatural destiny. Hence Catholicity recognizes in nature something sacred and inviolable, which even the Church must respect. Hence Catholicity must always respect the natural liberty of man, and can no more tyrannize over the infidel than over the believer, — must, in fact, as to the natural order, place both on the same footing of equality. Calvinism begins by denying all natural rights, nullifying nature, and therefore all natural liberty, and asserts

rights for the elect only. Hence it is free from all obligation to the non-elect, that is, to those who are not Calvinists, and is at liberty to play the tyrant over them at pleasure.

This is not mere speculation, or a simple logical conclusion from the Calvinistic premises. It is a conclusion practically drawn by Calvinists themselves, and written out in the blood of non-Calvinists, wherever they have had the power. Never have Calvinists held sacred any liberty except liberty for Calvinists. You may verify the fact by the history of Calvinism in Geneva, by that of the Puritans in England, that of the Covenanters in Scotland, and that of our own Puritan ancestors. Liberty for the elect, but no liberty for the non-elect, is the Calvinistic motto. To the saints belong the earth. Do you not see this in the Know-Nothing movement against Catholics in our own country? Unbelievers, Unitarians, Universalists, and non-Evangelical sects, may engage in that movement, but its informing and controlling spirit is that of Calvinism, just now galvanized, as we have elsewhere said, into a sort of spasmodic life. Its very language betrays it. It professes religious liberty, and its very aim is to deny it to Catholics, who in its view, we suppose, are rebrobrates.

We may see here, again, the title of the Jesuits, as true Catholics, to the gratitude of mankind, for the noble energy with which they vindicated the rights and dignity of nature against insidious Jansenism, that improved edition of Calvinism. "Nature," as some one remarks, "is not good for nothing." It is not good for everything, yet it is good for something, and in its place is no more to be denied than grace itself.

That Calvinism has accidentally served the cause of equal rights in this country, we are not disposed to deny. It led our Calvinistic ancestors to assert equal rights for the elect, that is, for Calvinists, and to make provisions for protecting them. When Calvinism lost its sway, and had become, as it practically had at the time of the Revolution, a dead letter, these provisions were without much difficulty extended so as to apply equally to all citizens, elect or non-elect. But no thanks to Calvinism for that, for they were so extended and made to protect equal rights, not as rights of the elect, but as the rights of man. We

think, if Mr. Bancroft had studied more thoroughly the Calvinistic system, he would have seen that, of all conceivable systems, it is the least favorable to that liberty and equality which he so eloquently and so energetically asserts. The equality that results from the equal depravity of nature can never be the basis of the equal rights of all men. To obtain this basis you must assert with the Catholic the inherent freedom, dignity, and nobility of human nature in every man, which requires the assertion of the unity of the race, and the recognition of that great fact, so seldom reflected on, so little understood, and so seldom practically applied, that God made man in his own image and likeness, and therefore man in his very nature must copy, imitate, or mirror his Maker.

The Workingmen were right in asserting the natural equality, or equal natural rights, of all men, and even in asserting the equal natural rights of all men to means and facilities for acquiring; for they did not, as it was alleged, assert the natural right of all men to equal acquisitions. The inequality they complained of was the unequal condition in which men are artificially placed in regard to acquiring, whether it be riches or honors, power or profit. Their error was in seeking to remove this inequality by social or political action. This inequality is, no doubt, in regard to the temporal order, a real grievance; but the difficulty is that it cannot be redressed by society, or if it can, not without striking at the right of property, and thus producing a far greater evil. There are many things very desirable, very proper to be done, which exceed both the ability and the competency of the state to do. The state alone is not competent to all the wants of even natural society. It must protect acquired as well as natural rights, and therefore the right to hold as well as to acquire property; and if it does this, it cannot secure to every man equal means or facilities for acquiring. It is obliged by its very nature to content itself with maintaining the equal right of all to acquire, and to hold what they acquire; when more is needed, we must look to a power of another order, — the moral power. The Workingmen committed a mistake analogous to that committed by our ultra-temperance people. Intemperance is a sin, a vice, which every man ought to avoid, and temperance is a virtue which every man ought to practise. But the state is competent in

the case only to leave full freedom to the virtue, and to punish the intemperance only in so far as it deprives some one of his rights. In that it is a sin or a vice, the state is not competent to deal with it, either by way of prevention or of punishment; it can take cognizance of it only in that it is an injury, or deprives some one of his rights, natural or acquired. The state cannot punish the simple vice of drunkenness; it can punish drunkenness only when it interferes with the rights of others, or disturbs the public peace. Hence the principle of the Maine Liquor Law is indefensible. A man has a natural right to drink wine, beer, cider, gin, rum, brandy, or whiskey, if he chooses, and can honestly procure it. He has a right to use intoxicating drinks so long as he does not abuse them. That right is and must be sacred and inviolable for the state. The state can have the right to deal only with the abuse. But the Maine Liquor Law proceeds on the principle that the state has the right to guard against the abuse by prohibiting the use, or by declaring the use itself an abuse. This, as it assumes for the state the right to alter the moral law or to introduce a new principle into morals, cannot be admitted, unless we are prepared to assert civil despotism. The office of the state is not to teach morals, or to interpret the moral law, but to execute it; not to define right, but to protect and vindicate it. To teach morals, to define what is or is not right, is not within the competency of the civil power. That belongs to the spiritual or moral power, distinct from the civil power, and moving in another orbit. The equality, if the Workingmen had understood it, which they wanted, they would have sought from love, not law, and by means of the Church, not the state; for the Church alone can introduce equality in the matters of acquired rights, by teaching the doctrine of love, and bringing home to the consciences of rich possessors, that they are stewards, and not absolute proprietors, of their estates, and therefore are to use them for the good of their neighbor, not for their own private good alone, on the principle that each is bound for all and all for each, or that all are members of one body, and members of one another, and that the body cannot suffer without the members, nor a member without the body. It was on this principle that St. Chrysostom told the rich of Constantinople that they were murderers of the poor who died for the want of the

means wherewith to live. But it would be perfect madness to attempt to carry out this principle by political organization or legislative action. The right to acquire and to hold property independent of the civil power must be recognized and protected, or the whole community will die of starvation. The evil which the state must tolerate for the sake of the good, the moral power operating on conscience and love must redress.

The doctrine of the solidarity and communion of the race, which Leroux makes the basis of his socialism and the principle of his explanation of Christianity, has something which, perhaps, a Christian may, and even must, accept. If we may be permitted to refer to our personal experience, we must say that it was through that doctrine, as set forth by Leroux in his work on Humanity, that by the grace of God we were led to the Catholic Church; and we may add, that the same was true of several of our friends, one at least of whom is now a most worthy member of the Catholic priesthood, and one of the most indefatigable and successful Catholic missionaries in the country. We thought we saw a great and important truth in the doctrine, but also that, as Leroux laid it down, it was incomplete; and if theoretically and practically completed anywhere, it must be in the Catholic Church. We seized the doctrine with our accustomed ardor, and, developing it in our own way, found ourselves knocking at the door of the Church, and demanding entrance. Having been admitted into the Church, and commenced the study of Catholic theology in the scholastic authors, in whom we found nothing which seemed to us a recognition of it, we felt that it was our duty to waive its public consideration till we could have time and opportunity of re-examining it in the light of Catholic faith. We saw at once that the doctrine pertained to an order of thought far below Catholic dogma, and that we had erred in supposing it to be the explication and expression of the real sense of the Catholic mysteries; but how far it was or was not in harmony with them, we felt unable to say. It was a problem to be solved, and not by us till we had become somewhat more familiar than we were at the time with Catholic theology. The form under which we had entertained it was, in regard to scholastic theology, a novelty, and therefore to be suspected. It might conceal an error, and even a dangerous error. It was certainly

prudent, nay, it was our duty, not to insist on it, and to be content with using the language, arguments, and illustrations which we knew to be safe. Hence the trains of thought with which we made our readers so familiar during our transition state, and which had played so important a part in the process of our conversion, were suddenly interrupted the moment we entered the Church and began to write as a Catholic. They who had watched our course, and taken some interest in our progress from a low form of rationalism to Catholicity, were unable to trace in our writings any continuity of thought between what was published the day before we entered the Church and what we wrote and published the day after. So abrupt and complete a change seemed to them inexplicable on any rational principles, and was of course ascribed to our fickleness, or to our no longer being suffered to have a mind of our own. People outside of the Church lost confidence in us, and if they continued to read us at all, it was mainly to amuse themselves with what they were pleased to look upon as our "feats of intellectual gladiatorship." This of course had its unpleasantness and its inconveniences, but it was not unendurable.

But we may say now, after more than ten years of silent thought and reflection on the subject, that, though not free from trifling errors, and much exaggerated as to their importance in our own mind, the principles which we learned from Leroux and developed and applied in our own way were substantially true, and we can without lesion to our Catholicity resume the train of thought which appeared to be so abruptly terminated on our entering the Church. The views which we set forth in our Letter to Dr. Channing, in 1842, *on the Mediatorial Life of Christ*, as far as they went, we can accept now, and not without advantage. They were not what we thought them, and did not attain, as we supposed, to Catholic doctrine; yet they embraced elements of natural truth which help us in some respects to understand the Catholic dogma, and which the dogma may accept as charity accepts philanthropy. The basis of the doctrine we set forth in that letter was, that man lives by communion with God, humanity, and nature, and that his life partakes of the qualities of the object with which he communes. Man cannot live by himself alone, and every fact

of life is the resultant of two factors, of the concurrent activity of subject and object, and partakes of the character of each. The individual can live and act only by virtue of communion with that which is not himself, and which we call his object, because it is set over against him. This does not mean that he cannot act without some object, or end to which he acts, although that is undoubtedly the case, but without another activity than his own, which meets and concurs with it. The fact of life results from the intershock of the two activities, and is their joint product. The subject is *living* subject, or subject *in actu*, only by virtue of communion with its object. Thus it cannot think without the active presence of the intelligible, or love without the active presence of the amiable, which is really only what St. Thomas teaches when he says the intellect is *in ordinem ad verum*, and the will *in ordinem ad bonum*; that the intellect is never false, and the will can never will only good. Therefore we have frequently brought out the doctrine in order to refute the modern psychologists, and those philosophers who would persuade us that it is not the *mundus physicus*, but an intermediary world, which they call the *mundus logicus*, that the mind in its perceptions immediately apprehends. The mind cannot think without thinking some object, and as to the production of thought, the object must act on or with the subject, — because if purely passive it is as if it were not, for pure passivity is mere potentiality, — the object must be real, being or existence, since what neither is nor exists cannot act or produce any effect. Consequently, either we perceive nothing and perform no act of perception, or the world perceived is the real world itself, not a merely abstract or logical world, or a mere *species* or phantasm.

But thought is an effect, and whoever thinks at all produces or generates something. Every theologian must admit this, or how else can he hold the mystery of the Trinity, and believe in the only begotten Son of God? In God, who is *actus purissimus*, or pure act, as say Aristotle, and the Schoolmen after him, as he is infinite and contains no passivity, he enters with his whole being into his thought, the word generated is and must be exactly his equal, and identical in nature, consubstantial with himself. But man, not being pure act, nor intelligible in himself, cannot think without another activity that

supplies the object necessary to reduce his passivity to act; and as he cannot enter with his whole being into his thought, he cannot, as God, generate the exact image of himself. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the object, since he imitates in his degree the divine intellect, he generates something, and this something we call a fact of life, or life itself considered as the product of living activity. Now, since to production or generation of thought or the fact of life subject and object must concur, it is their joint product, and must participate of the character of each. Here is the basis of what is called the solidarity of the race, under the point of view of intellect.

But man is not pure intellect. He has a heart as well as a head, and can love as well as think. What we have asserted of thought is equally true of love, as we learn from the same adorable mystery of the Trinity. For the Father, the Unbegotten, loves the Son, the begotten, and from their mutual love proceeds the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Ghost. Only like can commune with like, and love properly so called can be only of like to like, and therefore under the relation of love man only can be the object of man. By virtue of the unity of the race every human being is the object of every other human being. But by the law of all communion of subject and object, the result generated or proceeding is the joint product of the two factors, and therefore the life of any one man is the joint product of him and every other man; and thus is produced a solidarity of the life of all men, by which it is one and the same life for all and for each, and for each and for all. But as every generation, so to speak, overlaps its successor, and each new generation communes with its predecessor, the solidarity of the race is not only a solidarity of all men in space, but of all men in time, linking together, in one indissoluble life, the first man with the last, and the last man with the first.

Taking this doctrine, but giving a different application from that of Leroux, in order to escape his denial of the personality of God and the personal immortality of the soul, and to be able to assert the Incarnation in the individual man Jesus, instead of the race, we thought we could bridge over the gulf between the Unitarian and the Trinitarian, and accept and explain the Christian Church and Christian mysteries. In this respect our

letter to Dr. Channing fails. The thought we developed does not rise to the order of Catholic dogma, and at the highest remains in the natural order. Yet the doctrine is substantially true. It is not the supernatural truth of Christianity, but it is in some sense the truth of the natural order which corresponds to it, and by which it is made apprehensible to us. The error of Leroux and ourselves was not in asserting the natural communion and solidarity of the race, but in supposing them to be the real significance of the Christian mysteries, the Incarnation, Holy Communion, the Church, Apostolic Succession, Tradition, &c., or the great truths held by the early Christians, and symbolized by the Catholic dogmas. The error was in assuming that Catholic dogmas symbolize natural truths; it had been more correct to have said the reverse, that the natural truths symbolize the dogmas, or represent them as the human represents the Divine. "See that you make all things according to the pattern shown you in the Mount." The earthly symbolizes the heavenly, not the heavenly the earthly. The dogma is not, as Leroux, Cousin, and others have foolishly asserted, the form with which faith, the religious sentiment, or enthusiasm clothes the natural or philosophic truth. The natural or philosophic truth, on the contrary, is the symbol of which the dogma is the hidden meaning, the Divine reality, or the Divine likeness which it copies or imitates.

Although the natural communion of the human race does not introduce us to the principle of the Sacraments, as Leroux and we after him supposed, and although the natural solidarity of the race is infinitely below the Christian solidarity effected by the Sacraments, there is no opposition between one and the other. We do not by natural communion receive and incorporate into our life that grace which unites us to God and enables us to live the supernatural life of Christ, and the solidarity resulting from it is infinitely below that of the Church, that mystic body of Christ, in which he is as it were continuously incarnated; but it does express the condition of our natural human life, and its assertion, while no disadvantage to the supernatural, is of great advantage to the natural order. It condemns all exclusiveness, whether individual or national, and asserts the necessity to the full development of our natural life of the free and peaceful intercourse of

man with man the world over. Man has a threefold nature, and lives by communion with God, man, and nature. He communes with God in religion, with man in society, and with nature in property, and any political or social order that strikes at either of these, or hinders or obstructs this threefold communion, as Leroux well maintains, is alike repugnant to the will of God and the highest interests of humanity; and efforts made to render this communion free and unobstructed, to give freedom in the acquisition and security in the possession of property, to protect the family as the basis of society, and to break down the barriers to social intercourse interposed by prejudices of birth or caste, and to secure freedom of worship or religion, are in principle great and solemn duties, obligatory alike upon all men. Thus far the Liberalists and Socialists can make a valid defence. The end proposed is just and obligatory. The means they adopt of course we do and must condemn. Philanthropy enjoins what they would effect, and Philanthropy here may justify herself by the natural solidarity of the race.

Kossuth, when he was here, had much to say of "the solidarity of peoples," from which he concluded the right of the people of every country, irrespective of their government, to run to the assistance of any particular people struggling for its rights. This solidarity of peoples rests on the doctrine of the solidarity of the race. Man lives his social life only by communion with man, and every man thus becomes every man's object, and all are bound together in the unity of one indissoluble life. Man then can never be indifferent to man; never have the right to ask, with Cain, "Am I my brother's keeper?" Your brother is your object, without which you cannot live the life of love. He is your other self, the objective side of your own life. If this may be said of individuals, why not of nations? There is in some sense a solidarity of nations, as well as of individuals. The right of the people without the permission of their government to assist a sister people, we cannot absolutely deny. The race is more than the individual, and humanity more than the nation. There is a great and glorious truth in Senator Seward's doctrine of the Higher Law, a truth which every true man will assert, if need be, in exile or the dungeon, on the scaffold or at the stake. I am a man before I am a

citizen, and my rights as a man can never be subordinated to my duties as a citizen. Even the Church recognizes and vindicates my rights as a man, and the Church is higher in the order of God's providence than the state, as much so as grace is higher than nature. There are cases in which the state cannot bind the citizen, as the Apostles taught us when they refused to obey the magistrates who commanded them to preach no more in the name of Jesus of Nazareth. We are to love our neighbor as ourself; for in one sense our neighbor is ourself, since he is our object, without which we cannot love or live; there are cases when we must rush to his assistance, at least when we *may* rush to his assistance, at the hazard of life. There may then be cases when the solidarity of the race overrides the solidarity of the nation, and permits a people without the national sanction to rush to the assistance of another people struggling against tyranny for its liberty and independence; but not indeed at the call of every discomfited demagogue. The principle we hold to be true, but it can be of only rare application. The struggling people must have a cause manifestly just, and have adopted means manifestly unexceptionable, and the national permission must have been wrongly withheld, before the people of another nation have the right to interfere; and these things must be determined not by private judgment or caprice, but by an authority competent to decide in the case, otherwise an attack may be made against legitimate authority, and a blow be struck at order, which is as sacred as liberty.

We might pursue this subject further, but it is unnecessary at present. We have thus far been intent mainly on pointing out what a Catholic may accept as true and good in modern Liberalism and Socialism. What they want, we mean when sincere, earnest, and disinterested, what they are driving at, under certain aspects, is good, and in its place approved alike by charity and philanthropy. We cannot utterly condemn all we did and said as a Liberalist or as a Socialist, and we find much in Liberalists and Socialists of the present day to approve. When they are not completely beside themselves, we admit that most of the things they call political and social grievances are grievances, and such as ought to be redressed. But with what they contend for that is true and good, they couple great

and dangerous errors. They err, above all, as to the means by which they seek to gain their ends. In what they for the most part aim at, we can agree with them. We love liberty as much as they do, we are as indignant at wrong as they are; but we see them trying to effect by the state what can be effected only by the Church, and by the natural sentiment of philanthropy what is practicable only by the supernatural virtue of charity.

Every age has its own characteristics, and we must address its dominant sentiment, whether we would serve or disserve it. Our age is philanthropical rather than intellectual. It has lost faith intellectually, but retains a faint echo of it on the side of the affections. It does not think so much as it feels, and it demands the Gospel of Love with far more earnestness and energy than it does the Gospel of Truth. Charity had exalted and intensified its affections. Despoiled of charity, it is devoured by its benevolent sentiments. It would do good, it would devote itself to the poor, the enslaved, the neglected, the downtrodden. It would bind up the broken heart, and bring rest to the suffering. These are not bad traits, and we love to dwell on the disinterestedness of the Howards, the Frys, the Nightingales, and the benevolent men and women in our own country who so unreservedly devote themselves to the relief of the afflicted. These prove what the age craves, and what it is looking for. Through its benevolence Satan no doubt often misleads it, but through the same benevolence the missionary of the cross may approach it and lead it up to God.

We have wished, in these times, when the Church is assailed so violently by the galvanized Calvinism manifesting itself in Know-Nothing movements, to show, by exhibiting the manner in which she regards those movements which spring from natural benevolence or a generous regard for human well-being, that she no more deserves than she fears their violence. What is true and good in the natural order manifested by those outside, though imperfect, she accepts. We have wished, also, in a practical way, to reply to those who are perpetually accusing us of being narrow and exclusive, and a renegade from free principles. What we aimed at before our conversion is still dear to us, and we are still in some sense a man of our age. But having indicated the good side of Liberal-

ism and Socialism, we shall take a future opportunity to show more fully that it is accepted by the Church, and is completed only in and through her communion.

ART. III.—*Questions of the Soul.* By I. T. HECKER.
New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1855. 12mo. pp. 294.

WE have in these *Questions of the Soul* a remarkable work, and one of the very few original and genuine American books our country can boast. It could have been written only by an American to "the manner born," and is destined, in our judgment, to have a marked influence on American thought and American literature.

We cannot introduce this interesting and instructive, though simple and unpretending volume, to our readers, without recollecting that we have known the author almost from his boyhood, and have always regarded him as one to whom Almighty God has given a mission of vital importance to our common country. Few men really know him, few even suspect what is in him; but no one can commune with him for half an hour, and ever be again precisely what he was before. He is one of those men whom you feel it is good to be with. Virtue goes out from him. Simple, unpretending, playful, and docile as a child, warm and tender in his feelings, full of life and cheerfulness of manner, he wins at once your love, and infuses as it were his own sunshiny nature into your heart. From his youth he has been remarkable for his singular purity of heart, the guilelessness of his soul, the earnestness of his spirit, his devotion to truth, and his longing after perfection. We owe personally more than we can say to our long and intimate acquaintance with him. How often, when neither of us knew or believed in the glorious old Catholic Church, have we talked together by our own fire-side, on the great questions discussed in the volume before us, and stimulated each other's endeavors after truth and goodness! His modesty and docility made him in those times regard us as his teacher as well as his senior, but in truth we were the scholar. It was in these free communings, where each opened his mind and heart to the other,

that we both were led, the grace of God aiding, to feel the need of the Church, and that we talked, if we may so say, without intending or foreseeing it, each other into the belief and love of Catholicity. Each perhaps was of service to the other, but he aided us more than we him, for even then his was the master mind. These personal recollections are most dear to us, and we hope the author's modesty will not be offended at the homage which our heart cannot withhold. We loved him then as a younger brother, and happy are we to reverence him now as a father. Years have passed away since those times when we were both groping our way from the darkness in which we had been bred to the light of God's truth, and many changes have come over us both; but always will the recollection of our early intercourse be fresh in our heart. After long investigation of the various systems of religion and various plans of world-reform or of individual perfection agitated in our country, outside of the Church, he, through the mercy of God, found in the Catholic religion what he had so long and so patiently sought. He soon felt a vocation to a religious life, was received into the Congregation of the most Holy Redeemer, and went abroad to make his novitiate, and to prepare himself for the priesthood. After his ordination, he was two years on the mission in England, when he was permitted by his superiors to return to his native land, where, with others, he has been employed in giving missions in various parts of the country, with consoling success. We have watched his career as a missionary priest, both at home and abroad, with affectionate interest, but in this book more fully than anywhere else we have found again our young friend. Here he begins to utter what God has given him to utter, and his words will go to the hearts of all his early friends, and they are all who knew him. He has greater things than this to say, but he has here spoken the word that was needed, the proper word for the time and place, and it will and must fetch an echo from the inmost souls of not a few of his countrymen, especially in our own New England, where he was so well known and so warmly loved.

The author has given us here the very book the want of which many have felt, and has done what we ourselves have often attempted to do, and would have done had Almighty God given us the genius and ability to do it. We

can now throw the manuscript of our own partially completed work on the same subject into the fire. All who have had any experience in the matter know that, with all the variety and excellence of our Catholic literature, we have no book precisely adapted to the peculiar state of mind and tone of thought that we every day meet among the better and more earnest and aspiring class of our countrymen. All our controversial works have been written for a state of things which has passed or is passing away in this country. They do not meet our American mind; they fail to recognize to that mind the truths which it unquestionably has, and attack its errors under forms that it does not recognize as its own. There has as yet been no real medium of communication between Catholic and non-Catholic Americans, and if our Catholic writers have understood the non-Catholic American, he has not understood them. They have not spoken to the comprehension of the real American mind and heart, or penetrated to what we would call the inner American life.

The genuine American character is the most difficult character in the world to comprehend, and foreigners almost invariably fail in their efforts to understand it. Few Americans themselves, though they feel at once whether you understand it or not, can explain it either to themselves or to others. Our deeper inner life has never yet received its expression. We are as yet a mystery to ourselves, and cannot say what we are or are not. The chief reason of this is, that we are in our infancy, and our character, though forming, is not yet formed, at least not fully developed. To the foreigner and even to ourselves we seem an adult people, with a fixed character such as it is. But this seemingly fixed character is only on the surface. It is no index to the real national character, and can only mislead those who do not penetrate deeper. Under this beats the American heart, operates the real American life, which is rapidly transforming, assimilating, or casting off all this which the superficial observer takes to be Americanism. In order to seize the real American character, we must study, as in the child, what we are becoming, rather than what we are. Like children we live in the future, not in the present or the past, and look forward, not backward. We have hope, but no memory. As a people, we feel that we have no past, and we despise the present. We feel ourselves

bound by no traditions, whether of truth or error; we have faith only in what is to come. The great words we sometimes use are spoken prophetically, and express what we feel we are to be, not what we feel we are. We think, feel, speak, in reference not to what we are, but to what it is in us to be. Our character is in the bud; it has not yet blossomed, far less ripened into fruit. Hence the difficulty of comprehending it, and only they who can foretell the blossom and the fruit from studying the bud can comprehend it.

To arrive at some acquaintance with the American character in its proper sense, we must not study it in the busy, bustling life of the multitude, in our shops, in our streets, on our wharves, in our hotels, in our saloons, in our political caucuses, or in our sectarian meeting-houses and assemblies. Here you see us only on our outside, in our transitional state, or in what we have retained or imitated from the Old World, modified by the peculiarities of the framework of American society. The real American heart is not there, and is not indicated by what we there meet. We must look for it in what is to-day apparently a small and hardly heeded minority. It will not do to regard us as a people with a *credo*, a fixed form of belief, whether true or false; and it will do just as little to regard us as an infidel or unbelieving people. We are, if the thing be conceivable, neither the one nor the other. As a people, we have no distinctive or dogmatic faith; we have ceased to believe in distinct and definite doctrines, and so far have fallen into a sort of religious indifference; but we have a strong religious nature, we recoil with horror from open unbelief, and have a persuasion that there is and must be a true religion of some sort, though we know not precisely what or where it is. We are best represented by those who have outgrown all the forms of dogmatic Protestantism, and are looking, like Emerson and Parker, for something beyond the Reformation, and have glimpses of a truth, a beauty, a perfection above it, to which they long to attain, but feel that they have not as yet attained and know not how to attain. These are the real American people, however few their number, and theirs are the only words that as yet fetch an echo from the American heart. The formal Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, Socinian, is as such no representative of the American

people, and is obliged to yield to the dissolving influence of American life. He is an exotic that cannot long flourish in our soil or under our heavens. There is an agency at work in American minds and hearts that transforms him against his will, against his knowledge, — an agency that resists silently and mysteriously all sects with formal doctrines, and that will for ever prevent them from being naturalized or nationalized among us. They all feel the workings of this silent, secret agency, and many of them very unnecessarily suppose that it is the secret influence of Rome, the result of a concealed "Jesuitism," or "of a Popish conspiracy." It is no such thing. The same agency is at work among Catholics, and would transform Catholicity in the same way, were it not divine truth, protected by the hand of God himself. In ascertaining or estimating the real American character, we must look beyond all the sects, to those who have thrown them off, and that, too, without lapsing into cold materialism, or losing their natural religiosity and uprightness. These are already more numerous than is commonly imagined, and their number is every day rapidly increasing. In these is our hope, for he who can speak to the minds and hearts of these speaks to the real American mind and heart.

We doubt if any man, without extraordinary grace, can do this effectually, unless he is one who knows them by his own personal experience. Catholics who have lived long in the country, nay, who have been born and brought up in the country, do not readily enter into their state of mind, and rarely succeed in making themselves thoroughly intelligible to them; for they live not the same life, and speak not the same language. But yet it is through this class Catholicity is to be presented to the American heart and the country converted. In regard to individuals we may find, indeed, a point of support in the Catholic dogmas retained by most of the sects, but not for the conversion of any considerable number of the American people. Our best and firmest reliance is not on these Catholic dogmas which Protestantism still professes, for Protestants, speaking generally, hold them too loosely, but on the innate cravings of the soul, finding itself abandoned to simple nature, on that inward need which all men feel even by nature for truth and goodness. We shall, with the grace of God, find our account in proportion as we address

the heart, and the intellect through the heart. The fulcrum for our lever is in the natural craving of the heart for beatitude, to love and to be loved. We shall do well not to slight the mystic element of the soul, an element perhaps stronger than any other in our American nature.

Hitherto our Catholic authors, very naturally and very properly, have confined themselves, when addressing those without, either to the defence of Catholicity against the objections of Protestants, or to the refutation of the errors of non-Catholics. We have confined ourselves personally, in our discussions, mostly to the latter object, for it suited best our peculiar temperament. But, after all, we in this way present Catholicity mainly on its negative side, and silence the logic rather than win the hearts of non-Catholics. We show them in this way our religion under its least amiable and most repulsive aspect. There is another way of presenting it, which we have as yet hardly tried, that of presenting it in its purely affirmative or positive character, as the adequate object of the heart, which Tertullian says is naturally Christian, frankly recognizing its natural wants and activities, and showing it that Catholicity is that unknown good that it craves, the ideal to which it aspires, the true life it would live, and that superhuman help which it feels that it needs and which it has hitherto sought in vain, and must in vain seek elsewhere than in the Church. Now this is what our author has attempted, and, as far as we can judge, with complete success, in the volume before us. He makes no apologetic defence of Catholicity, and no polemical assault on Protestantism, although his work really contains a masterly refutation of the latter, and a triumphant defence of the former; but he presents Catholicity as the answer to the *Questions of the Soul*. He lets the people whom he addresses state these questions in their own way, and give him their own list of the wants of the heart, and tells them that they need not despair of finding an answer to these questions, or full satisfaction of these wants. He does not reproach them for raising these questions, or for feeling these wants, for he owns them to be natural, and regards them as indicative of the dignity and noble capacities of man's nature. He accepts them, and shows that Catholicity is that which adequately answers them all. In this consist the originality and peculiar merit of his method. It is not controversial, it is not speculative, it is not dog-

matic, but a simple statement of facts to the heart, which instructs and satisfies the understanding. It assumes nothing, but simply relates what those whom he addresses experience, and shows them affectionately what it is they want, and where and how they may find it. It is frank, confiding, hopeful, overflowing with tenderness and goodwill towards those who have not yet found what the author has found. The author addresses himself more especially to the persons known amongst us as Transcendentalists, and he finds something true and beautiful in many of those choice souls, who, however mistaken in their practical endeavors, sought earnestly for a time to live a higher life, and deserved something better than the sneers and scoffs they received from an unsympathizing world. He may not reach them all, but he must reach many of them, and even those he fails to convince will find his book surprising and attracting them. He has presented Catholicity in its true light to their understandings, and they must wish to accept it even when they fail to do so.

It is no easy matter to make selections that will give our readers a passable idea of this remarkable book. It is what every book should be, a genuine whole, and to give an idea of it we should need to extract it all. It is a genuine work of art in the highest sense of the term, as beautiful as true, and as true as beautiful. Any extract we can make will be weakened by being detached either from what precedes or follows it. We must, however, give a few specimens of the author's style and manner. We begin with the first chapter, *Has Man a Destiny?*

“ But what am I ?

An infant in the night ;

An infant crying for the light,

And with no language but a cry.’ — TENNYSON.

“ Every man that is born into life has for his task to find his destiny, or to make one. This he must accomplish, or be condemned to the greatest of all miseries, the misery of being ‘conscious of capacities without the proper objects to satisfy them.’

“ The question that agitates the mind of man, as soon as the eye of reason opens, is that of his destiny. The idea of God, himself, and the world around him, strikes him at that moment, as separate and independent facts. The charm that surrounded his innocent childhood is broken ; he enters upon a new sphere of life ; and, with feelings of surprise, he asks : ‘ Who am I ? ’ ‘ Whence did I come ? ’ ‘ Whither do I tend ? ’ ‘ Who is God ? ’ ‘ What are my

relations to God? to man? to the world around me?' 'Have I a destiny? a work to do? What is it? And where? Or is all ruled by Fate? or left to what men call Chance?'

'No When,—no Where,—no How, but that we are,
And naught besides!'

"These, and similar questions, are the first to spring up, at the dawn of reason, in the mind of those who have no fixed notions of religion. Alas! this is the condition, deny it who may, of the great mass of American youth.

"A shrewd observer of men, one who ranks high among our poets, has stated this fact in his quaint way in the following lines:—

'I saw men go up and down
In the country and the town,
With this prayer upon their neck,—
"Judgment and a judge we seek."
Not to monarchs we repair,
Nor to learned jurist's chair;
But they hurry to their peers,
To their kinsfolk, and their dears;
Louder than with speech they pray,—
"What am I? Companion, say!"'

"These questions we cannot set aside if we would; and, unanswered, they fasten upon the mind and consume the life of the heart, like the vultures that fed upon the vitals of the rock-bound Prometheus. Moreover, we would not set them aside if we had the power, for the highest prerogative of man's reason is, to know his destiny; and his noble energies were not given to be wasted or misspent, but to be directed to the fulfilment of it.

"First of all, then, the question of our destiny must be met and settled, and that, too, satisfactorily to the intellect and heart. Till this is done, it is idle and nonsensical to tell man to act. You tell him to act, and he will reply: 'But how can we act, when we see no purpose in our actions? How can we act, when we see no end worth acting for? Rather than act for such ends as men commonly do, we would let our shoulders fall from their sockets, and our arms with their bones be broken! For

"We were not born
To sink our finer feelings in the dust;
And better to the grave with feelings torn,
So in our steps stride truth and honest trust
In the great love of things, than to be slaves
To forms, whose ringing sides each stroke we give
Stamps with a hollower want. Yes, to our graves
Hurry, before we in the heaven's look live,
Strangers to our best thoughts, and fearing men,
And fearing death, and to be born again."

* Milnes.

† Emerson.

‡ W. E. Channing.

"If you cannot act, then love. 'But how can we love, when a deeper insight tells us, that to love is only to be deceived? To love till the inmost want of the soul is stilled, is but an act of self-deception, ending in greater pain and bitterer want. Mock us no longer by telling us to love. Can two voids make a fulness? Can two wants give bliss? Can two deficiencies make a whole and perfect result? 'Madly and in vain do two hearts beat to mingle and be a whole.'

"We would love, yes, this is precisely what we would do, but love what will answer to our whole nature, not merely to a part, and that part by no means the most noble. For he

"Who drinks of Cupid's nectar-cup,
Loveth downwards, and not up."*

And rather than this, our soul chooseth hanging and our bones death.'

"Oh! is it not a subject of despair for the soul, when we cannot find in ourselves, nor in any other, nor in all society, the light we need to solve life's mystery, the Destiny of Man! If death could give us any clew, who would not make the venture, and say:

'Lay thy loving wings
In death upon me, — if that way alone
Thy great Creation-thought thou wilt to me make known.' †

Such is the utterance of the soul when it is moved by some unknown influence from the centre and basis of common life, and is seeking for another and a higher one, to rest upon.

"But what is this that torments the soul? Has life no purpose? Has man no task to accomplish?

"Are we

'But eddies of the dust,
Uplifted by the blast and whirled
Along the highway of the world
A moment only, then to fall
Back to a common level all,
At the subsiding of the gust?' ‡

Is all around us chaos as it seems, and are we brought forth from darkness into reason's light, only to doubt and perchance despair?

'And is this all that man can claim?
Is this our longing's final aim?
To be like all things round, — no more
Than pebbles cast on time's great shore?' §

Not always does doubt spring from deficiency; in earnest hearts, it is but another form of faith and prayer. Listen to one who has

* Emerson.

† Milnes.

‡ Longfellow.

§ Sterling.

felt keenly the nobler impulses of the soul, who has had brilliant dreams of life and drunk dry the cup of woe.

“What you find to your sorrow is the star of hope. Your doubts are “the stamp and signet of a most perfect life.” There is in life a purpose; one equal to all the wants of the heart and the capacities of the soul; a purpose that will give to the heart a perpetual freshness of youth, to the mind an ever increasing vision of beauty, and to the will a divine basis for action. And this purpose can be yours.’

“Believe it! or trust one who has been where you are, and who speaks to you now, not of day-dreams, but of actualities, of hopes realized and of aims accomplished; one who can say,

‘What once I dreamt not now is true,
More lovely sights around me rise.’*

Lo! in the fields the yellow grain, the ripening fruit, the full-blown rose, how full of life! how perfect! how beautiful! And shall man, the crowning piece of God’s workmanship, walk with aimless feet? Shall he be

‘Weighed upon with heaviness,
And utterly consumed with sharp distress,
While all things else have rest from weariness?’†

No; man has a destiny, and to corrupt, to enfeeble, or to abandon those instincts, faculties, and activities which God has given to him whereby to reach his destiny, this is the soul’s suicide; this, and this alone, is sin.

“Man has a destiny, and his only evil is to deviate from it; and not to be able to act in accordance with his destiny, is the greatest of all miseries; this is, in every sense of the word, to be damned; this is the greatest torment of hell. Man has a destiny, and man’s highest good, his life, his happiness, and true being’s bliss, is in nothing else than in the fulfilment of his destiny; it is in this, that his beatitude and heaven consist.

“Man has a destiny, what is it?” — pp. 9 – 17.

We beg the reader to remark this sentence, so directly in the face and eyes of Calvinism and Jansenism: “No; man has a destiny, and to corrupt, to enfeeble, or to abandon those instincts, faculties, and activities which God has given him whereby to reach his destiny, this is the soul’s suicide; this, and this alone, is sin.” Here is the distinct recognition of all that is true in the saying of the Transcendentalists about following our instincts, and the truth without the error.

* Sterling.

† Tennyson.

After having settled the question that man has a destiny, the author proceeds to the question, What is man's destiny? He shows by a series of most interesting extracts from the writings of the greatest and most distinguished non-Catholics of the age, of men who are rightly called its representative men, that, while this question torments its soul, it is unable to answer it. Who greater than Goethe, that many-sided German? Yet here is the best answer he could give:—

"I've set my heart upon nothing you see;

Hurrah!

And so the world goes well with me.

And who has the mind to be fellow of mine,

Why, let him take hold and help me drain

These mouldy lees of wine.

"I set my heart first upon wealth,

Hurrah!

And bartered away my peace and health,

But, ah!

The slippery change went about like air,

And when I had clutched me a handful here

Away it went there.

"I set my heart upon woman next,

Hurrah!

For her sweet sake was oft perplexed,

But, ah!

The False one looked for a daintier lot,

The Constant one wearied me out and out,

The Best was not easily got.

"I set my heart upon travels grand,

Hurrah!

And spurned our plain, old Fatherland;

But, ah!

Naught seemed to be just the thing it should,

Most comfortless bed, and indifferent food,

My tastes misunderstood.

"I set my heart upon sounding fame;

Hurrah!

And, lo! I'm eclipsed by some upstart's name;

But, ah!

When in public life I loomed quite high,

The folks that passed me would look awry;

Their very worst friend was I.

"And then I set my heart upon war,

Hurrah!

We gained some battles with éclat,

Hurrah!

We troubled the foe with sword and flame,

(And some of our friends fared quite the same,)

I lost a leg for fame.

"Now I've set my heart upon nothing, you see;
 Hurrah!
 And the whole wide world belongs to me,
 Hurrah!
 The feast begins to run low, no doubt,
 But at the old cask we'll have one good bout!
 Come, drink the lees all out!"

We must cite the Chapter on the *Dignity of Man*.

"Come to it we must, if not before, at least at the moment of death, that God, God alone, is all our best having, our repose, the complete and perfect answer to man's whole being.

"Shall we ask the intelligence of man what it demands? Its answer is: 'To know, to know the truth; to know the whole truth; the primal and infinite truth; — to know God!'

"Shall we ask the heart of man the end of all its desires? It will answer: 'To love, to love the good; to love the supreme and infinite good; — to love God and all things else because of some reflect of God!' Shall we ask the will of man its purpose? It will reply: 'To act; to act in accordance with the primal truth for the Supreme Good; to do God's will.'

"The head, the heart, the hand of man with one voice proclaim that the end of man is to know, to love, to live for God! This is God's own destiny. Man's destiny, therefore, is God-like. For God created man in his 'own image and likeness.'

"The destiny of the soul, then, is to come to God; to be one with God. To live, is to think for God, to love for God, to act for God.

"A truthful life is one in which all the thoughts of the mind, all the affections of the heart, all the acts of the will, are directed to God. A truthful life is one in which all the faculties and energies of the soul tend to God.

"But God's happiness is one and the same with his life. Man, therefore, living the same life as God, participates in God's happiness, and his life here is the beginning of his eternal beatitude hereafter.

"What higher end can be conceived than that of God; what more beautiful life can be imagined than that of God; what more blissful can be thought of, than the happiness of God?

"Say not that in making God 'the limit where all our wishes end,' we isolate man from nature and humanity? Is not God in nature? in humanity? in all things? If so, then to see God is to see and know all things eminently; — to love God and be one with him, is to love and be one with all things most intimately; — to do God's will, is to do everything and serve all things most effectually. With God and one with God, man, like God, embraces all, and is eminently practical; without God, he is incomplete and his actions ineffectual.

"We may be told that this is all poetry, rhapsody, moonshine, smoke, and will, like

'Yon wavering column, perish!'"

"To some these thoughts may appear so; the world is wide, and leaving such by the way, we say this is

'A truth too vast for spirits lost in sloth,
By self-indulgence marred of noble growth,
Who bear about, in impotence and shame,
Their human reason's visionary name.'†

But to those who feel within their hearts the strivings of a noble enterprise, we have a word of hope. Ye, whose thoughts make the world a solitude, and who feel a bliss by you not understood, we have a word of hope. Ye, to whom God has given generous views of life and courage to act for Eternity; to you we have a word of hope, and, with assurance, say:—

'These are not dreams for laughter.
Now but shoots, these trees hereafter
Shall with fruit refresh us.'"‡

— pp. 30 – 33.

We commend this chapter on the Dignity of Man to our non-Catholic readers. They suppose, in their ignorance of Catholicity, or rather in confounding Catholicity with the heresy of the Jansenists, usually regarded by Protestants as "the better class of Catholics," as said to us one day the excellent Dr. Nevin, that we degrade human nature, and in order to exalt God belittle man. But in our Catholic belief, it is not necessary to detract from the creature in order to make up the greatness of the Creator. God is infinite, and infinitely great in himself and in his own right. No greatness of the creature can diminish his greatness, or lessen his dignity. God himself has lowered himself to man, that he might raise man to himself, and not lightly should we speak of that nature which the Son of God has not disdained to assume as his own. That nature which was created by God, redeemed by him, and destined to consort eternally with him, cannot be wanting in dignity. The views of your Dr. Channing, who, in the later years of his life, made the dignity of human nature his constant theme, fell far below those entertained by the Catholic. We honor all men, not as God, nor as able without the assistance of his grace to attain to supernatu-

* Schiller.

† Sterling.

‡ Goethe.

ral union with him, but as the noble creatures of God, made in his image and his likeness, and for an inconceivably glorious destiny. There is no danger in overrating the dignity of our nature, so long as we do not forget that God is its principle and end, and that we can do nothing without him, and are unable by our simple natural strength to attain to eternal life.

From the question of man's destiny in general, the author proceeds to show that each man has "a special destiny, a definite work to do," and that "this work is a great, an important, a divine work." This will be found a most interesting and instructive portion of the work. It offers an admirable commentary on Fourier's doctrine of "Attractions proportional to Destiny," and on the attempts made to realize it by means of associations and communities in ancient and modern times, including Brook Farm, Fruitlands, and the Brotherhood of the Cross. He shows that there is a tendency in a choice number of minds, in all ages and in all countries, to make it their special object to strive after perfection and an unworldly life. In other words, that the monastic life is in some sense a natural want, and only a mode of realizing the natural aspirations of highly spiritual souls. But he shows, at the same time, that these souls have never been able to fulfil their special destiny in any of the institutions founded outside of the Catholic Church. After showing the failure of all these institutions, he asks, Is there no path? That is, no way by which men may attain not only to their general, but to their special destiny?

"Is there no refuge but the tomb
For all this timeless spirit bloom?
Does earth no other prospect yield
But one broad, barren battle-field?" — MILNES.

"Were all these high hopes but idle fancies and splendid insufficiencies? Were all these holy aspirations but illusions and deceptive dreams? Were these heroic sacrifices but evidences of minds deluded? Then is life a mockery, and true it is that

'The fiend that man harries
Is love of the Best,
Whose soul seeks the perfect,
Which his eyes seek in vain.'

• Emerson.

For to give to man capacities, and those the highest and noblest of his soul, to give to him wants the deepest and most sacred of his heart, to condemn him to seek for their realization, to hold over his head their proper objects like the apple of Tantalus, and destine him never to reach them; this is not the work of a loving Deity, but cruelty the most refined of a fiend. If such be life, it is a curse; and he tells the truth of man who says,

‘Thy curse it was to see and hear
Beyond to-day’s scant hemisphere,
Beyond all mists of doubt and fear,
Into a life more true and clear,
And dearly thou dost rue it.’*

And it is not to be wondered at, that all our modern and youthful poets sing of Death, not as an ‘unknown form of a higher life,’ but invoke his shaft as an escape from the mockery and wearisomeness of this, — saying with Schiller,

‘Would this weary life were spent,
Would this fruitless search were o’er!’

- And if such be life and such its promises, who would not say from the depths of his soul, in tones of earnestness,

‘And rather than such visions, bless
The gloomiest depths of nothingness.’†

“But Mr. Emerson is wrong, not in saying that man loves the best and sees the perfect, — no, to this every heart and head consents, — but that he seeks in vain a realization of what he loves and sees. This is the error of Mr. Emerson and the whole school of this class of men. Our curse is not that we see into a life more clear and true, — this is the loftiest attribute of man, — but that man has lost or not yet discovered the way that leads to the possession of such a life. This is the fiend, here lies the curse, did these men but know it.

“There is a way. Has it been lost? or has it not yet been found? That, indeed, would be a sad plight for humanity, and no less a libel upon God’s goodness and wisdom, to imagine that man has wandered up and down upon this earth for these thousand years, and that none has found the path which leads to his true home and country.

“On the contrary, God, in creating man a free agent, was bound to make known to him the law and path to his destiny; leaving man to choose, to obey, and to follow it if he pleased, or not; otherwise, man would have no room to exercise the noble faculty of will. He must know this, too, in order to direct and

* Lowell.

† Sterling.

employ his faculties and powers aright, to be what he should be ; and until this is discovered, he is unable to act as a rational creature, as man.

"There is, then, a path that leads us to our final aim ; who is the one that has discovered it, and standing out as a guide, can say to humanity, 'T is I ; I am the way that leads to truth and life, — follow me !'

"Does the past give us such an answer ? What says the past ?" — pp. 88 – 91.

The author, in answer to this question, seeks and finds a model man, and a model life, in Jesus the God-man. He deduces the idea of the Church from the wants of the soul, and then raises the inquiry whether that idea is realized, and if so, where. He first examines Protestantism, and in a few pages gives the most masterly refutation of it that we have ever read, by simply showing its inability to answer the questions of the soul, or to satisfy its wants. He then interrogates Rome, the Catholic Church, and shows, by a simple statement of Catholicity, that she can answer, has answered, and does answer, every question the soul asks, and satisfy every want it feels. He shows that she meets all the wants of the soul, and affords all the means and facilities necessary to enable every one to fulfil his destiny, whether general or special. This book might therefore be called *The Questions of the Soul, and their Answers* ; for such it really is. Its great merit is, that it asks and answers those questions in the form in which they come up here and now, in our own age and country, and more especially as they have come up in our own New England. We have never met a man born and brought up in New York who had a more just appreciation of the New England inner life, and as a New England man by birth, though not by education, we most cordially thank him for the justice he does us. New England certainly is not the whole Union, but it has impressed its own mind upon no small part of it, whether for good or for evil it is not for us to say, and such, with all her faults, is her intellectual and religious influence, that her conversion to Catholicity would go a great way towards the conversion of the whole country. Nevertheless, no genuine Catholic can be in this country a sectionalist. We are all one country, one people, and one people too, whether Protestant or Catholic, whether Celt or Anglo-Saxon, German or French, by our

descent. Catholicity is itself superior to all nationalities and all distinctions of race, but it respects every nationality in its appropriate sphere, and enlightens and protects and fosters a pure and ardent patriotism. We may see this in the concluding chapter of our author, with which we must close our extracts.

“ ‘Am I not brave and strong? Am I not here
To fight and conquer? Have I not around
A world of comrades, bound to the same cause,
All brave as I, — all led by the same chief,
All pledged to victory?’ — MILNES.

“Man has a destiny, — his end is God, — his life is divine. Jesus Christ is the complement of man, — the restorer of the race. The Catholic Church is the manifestation of Jesus Christ, — the organ by which Jesus Christ perpetuates his life upon earth, and the organ of man’s restoration, and nature’s restoration through man.

“The Catholic Church affords to man the opportunity of becoming Christian without violating the laws of his reason, without stifling the dictates of his conscience. She alone is able to guide man to his destiny, — she is adequate to all the wants of the human heart, — and in her religious orders she opens a pathway to those nobler souls who seek a perfect life.

“This Church is here in the midst of us, but, strange as it may seem, it is concealed from the minds of the American people, by ignorance, misrepresentation, and calumny, as effectually as if it were once more buried in the Catacombs. But will the Bride of Christ always remain thus hidden? We think not. There are already some who have caught glimpses of her true character; and we may hope that the day is not far distant when sons and daughters of our own people will vie with the early Christians in devotion, self-sacrifice, and saintly lives, and, if need be, in the testimony of their blood for the truth.

“Indeed, it is an anomaly well worthy the attention of a reflecting mind, how a people, constituted as we are, a practical and independent people, can still retain a purely speculative religion, like Protestantism; a religion without faith, without an altar, without a sacrifice, without a priesthood, without a sacrament, without authority, without any bond of union, — a religion utterly unpractical, and destitute even of material grandeur!

“America presents to the mind, at the present epoch, one of the most interesting questions, and one too of the greatest moment for the future destiny of man; the question, Whether the Catholic Church will succeed in Christianizing the American people, as she has Christianized all European nations, so that the Cross of Christ will accompany the stars and stripes in our future?

"We say that this question is fraught with great interest for the future of humanity. Our people are young, fresh, and filled with the idea of great enterprises; the people who, of all others, if once Catholic, can give a new, noble, and glorious realization to Christianity; a development which will go even beyond the past in achievements of zeal, in the abundance of saints, as well as in art, science, and material greatness. The Catholic Church alone is able to give unity to a people composed of such conflicting elements as ours, and to form them into a great nation.

"The Church is the ever youthful bride of Christ. She is as pure, as bright, as fresh, as on the day of her birth. She can never fail. In her bosom are the inexhaustible sources of inspiration, strength, courage, holiness.

'Majesty,
Power, Glory, Strength, and
Beauty, all are aisled
In this eternal ark of worship undefiled.'*

"Youth of America! Here is opened to you a new, a noble, a divine career. Here is a godlike enterprise. An enterprise worthy of your energies, and glorious for your country.

'Tyre of the West!
Whose eagle wings thine own green world o'erspread,
Touching two oceans;—
O while thou yet hast room, fair, fruitful land,
Ere war and want have stained thy virgin sod,
Mark thee a place on high, a glorious stand,
Whence Truth her sign may make o'er forest, lake, and strand.'†
— pp. 290—294.

Neither our extracts nor our brief and imperfect analysis can give our readers anything like an adequate idea, hardly any idea at all, of the interest and value of this book. They must read it for themselves. It is written with great simplicity and eloquence. It is a genuine utterance, a faithful expression, as far as it goes, of the author's own heart. He has thought, felt, suffered, enjoyed, lived, all he here says; for, after all, the book is but a chapter from his own deep and varied spiritual experience. He himself is one who has sought and found peace in the very way he points out. What we admire in this book, even more than its sound theology, its rare philosophy, and its deep thought, is its genial spirit, its youthfulness and freshness, its enthusiasm, its hopefulness, and its charity. It is refreshing in these days to meet such a book. It is free,

* Byron.

† Lyra Apos.

bold, independent, manly, but it is kind and gentle, tender and loving. We have not found a bitter expression or a sarcasm in it, from beginning to end. It is a model in its way, and shows how a Catholic can say all that it is needful to say without giving offence to any one. Even they who may not accept the author's conclusions will have no unpleasant associations connected with them, will be disarmed of many prejudices, and be drawn towards him with love and respect. We need not say that we have endeavored to profit by its perusal, and we hope that it will be studied by all our lay writers who wish to present Catholicity to the American mind and heart.

Especially do we recommend this book to the youth of our country. Our hope for our country is in the youth, in the young men now growing up and forming their characters, who have not yet lost by contact with the world the down from their hearts. Young America, we know, is not just now in very good repute, but we know that there are thousands of warm and generous hearts among our educated young men, crying out for the great and kindling truths of this book, and demanding some object worthy of their lofty ambition. To them more especially is this book addressed, and we trust not in vain. They have each a mission. Our glorious republic too has a mission, a great work in Divine Providence, the sublime work of realizing the idea of Christian society, and of setting the example of a truly great, noble, Catholic people. In this work, young men, you are called to take your share,—a share in the work and in its glory.

ART. IV. — *De la Valeur de la Raison Humaine, ou ce que peut la Raison par elle seule.* Par LE P. CHASTEL, S. J. Paris: Leroux et Jouby. 1854. 8vo. pp. 530.

WE feel ourselves much indebted to Father Chastel for his learned, conscientious, and elaborate work on *The Value of Human Reason*, a copy of which he has been so obliging as to send us. We have occasionally seen things from the author which seemed to us to savor of

exaggerated rationalism ; but we have never arranged ourselves on the side of the exaggerated supernaturalists, against him ; and we assure him, that we find very little in this new volume, that, with some distinctions and qualifications to which we think he would not seriously object, we cannot and do not in fact most cordially accept.

It is due to ourselves to say, that we have never attempted to set forth a philosophical theory of our own, and in discussing, in hastily prepared essays, various philosophical questions, for a special purpose and under a special aspect, which is all we have done, it is very likely, even when our own general views were just, we have used expressions which are too exclusive, and which need more or less qualification. We came to Catholicity from a school of exaggerated rationalism, and though it has never been in our thought or intention to underrate natural reason, our main purpose has been to show the necessity of supernatural revelation, not only in regard to truths of the supernatural order, but even to a full and systematic view of the higher truths of philosophy. Bred amongst those who gave all to human reason and human nature, we have wished to bring out and establish the opposing truth, and it is not unlikely that we have, on many occasions, apparently expressed an undue sympathy with the views of the Traditionalists, as we should not have done had our special purpose been to vindicate the value of human reason ; yet we think our pages afford ample evidence that we have never denied or underrated that value. Our natural tendency, no doubt, has been to sympathize with the Traditionalists, and we have believed that less danger was to be apprehended in our times and our country from an exaggerated supernaturalism than from an exaggerated rationalism.

But we confess that some attention to the study of Jansenism has latterly led us to suspect a more practical danger from Traditionalism than we had at first apprehended. Traditionalism, as Father Chastel understands it, is, after all, only a form of Jansenism, and the controversy which he is now waging with the Traditionalists is at bottom only the old controversy waged by the Fathers of his Order with the Jansenists, a hundred and fifty years ago ; and very likely the charge of rationalism is as undeserved by him as that of Semi-Pelagianism was by them. The essence

of Jansenism, as we have said in a foregoing article, is the destruction of nature to make way for grace; and if our author rightly represents it, the essence of Traditionalism is the denial of reason to make way for the assertion of revelation, — an error precisely analogous, indeed precisely the same. We are by no means prepared to admit that the Traditionalists intend to go thus far, or that they will accept this statement in its full extent; but the principle of their error, which with many of them is certainly only a tendency, if logically developed and reduced to its last expression, is nothing else. Man is essentially a rational animal, and to deny his reason, or to suppose it acquired or adventitious, is to deny his nature, is to deny man himself; and the error of the Traditionalists, if carried out, would resolve itself into pantheism, and in an opposite direction into that very rationalism and humanitarianism against which it seems to be a protest. Looking at the question from this point of view, the danger from exaggerated supernaturalism, if less immediate, is perhaps not less serious, than the danger from exaggerated rationalism.

It is worthy also of note, that exaggerated rationalism has not originated exclusively in excessive confidence in human reason. It has to a great extent originated in the reaction of the mind against the Calvinistic and Jansenistic exaggerations of the supernatural. The immediate origin of French infidelity was in French Jansenism, and some persons have believed that the leading Jansenists intended to drive men into infidelity by making religion a burden too heavy to be borne. Certain it is, that Calvinists and Jansenists do place religion and nature in opposition, so that we must reject the one in order to follow the other. It is the feeling that to accept grace we must annihilate nature, or to accept revelation we must forego reason, rather than any overweening confidence in reason itself, that drives not a few into rationalism and naturalism. It is not that they do not feel the insufficiency of reason and of nature for themselves, but that they are repelled by a religion which seems to them to place itself in opposition to their natural reason, and to demand its destruction. As between Calvinism or Jansenism, and rationalism and naturalism, they are right. A religion which requires us to divest ourselves of the nature God gave us, and to forego the exercise of that reason with which he endowed

us, cannot be from God. That is certain, if anything is certain. Their repugnance is not to the Catholic religion, which presents itself simply as superior to reason, and as its necessary complement, not in opposition to it, but to Calvinism or Jansenism, which latterly they are prone to confound with Catholicity, and which certainly does present itself in opposition to reason, and seek to supersede it. We think, therefore, that, looking to the world as it is, it is not less important to the interests of religion to rescue it from the exaggerations of the supernaturalists than from the exaggerations of the rationalists, and perhaps even more important, although we are always to be on our guard against excessive rationalism. We are inclined to believe, with the Abbé Gratry, that it is more necessary, just now, to labor to rehabilitate reason than revelation; for, after all, scepticism more than rationalism is the disease of our times.

Father Chastel divides his book into four parts. The first part is devoted solely to the refutation of Traditionalism, as he finds it in the writings of De Bonald; the second part discusses what human reason can do in a society without tradition; the third part, what it can do in civilized society without revelation; and the fourth part, what it can do in Christian society by itself. He is always learned and able, but we hope he will permit us to say that he seems to us to succeed in the negative part of his work better than in its positive part. His refutation of the theory of the Traditionalists, as he sets it forth, and of the grounds on which they defend it, is triumphant, and leaves nothing to be desired; but his account of what reason is, how it can develop itself, and what it can do, is far less satisfactory. In this part of his work he is less clear, less definite, and leaves us in much doubt and uncertainty. He convinces us that reason can do something, but we do not see precisely what it has done, or what it is intrinsically able to do. In fact, he leaves us with the impression, that, though man by reason alone is theoretically able to do a great deal, practically he really has done little or nothing without revelation. He might have invented language, but as a fact it was given him originally by his Creator; he might have discovered the elementary truths of natural religion and morality, but as a fact Adam was created in possession of them, and they have

since been learned from society, for man has always been taught them. The savage tribe might, perhaps, spontaneously rise to civilization, but there is no well-authenticated instance of its ever having done so. He concedes that, practically, men have received their ideas very much in the way the Traditionalists contend, and limits himself, for the most part, to proving that they do not prove that they might not have received them in some other way. This is something, but it is not all that we could wish he had done. M. de Bonald, whom Father Chastel regards as the father of the Traditionalists, apparently maintains that all ideas, and reason itself, are acquired, and that in purely intellectual matters, in general, moral, and religious truths, man knows only by being taught, and only what he has been taught from without by society, and originally by a positive revelation from God. His great proof of this theory is that man cannot think without language, and that he has and can have language only as he has been taught it. This proof Father Chastel examines at great length. He alleges, in opposition, that man can think without language or words, and that he might even have invented language for himself. We think it quite certain that man can *think* without language, and M. de Bonald's famous saying, that "Man thinks his word before speaking his thought," says nothing against it. To make language or sensible signs absolutely necessary to the production of thought seems to us absurd; for to a non-thinking being signs have and can have no significance. M. de Bonald himself, on more occasions than one, concedes that thought must precede its verbal expression, and it may well be doubted if he ever held the contrary. Words can present no meaning to a mind that has not as yet thought, and none to a mind that has not already thought their meaning; otherwise a foreign language could be understood before having been learned. Language, that is, a sensible sign of some sort, is necessary, not to *present*, but to *re-present* or represent the purely intelligible; but we assure Father Chastel that we have never for a moment entertained the notion that man cannot think without language.

The error on this point of which the Traditionalists are accused, and a grave error it is too, seems to arise from their not sufficiently distinguishing between the *pre-*

sentation and the re-presentation of thought, or between intuition and reflection in the intelligible order. To think, *pensare*, as the Italians say, does not require language, but to re-think, *ripensare*, does require it in the case of intelligibles. This distinction is from Gioberti, and, in our judgment, is true and important. *La Civiltà Catholica* rejects it, as it does everything from that able but unhappy man, and contends, too hastily, we think, that to maintain that we cannot reflect on the purely intelligible without language, is to assert the whole error of the Traditionalists. We should say, it is to recognize and accept their truth without their error. Father Chastel takes note of the distinction, and maintains, contrary to what we suspect is the fact, that it was not recognized by M. de Bonald; but whether he rejects it or not for himself, he does not expressly say. We believe the Traditionalists have an erroneous theory, but every erroneous theory even has as its basis some truth, or truth under some aspect. We are not willing to believe that M. de Bonald was all wrong in his theory of language. Judging from Father Chastel's citations, we should say he erred in his expression rather than in his thought. We see no objection to admitting that in reflection, in distinguishing, in comparing, in reasoning, language, or artificial signs which represent the thought, are indispensable, and we believe this is all that M. de Bonald ever really meant. Father Chastel does not, perhaps, feel the necessity of language in this respect, because he apparently does not admit direct and immediate intuition of the intelligible. He appears to be undecided whether ideas are innate, or whether they are obtained, as Aristotle taught, by the active intellect, abstracting them from phantasms. Either, he seems to think, is a tenable doctrine. When ideas were regarded as a sort of intelligible *species*, image, or representation of the intelligible, distinguishable alike from the object apprehended and from the intellectual apprehension of it, it was not impossible to conceive it possible for ideas to be innate; but now, when we must regard ideas, not as something intermediate between subject and object, but either as subjective or as objective, either as the intelligible object apprehended or as the subjective apprehension of it, to call them innate borders, to say the least, very closely on the absurd. Des Cartes asserted that the idea of God is innate; but, when hard pressed on

the subject, he explained his meaning to be simply, that man has the innate capacity to think or apprehend God, in which he is followed by Malebranche and Leibnitz. Faculties we can well understand are innate, but that ideas, which are either the object of the faculty or the product of its exercise, are innate, we cannot. Ideas regarded as subjective are coeval with the soul's existence, for the soul is intellectual in its essence, and is as soon as it exists placed in relation with the intelligible. If by innate ideas is simply meant that the soul even in the mother's womb intuitively apprehends the intelligible, we do not object; but this we suspect is not the meaning of those who assert innate ideas. They regard them, not as the product of the mind, but as something inserted originally in it, as constitutive of it, and which it develops and applies on occasion of experience. They are the inherent funds of the soul itself. This in substance is sheer Kantianism, and would conduct, as it has conducted, to the doctrine of identity of subject and object, as asserted by Schelling, and of thought and being, as maintained by Hegel.

They who contend for innate ideas do not, as it seems to us, take sufficient note of the fact we have elsewhere signalized, that the human soul, though active, is not pure act, and can display its activity only in conjunction with the activity of the object. It is not purely passive, as Condillac and his school taught, and formed in its faculties by agencies from without; but it is incapable of purely independent action, and can act only in conjunction with another activity. It cannot know where there is no object to be known, or understand where there is nothing intelligible. It cannot know itself in itself, or by itself alone be its own intelligible object, for if it could it would be God. It can know itself only in knowing something not itself. This law holds true of all its activity, of its voluntary as well as of its intellectual activity, since, as all confess, it cannot will, save when the intellect presents it some object. All its thoughts are the resultant of two factors, and there can no more be thought without the concurrence of the object than without the concurrence of the subject. Ideas are either thoughts or the object of thought. We usually understand them in the latter sense, and identify them with the objective reality in that it is intelligible. We regard them as the reality in its relation to our intellectual

faculty. To call them in this sense innate would be to place the objective reality in the mind, and to make subject and object identical. If, on the other hand, we take ideas as the thoughts or simple apprehensions themselves, and regard them as innate, not formed by actually apprehending the objective reality, we fall into pure idealism, and can never logically assert any reality but the soul itself, or *le moi*, and its affections, — pure Fichteism. The solution of the difficulty is only in regarding thought or idea, subjectively taken, as the product of the simultaneous action of subject and object, formed by the intuitive apprehension or perception of the object actually and actively present to the subject, and concurring with it. Intellectual ideas are, then, not innate, in the sense of pertaining to the *innéité* of the subject, but are intuitions, that is, actual perceptions of the intelligible actively present, or present as a *vis activa* to the intellect. We as really and as truly apprehend in intellectual intuition intelligibles, as in sensible intuition sensibles. If intellectual, moral, and religious ideas pertain to the purely intelligible world, and are really intuitions, we must either admit that man can act as a pure intelligence, or else assert that these ideas cannot be represented to the mind, and made objects of the reflective understanding, as distinguished from the intuitive, without sensible signs of some sort, that is, without what we call language.

The Peripatetics — and our author at times seems to agree with them — suppose that they have these sensible signs in the sensible world itself, or rather in those phantasms from which they hold that the intelligible is obtained by abstraction. We concede at once that man is incapable of pure intellections, and that he never has intuition of the intelligible without at the same time and in the same intuitive act having intuition of the sensible. To have the purely intelligible, he must distinguish it from the sensible apprehended along with it. But what we contend here is, that the intelligible is really, though indistinctly, apprehended, and is not obtained mediately through the sensible, or by way of abstraction from phantasms. We cannot admit this *phantastic* origin of ideas. The intelligible is presented *with* but not *in* the phantasm, or sensible perception, and therefore cannot be said to be sensibly represented. The sensible is the concomitant,

but not the sign, of the intelligible. How then seize the purely intelligible, and separate or distinguish it from the sensible? Man is not a pure intelligence, and yet only a pure intelligence could do this, without a sensible sign representing the intelligible. To this process, therefore, which we call reflection, a process of distinguishing, separating, comparing, &c., we contend that language is necessary, and thus far we agree with the Traditionalists. In fact Father Chastel himself seems to concede all we here assert.

“Voyons donc sur quoi peut être fondée cette nécessité absolue de la parole pour penser. Nous tenons à le professer hautement : nous sommes loin, très-loin de méconnaître l'importance du langage, non-seulement pour l'échange de nos pensées avec nos semblables, mais pour les opérations les plus solitaires de notre esprit. Nous pouvons, à la vue d'un objet sensible, en concevoir l'idée ; nous pouvons conserver cette idée et la rappeler, au besoin, à notre souvenir. Là n'est pas la nécessité des mots ou des signes. Mais lorsqu'il s'agit d'abstraire les qualités diverses des choses, de les considérer à part et indépendamment des objets perçus ; de comparer ces objets, de recueillir leurs ressemblances et leurs différences, leurs innombrables rapports et tous les phénomènes de cause et d'effet ; lorsqu'il s'agit de combiner à l'infini ces rapports et ces phénomènes, et de former d'une manière quelconque des idées abstraites, générales, insensibles ; lorsqu'il s'agit surtout de conserver et de fixer sous le regard de l'esprit ces idées si mobiles et si fugitives ; de les préciser et de les classer, pour empêcher qu'elles ne s'effacent, ou qu'elles ne se confondent ; pour être en état de les rappeler à volonté, de manière que chacune d'elles se présente toujours la même et sous le même aspect ; alors on sent de quel secours, de quelle nécessité sont les mots et les expressions. Sans un signe particulier, attaché à chaque idée, en quelque sorte comme une étiquette, pour la déterminer et la caractériser, tout ce monde d'idées subtiles, légères, indécises, flotterait dans l'esprit, tourbillonnerait, s'évanouirait comme les atomes dans l'espace.

“Mais conclure de là qu'aucune idée ne peut jamais précéder le mot dans l'esprit ; que sa présence, même momentanée, y est impossible avant celle du mot, est une autre exagération non moins insoutenable, et que ne fera jamais accepter la nouvelle école.”—pp. 94, 95.

We agree entirely with Father Chastel in his conclusion. We hold that ideas in his sense of the term, that is, as apprehensions, always precede the word, and that

language is never necessary to *present* the intelligible to the intuitive faculty of the soul. It is necessary only to re-present it. This necessity does not exist in relation to sensible things, or those which have natural sensible signs. It is not thought, strictly taken, even in the reflective order, that demands language, but memory, and hence only in those operations of the understanding in which memory intervenes do we, or can we, assert the necessity of language. In contemplation, in meditation even, the mind often proceeds without the use of language; but reflection always implies memory, for it is a return of the mind upon its own past thoughts, or intuitions, which is possible only in case these intuitions, or the reality held in them, are re-presented to it. These cannot be retained and represented without sensible signs, which fix them for the memory. Without these signs they would fall into what in the schools is called direct consciousness, where they are seizable only by a pure intelligence, which man is not.

The other point, whether man could or could not have invented language, is one which we cannot now discuss at length. We have maintained, as our readers know, that he could not, and Father Chastel concedes that he has not, for he holds with us that the first man was created thinking and speaking. We have never meant to assert that it is metaphysically impossible; all we have meant is that it is practically impossible. In matters of this sort a moral impossibility is all that any philosopher ever denies or affirms. Language implies society, and society is inconceivable without language of some sort. Absolutely speaking, everything natural to man is possible naturally to him; for if not, it would not be natural but supernatural. And yet no theologian would venture to maintain that it is practically possible for a man in his present state to comprehend and conform to the whole natural order without supernatural assistance. It may be said, that, as society is natural and as language is necessary to it, man must have had the natural capacity to invent it, and to deny it would be to deny that God could have created man in a state of pure nature. But this by no means follows. We might as well say that man must have been able to invent or acquire his social instincts, or the natural elements without which he cannot live. We have the right to assume, that when God made man a social animal

and intended him for society, he gave him all that was necessary to render his social life practicable. As speech is necessary to society, to assume that God gave it, and that man could not otherwise have had it, is only assuming that God created man a social animal, and gave him what was essential to his destiny as such. Language may be regarded as a part of man's original social endowment, as included in those things which were necessary to enable him to live in society. To maintain, then, that man could not have himself invented language, involves no theological difficulty that we can see, and interposes no obstacle to the assertion of pure nature against the Jansenists, or human reason against the ultra-supernaturalists. All that we are required to maintain in this view of the case is, not that man could have invented language, but that he can by his natural powers use it, or speak without the grant of a supernatural faculty.

We confess, therefore, that we cannot understand the importance that Father Chastel attaches to the hypothesis that man might have invented speech. He admits that he defends it only as a possible hypothesis, for he himself holds that God created man not only thinking, but speaking, or endowed him with language the first moment of his existence. What practical consequence then follows from the hypothesis of the Traditionalists, that man could not have invented language, providing they do not go further, and say he cannot think without language? It may be that they have not proved their hypothesis, but, as far as we can judge, he has not proved his. The only argument he uses to prove that man could have invented language, that is, a system of artificial signs for the communication of ideas, is drawn from those who are born deaf and dumb. On the authority of professors, he asserts that the deaf and dumb do invent a real language of signs. But we beg him to take note, that, though they really have such a language, he presents no facts which prove that they have themselves alone invented it. The system of signs followed in our institutions for the deaf and dumb has been invented for them by those who had language; and the signs they followed before, in the bosom of their families, were not their sole invention, but even more the invention of those members of their families who were neither deaf nor dumb. This all-important fact he over-

looks. But till he has shown that the possession of language by their families has had no part in the invention of these signs, he can conclude nothing from them in favor of his hypothesis. All that he can conclude from his long and even wearisome discussions with regard to deaf mutes is, not that man can invent language, but that he can translate the language of the ear into the language of the eye, and that he does not need language to enable him to think in the intuitive order. Indeed, the learned author seems himself to be aware that he fails to prove his hypothesis, and very nearly admits that all he has done is to prove that the Traditionalists have not proved theirs.

We are not insensible to the importance of asserting the possibility of the state of pure nature, and we are well aware that Calvinism and Jansenism originate in denying that God could, if he had chosen, have created man, *seclusa ratione culpæ*, as he is now born, whence they are led to assert that what man lost in the Fall was a part of his nature; but we see not how denying that man could have invented language, although conceded to be necessary to his social life, can by any possibility affect that question, any more than to deny that man could have invented air, fire, or water. Suppose it in some sense external, it amounts to nothing, for there are many things external, which, if God had not given them, man could never have obtained. Moreover, we must not forget to be on our guard against excessive rationalism. If we concede to the rationalists, that man, beginning without language, could by his own unaided powers have gradually invented a language so complicated and so perfect in its structure, so rich in its resources, and so beautiful in its expressions, as the Greek, for instance, we hardly know what degree of progress we could deny to our modern humanitarians. There is, we venture to say, no system of human thought, ancient or modern, that equals the perfection of any of our modern cultivated languages. English, French, German, Spanish, Italian, any of these languages contains in itself a truer and richer philosophy than is entertained by any of those who speak it. How could men invent a language without language, and embody in it a philosophy far superior to any they have ever been able to embody in their systems?

Father Chastel recognizes the distinction we make be-

tween discovering truth and proving it. It will not do to build science on faith, or to maintain that the existence of God, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, and the difference between good and evil, regarded by our theologians as the preamble to faith, cannot be certainly proved by human reason. These, though originally communicated by revelation, must be naturally demonstrable, be truths of science, as well as of faith. Father Chastel, therefore, contends that man must have been able to *discover* them by his natural reason. In this, as against the Traditionalists, who appear to deny them to be truths of natural reason, and to contend that we can in no sense know them but as taught by a revelation from without, he is certainly right. But may not the Traditionalists also be right against him, when they contend that man was originally taught them by his Maker, and could never have discovered them, as truths in the reflective order, if he had not been so taught them? May not he and they find a point of agreement in distinguishing between discovering and demonstrating, and in saying that, although man could not have discovered them as objects of distinct reflection without being taught them, yet now they are represented to him in language he can by his natural reason demonstrate them? This would combine both the Traditional and the rational proof, leave man capable of real science, make a real distinction between science and faith, and avoid all confusion of the truths of the natural order and those of the supernatural order, as Father Chastel very properly wishes. Is it not possible that our author has dismissed this distinction a little too cavalierly, and that it deserves a little more attention than he seems to have paid it? He himself resorts to it when he wishes to prove that Bergier and others, claimed by the Traditionalists, were not of their school. The only argument he brings against it is, that language could not present these truths to the mind of the child ignorant of them. But this is not conclusive. That the words which represent them could not present, that is, express, them to the child that as yet has no intuition of them, we concede; but whence the necessity of supposing that the child is destitute of the intuition? The author has not disproved intelligible intuition, or proved that we apprehend the intelligible only in the sensible, and the general only in the particular. He does not pretend

that Peripateticism is anything more than a probable hypothesis, and he is, therefore, not entitled to conclude from it as if it were certain and undeniable truth.

The difficulty with both Father Chastel and the Traditionalists arises, we think, from their denying, overlooking, or not appreciating the fact that human reason has immediate intuition of the intelligible. The Traditionalists, not conceding this fact, are obliged to assume that the human mind is in no relation with the intelligible, as distinguished from the sensible, till instructed by society, which preserves the tradition of the revelation originally made to the first man. This necessarily denies all science, properly so called, or, what is the same thing, builds science on faith, making the act of faith precede the act of reason, which is impossible, since there can be no act of faith unless there has been previously an act of reason. Father Chastel sees this, and, fortified by the decisions of the Church, the teaching of doctors, and common sense, refutes it successfully; but denying, or at least not holding, intelligible intuition, he himself fails to give any satisfactory explanation of the real problem, or any clear and certain statement of the truth opposed to the error of the Traditionalists. After all, it is more as a theologian than as a philosopher that he refutes them. The fact is, both he and they are virtually sensists, and hold the Peripatetic maxim, that *nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu*. They, starting from this maxim of Aristotle, maintain that the human intellect can have cognition only of sensibles, and can come into possession of intellectual ideas, as they call them, only by means of external instruction; he, recoiling from this, and not quite prepared to accept the doctrine of innate ideas, contends that we possess these ideas only by way of mental abstraction from sensible intuitions or phantasms. He sees clearly enough, that, admitting neither innate ideas nor intelligible intuition, the Traditionalists place the human mind out of the condition of being even the recipient of the instruction they suppose, for they leave nothing in it to correspond to the meaning of the words through which it must be communicated. There is no magic in language, in mere words, that can put the mind in possession of ideas of an order of which it knows nothing, and can of itself know nothing. We do not know a language by committing its words to

memory, but by learning the meaning of the words themselves. In the case of a foreign language we learn it ordinarily by translating its words into the corresponding words of our own language. We know our own mother tongue only in so far as we know the things its signs stand for, and we may say it is only by the *verba mentis* that we can understand the *verba vocis*, or external speech. It would be impossible through external language to teach anything to a mind that was perfectly blank, for we can teach the unknown only by attaching it in some way to the known. It is only by virtue of a correspondence or analogy between the natural and the supernatural, that man is capable of receiving a supernatural revelation, or of finding in the mysteries of faith anything for his own understanding beyond empty words. The Traditionalists, by representing the mind as destitute of intellectual ideas, and as unable to behold the intelligible intuitively, really deny the possibility of such ideas, even in the natural order, and therefore really, though unintentionally, deny that man can even be the subject of a supernatural revelation.

But while Father Chastel sees all this clearly enough, he does not see that, by assuming that the intelligible is apprehended not immediately in intuition, but only mediately in sensation, he has to encounter a strictly analogous difficulty, because the intelligible by no conceivable mental process whatever is attainable from sensations or purely sensible data,—from the intuition of sensible things no more than from sensible signs. We readily concede that the intelligible is never intuitively apprehended by itself alone, and is always presented to us along with the sensible; but if it is not actually and immediately presented, actually and immediately apprehended, it cannot be obtained at all. The analysis of sensation can give only sensation, or the sensible object. To hold the intelligible, or to contemplate it by itself, we must undoubtedly separate it from the sensible phenomenon, as St. Thomas teaches. But if it was not originally distinct from the sensible element of the phenomenon, we could not separate or distinguish it, and all we should have for it would be a simple mental abstraction, formed by the mind, and without the least conceivable objective value. Our cognition would be restricted, objectively considered, to the sensible or non-intelligible world, and we should have no knowledge at

all, properly so called, — none at least above that which we detect in brutes. We should be compelled to reduce all our ideas, with Condillac, to “sensations transformed.” The intelligible would be to us as if it were not, and we could never receive a revelation of the supernatural, because we should want the natural ideas by which its mysteries could be connected with our natural intelligence. The only way we can see of escaping this conclusion is to regard the sensible as naturally corresponding to the intelligible, which in a certain sense it does, since God is *similitudo rerum omnium*. But we must remember that it is nature that copies or imitates God, not God that copies or imitates nature; the sensible that imitates the intelligible, not the intelligible that imitates the sensible. We must know the original in order to detect the resemblance in the copy. So, unless we suppose intelligible intuition, which puts the mind in possession of the original, the *idea exemplaris*, the fact alleged can avail nothing.

The recognition of the fact of immediate intuition of the intelligible solves every difficulty in the case, and we confess that we do not understand the unwillingness of Father Chastel and the Traditionalists to accept it. Man is intellectual as well as sensitive by nature; and if so, he must be as capable of intelligible as of sensible intuitions. Why, then, is there any more propriety in supposing the intelligible is obtained from the sensible, than in supposing the sensible is obtained from the intelligible? All Catholics must hold, that *ratio Dei existentiam cum certitudine probare potest*, — reason can prove with certainty the existence of God, — and therefore that the existence of God is a matter of science as well as of faith. But how can reason prove with certainty what it does not intuitively apprehend? Men certainly do and can know God, at least that he is, and is God, by the light of reason, but who will pretend that our cognitions can embrace matter not included in our intuitions? Why, then, since God is the intelligible, and, if we can know him, intelligible to us, hesitate to say that we have intuition of the intelligible? All knowledge is either intuitive or reflective. But as reflection is a return of the mind on its own past thoughts, reflective knowledge can never include any matter not included in our intuition. This is not a theory or an hypothesis in our understanding of the subject, but a

plain matter of fact. We cannot understand, therefore, the fear which many of our friends have of it. Is it attachment to routine, adherence to system, a reverence for great names, or a fear of being found to agree on any point with Gioberti? Or is there something in it which we do not see, that militates against faith, or the approved methods of explaining or defending the Christian mysteries?

There is no name in philosophy that we respect more than we do that of St. Thomas, but in philosophy we swear by the words of no human master. "Call no man," said our Lord, "master on earth, for one is your master in heaven." In heavenly things, in all that pertains to faith, we own a master, and we are content to sit at his feet and learn; but in earthly things, in matters of pure reason, so long as we keep within the limits of faith, we hold ourselves free. And it will not do for men who are vindicating the rights of reason, and who contend that reason without revelation is able to discover and prove all the great elementary truths of natural religion, to restrict our freedom by the authority of great names. The single name of St. Thomas, if against us, would, no doubt, be a presumption that we were in error; but on a point of simple natural reason we should not regard it as conclusive, for we believe it is lawful to dissent from even his philosophical opinions, when one has solid reasons for doing so. There are passages in St. Thomas which seem to us quite too favorable to modern sensism; but, as we have shown on another occasion, we do not believe that, fairly and honestly interpreted, he can be said to have held any of the errors of that system. We do not pretend that he formally taught the doctrine on intuition we have set forth, but we have studied him to no purpose if he teaches the contrary. He explains, after Aristotle, cognition by means of intelligible *species* and phantasms, or the *intellectus agens* and sensation; but he teaches expressly that the intelligible *species* is that by which the mind attains to the cognition of the intelligible, not that in which it terminates, and that what the mind really obtains or apprehends through them is the intelligible object itself. The intelligible *species* furnished by the *intellectus agens*, translated into plain English, is simply the intellectual light, or that property of the intellect by virtue of which it is capable of cognizing the intelligible, and in our modern modes of

thought is included in the intellectual faculty itself. The doctrine of St. Thomas, as we understand it, is, that man is intelligent by virtue of a created light, or reason, which is made in the image and likeness of the Divine Reason, and therefore contains in itself, in a participated sense, the ideas, types, *species*, or images of whatever we are naturally capable of knowing. It is by virtue of these ideas, types, images, or *species*, that the intellect is capable of cognition. Evidently, then, the intelligible *species* is really a property of the intellectual faculty, and that which makes it intellectual. It is included in the subject, and goes to make up what we call the intellect. Hence, to say that man takes cognizance of the intelligible by means of the intelligible *species*, means, in the system of St. Thomas, precisely what we mean when we say man has direct and immediate intuition of it. There is then really no discrepancy between the doctrine of St. Thomas and ours, and the apparent discrepancy arises from the fact, that he carried his analysis of the intellect a step or two further than we do ours. St. Thomas never really taught the sensist doctrine which some would father upon him, that the intelligible is merely inferred or concluded from sensible data. All he taught was that the intelligible is never apprehended without the sensible, and that, to be distinctly apprehended, it must be abstracted, that is, separated or distinguished by reflection, from the phantasms along with which it was originally presented, which is precisely the doctrine we contend for. At least, it is so we understand the Angelic Doctor, and therefore we do not seem to ourselves to depart from the real sense of the Thomist philosophy.

But we have no disposition to enter further at present into this discussion. We think, if the two parties now so fiercely pitted against each other in France would recognize the fact that reason has two modes of activity, one intuitive and the other reflective, and understand that in the reflective order language is necessary to represent — not *present*, but *re-present* — the intelligible, and that reflection proves, but does not discover, rational truth, they might shake hands and be friends; for no Catholic will pretend that reason in our fallen state is able without revelation to build up a complete system of even natural religion and morality. We beg Father Chastel to do us the justice to believe that we have made these remarks more by way of

suggestion than of criticism, and for the Traditional system no less than for his own. We certainly have no intention of dogmatizing on philosophy, and we every day feel less and less our competency to do so. We see and feel deeply the importance of sound philosophical views, and the necessity of maintaining in all its rights and value the natural reason with which God has endowed us, and which, though darkened by the Fall, still remains reason. We cannot forego it, for if we should we should cease to be men, and cease to be able to receive and believe the Christian revelation. Calvinism, by its exaggerated supernaturalism, by its doctrine of total depravity, and its annihilation of nature for anything good, declaring our best acts done without grace sinful and deserving eternal damnation, drove us into infidelity, into a denial of the proper supernatural, and the assertion of an exaggerated rationalism. Catholicity has redeemed us, and taught us that the supernatural presupposes the natural. The old problem which tormented us and so many of our friends, how to reconcile reason and faith, is no longer a problem for us, for we cannot conceive how it is possible there should be any discrepancy between them. Each has its place, and each may be said to serve the other. We can no more consent to decry reason than we can faith, or to restrict the sphere of the one than of the other.

We always mean to recognize in its fullest sense the whole body of rational truth; but we have no great confidence in our ability to set it forth in its systematic completeness. We feel that it becomes us to be modest and diffident of ourselves, and we may well fail where such a man as Father Chastel does not completely succeed. For ourselves, we feel that to ascertain and accept the truth of different schools is the best way to refute their errors. We should have been better pleased if the author had taken more pains to find a good sense in M. de Bonald's writings, and disengaged his truth from the errors which too often accompany it. It is clear to us, from the extracts the author makes, that he has done M. de Bonald scant justice, and that, had he been as generous to him as he is to Bergier, he could have proved him far less of a Traditionalist than he represents him. We do not like to see that great and good man, who did so much for religion and philosophy in France at a time when there were comparatively

few manly voices to speak out for either, pursued with so much *acharnement*. It is evident to us, that in his real thought, we say not in his expression, he went very little further than we should be disposed to go. Indeed, we think a more conciliatory disposition on the part of either school, and less of exclusiveness, would be not only to the advantage of charity, but also of philosophical truth. Mutual explanations might lead, we should think, to mutual understanding.

ART. V. — *The Papal Conspiracy exposed, and Protestantism defended, in the Light of Reason, History, and Scripture.* By EDWARD BEECHER, D. D. Boston: Stearns & Co. 1855. 12mo. pp. 420.

WE assure the author, that it is very far from our intention to offer a formal reply to the false charges, calumnies, and illogical conclusions of his elaborate volume, which contains the quintessence of Evangelical acidity double distilled. He may have more natural ability, but he is, if possible, less truthful and amiable than the Rev. Rufus W. Clark, reviewed in the first article in our present number. We will, however, concede that, if his *Papal Conspiracy exposed* had been issued before that article was written, we should have selected it as the subject of our comments, instead of *Romanism in America*, for it was our wish to take the most malignant, the most bitter, and the least scrupulous Protestant production against Catholics that we could lay our hands on. In this point of view, Dr. Beecher's volume is superior to Mr. Clark's. It is even more savage in its spirit, more elaborate in its falsehoods, more vigorous in its sophistry, if less polished in its literary execution. Yet it must be admitted that both are admirable specimens of Evangelical literature, and, if they could be used, would be a very good substitute for vinegar.

Dr. Edward Beecher is a son of the renowned Dr. Lyman Beecher, and brother of the really able and independent Henry Ward Beecher, and of the world-famous or world-notorious Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of *Uncle Tom's*

Cabin. He is not naturally imbecile, or even destitute of logical power. We think nature has even been liberal to him, and that, placed in favorable circumstances and under genial influences, he would have proved himself worthy of esteem both as a thinker and as a writer. But he is a melancholy example of the influence of modern Evangelicalism to prevent all manly development of the intellect, and all generous and noble expansion of the heart. His Puritanism, which he has never had the manliness to shake off, has kept him in a state of intellectual childhood, and prevented him from opening his heart to the genial rays of the sun of justice. He knows no freedom, and remains cramped, "cribbed, cabined, and confined," by his Protestantism, which cannot stand a moment before free thought and warm love, and can be defended only by falsehood, misrepresentation, calumny, vituperation, and chicane. If anything could deepen our disgust at Evangelicalism, it would be the book before us, which proves its power to extinguish a naturally noble mind and a naturally generous heart. Dr. Beecher, we hesitate not to say, was born for better things; he might have been a man, and have done a man's work; but having early stuck in the mire of Calvinism, he can save his race only as a beacon, or as the drunken Helotes served to teach temperance to the Spartan youth.

Dr. Beecher is haunted by strange visions of a Papal conspiracy against American Protestantism and American liberty, and in his agitated dreams he calls out upon his countrymen to put an extinguisher upon Catholicity. The poor man is certainly dreaming. There is no conspiracy of the sort he imagines. We probably know as much of the subject as he does, and our word is as good as his; and we tell him and our countrymen that there is no Papal conspiracy in the case, and the only conspiracy we know of is that of Protestantism in the Know-Nothing movement, to deprive Catholics of their political and civil rights, and perhaps to exterminate them, or to expel them from the country. "Even Mr. Brownson," the author says, "confesses that there is a system designed to exterminate Protestantism, not by force, but by argument and conviction." Suppose Mr. Brownson does so confess. What then? Suppose that what he confesses, or rather asserts, is true, does it prove the reality of "a Papal conspiracy"? Catholicity

and Protestantism, as everybody knows, are mutually antagonistic. A man cannot be a Protestant without being opposed to Catholicity, or a Catholic without being opposed to Protestantism. The Church labors to make all men Catholics, and Dr. Beecher labors, we suppose, to make all men Protestants. The success of either is, in the nature of the case, the extermination of the other. Even Dr. Beecher, we should suppose, could understand this much. The Church, in fulfilling her divine mission, seeks to convert all the non-Catholic portion of the people of this country to Catholicity, to gather them within her communion, and to nourish them at her breast, that she may present them pure and holy to her heavenly Spouse. Should she succeed in doing this, she would, of course, exterminate Protestantism. But here is no conspiracy. All is open and avowed. It is precisely what, if the Christian Church, she must aim at, and what she has always and everywhere aimed at, and to prove that it is so is no proof or exposure of a Papal or any other conspiracy. It is no wonderful discovery.

The Church works in open day, and all her proceedings are public. She avows her object, and her means of attaining it. Her object is to convert the whole world in general, and, if you please, this country in particular, to Catholicity. But by what means? By force? No. But by "argument and conviction." That is, by convincing the reason and the will that she is God's Church, out of which salvation is not possible. This supposes that she seeks only voluntary converts, and that she exterminates Protestantism only by convincing Protestants of its falsity, and inducing them voluntarily to abandon it. Now, does Dr. Beecher confess that, in an open field and fair play, Protestantism cannot stand before Catholicity? Does he call it a "conspiracy," to resolve to attack Protestantism by argument, by an appeal to the reason of Protestants? Would he maintain that a Protestant convinced of the falsity of Protestantism and the truth of Catholicity ought not to be allowed to profess himself a Catholic? Would he go so far as to deny to Catholicity the right to make converts if she can by "argument and conviction"? Does he feel that it is all over with Protestantism if Catholicity is free to combat it by argument? If so, how is it that he professes to defend it "in the light of reason, history, and Scrip-

ture"? If reason, history, and Scripture are on the side of Protestantism, what has it to fear in argument with Catholicity? Why does it call in force to close the reason and shut the mouth of its opponent? No man is ever against reason, unless he feels or fears that reason is against him.

If Dr. Beecher had spoken of a Protestant conspiracy for the extermination of Catholicity, he would have spoken of what is not at all an imagination or a dream. Everybody knows that Protestants express their determination to exterminate Catholicity, not in our country only, but in all countries. To this end they have formed and sustained alliances and associations, in conjunction with acknowledged conspirators, for the purpose of revolutionizing every Catholic state in Europe, in the hope that, by revolutionizing the state in the sense of Red Republicanism, they will put an end to the Papacy, and with the Papacy, to Catholicity. They have conspired, and still conspire, with Mazzini and other revolutionary leaders, against the Church, the grand bulwark of social freedom and of social order. They have gone further; they have formed a real and undeniable conspiracy, — a secret society, a secret organization, sustained by the most rigid rules, and, if not belied, by the most fearful oaths, — whose express object is to deprive Catholics of all their political rights, to reduce them, if it suffers them to live, to the condition of slaves in their native land, and for no offence but that of worshipping God according to the dictates of their own conscience. They have succeeded in possessing themselves of the government of this ancient Commonwealth, and they are laboring in secret conclave to get that of the Union, and to place the whole political power of this country in the hands of this secret society, governed by unknown and irresponsible chiefs, and substituting a secret and invisible despotism for the constitutional and public authority of the people. Now, with this well-known Protestant conspiracy against Catholics, with its ramifications throughout the Union, and perhaps throughout Christendom, what more shameless, what more satanic, than for a man like Dr. Beecher to turn round and accuse us of a "Papal conspiracy" against Protestantism? We are exposed at any moment to the fury of a Protestant mob, inflamed by the passionate appeals of Protestant ministers; our churches are blown up, burnt down, or desecrated; the sanctuary of our

private schools and colleges is invaded, or threatened to be invaded, by illegal and unconstitutional legislative committees; our dead are all but denied a burial; our children are kidnapped and placed in Protestant families to be brought up in what we regard as a damnable heresy; legislatures are devising ways and means to confiscate the funds given by Catholic charity for the support of divine worship and feeding of the poor; our lives and property are insecure, and the authorities afford us hardly a shadow of protection; and our rights as Catholics, as citizens, or as men are every day trampled upon with impunity; and yet Protestants have the incredible impudence to accuse us of conspiracy, to represent themselves as the victims of our secret councils,—as in danger from us of losing their liberty, and may be their lives! This is adding mockery to injury, and, if it is a fair exhibition of Protestantism, as we have but too much evidence that it is, we and all Catholics cannot be too thankful to Almighty God, that we are not Protestants.

Quem Deus vult perdere, prius dementat. Nothing can more clearly prove that Protestants are demented, than their present violence against Catholics. Never has Protestantism been willing to concede to Catholicity an open field and fair play. It boasts of religious liberty, but the only religious liberty it has ever recognized is its liberty by civil pains and penalties, or by material force, to shut the reason and close the mouth of Catholics. No country has ever become Protestant through the labors of peaceful Protestant missionaries, or by appeals to reason, history, and Scripture. Among whatever people Protestantism has gained an establishment, it has been by violence, by civil or physical force, and wherever it has sustained itself, it has been by falsehood, misrepresentation, calumny, and for the most part by civil laws disabling Catholics. It was not to be expected that it would change its nature on being transplanted to this New World. It indeed used fair words, and appeared gentle and tolerant when Catholicity was not here, or when it was so weak as to excite no fears; but the moment that Catholics became a little numerous, and seemed likely to gain a permanent foothold in the country, its tiger nature broke forth as of old. It could not be otherwise, for it is only a modern form of that old Gentilism which in the martyr ages cried out so vehemently, *Christianos ad leones!*

Christians to the lions! This is now seen, and save for the sake of Protestants we do not regret it. In fact, we rejoice to see Protestantism exposing itself, throwing off the mask, and confessing itself to be able to sustain itself only by persecution. This book by Dr. Beecher justifies all that we have ever said against Protestantism, and the rage of the Evangelicals against unoffending Catholics now exhibited will disgust every intelligent and fair-minded man in the Protestant ranks with a pretended religion that can inspire it. These recent movements show Protestantism in its true light, in its inherent ugliness, and will drive from the Protestant ranks all who have the least love of justice and fair dealing in their hearts. For, after all, what have we as Catholics done to provoke them? Have we not always, in these United States, demeaned ourselves as good and loyal citizens? Have we ever resorted to unfair or underhanded methods in our dealings with Protestants? Have we ever denied or sought to deny them any of their rights? Have we ever burnt down any of their meeting-houses or school-houses? Have we ever tarred and feathered any of their ministers? Have we kidnapped their orphan children, placed them with Catholics, and forced them to grow up in our religion? When have we set snares for unsuspecting Protestants? When have we attempted to convert them by any but fair, open, and honorable means? When have we tried to provoke them to riot and bloodshed? When have we mobbed them, and shot them down in the streets, or in their own houses? Or when have we without provocation stirred up a mob against them, killed and wounded large numbers of them, and then published in all the journals that it was they who mobbed us, and that we acted only in self-defence? Thank God! none of these things can be laid to our charge. There are men amongst Protestants who know this, and have the honesty and manliness to avow it. These see and feel Protestant injustice towards us, and we may be assured it will not deepen their attachment to Protestantism.

We are here what the Christians were under Diocletian, Galerius, and Maximian, and the Protestants represent the part of the persecuting pagans. We are the descendants of those Christians, holding their faith, and animated by the same spirit. They conquered, and so shall we; not in slaying, but in being slain. The old pagans were de-

feated in the very moment of their apparent triumph, not by being slain, but by slaying. Let our soil be saturated with the blood of Catholic martyrs, and it will no longer bear Protestantism. Protestantism will wither and die. How little, then, have we to fear Protestant persecution. "It is sweet," sings the patriot, "to die for our country"; how much more sweet to die for our God, who has died for us, and to know that in dying for him we win the victory? How pants the true soldier of the cross for the glorious crown of martyrdom! Courage, my brethren! perhaps that crown is reserved for some of us, and that we may not always have to envy those who fought the good fight under Nero, Decius, and Diocletian. Martyrdom is fearful only to those who inflict it, and persecution need alarm only persecutors. They, indeed, have reason to fear and tremble. We, for ourselves, can forgive them and pray for them, nay, thank them for the service they render us; but there is One above us and above them who will not forgive them unless they repent. God will avenge his Spouse, and the blood of his saints. Let men like Dr. Beecher, Rufus W. Clark, and the host of puritanical ministers at the head of the violent movements against Catholics, reflect on the fate of the persecuting pagan Emperors, and remember that they who are most responsible for them are they on whom the Divine vengeance will fall swiftest and heaviest.

We have already said that we have no intention of offering a formal reply to Dr. Beecher's book. It is not worthy of an answer. There is nothing in it against the Church that has not been answered over and over again. It may have weight with a few credulous and fanatical Protestants, who would read no answer to it were we to give one; it may be used as a pretext, by artful and unprincipled demagogues, for attacking the political and civil rights of Catholics; but to all intelligent, well-disposed, and fair-minded Protestants it carries with it its own refutation. The author has overshot his mark. He lies stoutly, but not adroitly. He betrays too openly his malignity, and the thoughtful and sober part of his readers will not believe that either we, or our Church, are so black as he paints us. Then the motives which govern him and his brethren are too patent. The undeniable fact is, that Protestantism as a religion is in this country on its

last legs, and is fast going the way of all the earth. Its ministers are losing their social position, their hold on the people, and their livelihood. They see and feel that their craft is in danger, and that their calling is no longer held in reverence or respect by the community at large. They are fast sinking into popular contempt, as were sunk, in the time of Diocletian, the pagan priests. They must do something to recover their standing and influence, and they hope to be able to do so by getting up a violent persecution against Catholics. But we tell them it is too late. Their day is over, and these violent movements they are heading are only the violent throes of one in his agony. The people of this country are not yet Catholic, but they have lost their confidence in Protestant ministers, and hold them in about the esteem that the intelligent Romans, under the Empire, held their priests. Whenever a party is obliged to resort to a secret organization in order to effect its purposes, it virtually confesses its weakness, and owns that the public is against it. If it has been in power, if it has once held the public, its resort to secret organization and to subterranean methods of operation is a proof that it has fallen, and that its doom is sealed. Its agony may be long and painful, but in its agony it is. Here is a fact that the Protestant leaders would do well to consider. Their secret organization, or their readiness to avail themselves of such organization, proves that they have no longer the mind or the heart of the American people on their side. This Know-Nothing movement is an humiliating confession of Protestant weakness; this book of Dr. Beecher is a cry of despair from the depths of the American Protestant heart.

No doubt expiring Protestantism may be revived to one last, vigorous, and desperate effort, as expiring Paganism was under Diocletian and Galerius, and the persecution of God's people may be severe and terrible; but that effort will exhaust it. To whom the empire will descend, we say not; but the people will be found to have had enough of Protestantism. No heresy has ever retained its vigor for much over three hundred years; those three hundred years for Protestantism have passed away, and it seems now to have the presentiment of its doom. The American people are not yet Catholic, they are not very generally disposed to become Catholic; but the day is near at hand when they

must make their election between Catholicity and no religion. The half-and-half religion of Protestantism no longer satisfies their hearts, hardly blinds or confuses their intellectual vision. They are beginning to see that whoso holds that God has made a revelation of his will to man recognizes, in principle, an authority as universal, as positive, as inflexible, and as obligatory, as that which the Catholic claims for his Church; that the Protestant, who asserts any supernatural authority, can never make good his defence against the Catholic, is inconsequent in rejecting Catholicity, and either goes too far or not far enough; and that there is no alternative for a man, who can and who does reason, but to fall back either on the Church or on unmitigated rationalism. He who questions this is ignorant of the state of the American mind. The fact is really undeniable, and therefore it is that we tell the Protestant ministers that their day is over, and that they will never recover their authority. Convinced of this, we see no use in spending time in replying to their tirades against Catholicity.

There are, however, one or two points raised by Dr. Beecher, on which we will offer a few remarks; not for his benefit, for he is past all human aid, but for the benefit of such honest-minded Protestants as are willing to know the truth, and to be just even to Catholics. Professor Park of Andover, some years since, asserted that the Church teaches that "no faith is to be kept with heretics." This we, of course, denied. Dr. Beecher cites certain documents, which he calls Papal bulls, in which he maintains that the doctrine is taught. In this he does no great credit to his critical sagacity, or to his principles as a moralist. The documents assert no doctrine we denied. There is in them, even as given by the author, no such doctrine as that "no faith is to be kept with heretics." The only doctrine we find in them bearing on the point is, that men who enter into engagements with heretics, or anybody else, to do that which it is unlawful or wrong for them to do, are not permitted to keep those engagements, but are bound to break them off. Does Dr. Beecher maintain the contrary? Suppose he had entered into an engagement with John Smith to cut my throat, would he be bound to keep that engagement? Suppose I entered into an engagement with some of my associates to burn down his

meeting-house, should I be bound to keep it? The doctrine of the Church is, that my faith, lawfully pledged, is to be kept; unlawfully pledged, it is not to be kept. If I pledge myself to heretics to do that which I am free to do, which it is lawful and right for me to do, I am bound to fulfil my engagement; but if I pledge myself to them to do that which I am not free to do, which is not lawful and right, which it were a sin or a crime in me to do, I am not to keep it. I sin in making the engagement, but not in breaking it, because the engagement is itself sinful or criminal, and therefore null. The same principle governs the question of oaths. A lawful oath binds in conscience, and is to be kept, to whomsoever it is given; but not an unlawful oath. If I swear to do that which is wrong, I sin in so swearing, but should sin doubly if I kept the oath. Oaths such as are said to be taken by the Know-Nothings in their lodges are, by the laws of this State, unlawful and criminal. The Know-Nothing sins, and commits a crime, in taking them, but he does not sin, and is not a perjurer, in breaking them, because, being illegal and criminal, they were never obligatory. The principle is, that no man can bind himself to sin, or incur an obligation which it would be sinful to take, or sinful to keep. Man never is and never can be morally bound to do wrong, to sin, or to commit a crime. Now suppose Catholics, princes or subjects, contract obligations with heretics against the rights of the Church, they would sin in contracting those obligations, but not in breaking them, for they could not be bound to fulfil them. Suppose Dr. Beecher should enter into an engagement with some of the followers of the late Abner Kneeland, to deprive, by violence, his church of their meeting-house, and to convert it into a dancing-hall, or an infidel conventicle, would he be bound to keep that engagement, or would he sin in breaking it? His sin would be in making such an engagement, and would be increased by keeping it. He would, even he will concede, be bound to break that engagement. What would he think of us, then, if we should say, Dr. Beecher teaches that no faith is to be kept with unbelievers, and that lying and perjury are no sin? Just what we think of him, when he says the same things of the Church, and alleges that she teaches no faith is to be kept with heretics. No faith is to be kept with heretics, or with anybody else, when to keep

it requires us to sin, or do wrong; but faith is to be kept with heretics, and with all others, when to keep it requires us to do nothing wrong or unlawful, although it may require us to do things against our own interest. Here is the whole doctrine of the Church on this subject, and this doctrine makes no distinction between the obligation of faith pledged to a heretic, and of faith pledged to a Catholic. He who objects to this doctrine only proves, either that he does not understand it, or that he has made no great proficiency in moral theology.

The object of Protestants in bringing this charge against Catholics is to make it appear that Catholics cannot be loyal to an heretical prince. Loyal to him in that he is a heretic, they cannot be; that is, they cannot obey, aid, or sustain him in his heresy; but as a prince, in all temporal matters, in the whole temporal order, if a legitimate prince, they can be, and are bound to be, loyal. If a prince, by the constitution of his state, holds his crown only on condition of being a Catholic, professing and protecting the Catholic religion, as was the case with the German emperors, and nearly all the Christian princes of Europe, down to the Reformation, his lapse into heresy undoubtedly forfeits his crown, and absolves his subjects, not by a law of the Church, but by the constitution of his realm. So, if the queen of Great Britain and Ireland should become a Catholic, she would, according to the constitution, legally forfeit her crown, and her subjects would be absolved from their allegiance, for she holds it only on condition of being a Protestant. But even in Great Britain, as long as the queen holds her crown according to the constitution of the realm, Catholics owe her full and unreserved temporal allegiance, just as much as they would if she were a Catholic. In this country, the state, according to the Constitution, is bound neither to be Catholic nor Protestant, and holds, therefore, under the law of nature alone. Catholics, therefore, owe it precisely the same allegiance that non-Catholics owe it. We beg the reader here to recall what we have said in our article on *Liberalism and Socialism*. Grace does not supersede nature, and therefore all the rights a non-Catholic prince has, under the law of nature, over his infidel subjects, he has over his Catholic subjects. We are, in all temporal matters, just as much bound to be loyal to the state here, as we should be if it were professedly Catholic.

We Catholics are neither Jansenists nor Calvinists, and therefore we admit the reality of the natural law; consequently, the rights of the state it confers, and the duties of subjects it imposes. This is sufficient as to our loyalty to an heretical or non-Catholic sovereign.

There is one other point, the relation of the Papacy, on which we wish to make a remark or two in addition to what we have said in our review of Mr. Clark's *Romanism in America*. Dr. Beecher, and several others of his class, have cited our defence of the supremacy of the spiritual power, and the subordination of the temporal, and given it as their opinion, that we have the advantage as against those of our Catholic friends who take the ground of what is called Gallicanism. We understand and appreciate their motives. They wish to promote divisions and get up angry controversies among Catholics themselves. In this they will signally fail, for we are none of us so foolish as to fight one another, when our citadel is besieged by the enemy. They think, also, that the Papal power is more odious to the American people in the form in which we have presented it, than that in which some others present it. But even here they are probably mistaken, and there are not a few among Protestants, who, if they are to admit the Papacy at all, would sooner accept it as defended by Bellarmine than as defended by Bossuet. Let us have it, they would say, in its plenitude, in its integrity, not mutilated and shorn of its strength. However this may be, the Protestant has the right to hold us to the defence of the Papacy as defended by Bellarmine, because a Catholic *may* hold Bellarmine's doctrine without suspicion of heterodoxy, and no Catholic has the right to insist that Protestants shall take Bossuet's, or even Fénelon's, as the only approved Catholic doctrine. All a Catholic can say to a Protestant is, a man *may* be a Catholic without holding that the authority exercised by Popes and Councils over temporal sovereigns in the Middle Ages was an authority inherent in the Papacy, but he cannot tell him, that to be a Catholic one *must* so hold. So, whether we are Gallicans or Ultramontanists, Protestants have the right, if they choose, to hold us to the defence of the Papacy on Ultramontane principles, and we must be prepared always so to defend it, till we are able to declare by authority that those principles are heterodox.

The point made against us is, that, supposing the Pope to have the supremacy alleged, Catholics owe him allegiance, and therefore cannot be loyal to the temporal government; or, in another form, the state is so subject to the Pope, that it has, and can have, no temporal independence. If all civil government held from the Church, or from God through the Church, that is, under grace and not under nature, this objection would be plausible; but this is not the doctrine we defend. There have been three classes of governments. 1. Governments that are bound by their constitution to profess and defend the Catholic religion. Such was the Holy Roman Empire, revived by St. Leo the Third, and conferred on Charlemagne. 2. Governments held as fiefs of the Holy See, such as were England, Russia, Aragon, Sicily, Naples, and some others. 3. Governments holding simply under the law of nature, as was the case with pagan Rome, and as it is with our republic, and most modern states. The relations which existed between the first two classes and the Papacy, in so far as they were peculiar, do not concern us. For us, the question comes up simply as to the relations between the Papacy and governments in so far as they hold under the law of nature, and have only obligations of the natural law to the spiritual. The question, moreover, does not relate to a non-Catholic people, for the Church does not judge them who are without. It has practical importance for the American people only in so far as they are Catholics. Suppose the American people should become Catholic, what would be, on the principles we have defended, the authority of the Pope in regard to their temporal government? Precisely his authority as the divinely appointed guardian and interpreter of the natural law. Supposing, what is true, that our civil constitution contains nothing repugnant to the law of nature, or natural justice, he would have no authority to alter or modify it, and none to require the people themselves to alter or modify it. Being the legitimate constitution, it would be binding on the Catholic conscience, and the law for the Pope in his intercourse with the American state, no less than for the citizens themselves. He could not absolve us from our allegiance to it, because that allegiance is due under the law of nature, is a precept of the natural as well as the revealed law, and the Pope can grant a dispensation from no precept of

either law. We must understand that the Pope has no arbitrary power in the case, and has, and claims, as we learn from Boniface the Eighth, no authority to dispose of temporal kingdoms, or to depose temporal princes at his own will and pleasure. Such an authority Bellarmine is as far from asserting as is Bossuet himself. The Pope does not make the law under which the prince holds, and can declare him deposed only in case he has forfeited his power by the law under which he holds. Unless the prince has forfeited his power by that law, the Pope cannot absolve his subjects from their oath of allegiance, for he cannot absolve any one from an oath which, in the particular case, has not in justice ceased to bind. The real nature of the absolution is the judicial declaration, that in the particular case, under the particular circumstances, the law does not require it to be kept, and therefore that the subject is free. The act of deposition is judicial, not legislative. It does not make or annul the law, but declares and applies it. The prince can be deposed only in case he is a tyrant, abuses and forfeits his trusts, and his subjects can be absolved only in case they are really so in natural justice. Here is nothing incompatible with the just freedom and independence of states, and the Papal authority is and can be terrible only to tyrants. The Pope is made by it, practically, a simple arbitrator, and exercises by divine right, and with the weight of his spiritual authority, the functions which our peace-men would have exercised by a Congress of nations, or which are attempted, with indifferent success, to be exercised by modern diplomacy. It makes him the divinely appointed court of appeal, in matters of difference between sovereign and sovereign, and between a sovereign and his subjects. The utility of such a court, and its necessity to the internal tranquillity of states and the peace of Christendom, all good men feel, and not a few even among non-Catholics acknowledge. Without it, there is or can be no Christendom; there is and can be, in the political order, only Gentilism, only a heathendom.

Protestants make singular blunders whenever they speak of Catholicity. Assuming that the Church is not from God, that she is at best a mere human institution, they are forced to attempt to explain what they witness amongst us on natural, evil, or Satanic principles. They travesty our holiest doctrines, and see only craft and wickedness, a

secret and Satanic meaning, in our most innocent expressions, and our most innocent, nay, our most praiseworthy, proceedings. Nothing can be more edifying than the conduct of our Catholic population under the present Know-Nothing provocations. Every one must be struck by their singularly calm and collected deportment. They manifest, as a body, no excitement, apparently feel no alarm, show no disposition to retaliate on their enemies, and quietly and peaceably pursue their ordinary avocations. How explain this? The Protestant cannot explain it in a good sense, and supposes that it is policy, that it is all owing to the influence of the priests. The priests have given the order, and the poor, superstitious, priest-ridden laity dare not disobey. Assuming this to be the fact, Protestants even find in it an argument against our religion itself. Can it be safe, they argue, to tolerate in a republic a religion whose priests have such power over their flocks? To-day, indeed, they exert their power to keep their people quiet; but who can say that they may not to-morrow use it to stir them up to murder and massacre poor defenceless Protestants, or to take away our liberties? But priests are men as well as the laity, and have like feelings and passions. How happens it, then, that the priests themselves are so calm and collected? Whence comes it that they can not only restrain their people, but themselves also? They are, it is answered, ordered to do so by the Pope. The Pope, having certain designs on this country, has given his orders, and they must be executed. But by what magic does the Pope, more than three thousand miles off, secure such unlimited obedience to his orders? How is the Pope able, at this distance, to make men put a curb on their natural tempers, and the natural passions of the human heart, and rise so much above themselves, overcome their natural powers and their physical timidity, and stand unmoved, calm and collected, before a whole people in wrath against them, insulting them, and reviling all they hold sacred? Here is something which our Protestant philosophers cannot explain, on their theory of Catholicity.

Protestants observe in the Catholic community certain remarkable phenomena, which they observe amongst no other people. Precluded by their Protestantism from explaining them by the operations of Divine grace, they undertake to explain them as the result of Satanic influ-

ence, or of the most consummate human policy. They suppose that the clergy are full of all craft and subtlety, and that the Pope is constantly interfering, directly or indirectly, most despotically, with every thought and every action of the individual Catholic. They assume that we have no freedom, no spontaneity; that we are automats in the hands of the priests, mere puppets, moving only as we are moved by secret wires, adroitly pulled by the bishops and clergy, at the command of the Pope. But in this they forget that we are Catholics, and reason as if we were Calvinists, with John Calvin, John Knox, or Cotton Mather for Pope. A system of policy, craft, fraud, and tyranny, like that which Protestants imagine to explain what they observe amongst us, would itself be supernatural, and its maintenance for eighteen hundred, or even for twelve hundred years, in the most civilized nations of the earth, would itself be the most stupendous miracle recorded in history. Nothing is philosophically or historically falser than this Protestant theory of the Church. There is nothing of this astuteness, of this consummate policy, in her history. Trace her through eighteen hundred years, and you will find, according to our human modes of judging, that her clergy, from the Pope downwards, have been far more successful in attaining to the simplicity of the dove, than to the prudence of the serpent. Strange as it may sound to Protestants, the thing which most strikes a convert from Protestantism, especially a convert from Evangelical Protestantism, on entering the Church, is the freedom and naturalness he finds amongst his new associates, and the total absence of that officiousness on the part of the clergy which he had been accustomed to in Evangelical ministers. Everything is free, natural, spontaneous. The bandage is stripped from his eyes and his limbs. He is no longer in swaddling-clothes; no longer swathed and lashed to a board, like the Indian infant, to be thrown over the back of its mother, set up against a tree, or hung on a branch. He feels a strange sensation of relief, and a life, a buoyancy, that is as new as delightful. He feels that he has suddenly burst from darkness into light, from the most galling slavery into the glorious liberty of the children of God. He feels that he is in very deed a freeman.

This notion of Protestants that we are under an iron

despotism is purely imaginary, and Catholics, if the matter were not so grave, would be much amused at their talk about Papal orders, rigidly enforced by the Popes on the bishops, by the bishops on their clergy, and by their clergy on the faithful. It would seem that they really believe that we are in all matters, temporal and spiritual, subject to arbitrary will or caprice, and that the Pope rules us as despotically as some of our old Puritan ministers did their respective congregations. But the government of the Church is, from first to last, a government of law, not of mere will. Amongst Protestants, authority is for the most part personal, and depends on the personal character of the minister, and with them an organization as complete as that of the Church would be an unmitigated despotism, and an ambitious man at the head of it could use it to gratify his lust for dominion. But with us he cannot, because with us authority is not personal, attaches not to the person, but to the office, and is determined by law. We may esteem one priest as a man higher than another, but this personal esteem does not mingle with our obedience to the priest as a priest. We reverence his office, and we obey him for the sake of the office, not for the sake of the man. Now the office is fixed in the original constitution of the Church, and its rights and duties are defined by an unalterable law. This law enters into Catholic instruction, and forms the Catholic conscience. Hence the clergy could not, if disposed, exert an illegitimate influence over the laity, because, the moment they attempted it, they would find not only the law, but the Catholic conscience itself, against them.

Catholic conscience is formed by Catholic faith, by Catholic teaching, which must be uniform throughout the world, and the same in every age. Hence it is not in the power of the Popes and clergy combined to change the Catholic conscience, or to pervert it to any purpose of personal or selfish ambition, even if they would. They have no influence, except through Catholic faith and conscience, neither of which is under their personal control. The Pope himself cannot create a new dogma, or change the law of conscience. The Protestant overlooks this fact, and supposes that with us, as with him, faith and conscience are variable, or changeable at will. This is a mistake. Catholic doctrine, which forms the Catholic conscience, is inva-

riable, and not alterable at the will of its ministers. It is open, public, and taught to children before even any ill-disposed priest can think of availing himself of his office of teacher to mould the young mind to his selfish or ambitious purposes. The influence which the clergy are able through their office to exert could become dangerous only on condition that they could control the faith they teach, and form the Catholic conscience at their will, as is, to a great extent, the case with Protestant ministers. If, *per impossibile*, all Protestant sects could unite in one body, in a single organization, the world would see a despotism far more rigid and oppressive than was exercised even by the old heathen sacerdocies, for these ministers would be restrained by no Protestant conscience, and would have the sole control over their own teaching. The principles applicable to such an organization cannot, even humanly, apply to the Church, because her pastors can only teach what they and the laity also have been taught from the beginning, and are bound by the same law that binds the body of the faithful.

This reasoning applies to the question before us. The rights and duties of sovereigns and subjects are in Catholic teaching clearly defined. Nothing in regard to either is left to arbitrary will or caprice. Those rights and duties as the Church in her public teaching has always defined them are sacred and inviolable for all Catholics, for the Pope and clergy no less than for the laity. Whatever power of intervention the Pope may be assumed to have, he can intervene in no case not foreseen, and in no respect except in accordance with the principles always publicly recognized and always publicly taught. He cannot impose a new political duty on sovereign or subject, or exact from either what has not always been exacted by the law under which the authority holds. What will sustain his intervention? What can he rely on to give his intervention success? Catholic faith and conscience. Nothing else. But these he does not and cannot form, and these he does not control, for they were formed before he was Pope, and therefore could not be relied on in case of the contravention of either. Suppose the Pope, as we and many Catholics hold, has power to depose a temporal sovereign, or to declare him fallen from his dignity, and his subjects absolved from their oath of fidelity to him, he can

do so only in case such sovereign has, according to Catholic morality, publicly taught and presumed to be well known by everybody, abused and forfeited his trusts, and has already ceased *de jure* to reign. Now that morality, which no Pope makes or can alter, and which binds the Pope as well as the prince, teaches that power is amissible indeed, but that no temporal sovereign forfeits his trusts, committed to him by God through the people, except by abusing them, by using his power iniquitously, contrary to the common good, and in grievous oppression of his subjects. And what man, worthy to be a freeman, and not imbued with the spirit of an Oriental slave, will not acknowledge, nay, will not maintain, that, when a prince so abuses his powers, he ought to be deposed? The old Puritans of England, under Cromwell, went further, and not only deposed their sovereign, but beheaded him; and the doctrine of those at the present day who are most inveterate in their hostility to the Papacy is, that it is lawful to depose a sovereign even because he is a sovereign, and solely for the sake of changing the form of government. Ultramontaniam, in what its enemies may regard as its most odious form, goes by no means so far, and they who take the highest views of the Papal prerogative hold that the Pope can depose a temporal prince, holding under the law of nature, only in case he so abuses his power as to forfeit his right to reign. He is deposed for his crimes, his iniquity, his tyranny, his oppression of his subjects, for nothing else.

The difficulties which honest and fair-minded non-Catholics feel on the subject arise from supposing that, because we admit the plenary authority of the Pope as vicar of Jesus Christ on earth, we necessarily admit that he has the sovereign authority over our faith and morals, and can make them what he pleases. They do not see how it is that we can recognize such an authority without subjecting ourselves to the will or caprice of him who holds it. They do not see this, because they do not understand that Catholic faith and morals are in themselves entirely independent of the Papal will, and that the Pope has no more power to impose an article of faith or a precept of morality than the humblest layman. He as head of the Church is the guardian and interpreter of the faith once delivered to the saints, and he can define what is of faith and morals,

what has been delivered, what the law of which he is the guardian enjoins; but he cannot, even if we could conceive him to wish to do so, mould either faith or morality to suit any passion or selfish purpose of his own. In this sense he has no power over our faith or conscience. There is not a Protestant minister in the land that has not in this respect more power over the faith and conscience of his congregation, providing he gains their confidence, than the Pope has over the faith and conscience of Catholics. The minister to a great extent forms the doctrine he teaches out of his own brain, and imposes upon his followers his own private opinions; he can insist on a new and peculiar morality, and impose on the Protestant conscience a law of his own enacting, as we every day witness. The Pope cannot. By the nature of the case, as well as by divine grace, he is restricted in his teaching to what he has received, and in his government of the Church to the law imposed from the first. His legislative authority is limited to matters of discipline and administration, and in these is bound by the fundamental law. He can introduce no new principle, or change or reject no principle hitherto recognized and acted upon. This, if considered, would satisfy, we should think, any honest and serious mind, that the Pope really has no power of his own over faith and conscience, and that in regard to them he is the simple organ of the law, or of the authority that originally enacted it. The law for the Catholic conscience is not that I shall believe and do whatever the Pope commands me, but that I shall believe and do whatever God commands me through the Pope, or in the law of which the Pope is the divinely instituted guardian and interpreter. The divine command or this law binds the Pope as much as it does me, and he cannot give it an arbitrary interpretation, because its interpretation — an interpretation that is fixed and unalterable — has been given and known to the Church from the first, and is not left to be discovered or invented by any individual Pope. New questions come up indeed for decision, but these are not decided by a new and previously unknown interpretation of the law, but by the application of the law as always interpreted, or in the sense in which the Church has always understood it. I as an individual Catholic may not know in this or that case what God commands, or what is the true sense of the law, and I apply to

the Holy Father to be informed. He answers me, not by a new command or a new interpretation, but by telling me what in the sense of the Church has always been the law or the Divine command on the subject. He enlightens my conscience, but he does not form it. The law which he proclaims as the law of my conscience is equally the law of his, and he can no more make it what he will than I can what I will. I am as free, therefore, in my faith and conscience as he is in his. The Protestant notion, that the Catholic has no faith or conscience but what the Pope wills, is wholly unfounded.

We insist so strenuously on this point, because we are confident that it is the point on which Protestants most frequently and most seriously misunderstand Catholicity. They really think that we are deprived of all freedom, and are mere slaves to our priests, or if not the priests, at least to the Pope. Nothing is further from the truth. Priests are the ministers of the law to us, not the law itself. Catholic faith and morals are not private or arbitrary things. They are *catholic*, public, and taught openly to all the faithful. We have them all in our Catechism, and we know there can be no departure from them,—nothing varied in them, nothing added to them, nothing taken from them. The Church knew her work in the beginning, and sprung into life with the full possession of all her faculties. She had her *credo* to start with; she had her doctrines fully formed, in the outset; and there were for her no new discoveries to make, no new interpretations to give. These doctrines may not be equally well known by all the faithful, but the Church has always equally possessed and known them, and they have always and everywhere been taught to her children, and in their substance known and believed by them all. Having been so known and believed, they have formed alike in the Church teaching and in the Church believing the law of the Catholic conscience, to which the pastors are as subject as their flocks, and which teachers no more than believers can alter, for teachers must be believers before being teachers. For Catholics there is and can be no slavery to persons, whatever their rank or dignity. There is no power in pope or bishop to enslave our consciences, or to reduce us to that spiritual thralldom Protestants in their folly speak of; for neither, if they would, could make us believe that we

are bound in good conscience to do what is repugnant to the faith and morals they have uniformly taught us, and which they have assured us had been taught them also. All you can say against us is that in your opinion the faith and morals taught us are false and mischievous, but you cannot call us spiritual slaves because we believe them, and feel ourselves bound in conscience to conform to them. We believe them because we believe that God has taught them and commands us to conform to them, and it is not slavery to be bound to believe and obey God. The most you can say is that we labor under a mistake, but in so saying you are at least as liable to labor under a mistake as we. At the worst we can judge of that question as well as you, fallible as you certainly are, and confess yourselves.

If Protestants would bear in mind that Catholic faith and morality are always the same, and are taught to all Catholics, and form for all the law of conscience, the spring of action, and the guide of the understanding, they would be able to explain, in a much more simple way than is usual with them, many things they observe among Catholics, and see that they can interpret them more rationally in a good than in a bad sense. They would see that much of that which they attribute to the direct and positive orders of the clergy, or to a secret and well-concerted scheme of action, is the spontaneous expression of our Catholic life. Unity of life begets unity of action. Uniform faith and morals produce uniform private and public effects. We act freely as Catholics from the faith we have received and the life that is in us, and the conduct which is often supposed to result from Papal orders, clerical influence, or subtle policy is nothing but the open and frank expression of the interior life common to all the faithful. The Papal orders are much rarer than is commonly supposed; and much less is to be attributed to the personal influence of the clergy than is commonly imagined. There is a Catholic common sense, that counts for something, and Protestants would be surprised to know how much of that which they charge to conspiracy is perfectly free and spontaneous with us.

Resolved to understand everything among us in a bad sense, Protestants attribute the introduction and spread of Catholicity in this country to a Papal conspiracy. They sometimes go so far as to attribute the Irish migration

hither to the Pope and Cardinals. We have not learned whether they attribute to the Pope and Cardinals, or not, the Irish famine of 1846. We should not, however, be surprised to find that they do. They regard every Catholic Irish servant-girl in a Protestant family as an emissary or an emissaryess of the Pope, initiated more or less into the secret of the Papal conspiracy. Every Irish maid-servant and man-servant is supposed to have no faith, no conscience, but to do the will of the priest, and to be ready to obey his order, whether it be to poison their Protestant master, or to burn down his house. Verily, one is not surprised at Barnum's success. Now the Pope and Cardinals had no more to do with the Irish migration than they had with the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth. The Irish were forced to emigrate by the misgovernment of their country by Protestant England, and came here because we promised them liberty of conscience, civil and political equality, after a short probation, with natural-born citizens, and good wages and plenty of employment. They came here Catholics, and they choose to remain so. They are so far from being engaged in a conspiracy to deliver over this country to the Pope, that, if we were to reproach them at all, it would be for their want of zeal for the conversion of our non-Catholic countrymen. They have suffered so long and so much from the Anglo-Saxon, that they can hardly persuade themselves that his conversion enters into the designs of Providence. They know their faith, and love it; they know the rights it gives them, and the duties it imposes, and there is not one among them who, if ordered by a priest to do anything contrary to Catholic morality, would not say to him, "Get behind me, Satan." If there could be found a priest base enough to give the order supposed, there is no Catholic servant that is so ignorant as to believe it obligatory. He, the priest, would, were he to give it, lose all his influence, and be looked upon, not as a priest, but as a moral monster. To poison one's master or to burn down his house, Catholic morality, as taught to all, condemns, and every Catholic knows that whosoever should advise or order it denies Catholic teaching, and therefore is to be held as separated from the faithful. If an angel from heaven, says St. Paul, should preach to you any other Gospel than that which we have preached, let him be anathema. No con-

spiracy by the Pope and clergy to do what is contrary to the faith and morals publicly taught, and which are held by all Catholics, could possibly be formed, and to do what is required by Catholic faith and morals no conspiracy is needed, and no additional power could possibly be derived from it.

There are no doubt among Catholics the silent operations of Divine grace, and the secret or invisible influences of faith and charity; but the Protestant notion that the Church is a huge secret society, somewhat like that of the Know-Nothings, is as far from the truth as was the notion of the old heathens, that Christians worshipped an ass's head, and killed and eat an infant in their assemblies. The Church is open and frank, and what she does she does in the light, not in the dark. She has no secrets but those of the interior life, and she condemns all secret societies. Her faith is proclaimed on the house-tops, before all the world; her dogmas and morals are not concealed; all may know them who will; and she calls upon all by her missionaries, not emissaries, to make themselves acquainted with them. Her emissaries, you say, are secretly at work to bring this great, free, and glorious republic under the dominion of Popery. Translate this into civil and gentlemanly language, and it means that Catholic missionaries are at work to convert the people of this country, as of all others, to Catholicity. And what is there so very objectionable in this? If they can, by appeals to reason, history, and Scripture, convince the American people that Catholicity is from God, who has the right to complain? Reason, history, and Scripture are open to you to use against them, if you choose. They are willing to meet you on fair and equal terms before the American public, and if you are unwilling to meet them on the same terms, or, so meeting them, are worsted, is this their fault?

But Dr. Beecher would persuade us that Popery is itself a grand conspiracy against the Gospel and the liberties of mankind; but Dr. Beecher is not very high authority, nor very persuasive in his speech. He deals too much in filth to have much influence with men of a tolerable stomach. The pretence is absurd. You may say Catholicity in your judgment is not true Christianity, and is unfavorable to true freedom, but you cannot say it is a *conspiracy*. A conspiracy is a combination of men for an evil purpose,

more especially an unlawful plot to overthrow a government. In neither sense can you call the Church a conspiracy. It is not a conspiracy against governments in general, or any particular government, certainly not against ours, which it is our sacred duty as Catholics to sustain. It is not a combination for an evil purpose, for the purpose of the Church is to convert the world to Jesus Christ, and to establish on earth the reign of peace. This is a good purpose, and even if the Church could be mistaken, as she uses and suffers to be used none but lawful means to accomplish it, she is and can be no combination of men for an evil purpose. To talk of exposing the Papal conspiracy, is only to expose your own looseness of language, or something still more reprehensible.

But enough. We have wished in what we have said to address ourselves to that class of Protestants — large, we would fain hope — who love fair play, and who, however they may dislike Catholicity, would deal justly and honorably with Catholics. We have wished to offer them some suggestions which may, if taken up and pursued by their own thought and reflection, satisfy them that Catholics, even if Ultramontanists, may be as free and act as spontaneously, to say the least, as their Evangelical opponents. In general, however, we are unwilling to assume even the appearance of an apologist. Works like Dr. Beecher's can do us, in the long run, no harm. They can make no lasting impression on the American people, and in the end will operate greatly to the damage of Protestantism. Sensible people will be led by them to ask, Whence is it that Protestantism shows itself so weak and malignant, so untruthful in its statements, so unphilosophical in its reasoning? Can it make no better defence? Has it no more refinement, no more honesty, no more virtue? Protestantism cannot long survive the asking of such questions.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *Fabiola ; or the Church of the Catacombs.* By HIS EMINENCE CARDINAL WISEMAN. New York : D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1855. 16mo. pp. 385.

WE are indebted to Mr. Donahoe, Catholic bookseller, of this city, for a copy of this singularly beautiful and interesting work, by his Eminence Cardinal Wiseman. Some of our friends in England have started the plan of a popular Catholic library, or a series of popular works designed to furnish to the English-speaking Catholic public a pure, chaste, and elevated literature. English literature is extensive, various, and rich ; but it has for the most part been produced by authors separated from the Church, opposed to her doctrines, or strangers to her spirit. It is uncatholic even when not anti-Catholic. Undoubtedly the English Catholic student must, if he would master his own language, and speak or write to the approbation or comprehension of his fellow-Englishmen, or of Anglo-Americans even, make himself more or less acquainted with it. In any system of education devised for those whose mother tongue is English, its study must hold a prominent place. Not otherwise is it possible to understand our national culture, national modes of thought, or national genius. To exclude it from our Catholic schools and colleges, or from the general reading of Catholic youth, would be in some sense to denationalize our Catholic population, and to produce a total civil and literary, as well as religious, separation between us and our non-catholic countrymen. But, unhappily, there is much danger to the chastity of Catholic thought and life in familiarity with this literature, and those who are fed with it can hardly be expected, without extraordinary grace, to grow up strong and lusty Catholics. Their faith, even when not extinguished, is likely to be pale and sickly, and their charity cold and languid. Highly important is it, therefore, that it should be purified by the infusion of new works, retaining all its nobler qualities, and free from its anti-Catholic and irreligious tendencies.

The production of these works is a matter of some difficulty. The greater part of our educated Catholics have formed their mental habits and tastes in the study of a foreign literature, and are to some extent unpractised and unskilful in the use of their mother tongue. Most of our Catholic books have a certain foreign air and accent, and do not address themselves to our peculiarly English or American home feelings. Their intellectual and religious excellence in a great measure atones for this want of nationality, and renders them as works of pure instruction or edification highly useful and satisfactory, but as works intended to

form the literary taste and to satisfy the literary wants of a cultivated and a reading people, they are, it must be confessed, not a little deficient. Translations of foreign works, however well done, cannot supply these wants, because no foreign literary work can ever be thoroughly nationalized by translation. It will always bear traces of its foreign birth and breeding. To a large portion of even our Irish Catholics, English is virtually a foreign tongue, and hence we view with deep interest the opening of the Catholic University in Dublin. The recent conversion of so many eminent men and distinguished scholars from Anglicanism must, however, do much to remedy our want of an English Catholic literature. These converts speak English without any foreign accent, and, except in what touches faith, are as national as any class of their countrymen. They are, too, most of them, active, energetic men, and are fast naturalizing Catholicity in our noble English tongue. But converts cannot do all. As long as they live, the fact that Catholicity was not the faith of their childhood and youth will remain, and have more or less of influence. They can never be perfectly at their ease, and they will often be at a loss where to draw the line between their old life and the new. They need a guide, who has been bred a Catholic, informed throughout with the Catholic spirit, and knowing as it were by instinct what Catholic literature may accept from the non-Catholic world, and what it must reject, — one who finds in himself all that is acceptable in the general literature of his country harmonized with Catholic faith and charity. With such a guide, these converts, both in England and the United States, will do a noble service to English Catholic literature. Such a guide they have in the author of *Fabiola*, who seems to have made himself thoroughly master of the whole range of English classical literature, familiar with the tastes, the modes of thought, the genius, the inner life, of his Protestant countrymen. Under his direction and patronage, we see no reason why the *Popular Catholic Library* should not prove of great national importance. We expect much from a literary undertaking in which he takes part, and which is edited by Capes, Northcote, and Thompson, so favorably known through the pages of *The Rambler*. *Fabiola* is the only volume of the *Popular Library* we have seen; but we see announced *The Life of St. Frances of Rome*, by that admirable Catholic novelist, if we may so call her, Lady Georgiana Fullerton, whose *Lady-Bird*, we are bound to say, on a re-perusal, deserves much higher praise than we gave it; *The Heroines of Charity*, by Aubrey de Vere, Esq.; and several others which must be of high interest.

Were we to speak of *Fabiola* in the strong terms our feelings would prompt, we should be deemed extravagant by those who have not read it. It is a most charming book, a truly popular work, and alike pleasing to the scholar and the general reader.

The author, when he enters the catacombs, loses himself, perhaps, for a moment in the antiquarian, but it is only for a moment. With this slight exception, to which we by no means object, for the information he gives is most acceptable, the author maintains his popular character, and we know no work of fiction in our language of deeper or better-sustained interest throughout. We read it through, and then turned back to the beginning and read it through again. It is the first work of the kind that we have read, in any language, in which truly pious and devout sentiment and the loftiest and richest imagination are so blended, so fused together, that the one never jars on the other. The saintly and the human are both brought out, are both presented in their highest forms, and without contrast or discord, as perfectly harmonized, and each as it were suiting the nature of the other. The saints, and they are real saints, proposed by the Church to the veneration of all her children, are presented as living, breathing, talking, laughing, joying, and sorrowing human beings, and yet without for one moment ceasing to be saints. Take St. Agnes, St. Pancratus, or St. Sebastian, as you find them in these pages, and then turn to them as presented in the *Lives* of Alban Butler. In the *Lives* they are cold abstractions, hardly so much as dry bones. A few dry facts are related, accompanied by some good sermonizing, and some very pious reflections; but the saint is not there, and no painter that ever lived could from what he relates ever give us a St. Agnes or a St. Sebastian. Alban Butler was a good man, a really learned man, but we doubt if any man ever lived of poorer imagination, or less fitted to be the biographer of a saint. The Cardinal is true to life, true to history, and changes nothing in the character of any saint as it is handed down in the tradition of the Church. To have changed the character, to have drawn on his imagination to invent a character to pass under the name of a venerated saint, would have been profanation. But while true to the traditional character, he brings that character out in its naturalness and completeness. St. Agnes lives for us in these pages; we see, know, love, venerate her, not as a being apart, not as a poetical ideal, but as a real, living, and sympathizing human being; as our own dear sister, only sweeter, lovelier, and holier. This is what we admire so much in *Fabiola*. Those glorious old saints, who prepared for "their fight," and so heroically shed their blood for their dear Redeemer, are brought near us, and we are made to feel that they were flesh of our flesh, and bone of our bone. They do not stand afar off from us, in a distant empyrean region, unapproachable in their devotion and in their virtue. They are by our side, in our midst, like us, and we feel that what they are we can ourselves be. Their heroism is the heroism of men and women, elevated by grace indeed, but elevated

without ceasing to be men and women, our own kith and kin, our brothers and our sisters.

It requires an effort in reading Butler's *Lives* to imagine the saints amiable and loving, persons who, if we had known them, would have attracted us, and wound themselves around our hearts. We look upon them as wellnigh divested of ordinary humanity, and think of them only as fighting with human nature, and struggling to master it. We doubt not the struggle, we doubt not the mastery, but, after all, the greatest saints are precisely those in whom human nature appears in its purest and most lovely forms, clothed with its strongest and most attractive features. A sour, morose, repulsive saint were an unheard-of anomaly, and would be only a Calvinistic or Jansenistic saint. We never felt this so strongly as when reading this book by Cardinal Wiseman. It is a great mistake to suppose that the Christians were the coarse and vulgar fanatics imagined by Lytton Bulwer in his *Last Days of Pompeii*, or people from whom a man of cultivated mind and refined tastes would instinctively shrink. They were precisely those who were the most elevated in their views and feelings, the most simple and attractive in their conversation, the most pure and winning in their manners; and the contrast between them and the heathen in the midst of whom they lived was in every respect to their advantage. But we beg our readers to turn to the Cardinal's book itself. If they want pure, chaste amusement, they will find it in its pages, and they will find also a most truthful picture of the Roman world, Christian and Pagan, at the close of the third century, and as much instruction and edification at the same time as if the book was written expressly for spiritual reading.

2. *The Immaculate Conception of the Most Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of God; a Dogma of the Catholic Church.* By J. D. BRYANT, M. D., Author of *Pauline Seward*. Boston: Donahoe. 1855. 12mo. pp. 322.

Acceding to the wishes of the entire Church and moved from on high, the Supreme Pastor of all the faithful has declared that to be a dogma of faith which has always been piously believed by the Catholic world. The whole Church rejoices with a holy and sincere joy, not indeed expressed in drunken feasts and noisy assemblies, but poured forth in the heartfelt thanksgivings that ascend from every pious bosom to the throne of Divine Goodness, pure and sacred as the event which gives them birth. It is truly a triumph which the Church now celebrates,—a victory of divine mercy over the fallen nature of man, and the immunity of the Holy Mother of God from the general curse inflicted on the human

race by the sin of Adam. At this seasonable time, when the whole Catholic world rejoices at the solemn definition of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin as a dogma of our faith, we hail with pleasure this book by Dr. Bryant, in which the history of this belief is related, and its assertion is shown by the unanimous voice of all Catholic writers from the very commencement of Christianity.

We have always felt a great envy for those writers who, like the author of this book, have devoted their time and their talents to the service of the Mother of God, and have sought by their writings to increase this holy devotion. In judging their productions, we lay aside the critic and become only the emulator of their piety. Such works, as artistic productions, have doubtless their faults, like any other kind of books, but we admire and reverence the holy spirit of devotion which pervades their pages. The arguments which the author brings to establish the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception may not be in all cases invincible or irresistible, but the doctrine which he seeks to confirm is true, and we need not the arguments to convince us of it; we believe it on the infallible authority of the papal decision, and, viewing the proofs which the author brings as works of supererogation, we thank him for having done more than he was required to do, for having given what he might have withheld. The work, he tells us, in the Preface, "is less an original than a compilation. It is precisely this," he continues, "which constitutes its claim to public confidence, as a correct and genuine history of the Immaculate Conception; the task before him being, to collect and cull, — not invent. There is also a certain amount of matter resting upon the bosom of literature, like uninhabited and beautiful islands upon the surface of the ocean, or oases in the desert. Wherever found, they have been seized as common property, and appropriated to some use. It is not, however, to be inferred from these avowals, that the author presumes to have exhausted the subject. For, though he has adduced testimony in favor of the doctrine from every age of the Christian era, he has but sketched the outlines of the picture, leaving the filling up of its majestic and faultless proportions to some master hand, which may even now be engaged upon the superior task." The beautiful dedication, which we copy, will be to all pious Catholics, who glory in the high title of children of Mary, a sufficient proof of the truly devout spirit in which the author has executed the enviable task he has assumed.

"**MOST BLESSED MOTHER OF GOD:** — Wilt thou deign to smile upon and accept my humble gift? It is most unworthily laid upon Thy shrine, — unworthy in itself, unworthy on the part of the giver. My infant lips were never taught to lisp Thy Blessed name; my youthful feet were never led to Thy throngéd Court; and too late, I fear, has my manly heart learned to throb in love and devotion at the mention of Thy holy name, — too late have my lips been attuned to Thy praise. But, with Saint Ber-

nard, I piously believe that it has never been heard of that any who have had recourse to Thy protection, implored Thy aid, and sought the suffrage of Thy prayers, have ever been forsaken. Thy loving Redeemer and mine, when on the cross, gave Thee, in the person of the beloved disciple, to be the Mother of His Church. I am, therefore, Thy child; dedicated and pledged to Thee. Thou canst not cast me off. Turn, then, Most Gracious Queen, Thine eyes of mercy on me. I give my soul in charge to Thee. See to it, my Mother, that it be not lost. Thy Divine Son refuses nothing to Thy prayers. He will not refuse, at Thy request, the boon of my salvation. Ah! I see Thy loving, smiling, gracious face, beaming with approving joy in view of what I ask.

"But alas! how dare I hope,—presumptuous sinner that I am; a sin-polluted soul; a friendless wanderer in this vale of tears; a shipwrecked mariner, tossed upon the stormy billows of the sea of life! But did not Jesus die for such? Did not He shed His sacred blood to cleanse and purify? Did He not become Thy Son to sympathize with me? Thou knowest that He did. And Thou, fair Morning Star, hast Thou not, in virtue of being Mother of God, become the Guide, the Protectress, of just such helpless, tempest-tost, and sinful souls? Thou knowest that Thou hast. In Him, Thou art the Health of the weak, the Refuge of sinners, the Consolation of the afflicted, and the Help of Christians. Queen of Angels, Saints, and Martyrs, be each of these to me. None needs them more, and none will repay Thee with a richer, freer, or more gushing tide of gratitude and ardent love.

"It is in veneration of Thee, Most Clement Virgin, and to vindicate Thy immaculate and spotless worth, that I have aspired, with devout and generous zeal, to lay this gift, together with my heart, at Thy sacred feet. Would that the offering were more acceptable; but one favoring glance from Thy refulgent eye will make them all I wish. It is for Thee, Immaculate, and for the honor of the Lord, I write. Procure for me, by Thy powerful prayers, most Potent Virgin, fresh stores of love for Him. Absorb me in this boundless ocean of everlasting bliss. Let this heavenly flame burn within, and consume me with its ravishing delights. Let this be the heavenly fire which shall try all my works. Say to Thy Divine Son for me, Jesus, I love Thee with all the power of my soul, and mind, and heart. I love Thee with a sovereign love; so that whatever I possess of health, strength, mind, talent, credit, or goods is humbly consecrated to Thee, and employed for the honor and glory of Thy Most Holy Name.

"Finally, O Queen of my heart, and perfect Symbol of purity and love, I ask to be enrolled by Thee among even Thy least favored children. So that, when Thou makest up Thy jewels, and settest Thy starry crown of saved souls, I may be one of those proclaimed by Thee Thine own.

"Sweet Mother, this is the sum of what is asked by Thy unworthy, but most loving
SON."

3. *Enchiridion Symbolorum et Definitionum, quæ de Rebus Fidei et Morum a Conciliis Œcumenicis et Summis Pontificibus emanarunt.* In Auditorum Usum edidit HENRICUS DENZINGER, Philosophiæ et Theologiæ Doctor et in Universitate Wirceburgensi Dogmatices Professor Ordinarius. Editio altera aucta et

emendata, et ab ordinario approbata. Milwaukee (Wisconsin) : Christian Ott. 1854. 16mo. pp. 504.

THIS is a most useful volume, and one which every clergyman, every journalist, and every Catholic author should possess. It contains nearly all the propositions condemned by the Supreme Pontiffs and by General Councils, from the earliest ages to the present time, in an authentic form, with an admirably arranged index to the subjects treated. The work is admirable for its method, and seems to us just what such a work should be. Its American publisher is Christian Ott, of Milwaukee (Wis.), our agent in that young and thriving city.

4. *Miscellanea; comprising Reviews, Lectures, and Essays, on Historical, Theological, and Miscellaneous Subjects.* By M. J. SPALDING, D. D., Bishop of Louisville. Louisville, Ky. : Webb, Gill, & Levering. 1855. 8vo. pp. 439.

WE regret that our space does not permit us to do more than barely announce this most rich and instructive volume. Bishop Spalding is one of our very best authors, and perhaps as an essayist and reviewer he stands unrivalled among our American Catholic writers. The greater part of this volume originally appeared in monthly periodicals, chiefly in *The United States Catholic Magazine and Monthly Review*, formerly published at Baltimore, decidedly the ablest, most learned, and interesting periodical we have ever had in this country, and whose place is but imperfectly supplied by *The Metropolitan*. They are, for the most part, on important and deeply interesting topics, and topics now prominently before the American people. They are American in their tone and character, liberal in their spirit, and the best adapted to the common American mind of anything of the sort we have.

5. *The Poetical Works of WILLIAM WORDSWORTH.* Boston : Little, Brown, & Co. 1855. 16mo. 7 vols.

WE cannot write the name of the well-known and highly esteemed firm of Little, Brown, & Co., without expressing our deep sorrow at the recent and sudden death of one of the partners, Mr. James Brown, one of our most intelligent, enterprising, beloved, and public-spirited citizens, and one of the brightest ornaments of the trade in the United States. We mourn in him, also, the loss of a personal friend, whom we had long known and loved and esteemed, and to whom we were under many obligations. It will be long before his place is filled in our heart or in our community.

We had intended, indeed partly prepared, a formal review of Wordsworth's Poems, but we have at present no space for it. Wordsworth is not a favorite poet with us, but he has his admirers; and though we cannot say that he has given us a single poem that can be praised as a whole, we willingly concede that he has written some of the best lines to be found in our language. His poems, moreover, are in general moral, and such as are not likely to corrupt the heart of the reader. There are now and then traces of German pantheism, and clear indications that the author was very little acquainted with the Christian thought; but these are too slight to produce much effect on the ordinary reader. The author deserves great credit for his endeavors to restore English poetry to its native simplicity and naturalness, and to free it from the wild passions of the Byronic school. If he has not made the river Duddon poetical, he has at least done homage to the poetry of ordinary life. His numerous admirers will find in this edition his complete poetical works, and will be grateful to the publishers for the very elegant and attractive style in which they have issued them.

6. *Ancient History: from the Dispersion of the Sons of Noe to the Battle of Actium and Change of the Roman Republic into an Empire.* By PETER FREDET, D. D., Professor of History in St. Mary's College, Baltimore, Author of "Modern History." Fourth Edition, carefully revised, enlarged, and improved. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1854. 12mo. pp. 504.
7. *Modern History; from the Coming of Christ and the Change of the Roman Republic into an Empire to the Year of our Lord 1854.* By PETER FREDET, D. D., Professor of History in St. Mary's College, Baltimore. Tenth Edition, carefully revised, enlarged, and improved. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1854. 12mo. pp. 552.
8. *The Life of St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori, Bishop of St. Agatha of the Goths, and Founder of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer.* Compiled from the published Memoirs of the Saint, by one of the Redemptionist Fathers. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1855. 12mo. pp. 594.

Dr. Fredet's Histories are too well known and too highly esteemed to make it necessary for us to commend them. The Life of St. Alphonsus is, we believe, a new biography of that great saint, by one of his spiritual children, and will tend to increase among us the veneration in which he is held. We cannot help thinking that this country is yet to be greatly indebted to the Congregation he founded.

9. *The Gentile Nations ; or, The History and Religion of the Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes, Persians, Greeks, and Romans ; collected from Ancient Authors and Holy Scripture, and including the Recent Discoveries in Egyptian, Persian, and Assyrian Inscriptions ; forming a Complete Connection of Sacred and Profane History, and showing the Fulfilment of Sacred Prophecy.* By GEORGE SMITH, F. A. S., Member of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, of the Royal Society of Literature, of the Irish Archæological Society, etc. New York : Carlton and Phillips. 1854. 8vo. pp. 663.
10. *Christ and Christianity : a Vindication of the Divine Authority of the Christian Religion, grounded on the Historical Verity of the Life of Christ.* By WILLIAM LINDSAY ALEXANDER, D.D. New York : Carlton and Phillips. 1854. 12mo. pp. 314.
11. *The Heroines of History.* By MRS. OCTAVIUS FREIRE OWEN. With eight Illustrations. New York : Carlton and Phillips. 1854. 12mo. pp. 386.

The work on the *Gentile Nations* appears to be the third volume of a larger work. It is not unexceptionable, but is learned, and worth studying.

12. *Rhymes with Reason and without.* By B. P. SHILLABER. Boston : Abel Tompkins and B. B. Mussey & Co. 1855. 12mo. pp. 336.
13. *Life and Sayings of Mrs. Partington, and others of the Family.* Edited by B. P. SHILLABER, of the Boston Post. New York : J. C. Derby. 1854. 12mo. pp. 382.

We have here the veritable Life and Sayings of the veritable Mrs. Partington, which everybody has found amusing, and which, if considered, will be found something more than amusing. The *Rhymes* are meritorious, and the author possesses no small share of real genius, and is, as we can testify, a modest, amiable, and deserving man.

14. *Institutes of Metaphysic. The Theory of Knowing and Being.* By JAMES F. FERRIER, A. B. Oxon., Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy, St. Andrews. Edinburgh and London : William Blackwood & Sons. 1854. 12mo. pp. 530.

15. *Lingard's History of England abridged; with a Continuation, from 1688 to 1854.* By JAMES BURKE, Esq., A. B. *To which is prefixed a Memoir of Dr. Lingard, with Marginal Notes.* By M. J. KERNEY, A. M. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1855. 8vo. pp. 662.
16. *The Life of St. Rose of Lima.* Edited by the Rev. F. W. FABER, D. D. Philadelphia: Peter F. Cunningham. 1855. 12mo. pp. 265.
17. *A Treatise on English Punctuation; designed for Letter-writers, Authors, Printers, and Correctors of the Press; and for the Use of Schools and Academies. With an Appendix, containing Rules on the Use of Capitals, a List of Abbreviations, Hints on the Preparation of Copy and on Proof-reading, Specimens of Proof-sheet, etc.* By JOHN WILSON. Third Edition, enlarged. Boston: John Wilson & Son. 1855. 16mo. pp. 334.
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** WE notice with pain a disposition among our Know-Nothing writers to hold the bishops whose names are on the cover of our Review responsible for whatever sentiment or doctrine is found in our pages. This is wrong. The bishops have kindly encouraged the publication of our Review, having confidence in our loyal intentions, and believing it, upon the whole, useful to the cause of truth; but they *indorse* no sentiment or doctrine we advance. The whole responsibility rests upon the editor alone, and no bishop is responsible for anything that appears in our pages, and every one is just as free to controvert or condemn anything in our pages as he would be were his name not on the cover. We beg our opponents to bear this in mind, and to remember that our Review does not, in any sense whatever, speak by authority of the American hierarchy, and has no other indorser than its lay editor, who is free to write and publish, simply holding himself responsible to the proper authorities, what he pleases. The merit or the blame, if either, in all cases belongs to him, and the public cannot justly hold anybody else in any respect responsible. We commend this especially to the notice of Professor McClintock and Dr. Edward Beecher.

BROWNSON'S QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1855.

ART. I. — *Philosophie. De la Connaissance de Dieu.* Par A. GRATRY, Prêtre de l'Oratoire de l'Immaculée Conception. Paris: Douniol; Lecoffre & Cie. 1853. 2 tomes. 8vo.

IN our number for January last we gave a brief and hasty notice of the Abbé Gratry's profound and learned work, and intimated that we might resume on a future occasion our examination of it. We regret that we have not yet seen the author's promised work on Logic, in which he had proposed to develop and vindicate his geometrical method of proving the existence of God, for it is possible that he may in that work have advanced something which will require us in some respects to modify the objections we urged in our former article against that method. We should be glad to find the author in the right, for he is a man from whom we do not like to dissent, and from whom we cannot dissent without an uncomfortable feeling. But as at present informed, we must abide by the objections to his method which we have urged.

We are bound in justice to the excellent author, certainly one of the ablest and most learned men in France, and with whom we have numerous points of sympathy, to confess that the more deeply we study his volumes, the more highly do we appreciate them; and we are not a little pleased to find that they have met with a success very unusual in the case of works so really learned and

profound. We see that they have some time since passed to a second edition, and perhaps a third edition may already be called for. The author is just such a man as France in our times needs, and he can hardly fail to exert a wide and salutary influence on the French mind. He is in a good sense a man of his age, and admirably fitted to bring out and render popular those great philosophical principles, which are now so much needed to reconcile conflicting parties, and to restore to full vigor and activity our expiring intellectual life. Amid the despotism of an exaggerated supernaturalism and a new-fangled Cæsarism on the one hand, and the no less odious despotism of socialism, Red Republicanism, or centralized democracy, on the other, it is refreshing to hear a free voice speak out in true manly tones, in defence alike of reason and of revelation. Even one such voice goes far to redeem the age. It proves that our God has not abandoned us to our own folly and wickedness, and that we are still under his gracious providence. Whatever faults we have found or may still find with the author on certain points, we look upon him as one whom God has raised up to render most important services, in these unhappy times, to the cause of truth, both natural and revealed.

The real differences between us and M. Gratry, in regard to philosophical matters, are not, we apprehend, after all, so great as they appear. Every man who really philosophizes, who really thinks, and not merely repeats, has his own special point of view, and in some respects a language of his own. No two men approach the same problems under precisely the same aspect, or use even the same general terminology in precisely the same sense. M. Gratry denies that we have or can have naturally direct and immediate intuition of God, and maintains that our natural view of him is indirect and implicit only; yet we think a few words of mutual explanation would show that there is between him and us no essential difference even on this point. He maintains, after St. Augustine, Malebranche, and Fénelon, that we see things by the light of God (*la lumière de Dieu*), which alone renders them visible either to the senses or the intellect. What more have we ourselves said?

The light of God, which renders things visible or intelligible to us, is, according to the author, as well as

according to St. Augustine, Malebranche, and Fénelon, God himself, in relation with our intellective faculty, and therefore not distinguishable from God. It is the divine intelligibility, and therefore the divine being itself. It must be either God or something created, *quid creatum*; for there is no intermediate existence between God and creature. Whatever is not creature is God, and whatever is not God is creature. The author does not hold that this light is created, for he distinguishes it with Fénelon from our light or reason, and calls it the universal, eternal, and immutable reason. He represents it as the light of our light, the reason of our reason, the medium by which created intelligences see or apprehend the world and our own soul. It must then be not creature, but God, as Fénelon asserts, when he asks, "Is not this the God I seek?"

But if God is the light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world, if he is the light by which we see our own soul and created things, the medium by which they are visible to us, we do not see how the author can deny direct and immediate intuition of God. He vindicates the right to explain intellectual vision by the analogy of sensible vision. Now in sensible vision the light is that which first strikes the eye, and is that which is first, directly, and immediately seen. Other objects are seen by it as the medium of their visibility. In intellectual vision it must, if the analogy holds, be the same. Then the view of God as the light, or intuition of God as the intelligible, cannot be indirect and implicit only, as the author maintains, but must, on his own principles, be direct and immediate.

We must bear in mind that God alone is intelligible in himself, that is, intelligible without any borrowed light, and that all creatures in themselves are unintelligible. Objects are invisible in the dark, and are visible only when illumined by a borrowed light. St. Thomas teaches that man, that is, the human soul, is in itself unintelligible. This being so, it follows necessarily that created things can be intelligible to a created or participated reason, such as is ours, only as rendered intelligible or as illumined by an uncreated light, that is, by the light of God, or the light of his own eternal being; that is, again, only as enlightened by him, or made intelligible by his

own intelligibility. He then is himself the medium of their visibility, and of our apprehension of them. Then, since the medium must be immediate, for if not we should be obliged to suppose an infinite series of mediums, and is that which is seen itself without a medium, we are forced to say, with Malebranche, that "we see creatures by God," and that our view of him is direct and immediate, unless we are prepared to say that we can see objects by the light without seeing the light itself.

The author shrinks from this conclusion, and says: "The soul in the present state does not see God directly. It sees itself and its ideas in the light of God, as the eye sees objects in the light of day. But to see the day is not the same thing as to see the sun itself, although the day comes from the sun; to see colors and the forms of objects is still not to see the sun, although forms are visible only under the sun, and colors are only the very light of the sun, broken, refracted, and partially reflected by objects. So it is impossible to say that every idea, every view, every cognition, is immediately and directly an intuition of God, although there can be no idea without God, and every cognition implies God, as every sensible vision implies the day, and the sun's presence as its source." This is very well said, and would be conclusive against us if we were at liberty to suppose a distinction between God and his light, analogous to that between the sun and the day, or between the sun and the light. The sun elicits the light, but is not itself the light; it makes, in the order of second causes, the day, but is not itself the day. The analogy therefore will not hold, for God is himself in his own being the light, and not simply its occasion or cause. To distinguish the light from God, as we distinguish the day from the sun, would be to make the light a creature, something created, and therefore in the last analysis to identify it with our own created reason, or with the created objects rendered visible or intelligible by it. We must therefore reject the distinction, and say, not indeed that every idea, every view, every cognition, is a direct and immediate intuition of God, but that in every idea, view, or cognition there is immediate and direct intuition of him, as in every vision there is sensible intuition of the light by which the sensible object is seen.

But in sensible vision, though we directly and immediately see the light, that is, see it without any medium between it and the eye, we do not see it in and by itself alone. We apprehend the light only in apprehending the object it illuminates, and only as it is reflected from the illuminated object to the eye. So in intellectual vision, we directly and immediately, in the same sense, apprehend God, but not in and by himself alone. We apprehend him only in apprehending creatures luminous by his light, and only as he, so to speak, is reflected or mirrored by them. Here we are not left to doubt or speculation, for St. Paul says expressly, *Videmus nunc per speculum in ænigmate*,— We see God *per speculum*; that is, as in a mirror. To see him in himself, to see him alone, by himself, separate from the perception of the illuminated object, is not naturally possible; for if it were, the beatific vision would be possible without the *ens supernaturale*, or light of glory. If therefore what the author means to deny is that we see God in himself, directly and immediately by himself, not as reflected or mirrored by his works, we fully agree with him. But this no Catholic, not even Gioberti, ever affirms. What we mean by the direct and immediate intuition of God is, not that we see him separate from his works, in himself, but that we see him without any medium between him and the eye of the mind. As between the eye and the light, the intuition of the light is direct and immediate, just as much so when reflected from the illuminated body as when seen by and in itself; so as the light which is God strikes the eye without anything between it and the object it illuminates, we say we have direct and immediate intuition of God, although he strikes the eye only in illuminating created things.

The author says that Malebranche, instead of saying, "We see creatures by God," should have said, with St. Paul, "We see God by creatures." As we understand the matter, we ought to say both. St. Paul nowhere teaches that we can see creatures without God illuminating them, and we certainly see nothing in what we hold inconsistent with what he says of our seeing him by creatures. *Invisibilia ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur; sempiterna quoque ejus virtus, et divinitas*, is truth for us as well as for our

author. We believe it is by God that we see creatures, and by creatures that we see God. We believe both propositions may be and are true. The dispute arises from the fact that most philosophers overlook the primitive synthesis of thought. Malebranche says truly, that it is by God that we see creatures, but having assumed very unnecessarily that we see God without creatures, and that it is in him that we see creatures, he was unable to affirm logically any actual creatures at all; for creatures seen in God are their ideas or archetypes, possible creatures, not actually existing creatures. He had a possible creator and a possible creation, nothing more, and in order to explain our perception of actual existences he was obliged to resort to what is called occasionalism, and to assume that our ideas of things are produced in us by the immediate and direct action of God on occasion of our impressions and sensations. Spinoza and our modern Germans, starting with the same assumption that God is seen or apprehended without creatures, lose creation itself, and fall into unmitigated pantheism. Startled by this conclusion, our author says we must say, "We see God by creatures." But if he understands by this that we can see creatures without seeing God, he will owe it to his theology, not to his philosophy, if he does not lose God and fall into unmitigated atheism. Indeed, nearly all ancient and modern philosophy tends, when not corrected by theology, to one or the other of these two errors.

The only way to avoid both errors is to recognize the fact, which Gioberti has more distinctly brought out than any other writer with whom we are acquainted, that the primitive thought is a synthesis, and that God and creature in their real relation are given primitively and simultaneously, in one and the same intuition, neither, chronologically considered, prior to the other. Modern philosophy can boast of having stated and established two important facts, which had not previously been clearly and distinctly recognized. These facts are,—
1. That thought is the joint product of subject and object, and can be the product of neither alone. Therefore both must precede thought, be independent of it, and therefore really exist. Here is the refutation of both idealism and scepticism. 2. That thought is not only

a synthesis inasmuch as it includes both subject and object in their joint activity, but is also a synthesis inasmuch as it embraces the objective synthesis, or God and creature in their real relation in the order of being. Philosophers long disputed about the passage from the subjective to the objective, and from the objective to the subjective. It is now seen that there is no passage from the one to the other, and that none is needed, because one is never given in thought without the other, but both are given simultaneously, though distinctly. Philosophers have also disputed about a scientific passage from the idea of creature to that of God, and from the idea of God to that of creature. We think it has been conclusively shown that no such passage is possible or needful, for both terms in their real relation are given immediately and simultaneously in the primitive intuition, and neither is left to be deduced from the other. We never think God without thinking creature, nor creature without thinking God. The one term is never apprehended without the other, and never the one save by the apprehension of the other, any more than we can apprehend the light without the body illuminated, or the body without the light that illuminates it. If philosophy, as we hold, has succeeded in establishing these two capital facts, it has at length succeeded in harmonizing itself with theology, and placing itself in perfect accord with revelation,—one of the great aims of the Abbé Gratry in the volumes before us.

All sound philosophy, as we many years ago—before ever we heard of the name of Gioberti—maintained, must be synthetic. The grand error of philosophers in all ages has been in overlooking the primitive synthesis of thought, and endeavoring to deduce all natural truth from a single term. M. Victor Cousin saw this error, and sought to avoid it by what he called eclecticism; but unhappily his eclecticism was no genuine eclecticism at all, but a crude syncretism. Pierre Leroux saw clearly enough where M. Cousin failed, and recognized and distinctly set forth the synthesis of thought as to subject and object, but failed to recognize the synthesis in the object, or the ideal synthesis. Gioberti, with a rare sagacity, detects the objective or ideal synthesis, and shows that the intuitive object is the synthesis of being and existence in their real relation, ex-

pressed in the formula, Being creates existences, *Ens creat existentias*; and thus escapes the syncretism of Cousin and the pantheism of Leroux. The other synthesis, the one so fully developed and so greatly exaggerated by Leroux, Gioberti seems, as far as we are acquainted with his writings, to have left undeveloped. He implies it, but he does not appear to have considered it, or to have clearly and distinctly apprehended it. Consequently he fails to present to the common philosophic understanding a psychology in harmony with his ontology, which is the principal reason, we suspect, why his ontology has encountered so much and such violent opposition. He is understood either as neglecting psychology or as deducing it from his ontology, and therefore is supposed to favor pantheism; whereas his real doctrine is, that the psychological and the ontological are given simultaneously, the one by the other, and never the one without the other. This he affirms over and over again; but this he does not show, as he might by the analysis of thought regarded as a fact of consciousness. On this point he might have profited by Leroux, for whom as an intellectual man he expresses a contempt which we are very far from sharing.

The merit of Leroux is not in discovering, but in developing the fact, that both subject and object enter into every thought. What concerns the object, the ontological element of thought, Gioberti has well developed, but he has left undetermined, in great obscurity, the psychological element, or the part of the subject. Undoubtedly the object, the ideal formula, according to Gioberti, presents and affirms itself, but it presents and affirms itself to the subject, or the human reason, which has and must have its part in the affirmation; for it is it that apprehends what is presented and affirmed. It will no more do to assert the pure passivity of the subject in the fact of intuition, than the pure passivity of the object. Thought is always psychological as well as ontological, subjective as well as objective; and we can never be more certain that the object presents itself, than we are that we apprehend it. This apprehension or this intuition of the object is a subjective act, as well as an objective act, for in fact it is the joint action of two concurrent activities. Gioberti implies, indeed concedes, this; but he passes it over too lightly, and makes, apparently at least, too little of the subjective activity. The subject enters actively into every intuition, as well as into every reflection.

But the subject enters for what it is, according to the laws of its own nature, and therefore philosophy must analyze the subject as well as the object; and as the psychological is not explicable without the ontological, so is the ontological not explicable to us without the psychological. As we have recognized an objective synthesis, and a synthesis of subject and object, so must we in fact recognize a subjective synthesis; for the subject in all its operations acts as it is and according to its own nature. Man is defined by the Schoolmen to be a rational animal, and reason includes at once and indissolubly intellect and will, the faculty of apprehending the true and that of aspiring to the good, — of knowing and of loving. Every thought is at once a perception and an aspiration. It is to this synthesis of perception or intellection and aspiration, or of knowing and loving, that M. Gratry devotes no inconsiderable portion of his work. In most of our philosophical systems, knowing and loving, intellection and aspiration, are disjointed, and regarded as operating in some sense independently one of the other, and hence science is presented without life, and morality without light. The one is blind, the other is lifeless. Our systems therefore do not accord with reality, for in actual life reason operates as understanding and will, intellect and love. To bring our systems into harmony with reality, we must then, in addition to the two syntheses we have already signalized, add a third, that of intellect and will, perception and aspiration, or knowledge and love.

We here experience some difficulty in expressing our meaning, for nearly all the terms we must use have been on one side or another abused. When we speak of rational love we are in danger of being understood to speak of sensitive love, or of favoring modern sentimentalism. The Greek *Eros* in our times is confounded with the Greek *Anteros*, and *erotic* has only a bad sense. The difficulty is to speak of rational love without being understood, on the one hand, to speak of the operations of free-will, or on the other, of the love of the senses, or carnal love. The love of which Plato speaks is in our sensual age reduced to a licentious love. Nevertheless love is a word we must use, and the love or affection which Plato represents as one wing of the soul must be recognized, and reaffirmed.

In reason as a faculty of the human soul we must distinguish three things, intellect, will, and free-will. Free-will, *arbitrium liberum*, is the subjective principle of all virtue or morality strictly so called; but we must distinguish it from will taken generally. Free-will is simply the faculty of election, and without it man could be the subject neither of praise nor blame. But all our theologians distinguish between will and free-will, the *voluntarium* and the *liberum*. Cousin makes the distinction a distinction between the spontaneous will and the reflective will, the indeliberate and the deliberate, which we may accept, if we confine our praise or blame to the acts of deliberate will.

Now if we consider will in this sense as distinguished from free-will, which in us is deliberate, not spontaneous, we shall find with St. Thomas that it is *appetitive*, and really the element of what Plato calls love, or of rational love as distinguished from the love of the senses. It operates rationally, but indeliberately. Its essential nature is to become one with its object, the nature of all love, and, if we consider it, of all volition. Being an integral element of reason or the rational soul, it necessarily enters into every rational operation of man, and plays an undivided part in every thought. Hence it is that every object of the mind is apprehended alike as the object of intellect and of will, of knowledge and of love, therefore under the forms of the true and the good. We can then give in our philosophical systems a correct account neither of the subject nor of the object, — in the barbarous language of some writers, the me and the not-me (*le moi et le non-moi*), — without recognizing both intellect and will; for as the subject can operate only in concurrence with the object, it could not operate at all were the object not simultaneously the object of both, and therefore under the aspect apprehended good as well as true.

But though the soul operates simultaneously in all its operations as intellect and will, the will is the commanding faculty, the monarch of the mind, as it has sometimes been called, and it is in some sense as its servant, not as its master, that the intellect operates. The motive power of all intellectual life is the will, love, the love of good. This love of good is resolved

by many into the desire of happiness, or of our own beatitude, and hence the desire of happiness is said to be the spring and motive of all our natural actions. That there is in this love of good a reference to self, to our own good, is certain from the fact that the subject enters into all its operations; but as the object also enters, there is also a love of the object, of the good for its own sake, and in the purest and highest kind of love, the soul seeks the union desired by giving itself wholly to the object, rather than by appropriating the object to itself. But be this as it may, this love of good is at the bottom of our whole intellectual life. It is the spring and motive, or rather *mobile*, of all our actions, and must therefore hold the first place in our philosophy, whether we speak of the subject or of the object.

The great merit of M. Gratry, in our view, consists in his recognition and development of this truth, — in taking his point of departure in reason on the side of love rather than on the side of intellect, and in the object under the form of the good rather than under the form of the true. In our previous article we pointed out the dangers to which this mode of considering the question is exposed, especially that of falling into an unintelligible mysticism on the one hand, or an unintelligent sentimentalism on the other. But this danger does not grow out of M. Gratry's doctrine itself, or even his statements taken in themselves. It grows out of the perversion of men's minds and hearts in our times, which leads them to misapprehend or misinterpret the truth, however clearly and guardedly expressed. But this is a risk that must be run. The doctrine is sound and important, and perhaps the danger will much diminish, if we are careful to state what M. Gratry does not take the trouble to state, that will is a rational faculty, and therefore the love we speak of is not a blind love. Reason, which is alike the general faculty of knowing and loving, exists always in its unity, and its operations are simultaneously knowing and loving, and therefore in the love itself there is not only the desire, but the intuition, of good. Individuals differ, and in some the knowing and in others the loving quality predominates, as God gives to some saints greater grace of understanding, and to others greater grace of love. Science may in this predominate over love; in

that, love over science. Not every saint of equal heroic love is qualified to be a doctor of the Church. True heroic love may be found in souls of no great intellectual capacity, and with but little knowledge. Nevertheless, rational love is never wholly blind, and in all love there is intellectual apprehension, more or less full, more or less distinct, of its object.

Love is the aspiration of the soul to good, whether it be to possess the good by giving itself to its object, or by appropriating its object to itself. In either case it is alike an aspiration. This aspiration is the genuine Platonic love, without which the soul cannot rise even by science to God. It is that other wing of the soul by which it rises to the empyrean, to "the First Good and First Fair." In this aspiration of the soul, this love, this craving for good, is the source of the universal belief in God. It is not by any process of reasoning, whether deductive or inductive, whether syllogistic or dialectic, that men are primarily led to believe in God. They believe in his existence as the Supreme Good, because they naturally, in their own natures, aspire to him, and are carried away by a natural prayer of the heart towards him. When the word God falls on their ears, it expresses or it names what their hearts have already believed and loved, though without a name. And this aspiration is no mean proof of the existence of God, because it is not, we must remember, a purely subjective phenomenon, and because it is not a mere blind craving, but includes a real intuition — obscure if you will, yet real — of its object, and therefore of God as the Supreme Good. It is indeed the testimony of the heart, but at the same time the testimony of the highest reason, and therefore worthy of the fullest confidence.

Now, bearing in mind that love is the spring of our whole rational life, it follows that the true point of view for philosophy is to consider man primarily as loving or aspiring, rather than as perceiving and knowing. It must consider him primarily under his moral relations, therefore under the point of view of his end or destiny, or as related to God as the end craved, or the good to which the soul aspires. This is what our author maintains with much clearness and force. Hence he considers theology as the answer to the wants of the

heart, to the soul's love of good, before considering it as the answer to the questions of pure intellect. Understood as we have endeavored to explain it, we like this, because it conforms to the order of life, and redeems philosophy from dead and repulsive abstractions, beneath which it has been buried, and renders it living and attractive.

Taking his point of departure in love or the soul's aspiration to good, the author easily demonstrates that no created good, that no good less than God, the Supreme Good, can fill the soul, and satisfy its love. He does not even stop here. He further shows that even God, as attainable by our natural powers, cannot completely satisfy the natural wants of the soul, and therefore concludes that there can be for man no natural adequate beatitude, and that for his complete satisfaction the supernatural is necessary. In this way he passes from philosophy to revelation, from reason to faith, and shows the connecting link between the natural and the supernatural, and the accord of nature and grace.

But here the author touches debatable ground, and has a powerful theological school against him. The author's doctrine seems to imply that man naturally aspires to the supernatural, and that his natural wants even cannot be satisfied without the beatific vision, or the vision of God as he is in himself. This would imply that the beatific vision is due to man's nature, for that is due to nature which is necessary to the realization of its end. Certain it is, that the supernatural can never be due to the natural, and therefore the beatific vision, if due to man's nature, must have been naturally possible, and therefore natural, not supernatural. But it certainly is not naturally possible to man as we now find him. Then man by transgression must have lost a part of his nature, some of his natural powers, and then God could not have created him, *seclusa ratione culpæ*, as he is now born, which is a condemned proposition. It is the 55th proposition of Baius: *Deus non potuisset ab initio talem creare hominum, qualis nunc nascitur*. That only can be called natural which is of pure nature, and that only is pure nature in which God might have originally created us, if he had chosen. Now, as the beatific vision is confessedly supernatural, it must be in every sense above our

natural powers, and consequently can be no object of natural desire, or necessary to satisfy the soul's natural craving for beatitude, especially if in every desire there is even an obscure perception of the object.

There is undoubtedly some force in this reasoning, but perhaps it is not conclusive. The proposition of Baius was not condemned by St. Pius the Fifth as false in every sense, but solely in the sense of its asserters, as we are told in the Papal Bull itself. The doctrine of the author, moreover, has been maintained since the condemnation of Baius, by a host of eminent theologians, without the least mark of censure, and is certainly a free opinion at least, as is evident from the fact that these volumes themselves were examined at Rome by the Consultor of the Index, and declared to contain nothing contrary to faith. We must also remark, that, though God could have created us in the state of pure nature, it is certain that he did not, at least did not leave us in that state. He might, we doubt not, have created us for a purely natural beatitude, but we believe it is allowable to say that he has not. Man was originally intended by his Maker for a supernatural destiny, not indeed to be gained by his natural powers, but by the supernatural elevation and assistance of grace. Strictly speaking, man has no natural destiny, and is destined only to a supernatural heaven or to a supernatural hell. In reasoning of man now, we must take him as he is. He certainly has no complete natural beatitude, and the actual wants of his soul certainly cannot be satisfied with anything less than the beatific vision. Yet it may be that these wants do not in all respects belong to the soul as pure nature, and it may be that they are to some extent due to the secret operations of grace, which will not suffer us to find repose anywhere this side of our supernatural destiny. Take man as we find him to-day, and it is certainly true that nothing short of the beatific vision can satisfy his longing to love, or completely fill his soul. And whether this is the result of pure nature or of the secret operations of grace, the argument for the supernatural is equally strong.

It is no part of our office to enter into the dispute on this point between the Augustinians and the Jesuits, for both are Catholics without reproach. But this much is, we think, certain, that man, as we now find him, in the present decree of God, as say the theologians, has in fact

no natural destiny; and nothing natural, not even the natural vision of God, which is only a vision *per speculum*, not an intuitive vision of his essence, can satisfy the wants of his soul. He certainly has desires both to know and to love which transcend the whole natural order. He has these desires prior to faith. Whether these desires belong to him as pure nature or not, certain it is that he has them, and with them enters into all his acts, or rational operations. It is impossible to find a mind which has not aspirations beyond nature, and which nothing in nature can satisfy. Every man proves it in his own experience. The natural vision of God is insufficient to satisfy our craving to know, for it is remarkable that Reason, when she has attained the ultimate limits of rational knowledge, seems to herself to know perfectly well that there is an infinite unknown reality beyond. She never can persuade herself that the limits of what she knows are the limits of what is. Now how explain this? How explain this knowledge, if we may so say, of the unknown and the naturally unknowable. Gioberti explains it by claiming for man a faculty of superintelligence, of seizing, in some sense, the superintelligible, and regards it as the soul's secret apprehension of her own potentiality. We do not attempt to explain it; we only call attention to it as a fact, a mysterious fact, no doubt, but a fact of the last importance. We do not know how to explain it, but we are disposed to regard it as the natural aptitude of the soul for the supernatural, by virtue of which the supernatural is as it were linked with the natural, joined on to it, and so that it can elevate the natural without superseding it. From this it would follow that in the highest sense man is completed, perfected, only in the supernatural, which is, if we understand it, the doctrine of St. Thomas, and which should be the case, if man was originally intended for a supernatural, not a natural, destiny.

There are, as M. Gratry after the theologians maintains, two degrees of the Divine intelligibility, or of knowledge of God,—the knowledge of God *per speculum*, a knowledge of him by his works as the light which illuminates them, and the knowledge of God in his essence, as he is in himself. The first is within the powers of natural reason, the second is not, and is possible only in heaven, by the light of glory. But these two degrees are connected even in

this life, by supernatural faith, which, resting on the first as its basis or preamble, is a beginning or a foretaste of the second. There are then really three degrees or stages in the knowledge of God, philosophy, faith, and the beatific vision. The last two are supernatural, the first is natural. But is the natural without any connecting link with the supernatural? Must there not be a natural relation of philosophy to faith, as well as of faith to the beatific vision? If we examine the great philosophers, Gentile as well as Christian, we shall find a distinct recognition of the first two degrees of knowledge of God which we have described, but a confession that one of them is not naturally attainable. Whence this recognition by Philosophy of the existence of an order of knowledge confessedly beyond her reach? All men naturally, that is, prior to faith, aspire to it, at least implicitly, and find no real repose short of it. Whence this aspiration to the unseen, the unknown, and the naturally unknowable? Does it not result from some aptitude in the soul for the supernatural, a consciousness of an undeveloped power, or the secret perception of the infinite, that is, that the infinite really is, with the consciousness that we neither possess it nor know what it is? As every perception is also an aspiration, and as every man does perceive, in perceiving God *per speculum*, that the infinite is, though he perceives not what it is, why may we not say that man naturally aspires to the infinite, and that in this aspiration there is in some sense a natural basis of supernatural faith? Faith, and even the beatific vision, though above reason, cannot be wholly foreign to it; for if they were, how could we speak intelligibly of them, and how could what we say of them have any meaning for the natural understanding? It seems to us, therefore, that the three degrees of the Divine intelligibility are to be considered, not as three separate itineraries, but as three stages in one and the same itinerary of the soul to God. Philosophy, if worthy of the name, has then a natural aptitude for supernatural faith, and conducts to faith, as faith conducts to the perfect knowledge of God in the beatific vision. This, if we understand our author, is what he holds, and what he has attempted in these volumes to bring out and establish, and, so far as we are able to judge of such profound matters, with complete success.

Our readers will readily excuse us from doing more here

than stating as well as we are able the doctrine of the author. We shrink from its discussion, as being altogether beyond our depth. But they will see, if his doctrine be admissible, that, while it confines philosophy within the sphere of the natural, it removes all discrepancy between it and faith, and enables the natural understanding to perceive the unity of man's whole intellectual life, or at least the possibility of such unity. Revelation gives us a foretaste of a knowledge of God far above that which is possible by natural reason alone; but revelation must be made to reason, as its subject, and there must be in some sense a fusion of the natural and supernatural into one uniform light, or else the revelation would be to us as if it were not. But this could not be if reason had not in itself a certain aptitude for the supernatural, if reason were not the preamble to faith, as faith is the preamble to the beatific vision. Supposing this to be so, all true philosophy, though falling always below faith, though never faith itself, yet conducts to faith, and finds its complement in it; and therefore all those intellectual systems, called Philosophy, which conduct to doubt or scepticism, are false, and unworthy of the least attention.

The doctrine here asserted is the reverse of that of the Eclectic school founded by M. Cousin. That school regards faith as symbolic of the truths attainable by natural reason, and therefore as the preamble to philosophy, and destined to disappear in the light of natural science. It places faith below philosophy, and harmonizes them by making philosophy a higher form of intellectual apprehension than faith,—that is, by simply denying the truths revealed by faith, and recognizing no truths but those evident to natural reason! Faith is supposed to fade away in the clearer light of philosophy, instead of philosophy finding its complement in the higher truths revealed by faith. Catholic dogma is all very true, says this school, but it is the truth of the natural order expressed in a poetical or symbolical form, adapted to the wants of the simple, the rude, and the vulgar. It is not the office of philosophy to deny Catholic dogma, but to disengage the natural truth from the poetic form, and express it in a clear, distinct, and scientific form. For the vulgar, the mass of the people, dogma is necessary; but for philosophers, the *élite* of the race, it ceases to be necessary, because they

have science, and where science begins, faith ends. But unhappily for this school, our natural science ends where faith begins, and is never a complete science, and, without that higher order of truth of which faith is a foretaste, can never rest satisfied with itself.

Faith undoubtedly is in some sense symbolic, and so far the Eclectics are right. But of what is it symbolic? Faith undoubtedly ends where the light of science begins; but of what science? The error is, not in assuming faith to be symbolical, but in assuming that it is symbolical of the truths naturally apprehensible, and that the science in which it ends is natural science, the science attainable by the natural light of reason, instead of that superior science attainable only in heaven by the light of glory. Faith is a medium science between the two sciences, beginning where natural science ends, and ending where the supernatural science, or the Science of the Blessed, begins, and partakes in some sense of the nature of both. Instead, then, of pitying the poor people who have only faith, we should pity the poor philosophers who have only philosophy. There is no exaggeration in saying that the youngest child who has learned his Catechism is above them, and is introduced to an order of reality far above anything they have attained to,—not because the Catechism supersedes natural science, but because it adds to the highest philosophy the revelation of an order of truth for ever above and beyond the reach of the profoundest philosopher.

But to return. The itinerary of the soul to God includes, as we have seen, three stages, reason, faith, the beatific vision, and the true and direct science of God is complete only in the last stage. Without undertaking to explain here the precise relation of these stages to one another, we wish to remark, that through them all the itinerary is one and the same, and is the itinerary of one and the same soul, or rational subject. What is begun in reason is completed only in the beatific vision. "I shall be satisfied when I awake in Thy likeness." The journey terminates, and we can repose, only when we have attained to direct and immediate knowledge of God in his essence, or as he is in himself. Of course this last and perfect degree of science is not obtained by a simple development of our natural powers, and is obtained only by

the supernatural elevation of our natural powers, first, by the grace of faith, and, second, by the light of glory. As the natural desire of the soul to know cannot be completely satisfied, in the present providence of God, without this last degree of science, it follows that it is only in this that the soul can find its supreme good, or the object adequate to satisfy its natural craving to love. We do not, of course, pretend that man is naturally able to love God as so beheld, because he is not naturally able so to behold him; and though love may surpass science, and as it were overflow it, we cannot love what we do not in some degree intellectually apprehend. We do not say, by any means, that God could not have so made man that he would have been satisfied with that knowledge of him which is *per speculum*, but we do say, that as we find him now, even prior to faith, he does not so exist. Hence we learn that the soul can find its supreme good only in the complete knowledge and perfect love of God, and that this knowledge and love are not naturally attainable.

Without faith our philosophy is incomplete, and without the intuitive vision of God, *in patria*, our faith cannot be perfected. To this conclusion we are conducted by all sound philosophy. As Reason is able to detect her own limits, and to be well assured of the knowable infinitely surpassing the known, so Philosophy is able to detect her own insufficiency, and to assert the necessity, in order to appease the cravings of the soul, of faith or supernatural revelation. Reason itself is able to assert God, and to assert him as the final cause as well as the first cause of our existence. It is able, not to secure us unaided our supreme good, but to tell us that our supreme good is in the knowledge and love of God, who is the Supreme Good itself. It tells us, that we have a supreme good, and where that supreme good is to be found; but it cannot show it to us, tell us what it is, or of itself obtain it for us. For this last, grace is necessary to enlighten the understanding and to elevate the will, that is, to make us a revelation of God in a sense above that in which he is naturally apprehensible. It is idle, then, for any of us to seek any real and permanent good save as elevated by grace and guided by faith, or, in other words, without the teachings and sacraments of the Church.

This has been admirably set forth by Father Hecker

in his exceedingly interesting and profound work, entitled, *Questions of the Soul*. Assuming the great truths which underlie M. Gratry's philosophy, — that man loves as well as knows, and that every one of his thoughts is an aspiration, a real demand for good, — he shows what are the natural and unceasing wants of the soul, and that these wants cannot be satisfied out of the Catholic Church; but that in that Church Almighty God, in the excess of his bounty, has made the most ample provision for their complete satisfaction. The vain sophist, the unhappy worldling, may not believe this, but we can tell either, that it is in strict accordance with the deepest and truest philosophy.

It will be seen from what we have said, that M. Gratry has really given us a living and practical philosophy. It explains our moral and intellectual constitution, and harmonizes reason and faith. It thus satisfies the intellect. It harmonizes intellect and love by showing the innate synthesis of perception and aspiration, of science and morality. He harmonizes thus our whole intellectual and moral life, and shows that, while all genuine love is rational, all rational operations have union with God, as the supreme good of the soul, or as the supreme good in itself, for their end. He does not war with the Schoolmen, but he presents their teachings in a more life-giving form to our age; and, while he is no innovator in thought, he will, we think, impress a new movement on the mind of the age, that will be as salutary as powerful. We most cordially commend his work, notwithstanding the few faults we have found with it, to all lovers of sound philosophy.

ART. II.—*The Roman Empire after the Peace of the Church.*—*A Fragment from a History of the Western Monks.*

THE Roman people, the conquerors of all nations and the masters of the world, subject for three hundred years to an almost uninterrupted succession of monsters or idiots, with only now and then a few tolerable princes, present the greatest prodigy in history of the decline and debasement

of man. An equally great prodigy of the power and goodness of God is seen in the Peace of the Church proclaimed by Constantine in 312. Conquered by an unarmed multitude, the Empire surrendered to the Galilean. Persecution, after a last paroxysm, the most cruel of all, was followed by protection. Humanity breathed again, and the truth first sealed with the blood of a God-made man, and afterwards with that of so many thousands of martyrs, could henceforth freely take its victorious flight to the extremities of the earth.

Yet there is a still greater prodigy, — the rapid and permanent decline of the Roman world after the Peace of the Church. Indeed, if there is nothing in the annals of cruelty and corruption more abject than the Roman Empire from Augustus to Diocletian, there is something still more sad and astonishing, — it is the Roman Empire become Christian.

Why did not Christianity, drawn from the Catacombs to be placed on the throne of the Cæsars, suffice for the regeneration of souls in the temporal, as in the spiritual order? Why was it not able to restore to authority its respect, to the citizen his dignity, to Rome her greatness, and to civilized Europe the strength to live and to defend itself? Why did the imperial power, when reconciled to the Church, fall into still greater impotence and contempt? Why was this memorable alliance of the priesthood and the empire unable to prevent either the ruin of the state or the slavery and division of the Church?

Never was revolution more complete; for the Church not only celebrated her emancipation, when she beheld Constantine assume the labarum for his standard, but also a close and entire alliance of the cross and the imperial sceptre. The Christian religion, no longer proscribed, soon became protected, then dominant. The successor of Nero and Decius sat in the first General Council, and received the title of Defender of the Holy Canons. As a learned author has observed, the Roman and Christian commonwealths joined hands under Constantine.* Sole chief, judge, and legislator of the universe, he took bishops for his counsellors, and gave to their decrees the force of law.

The world had a monarch: this monarch was absolute:

* Franz de Champagny, *De la Charité Chrétienne au Quatrième Siècle.*

no one thought of disputing or limiting his power, which the Church blessed and gloried in protecting. This ideal — so dear to many minds — of a man before whom all men prostrate themselves, and who, master of all these slaves, prostrates himself in turn before God, was then seen realized. It was seen for two or three centuries, during which everything went to ruin in the empire; and the Church has known no epoch in which she has been more agitated, tormented, and compromised.

Whilst imperial Rome was sunk in the mire, the Church enjoyed her grandest and noblest existence, — not, as is too often imagined, only concealed in the Catacombs, but struggling heroically and in open day, by sufferings and arguments, with courage and eloquence, by her councils* and her schools, and first and especially by her martyrs, but also by those great apologists, St. Irenæus, St. Justin, St. Cyprian, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, Eusebius, and Lactantius, who purified while they renewed the eloquence of Greece and Rome. War had so prospered the Church, that, when peace was offered her, she was spread over the whole earth.

But after so gloriously surviving three centuries of battle, how will she resist the victory, and maintain her triumph after these struggles? Will she not fall, like all human conquerors, in the pride and intoxication of success? To the vigilant and fruitful education of war, to the holy joy of persecution, to the dignity of permanent and open danger, must succeed an entirely new conduct, and on a ground otherwise difficult. Associated henceforth with this same imperial power which had in vain essayed to annihilate her, she becomes in a measure responsible for a society for three centuries decaying and rotting in all the refinements of corruption. It is not enough that she rule the ancient world, she must also transform and replace it. It was a frightful task, but must not be beyond her strength. God chose this moment to send his Church a cloud of saints, pontiffs, doctors, orators, and writers. They formed that constellation of Christian geniuses, which, under the name of Fathers of the Church, has conquered the first place in the veneration of ages, and demanded the

* The collection of Père Labbe reckons sixty-two prior to the Peace of the Church.

respect even of sceptics. They filled both the East and the West with the splendor of the true and the beautiful; they brought to the service of truth an ardor, eloquence, and learning which nothing can ever surpass. A hundred years after the Peace of the Church, they had covered the earth with good works and beautiful writings, created an asylum for every grief, a relief for every want, and lessons and examples of all truth and virtue. Yet they did not succeed in creating a new society, in transforming the pagan world. According to their own avowal, their attempt was unsuccessful. That long cry of grief, prolonged through all the pages which the saints and Christian writers have bequeathed us, breaks forth with an intensity which has never been equalled in the whole course of time. They felt themselves overrun, and, as it were, swallowed up by the corruptions of Paganism. Listen to Jerome, Chrysostom, Augustine, Salvian, or any of them. They see with despair the greater part of Christians rushing into the pleasures of Paganism. The unrestrained lust for spectacles, not even arrested by the blood of the gladiator, all the shameful excesses, frivolities, and prostitutions of persecuting Rome, assailed the new converts, and subjugated the sons of the martyrs. A little later, a new Juvenal might sing the defeat of those who had conquered the world for God, and the vengeance of the genius of evil on its conquerors:—

“Victumque ulciscitur orbem.”

But Paganism preserved and maintained its empire, by the nature and action of the temporal power, in the presence of the Church, even more than in the domestic and private life. No symptom appeared there of the transformation which the idea and exercise of power was one day to undergo among Christian nations. Constantine and his successors were baptized; the empire, that is, the imperial power, was not. The hand which opened to Christians the door to favor and to power was the same which laid for them snares, in which any other church than the Immortal Spouse of Christ would have for ever perished without honor. The emperors sought to become the masters and oracles of a religion of which they could only be children, or, at most, ministers. No sooner did they acknowledge its right to live, than they believed

themselves invested with the right to govern it. Baptized yesterday, they thought they must become pontiffs and doctors to-day. Not succeeding in this, they renewed in behalf of Arius the persecutions begun by their predecessors in behalf of Jupiter and Venus. Even Constantine himself, the liberator of the Church, the lay president of the Council of Nicæa, soon grew tired of the liberty and increasing authority of the newly emancipated Christians. Influenced by the ecclesiastical courtiers who surrounded his throne, he banished St. Athanasius, the noblest and purest of Christians. His successors were far worse. Hear what Bossuet says: "The Emperor Constantius placed himself at the head of the Arians, and so cruelly persecuted the Catholics that this persecution was regarded as *more cruel* than that of Decius or Maximian, and as the prelude to that of Antichrist. . . . Valens, Emperor of the East, an Arian like Constantius, was a still more violent persecutor; and it was said of him that he seemed to grow lenient when he changed the punishment of death into banishment."*

The trial must have been severe; for then was seen what never has been seen before or since, — a Pope yielded. According to the common opinion, Liberius, after a noble resistance to the torments of exile, yielded, and sacrificed, not indeed the true doctrine, but the intrepid defender of the truth, Athanasius. He rose again; the indefectible authority of his See is not affected, only the renown of his persecutors is compromised; † yet at his name there arises a shade which passes in front of the column of truth which guides the view of every Catholic plunging into the depths of history.

These violences, exiles, and massacres, renewed in the fifth century, were prolonged from generation to generation. Every heresiarch finds an auxiliary on the imperial throne. After Arius came Nestorius, after Nestorius, Eutyches; and thus we step from one persecution to another, to the bloody oppression of the Iconoclast Emperors, followed by the greatest of all schisms, which for ever separated the emancipated and orthodox West from the

* Bossuet, *Cinquième Avertissement aux Protestans*, c. 18.

† Fleury, *Histoire Ecclésiastique*, Tom. XVI. c. 18. — Le Comte de Maistre, *Du Pape*, Liv. I. c. 15.

East, still prostrated under the double yoke of error and force.

Yet how many bitter sufferings during the long dark ages which preceded the final rupture! It was no longer Pagans, but Christians, that persecuted Christianity. It was no longer from the prætorium or circus that the Emperors — true personification of ancient and implacable Rome — sent the Christians to the wild beasts; but in the bosom of councils, and in the name of a false orthodoxy, they planned their decrees, stamped with the triple mark of chicanery, cunning, and cruelty. Before proceeding to banishment and torment, they tortured the conscience and understanding with formulas and definitions. The greatest geniuses and noblest characters of this epoch, fruitful in great men, were in vain employed in reasoning with these crowned casuists, who dogmatized instead of reigning, and sacrificed in miserable quarrels both the majesty of the Church and the security of the state. Exile must have been a relief to those holy confessors, condemned to respectful discussion with such adversaries. Whilst the empire was falling to decay, and avenging nations were entering at the breach on all sides, these pitiable autocrats, masters of a clergy who rivalled in servility the eunuchs of the palace, wrote books of theology, prepared formulas, invented and condemned heresies in confessions of faith which were themselves heretical.* And as though these crowned theologians were not enough, they had to endure Empreses also, who, in their turn, took part in directing consciences, defining dogmas, and punishing bishops. An Ambrose was seen contending with a Justina, and a Chrysostom the victim of the follies of Eudoxia. Nothing was too low or senseless for this wretched government.

Some one may cite Theodosius: but that famous penitence which does so much honor to the great Theodosius, and to St. Ambrose, throws a bloody light on the state of this pretended Christian empire. What a society that was in which the massacre of a whole city was ordered, in cold blood, to revenge an injury done to a statue! What

* Such were the Henoticon of the Emperor Zeno in 432, condemned by Pope Felix III.; the Ecthesis of Heraclius, condemned by Pope John IV.; and the Typus of Constans II., condemned by St. Martin I.

a recital of the sufferings and torments inflicted on the inhabitants of Antioch before the intervention of Bishop Flavianus had pacified the imperial wrath! The horror of such a system, if it had lasted, must have for ever defiled Christianity, with which it sought to adorn itself. And for one Theodosius, how many we find like Valens, like Honorius, and like Copronymus! The fearful temptation of absolute power turned all their heads. The Christian princes did not resist it any more than the Pagan Emperors. To monsters of luxury and cruelty, like Heliogabalus and Maximian, succeeded prodigies of imbecility and inconsistency.

What must have been the hardest for the Church was, that these pitiable masters of the world pretended to place her under obligations to them. She paid dearly for the material support which she received from the imperial power, which protected without honoring, or even understanding, her. Every decree passed to favor Christianity, to shut the temples, to forbid the sacrifices of the old worship, to extirpate and destroy the last remains of Paganism, was accompanied or followed by some act intended to settle a question of dogma, of discipline, or of Church government. A law of Theodosius the Second, in 428, condemned heretics to hard labor in the mines, and he was himself an Eutychian. Thus heresy, believing itself sufficiently orthodox to proscribe all who thought differently, ascended the throne where omnipotence awaited it. The same Emperor, and his colleague, Valentinian the Third, decreed the punishment of death for idolatry; but idolatry reigned in their own heart, and all around them. The whole ceremonial of their court, all the acts of their government, are impregnated with the tradition of the Prince-God.* The most pious of them, even the great Theodosius himself, speak continually of their sacred palaces, of their *divine* house. They permit such a minister to come and adore their *eternity*. The same Valentinian who punished idolatry with death called the Romans to arms against an invasion of the Vandals, and declared the proclamation signed by the *divine hand*, meaning his own.†

Thus the divinity of the prince, an invention of the

* Champagny, op. cit. p. 358.

† "Et manu divina proponatur," etc. *Novell.*, Tit. XX.

Cæsars who sealed the degradation of Rome and placed slavery under the sanction of idolatry, a hideous chimæra which had been the principal pretext for persecution, and had drunk the blood of so many human victims, lasted for a century after the Peace of the Church. Sacrifices were no longer offered to the Cæsars after their death, but during their life they were proclaimed *divine* and *eternal*. It was only a word; but a word which showed the cowardice of souls and the flagrant servitude of the Christian idea.

The Church has passed through many trials, she has been frequently compromised and persecuted, profaned and betrayed by unworthy ministers; but I know not that she was ever nearer the precipice into which God has promised she should never fall. I do not know that her lot was ever more sad than under this long series of monarchs who believed themselves her benefactors and protectors, and refused her liberty, peace, and honor.

If such were the sorrows of the Church while yet so young and at so short a distance from her cradle, what must have been those of the state,—of the lay society? Paganism still remained standing and entire, as has been shown by one of the most excellent historians of our age: "The civil society appeared Christian, like the religious society; the sovereigns and the people in an immense majority had embraced Christianity; but the civil society was Pagan at bottom; its institutions, laws, and manners were retained from Paganism. It was the society which Paganism had formed, and by no means that of Christianity." *

And this Paganism, be it remembered, was Paganism in its most degenerate form. The policy of statesmen consisted, according to Tacitus, in supporting emperors of any kind.† All the greatness of Rome, to use the expression of Montesquieu, ended only in gorging with pleasure five or six monsters. After Constantine the sovereigns are worth more than these monsters, but the institutions are

* Guizot, *Histoire de la Civilization en France*, 2de leçon. He adds, that "the Christian society was only developed later,—after the invasion of the barbarians: it belongs to modern history."

† "Bonos imperatores volo expetere, qualescumque tolerare." *Histor.*, IV. 8.

worth less and less. A hundred and twenty millions of men have no other right than that of belonging to a single man, an accidental master, called to the empire by a caprice of the army or an intrigue of the court. Despotism in growing old becomes weaker and more vexatious. It weighs on all, but protects none. After the conversion of Constantine, as before it, each reign knits closer that scientific fiscal system which ends in ruining both labor and property throughout the Roman world. With the aid of jurisprudence, it erects the Emperor, as sole representative of the sovereign people, into the supreme proprietor of all the wealth of the empire. Taxes succeed in absorbing all that confiscations have not exhausted of the patrimony of freemen. The proprietor, the citizen, is only a public debtor, and is treated with all the barbarities which the old Romans used towards their debtors: he is thrown into prison, and scourged; his wife too is scourged, and his children are sold.* The administrative system, introduced by Diocletian, continued by the Christian Emperors, and perfected by Justinian, becomes the scourge of the world. The aristocracy, first victim of despotism, deprived of power and independence, its place everywhere supplied by the administration, is buried under pompously ridiculous titles, which conceal its impotence from no one. The citizens of the towns, responsible for the taxes, and condemned to magistracies as to the galleys, are under the name of *curiales* subjected to a skilfully organized and pitilessly applied oppression. A law of the two sons of Theodosius punished with confiscation of property the

* The following is a story which indirectly enters into our subject, and shows what was the state of Roman and Christian Egypt in the fifth century. A robber who has become a monk relates it to the celebrated Abbot Paphnucius. "*Inveni aliquam formosam mulierem errantem in solitudine, fugatam ab apparitoribus et curialibus præsidis et senatorum, propter publicum mariti debitum. Sciscitatus sum ex ea causam fletus. Illa dixit cum maritus tempore biennii ob debitum publicum trecentorum aureorum sæpe fuerit flagellatus, et in carcere inclusus et tres mihi carissimi filii venditi fuerint, ego recedo fugitiva, etiam errans per solitudinem sæpe inventa et assidue flagellata, jam tres dies permansi jejuna.*" The robber had pity on this victim of the magistrates; gave her the gold which he had stolen, and placed her and her children in shelter from outrage, *citra probrum et contumeliam*. This act of piety obtained for him the mercy of God and his conversion. Palladius, *Historia Lasiaca*, c. 63.

impiety of the unfortunate proprietor who left these towns transformed into prisons, to take refuge in the country.*

The rural population, exhausted by the abominable exactions of the treasury, without protection or encouragement, disgusted with agriculture, flee to the woods or to the Barbarians, or else revolt and are cut to pieces. Bossuet sums up their condition in two sentences. "Every thing perishes in the East: the whole West is deserted."† Labor cannot be procured, the soil remains uncultivated, the population declines; weakness, decay, and death are spread over the whole empire. Provinces, invaded and laid waste by the barbarians, and by the imperial officers, have not retained sufficient energy to throw off the yoke. *The world is dying at Rome*, said the Gallic lords to the Emperor Avitus,‡ and Rome herself, abandoned by the Emperors and sacked by the Goths, seems condemned to death. Nothing remains of those happy days when Roman liberty and its civic majesty cast on human nature a light of which the memory is, thank God, unextinguishable.

Nothing ever equalled the degradation of these Romans of the empire. Free, they had conquered and governed the world; enslaved, they could not even defend themselves. They changed their masters, took two, then four, and increased despotism in every manner. With their ancient liberty had departed all virtue and manliness. Nothing was left but a society of functionaries without vigor, without rights, and without honor.

I say nothing of the decline of the arts, of the low state of literature and the sciences. The spiritual was a thousand times greater than the material misery. Everything was enervated, decrepit, emaciated. Not a single great man, not one great character, appeared in this decayed society. Eunuchs and sophists of the court governed the state without control, and encountered no resist-

* "Curiales jubemus moneri ne civitates fugiant aut deserant, rus habitandi causa; fundum quem civitati præculerint scientes fisco ne sociandum, eoque rure esse carituras, cujus causa *impíos* se, vitanda patriam, demonstrarint." *L. curiales* 2. — Cod. Theod., Lib. XII. Tit. 18, *Si Curiales*.

† *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle*, Première Partie, XI^e epoq., Troisième Partie, Chap. 7.

‡ Sidon. Apollinaris, *Paneg. Avit.*

ance except from the Church. After Theodosius, it was necessary that a truly Christian woman like St. Pulcheria should occupy the throne of Constantine, to regain for it the respect which it had lost. If a great captain, a man of talent and a heart, appears from time to time, he is sure to fall, like Stilicon, Aetius, and Belisarius, under the homicidal jealousy of a master who can tolerate neither power nor fame by the side of his omnipotence. Whilst they lived, their renown was a title of proscription, which even their death could not gild. The infected air which they breathed seems to have tainted their glory; it remains without splendor or respect in history.

In such disastrous times we must turn to the Church if we wish to find any traces of the greatness and force which are the rightful endowments of God's noblest creature. Only in the different orders of the ecclesiastical hierarchy was it still possible to live, to struggle, and even to shine, despite the yoke of the theological Emperors. The whole empire, great and small, the last offspring of the Roman patricians, the old races of the conquered nations, and the plebeians of all the provinces, decorated in a mass with the title of Roman citizen after this title had lost all value, might all in the City of God demand back their lost dignity, their confiscated liberty. The Church alone offered them, in the energy, activity, intelligence, and devotion which she still retained, a sufficient nutriment; for she invited them all to an inexhaustible source of sacrifices and victories. Glory, virtue, courage, liberty, and all that honors life even in a human point of view, were found only in the Church, in those great controversies, and those incessant struggles for the salvation of souls and the triumph of truth, where she had always right, reason, and genius on her side; and even these were not enough to gain her cause before the throne of her protectors.

But by the side of this spiritual society, instituted and ruled by himself, God has created a temporal society, and although here as everywhere he reserves to himself the secret conduct of events, and the care of striking the great blows of his infallible justice; he has left its habitual government to the free and intelligent activity of man. To take from this temporal society its life, or all that constitutes the value of life, to reduce it to

stagnation, to slavery, to indifference, to moral misery, in order to admit that only the spiritual society has the right to live and to grow, and that only religious controversy should engage the affections of the soul, is to push humanity into an abyss. History presents more than one example of this, as well as of the opposite excess; but such a state of things is repugnant to the laws of the creation. It is in accordance neither with the views of God nor with the interests of the Church to condemn civil society to a nullity. Man has other rights than that of choosing between the priesthood and slavery. There is nothing which approaches nearer to heaven than a monastery inhabited by religious, freely detached from the world; but to transform the world into a cloister of unwilling monks would be to counterfeit and anticipate hell. God never made the degradation and slavery of the world a condition of the liberty of his Church. Happily different times followed, when by the side of the triumphant, free, and fruitful Church arose a society ardent and humble in its faith, and energetic, warlike, generous, and manly even in its errors; where authority was respected, yet limited, and liberty was ennobled by sacrifice and charity; where heroes elbow the saints, and the cloisters, more full than ever before, are not the only refuge of noble and manly souls; where many, though not all men, find the full possession of themselves; and where sovereigns have to count with their subjects, the strong with the weak, and all with God.

In the fourth and fifth centuries the aurora of this necessary renovation had not yet dawned. All the old imperial world was still standing. Christianity accepted that degradation, as she accepts everything, in the supernatural confidence of improving the good and reducing the evil. Yet in spite of its power and its divine origin, in spite of the humble and zealous devotion of the fathers and the pontiffs to the decrepit majesty of the Cæsars, in spite of its men of genius and its saints, Christianity did not succeed in transforming the old society. Had it succeeded in gaining possession of it with the elements of which it was then composed, it could only have made of it a sort of Christian China. God spared it this abortion; but in what then occurred we have an ever-

memorable example of the impotence of genius and sanctity against corruption engendered by despotism.

The old world was then in its agony. The empire was falling slowly into shame and contempt, tainted with that sad weakness which inspires not even pity. Everything was running into incurable decay. Such was the result of the Roman empire two centuries after it became Christian. In the spiritual order, it was tending towards the schism which under the Byzantine Emperors tore from unity and truth more than one half of the world converted by the Apostles. In the temporal order, it resulted in the miserable government of the Lower Empire, the very name of which is a reproach.

In order that the Church might save society, it required a new element in society, a new force in the Church. Two invasions were necessary: that of the Barbarians in the North, and that of the Monks in the South.

They come; first, the Barbarians. See them struggling with the Romans enervated by slavery, with those impotent Emperors in the height of their omnipotence. At first, obscure victims or despised prisoners of the early Emperors; then, the auxiliaries alternately sought after and feared; next, irresistible enemies; and, lastly, conquerors and masters of the humbled empire, — they come not like the torrent which passes by, but as the tide which advances and retires, returns and becomes master of the flooded soil. Thus they advance and retire, return, remain, and triumph. Those who would have wished to stop and make terms with the frightened Romans are in turn pushed on and passed over by the wave which follows. They come down the valley of the Danube, which puts them on the way to Byzantium and Asia Minor. They ascend its tributaries till they come to the Alps, whence they rush upon Italy. They cross the Rhine, pass the Vosges, the Cevennes, and the Pyrenees, and spread over Gaul and Spain. They are not a single people, like the Roman nation, but a hundred distinct and independent races. It is not the army of a conqueror, like Alexander or Cæsar, but of a hundred unknown and intrepid kings, possessing soldiers, not subjects, and accountable for their authority to their priests and their warriors, and forced to labor with boldness and perseverance in order that their power may be pardoned. They all obey an irresistible

impulse, and bear in their rear the destinies and institutions of future Christianity.

Visible but unconscious instruments of the Divine justice, they come to avenge an oppressed people and slaughtered martyrs. They destroy, but it is only to replace what they destroy; and besides, they kill nothing which deserves to live, or which still retains the conditions of life. They shed blood in torrents, but they renew with their own blood the exhausted vigor of Europe. They bring with them fire and the sword, but they also bring strength and life. Through a thousand faults and a thousand crimes, they exhibit two things unknown to Roman society,—the dignity of man, and respect for woman. With them these were rather instincts than principles; but when purified and fecundated by Christianity, they will produce Catholic chivalry and royalty. Above all, they will produce a sentiment unknown in the Roman Empire, perhaps not known to the most illustrious Pagans, and yet incompatible with despotism,—the sentiment of honor, “the secret and profound resort of modern society, and which is nothing else than the inviolability and independence of the human conscience superior to all power, to all tyranny, and to all external force.”*

They bring also liberty; not indeed such as we have since conceived and possessed it, but the germs and the conditions of all liberty; that is to say, the spirit of resistance to all excessive power, a manly impatience of the yoke, a profound consciousness of personal right, of the individual value of every soul before other men, as before God.

Liberty and honor! What Rome wanted and the world after Augustus, we owe to our ancestors, the Barbarians.

In a purely religious point of view, more than one great heart among Christians was able from the beginning to recognize the mysterious marks with which God had characterized these races, which seemed only the offspring of his anger. They proclaimed them with a confidence un-

*Ozanam, *Cours inédit sur la Civilization Chrétienne*. We may be permitted at the same time to cite and to announce this work, which a pious hand will soon present to the public. It will be the last legacy of the young writer, who was so perfect a Christian, so eloquent and feeling an orator, and whose premature death is one of the greatest misfortunes that religion and literature have for a long time had to deplore.

shaken by the fury of the hurricane which they had to pass through, and which lasted for two centuries. In the midst of the sufferings and barbarities of the first invasion of the Goths, St. Augustine relates the wonderful withdrawal of Alaric's soldiers before the tombs of the martyrs, and even speaks of the mercy and humanity of these terrible conquerors. "*Misericordia et humilitas etiam immanium barbarorum.*"* Salviau hesitates not to say, that even the heretical Barbarians led a better life than the orthodox Romans. "Their chastity," he says, "purifies the earth, still tainted with the Roman debauches." Paul Orosius, a disciple of St. Augustine, compares them to Alexander and to the Romans in the days of the Republic, and adds: "The Germans overthrow the earth at present, but if (which God forbid) they end by becoming its masters and governing it according to their manners, perhaps posterity will honor with the title of great kings those in whom we can see only enemies."

Yet let us not exaggerate or go beyond the truth. These great conquests of the future existed only in germ, in the fermentation of these confused and boiling masses. At first sight, they seem to be animated by cruelty and violence, by the love of blood and devastation, and, as with all savages, the explosions of brutal nature are closely allied to the refinements of art. These unsubdued men, who could so well avenge the dignity of man against their sovereigns, respected it so little, that they butchered whole populations as if in sport. These warriors, kneeling around their prophetesses and acknowledging that there is something holy in woman,† too frequently made their captives the toys of their luxury or cruelty,‡ and their kings, at least, practised polygamy.

Placed in presence of Christianity, their attitude was uncertain, their adhesion tardy and equivocal. Though at an early time there were Christians among the Goths; though from the first days of the Peace of the Church German bishops appeared in the councils (at Arles, Nicæa, Sardica); though at the sacking of Rome, in 410, Alaric

* *De Civit. Dei*, Lib. I. cap. 4. Cf. cap. 1 et 7.

† "*Inesse quinetiam sanctum aliquid.*" Tacitus, *De Mor. Germ.*

‡ See, amongst other examples, the torments inflicted on three hundred Frank maidens given as hostages to the Thuringians.

ordered respect to be paid to the sacred vases, to the churches, and to Christian women; though the whole of barbarism personified in its two greatest leaders seemed to pause before St. Leo, who was alone able to restrain Genseric and make Attila recoil,—it is not less true that these two centuries of the invasion of the heart of the Christian world did not suffice to unite the conquerors in the religion of the conquered. The Saxons, Franks, Gepidi, and Alani remained idolaters, and what was a thousand times more lamentable, as fast as these nations became Christian they fell a prey to heresy. The truth was for them only a bridge from one abyss to another. Kept down for a moment in the empire by Theodosius, Arianism seduced and subjugated the future conquerors of the empire. The Visigoths, Ostrogoths, Heruli, and Burgundians became Arians. Euric and the Suevi in Spain, Genseric and the Vandals in Africa, immolated thousands of victims to this doctrine, which was the idol of all tyrants; because it flattered the revolt of reason against faith, and the usurpation of power over the Church.

The contagion of Roman morals soon infected these young and passionate races. Their energetic vitality fell a prey to the impure caresses of a decrepit civilization. The conquest became a debauch, and the world ran the risk of changing masters without changing its destiny. Who then will discipline these unconquered races? Who will instruct them in the great art of living and governing? Who will teach them to establish kingdoms and societies? Who will bend without enfeebling them? Who will preserve them from the contagion? Who will prevent them from rushing headlong into corruption, and rotting before they are ripe?

The Church: but the Church through the Monks. From the depths of the deserts of the East and of Africa, God sent forth a host of black men, more intrepid and patient, more indefatigable and more severe towards themselves, than were either the Romans or the Barbarians. Without noise they spread over the empire, and when the hour of its ruin struck, they were ready in the West as in the East. The Barbarians came, and as they advanced, by their side, before them, behind them, and wherever they passed with fire and death, another army encamped in silence; other colonies were formed, grouped together, and

devoted to repair the horrors of the invasion, and to gather the fruits of the victory. When the exterminators had overrun, ravaged, and conquered everything, a great man appeared. St. Benedict was the legislator of voluntary labor, continence, and poverty. He counted his children, his soldiers, by thousands. He received some from among the Barbarians. Even their chief prostrated himself before the saint, and arose with the title of his vassal and auxiliary. St. Benedict wrote a rule which for six centuries shone on the world like a lighthouse of salvation, and was the law, the strength, the life of these peaceful legions, destined in turn to inundate Europe; but to fecundate it, to raise its ruins, to cultivate its wasted fields, people its deserts, and conquer its conquerors.

The Roman empire without the Barbarians was an abyss of slavery and corruption. Conquered by the Barbarians, it was a chaos without the Monks. The Barbarians and Monks united renewed the world, and this new world was called Christendom.

Thus far we have translated from an article by the illustrious Count Montalembert, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of the 1st of January last. The article is a fragment from the author's History of the Western Monks, — a work which the Catholic world is awaiting with some impatience, and which it is prepared to greet with a cordial welcome. Our readers need not to be told of the high estimation in which we hold the profound, eloquent, and learned author, and accomplished academician. Our confidence in his wisdom and prudence as a Catholic leader has not been shaken by the sneers and abuse of the *Univers*, or the attacks of those whose principle it is to adulate power, and to despise a manly independence. In religion Montalembert is a sincere and earnest Catholic; in politics he is the stanch defender of true liberty, and the uncompromising enemy of despotism, whether the despotism of the one, the few, or the many. He is no democrat, no revolutionist, but he certainly believes that political liberty is a right, and that some guaranties against the abuses of power are necessary, alike under a temporal and a spiritual point of view, for every people. In this we are most happy to agree with him, and we honor him that he has had the firmness to stand by his old principles, not-

withstanding the defection of so many of his friends, the horrors perpetrated by Red Republicanism in the name of liberty, and the present reaction in favor of arbitrary power. We always loved and admired him; we now do so more than ever, and we are proud to be included in the number of his friends, and in our humble way to co-operate with him and his noble associates in France.

The men who have principles by which they can stand, in good report and in evil report, are few. In our country everybody can talk about politics, but not one in ten thousand has any real understanding of political science. Most men follow the fashion of the hour. Hence it is that the man who has principles, and abides by them, is almost always misinterpreted. From 1843 to 1850 we directed all our energies against revolutionism and the exaggerations of democracy, and were denounced as hostile to political freedom and in favor of despotism. Since the resuscitation of the imperial *régime* in France, we have opposed as strenuously as we could arbitrary power, and the extension of Cæsarism, and we are supposed by not a few of our friends to have changed our principles, and deserted the stand we took against the European republicans. The truth is, we were misapprehended then, and are misunderstood now. When we opposed the revolutionists, we did it in the name of liberty, not of kings and Cæsars, and in opposing Cæsarism now, we do it in the name of liberty, not of democracy. What we oppose is arbitrary power, in whose hands soever vested, — a government of mere will, whose will soever it may be. We have repeated this so often that neither our friends nor our enemies have any valid excuse for misapprehending us. In the same way has our illustrious friend been also misapprehended. When he advocated authority against the anarchical revolution of 1848, and labored to save society from the destructive fury of Red Republicanism and despotic socialism, he was denounced as the supporter of arbitrary power; when a reaction took place, and the nation was ready to surrender itself body and soul to Cæsar, and he refused to applaud it, he was sneered at as a constitutionalist, a parliamentarian, and as hankering after the tribune. But in both cases he was the consistent friend of political freedom. He holds and always has held, whether under the elder or the younger branch of the Bourbons, the republicans, or the Bonapart-

ists, that the nation has a right to a voice in the management of its affairs, and that there can be in modern times political freedom only under a constitutional and parliamentary government, which secures publicity and freedom of discussion. He is no enemy of the Bonapartes, he is a loyal subject of Napoleon the Third, but he wishes political guaranties, which the imperial constitution does not give, both for the sake of the temporal order and the spiritual. For this, whatever others may do, we honor him, and deem ourselves honored in so doing.

We know that there are Catholics, at home and abroad, who think the cause of religion is to some extent identified with the present imperial *régime* in France. They regard Louis Napoleon as the defender of religion and the protector of the Church, and our refusal to give him our confidence has made us more enemies than friends. We regret this less for our own sake than that of our holy religion. We believe the Emperor wishes well to the Church, but he is ignorant of her interests, and seeks only his own. He neither understands nor loves the freedom of the Church, and, like absolute princes generally, he will protect no further than he can enslave her. As a question of policy, we doubt the prudence, in a republican country like ours, or under a constitutional government like Great Britain and Belgium, of identifying the cause of our Church with that of absolutism. We are charged with being the friends of despotism, with being opposed to political liberty, and we only confirm the charge by our sympathies with Louis Napoleon. He has done nothing, that we are aware of, to endear him to the hearts of Catholics, and if he is fighting against one bitter enemy of the Church, he is in close alliance with another, avowedly in defence of a third. The *Univers*, the leading Catholic journal in Europe, and which under many relations deserves well of the Catholic public, is doing great injury to the Catholic cause, in France and out of it, by its devotion to modern Cæsarism, and its fierce attacks upon liberty in the past and the present, in the old world and the new. It is doing not a little to aid the powerful reaction already commenced against Catholicity. We regret to see some of our own Catholic journals copying its bad example. From 1830 up to 1852, the great leaders of the Catholic party in Europe and this country had adopted

liberty as their watchword, and had advocated, each as the necessary condition of the other, both religious and political freedom; and we have seen no reason, because France has passed from constitutionalism to Cæsarism, to change this wise and sound policy. The Church has no natural affinity with despotism, and has herself always been on the side of freedom. We think of Red Republicanism precisely as we did in 1848, and as we opposed then all alliance of the Church with the Revolution in its favor, so do we oppose all alliance of Catholicity with the Cæsarism which has supplanted it. We do this, not only because we hate despotism in whatever shape it comes, but because the centralized monarchy now dominant in France and Austria will soon provoke a Red Republican reaction, and involve the world anew in the horrors of anarchical revolution. Europe will settle down permanently neither under absolute monarchy nor under absolute democracy, and will alternate from the one to the other till the friends of freedom and order grow wise enough to avoid either extreme.

Religion certainly had much to fear from the revolution, but it has even more from the Cæsarism which is accepted as a remedy against it. This Count Montalembert shows clearly enough in the fragment we have translated. In all ages absolute princes have been the worst enemies of religion, and the Church has nothing more to dread than their protection. They may keep her churches in repair, contribute liberally for the support of the clergy, and the maintenance of the pomp of divine service, but they will never allow her her rightful freedom and independence. They seldom consent to serve her any further than they can use her, and her interests must always be sacrificed to the policy of state. They study always to confine her action to the narrowest possible sphere, to deprive her ministers of all manliness and independence of character, and to render them imbecile or the mere worshippers of power. They oppose every effort on the part of the clergy to educate the faithful, and to elevate the moral and intellectual character of the people. We have seen this in every Catholic country subjected to their domination. A few are educated. Churches are multiplied, the pomp of religious worship amply provided for, but the mass of the people are suffered to vegetate from age to age in the gross-

est ignorance. A traveller through Mexico is struck with what appear to be monuments of the piety of the Spanish government. Large and magnificent churches were built and richly endowed wherever needed, and in no country was more ample provision made for the material support of religion; and yet in no country was the religious and secular instruction of the people more shamefully neglected. The clergy were permitted to administer the sacraments if they saw proper, and were assigned an honorable place in processions, but an arbitrary and jealous government took good care that they should content themselves with giving the least possible amount of instruction, and do nothing to create a great, energetic, and enlightened people. Despotism Spain wanted loyal subjects, not free and enlightened citizens. The state of religion in Cuba, the Queen of the Antilles, is most deplorable, and would gain immensely by the annexation of the island to the American Union. It is hard for any but a courtier or the servile tool of some grandee to be made a bishop or to be appointed to a benefice, and if a bishop or a priest should really attempt to discharge the duties of his office, he would be thwarted by the civil authorities. In all despotic countries the Church, whatever the external splendor she may exhibit, is crippled in her power, is reduced to a sort of gilded slavery. The clergy, confined to the narrowest sphere possible, lose their independence and manliness of character, become indolent and luxurious, servile and self-seeking, and neglectful of the duties of their charge. The people are left to perish. Nothing but the storms created by revolutions or new heresies can purify the atmosphere, and prepare the way for their resuscitation. Hence we explain that imbecility which we so often meet in old Catholic populations, where the Church has for a long time enjoyed the *protection* of the temporal authority.

Yet it is so pleasant to have the protection of the civil ruler, to have the state take care of the temporal wants of the Church, that many Catholics are prone to think that it cannot be purchased at too high a price. Hence their delight in the present state of things in France, and their fulsome adulation of the new Emperor. To obtain the imperial protection for religion they are willing to surrender to the newly elected monarch all their rights as men, and all the rights of the nation. Yet, unless all our

information is erroneous, the external respect gained for the Church in France but ill atones for the reaction going on in the minds of the intelligent classes against Catholicity. The political press in France is not allowed one particle of freedom, but in return the *Presse* and the *Siècle* are free to blaspheme religion to their heart's content. Churches are built, repaired, or embellished, but the Church is losing much of what she gained under Louis Philippe and the Republic. Experience proves that what is best for the Church is not imperial or royal protection, but freedom and independence. We cannot make all men monks, nor can we convert the world into a cloister. It will not do to proceed as if the evangelical counsels were precepts. We must take men as we find them. If we ask too much, we shall get nothing. Rational liberty is a natural right, and men will not, unless brutalized, be content with slavery. If power exacts too much, men do and will resist it, and if they find religion associated with it, apparently its accomplice, they will resist religion also. To identify the Catholic cause with Louis Napoleon, or any other Cæsar, and to make the Church in any degree responsible for his government, were to alienate the affections of every lover of constitutional government or political freedom.

We do not attack the imperial *régime* in France. It is not our business to do it, and we are not disposed to do it, if it were. We have no hostility to the Emperor, and should be sorry to see any disaster befall him. Were we a citizen of France, we should demean ourselves as a loyal subject; but as an American Catholic we owe him no allegiance, and protest against being required to admire or uphold the Cæsarism he is fastening upon his beautiful country. If Frenchmen like it, that is their affair; if they choose to defend it, they have a right to do so, providing they defend it in their character of Frenchmen, for themselves, not as Catholics, for the whole Catholic world. For ourselves we take our stand on the side of constitutional government, and demand as our right both political and religious freedom. We believe the less connection the Church has with the state, especially in our times, the better. It was not without significance that Gregory the Sixteenth was accustomed to add, "From our protectors, O Lord, deliver us." The lay society has relapsed into Paganism, and the Church has

once more to resume her character as a Missionary Church, and to rely on herself, and not on the state. A new martyr age not unlikely awaits us, and we must not suffer it to find us unprepared. The Church is spread through all lands, but there is now no Christendom, and the Church is as free with us, and as independent, as in the most Catholic state in Europe, notwithstanding all the Know-Nothing opposition we have to encounter. She is freer than she would be if the government professed to be her protector, and she will yet prove to be the grand protector of our American liberty. Leave our Church to herself, that is all we ask, and leave us our equal rights as Catholics with others, and we are content. Give us an open field and fair play, and we ask no more. We have no fears for our religion. It can survive the rough and tumble of even American life, and maintain herself in any kind of encounter to which she may be exposed, if not hampered by the so-called protection of the government.

ART. III. — *Institutes of Metaphysic: the Theory of Knowing and Being.* By JAMES F. FERRIER, A. B. Oxon., Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy, St. Andrews. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1854. 12mo. pp. 530.

THIS work of Professor Ferrier claims the attention of the reader, as something more than an ordinary work on philosophy. It is earnest and original; its pretensions are bold, and deserve a careful examination. It purports to be a closely reasoned system of philosophy, and if its doctrines are deduced with all the exactness of mathematical demonstration from the proposition with which it starts, and this first proposition itself is also true and evident, a great work has been accomplished, something certain has been established in philosophy, and so clearly demonstrated that it can no more be called in question than a proposition of Euclid. Has the author succeeded in this grand attempt? Does his work merit the title

with which he has honored it? Has he really given us the *Institutes* of Metaphysics? This is what we propose briefly to examine in the present article.

The system may be stated in a few words. The starting point of the author's philosophy is expressed in Proposition First: "Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognizance of itself." Hence the true and complete object of every cognition is the thing and one's self together, or subject *plus* object; the former is the universal and necessary, the latter the particular and contingent element of the object of every cognition; neither is cognizable by itself. These two elements constitute the absolute in cognition, the *minimum scibile*, and may be expressed as the synthesis of subject *plus* object; as matter *mecum*; thoughts or mental states whatsoever *together* with the self or subject; the universal in union with the particular; or the *ego* or mind in any determinate condition, with any thought or thing present to it.

Ignorance is an intellectual defect, a privation of something which is consistent with the nature of intelligence; it is a privation of knowledge. Hence it is remediable; or there can only be ignorance of that which it is possible to know. Therefore object *plus* subject, the *minimum* of knowledge, is also the *minimum* of ignorance. Having thus examined the universal conditions of all knowledge and of all ignorance, we come to their application in the third part of the work, which is called Ontology, the object of which is to determine the nature of true and absolute existence. Absolute existence, or that which truly is, is either what we know or what we are ignorant of, or what we neither know nor are ignorant of. But that which we neither know nor are ignorant of is the contradictory which absolute existence cannot be. It must therefore be either what we know, or what we are ignorant of, which has been proved to be object *plus* subject. This is the conclusion to which the author leads us: "Absolute existence is the synthesis of the subject and object, — the union of the universal and the particular, — the concretion of the *ego* and the *non-ego*; in other words, the only true, and real, and independent existences are minds-together-with-that-which-they-apprehend." This proposition is

followed by another, with which the author concludes his work, in which he limits the number of absolute existences, and declares that one only is necessary, "and that existence is a supreme, and infinite, and everlasting Mind in synthesis with all things."

In this conclusion is contained the whole error of pantheism, the denial of all particular existence, and the assertion of one single absolute existence. Does the author intend this? We cannot say that he does, yet his whole work shows an acquaintance with the German philosophers who have asserted this same error, which would convict him of a consciousness of the tendency of his doctrine. But before judging his conclusions let us examine his arguments, and, to begin at the beginning, his First Proposition is as follows: "Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognizance of itself." This seems undeniable, and sufficiently evident without need of demonstration. The author does not attempt to prove this proposition, but makes on it these remarks:—

"There is always a latent reference of one's perceptions and thoughts to one's self as the person who experiences them, which proves that, however deeply we may be engrossed with the objects before us, we are never stripped entirely of the consciousness of ourselves. And this is all that our proposition contends for. There is a calm, unobtrusive current of self-consciousness flowing on in company with all our knowledge, and during every moment of our waking existence; and this self-consciousness is the ground or condition of all our other consciousness. Nine hundred and ninety-nine parts of our attention may be always devoted to the thing or business we have in hand: it is sufficient for our argument if it be admitted that the thousandth part, or even a smaller fraction of it, is perpetually directed upon ourselves."— p. 78.

"If this first proposition is not very clearly confirmed by experience, it is at any rate not refuted by that authority. No one, by any effort of the mind, can ever apprehend a thing to the entire exclusion of himself. A man cannot wittingly leave himself altogether out of his account, and proceed to the consideration of the objects by which he is surrounded. On the contrary, he will find that, *nolens volens*, he carries himself consciously along with him, faint though the consciousness may be, in all the scenes

through which he passes, and in all the operations in which he is engaged. He will find that, when he is cognizant of perceptions, he is always cognizant of them *as his*. But this cognizance is equivalent to self-consciousness, and therefore it is reasonable to conclude that our proposition is not only not overthrown, but, moreover, that it is corroborated by experience.

“But it is Reason alone which can give to this proposition the certainty and extension which are required to render it a sure foundation for all that is to follow. Experience can only establish it as a limited matter of fact; and this is not sufficient for the purposes of our subsequent demonstrations. It must be established as a necessary truth of reason,—as a law binding on intelligence universally,—as a conception, the opposite of which is a contradiction and an absurdity. Strictly speaking, the proposition cannot be demonstrated, because, being itself the absolute starting-point, it cannot be deduced from any antecedent data; but it may be explained in such a way as to leave no doubt as to its axiomatic character. It claims all the stringency of a geometrical axiom, and its claims, it is conceived, are irresistible. If it were possible for an intelligence to receive knowledge at *any one* time without knowing that it was his knowledge, it would be possible for him to do this at *all* times. So that an intelligent being might be endowed with knowledge without once, during the whole term of his existence, knowing that he possessed it. Is there not a contradiction involved in that supposition? But if that supposition be a contradiction, it is equally contradictory to suppose that an intelligence can be conscious of his knowledge, at any single moment, without being conscious of it as his. A man has knowledge, and is cognizant of perceptions, only when he brings them home to himself. If he were not aware that they were his, he could not be aware of them at all. Can *I* know without knowing that it is *I* who know? No, truly. But if a man, in knowing anything, must always know that he knows it, he must always be self-conscious. And therefore reason establishes our first proposition as a necessary truth,—as an axiom, the denial of which involves a contradiction, or is, in plain words, nonsense.” — pp. 83–85.

Whoever knows, knows that he knows. Nothing is more certain; and were this the only sense in which this proposition could be understood, no one could reasonably object to it. Undoubtedly, in all our intellectual acts, in every cognition, we are cognizant of ourself, we are conscious of our own connection with the object by the act of intelligence. It is in this sense that the author explains his proposition in the passage we have just

quoted. But it is necessary to take note that the cognizance of self which enters into the cognition is a cognizance of self as subject, not as object of the cognition. We cannot know that which is not; and if I know myself as the subject, I know myself as not the object of my cognition. Our intellect can never be its own object. Only the Divine Essence, which is pure act, is perfectly intelligible in itself, is its own full and adequate object. The human intellect knows itself, as the Schoolmen say, *per suam præsentiam*, which is nothing more than that the intellect is conscious of its presence, knows itself as the subject of the cognition. Nothing is thereby added to the object, for when I say the intellect is conscious of itself, or is present to itself in all its acts, I assert no more than when I say that it is the intellect which knows in all its acts. The object of cognition does not thereby become object *plus* subject, as the author contends, but remains simply the object, and nothing more. The intellect, he admits, cannot be its own entire object. It can know itself only in knowing something not itself; and in knowing that which is not itself, it knows itself. There must therefore, he contends, be two distinct and yet inseparable elements in the object of every cognition. This is asserted in the Second Proposition: "The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than what is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self, — object *plus* subject, — thing, or thought, *mecum*. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition." This is further explained by the following illustration: —

"The change which the condition of knowledge effects upon the object of knowledge may be further understood by considering how very different the speculative enumeration of ourselves and things as based on Proposition II. is from the way in which we usually but erroneously enumerate them. We are cognizant of ourselves and of a number of surrounding objects. We look upon ourselves as numerically different from each of these things, just as each of them is numerically different from its neighbors. That is our ordinary way of counting. The speculative computation is quite different. Each of the things is always that thing *plus me*. So that supposing the things to be represented by the figures 1, 2, 3,

4, and ourselves by the figure 5, while following the ordinary ciphering we should count them and ourselves as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; we should, following the speculative ciphering, count them and ourselves as $1 + 5, 2 + 5, 3 + 5, 4 + 5$. And the result in each case equals me-in-union-with-the-thing, whatever it may be. Me-in-union-with-it, — this synthesis is always the total datum or object which I know. This 5 (illustrative of the ego) is the standard factor in every reckoning, is always part of the object apprehended, and is the necessary condition of its apprehension. If we consider the things 1, 2, 3, 4 as forming *one* complexus in that case, it is still $1 + 5 = \text{me-in-union-with-things}$." — pp. 96, 97.

Understanding the first proposition in the sense in which we have admitted its truth, there is no logic by which we can obtain this conclusion. The author, in fact, seems to regard it as only the first proposition differently enunciated. The assertion which it contains, that object is object *plus* subject, stands in direct opposition to the author's "law of identity," which he calls the criterion of necessary truth, — *A is A*. If *A is A*, then *A is not A + B*. Object is object, equal to itself and nothing more than itself. If object equals object *plus* subject, subject must be equal to zero; and if subject equals zero, object must also equal zero; for there can be no object without a subject, and if there is no subject to act, there can be no object acted on. Thus in confounding subject and object the learned Professor destroys the subject and thereby puts an end to the whole question, as there is no longer either subject or object. The only knowledge of itself which can be asserted is the consciousness of self as the subject of the cognition. But this is only to assert, that when the intellect knows, it knows that it knows, or is present to itself in its act, and does by no means constitute the intellect an element or part of the object known.

Another great error of our author is in reasoning from what he considers the conditions of our knowledge to the absolute conditions of all knowledge. In the demonstration of his propositions he speaks of *our* knowledge, and afterwards astutely substitutes the term *all knowledge*. "It is absolutely indispensable," these are his words, "for the salvation of our argument from beginning to end that these necessary laws should be fixed as

authoritative, not over human reason only, but as binding on all possible intelligence It should be added, that the system does not assume, at the outset, that there is any intelligence except the human. Such an assumption is not necessary to enable it to get under weigh, and would therefore be altogether irrelevant. But it maintains that, if there be any other intelligence (either actual or possible) besides man's, that intelligence must conform to the necessary laws, these being the essential conditions and constituents of all intellect and of all thought." The author therefore starts with the conditions of human knowledge, and afterwards assumes that these are the necessary laws of knowledge. He nowhere proves this, but by frequently substituting the one expression for the other he seems at last to have convinced himself that the whole matter has been satisfactorily demonstrated. This is a point of great importance in his system, as he confesses, and we are surprised that he has not taken more pains with it, though we really cannot see by what process of argument he would prove the conditions of our knowledge to be equally binding on all intelligence. If there be but so much as one intelligence not subject to these conditions, the whole system falls to the ground. Now God, who is a self-sufficient being, dependent on no creature either for his being or for his knowledge, is the adequate object of his own understanding. The laws of our knowledge are not binding on him, for man to know requires an object not himself. The conditions of our knowledge are not therefore the necessary laws of all intelligence, but there is an intelligence not subject to these conditions. God is both the subject and the object of his own intelligence. The synthesis of object and subject, the *ego*, together with whatever it apprehends, is in him resolved into mind in synthesis with itself, which is no synthesis at all, but is simply the Divine Mind; and the whole of Professor Ferrier's volume results in the assertion that God is absolute existence, — a great truth, certainly, yet one which no one would have denied, if he had placed it at the commencement instead of the conclusion of the work, and which did not require five hundred pages of close argument to establish its certainty. These doctrines, the error of which we have endeavored to point out,

are the fundamental *institutes*, the basis of the author's Epistemology, the first and by far the largest of the three parts into which the work is divided. A much smaller space is devoted to his Agnoiology, or Theory of Ignorance, and his Ontology, or Theory of Being. Agnoiology is a new section of philosophy, and is a remarkably curious and original treatise, and apparently quite in harmony with his Theory of Knowledge, or Epistemology. The substance of the Agnoiology is, that we can neither be ignorant of self *per se*, nor of anything else *per se*. His reasoning is as follows:—

“PROPOSITION I.

“Ignorance is an intellectual defect, imperfection, privation, or short-coming.

“DEMONSTRATION.

“The deprivation of anything whose possession is consistent with the nature of the Being which wants it, is a defect. But ignorance is a deprivation of something which is consistent with the nature of intelligence: it is a deprivation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is an intellectual defect, imperfection, privation, or short-coming.” — p. 397.

Therefore, —

“PROPOSITION II.

“All ignorance is *possibly* remediable.

“DEMONSTRATION.

“No kind of knowledge is absolutely inconsistent with the nature of all intelligence. But unless all ignorance were *possibly* remediable, some kind of knowledge would be inconsistent with the nature of all intelligence, to wit, the knowledge by which the ignorance in question might be remedied. Therefore all ignorance is *possibly* remediable.

“Or again, All defects are possibly remediable, otherwise they could not be defects. But ignorance is a defect. (Prop. I.) Therefore all ignorance is possibly remediable.” — p. 402.

Proposition III. follows close on the heels of these two: —

“We can be ignorant only of what can possibly be known; in other words, there can be an ignorance only of that of which there can be a knowledge.

“DEMONSTRATION.

“If we could be ignorant of what could not possibly be known by any intelligence, all ignorance would not be possibly remediable. The knowledge in which we were deficient could not be

possessed by any intelligence. But all ignorance is possibly remediable (by Prop. II.). Therefore, we can be ignorant only of what can possibly be known; in other words, there can be an ignorance only of that of which there can be a knowledge.

“OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

“This is the most important proposition in the agnology: indeed, with the exception of the first of the epistemology, it is the most fruitful and penetrating proposition in the whole system. It announces — for the first time, it is believed — the primary law of all ignorance, just as the first of the epistemology expresses the primary law of all knowledge. It is mainly by the aid of these two propositions that this system of Institutes is worked out. All the other propositions have an essential part to play in contributing to the final result; but these two are the most efficient performers in the work. If the reader has got well in hand these two truths, — *first*, that there can be a knowledge of things only with the addition of a self or subject; and, *secondly*, that there can be an ignorance only of that of which there can be a knowledge, — he will find himself in possession of a lever powerful enough to break open the innermost secretaries of nature. These two instruments cut deep and far, — they lay open the universe from stem to stern.

“The law of all ignorance may be illustrated by the same symbols which were used in Proposition IV. of the epistemology, Obs. 11, to illustrate the law of all knowledge. Just as there can be a knowledge of X only when there is a knowledge of Y, so there can be an ignorance of X only when there is an ignorance of Y. Because if there could be an ignorance of X without Y, but not a knowledge of X without Y, something would be ignored which could not be known, — a supposition which is contradictory and absurd.” — pp. 404 – 406.

These three propositions, which appear so simple and evident, once admitted, it is easy to see whither the author would lead us. He has already established in his epistemology what it is possible to know, and he now proves that we can only be ignorant of that which it is possible to know. Therefore, if we accept his epistemology, we must either admit that we know everything, or that we know nothing. For either we know self or the subject, or we do not know it. In the former case we know everything; for as there can be no knowledge of things *per se*, so also, according to the fourth proposition of the agnology, there can be no ignorance of them *per se* or without ignorance of self, and consequently, if we are not ignorant of the subject we cannot be ignorant of anything whatsoever. Thus

the knowledge of self includes or requires the knowledge of all things. In the same manner, ignorance of self or the subjective part of the object must always be accompanied by the most entire and complete ignorance of all things whatever. This is an evident corollary of the author's epistemology, which asserts the *ego* or *me* as the "universal and necessary element of every object of knowledge," and declares all knowledge of things *per se*, or without a knowledge of the *me* at the same time, impossible. The knowledge or ignorance of the *me* or subject must therefore be ever accompanied by the knowledge or ignorance of all that is not the *me*. The object of knowledge is then indivisible in reality, though it may not be so in mental abstraction. The pantheistic doctrine of universal identity which this involves may startle the reader, but it does not seem to have been unknown to the author. Witness the following passage: —

"Popularly considered, the universe *plus me* is greater than a grain of sand *plus me*. But this difference is altogether trivial, and of no account in philosophy. Let Y represent the subject, and X the object. So soon as Y apprehends $Y + X$, the whole business of knowing is accomplished. The unit of knowledge, the *minimum scibile per se*, is constituted and compassed. We may add to this X as many other X's as we please. But that makes no difference in the eyes of reason. A million X's *plus Y* is only accidentally but not essentially more than the *minimum scibile per se*. Although in the ordinary intercourse of life it may be convenient to regard the *minimum* and the *maximum* of cognition as diverse, yet, speculatively considered, they are coincident." — pp. 108, 109.

We cannot suppose him possessed of so poor an understanding as to attach the importance which he does to what he does not comprehend. He prepares the reader for strange doctrines even from the commencement of the work, where he maintains the novel doctrine that it is more important that a system be reasoned than that it be true. Lest we be accused of mistating, we give his own words.

"A system of philosophy is bound by two main requisitions, — it ought to be true, and it ought to be reasoned. If a system of philosophy is not true, it will scarcely be convincing; and if it is not reasoned, a man will be as little satisfied with it as a hungry person would be by having his meat served up to him raw. Philosophy, therefore, in its ideal perfection, is a body of reasoned truth.

"Of these obligations, the latter is the more stringent : it is more proper that philosophy should be reasoned, than that it should be true ; because while truth may perhaps be attainable by man, to reason is certainly his province, and within his power. In a case where two objects have to be overtaken, it is more incumbent on us to compass the one to which our faculties are certainly competent, than the other, to which they are perhaps inadequate.

"This consideration determines the value of a system of philosophy. A system is of the highest value only when it embraces both these requisitions, — that is, when it is both true and reasoned. But a system which is reasoned without being true, is always of higher value than a system which is true without being reasoned.

"The latter kind of system is of no value ; because philosophy is 'the attainment of truth *by the way of reason.*' That is its definition. A system, therefore, which reaches the truth, but *not* by the way of reason, is not philosophy at all ; and has, therefore, no scientific worth. The best that could be said of it would be, that it was better than a system which was neither true nor reasoned.

"Again, — an unreasoned philosophy, even though true, carries no guaranty of its truth. It may be true, but it cannot be certain ; because all certainty depends on rigorous evidence, — on strict demonstrative proof. Therefore no certainty can attach to the conclusions of an unreasoned philosophy.

"Further, — the truths of science, in so far as science is a means of intellectual culture, are of no importance in themselves, or considered apart from each other. It is only the study and apprehension of their vital and organic connection which is valuable in an educational point of view. But an unreasoned body of philosophy, however true and formal it may be, has no living and essential interdependency of parts on parts ; and is, therefore, useless as a discipline of the mind, and valueless for purposes of tuition.

"On the other hand, a system which is reasoned, but not true, has always some value. It creates reason by exercising it. It is employing the proper means to reach truth, although it may fail to reach it. Even though its parts may not be true, yet if each of them be a step leading to the final catastrophe, — a link in an unbroken chain on which the ultimate disclosure hinges, — and if each of the parts be introduced merely because it is such a step or link, — in that case it is conceived that the system is not without its use, as affording an invigorating employment to the reasoning powers, and that general satisfaction to the mind which the successful extrication of a plot, whether in science or in romance, never fails to communicate.

"Such a system, although it falls short of the definition of philosophy just given, comes nearer to it than the other ; because to reach truth, but not by the way of reason, is to violate the defini-

tion in its very essence ; whereas to miss truth, but by the way of reason, is to comply with the fundamental circumstance which it prescribes. If there are other ways of reaching truth than the road of reason, a system which enters on any of these other paths, whatever else it may be, is not a system of philosophy in the proper sense of the word." — pp. 1 – 4.

From this it appears that the author's aim is not so much truth, as it is a reasoned system of something, even though it be of error. This seems to us very much as though some one should say to a fisherman, "It is more important that you should keep your line in the water than that you should catch any fish ; for the former is in your power, and the latter may not depend on you."

We here see the importance of determining the precise meaning of the first proposition of the epistemology, — that in all our cognitions we have cognizance of self. Understood in the sense in which we have admitted its truth, no difficulty whatever is found in any part of the system, and the agnology is easily refuted. Understanding by that proposition merely that the intellect in all its acts is conscious of, or present to, itself, no such conclusions can be deduced. The intellect always in act is always conscious of its own presence. It does not cease to be so conscious, because this or that object is not present to it ; for, though any particular thing be not the object of the intellect, *some* object is always present, and *any* act of the intellect knowing *any* object is sufficient ; the intellect knowing this object is conscious of itself. It is therefore absurd to say that the absence of any object destroys the consciousness of self which the intellect has in all its acts. May not I know some things and be ignorant of others ? No one can deny this. If I know some things, I am cognizant of myself, and if I am cognizant of myself, I am cognizant of myself though there are things of which I am ignorant. The intellect, moreover, is always in act, always knows, whatever may be the object of its knowledge. It must therefore be always cognizant of itself.

But if the first proposition be admitted in any other sense, we must admit the author's conclusions, no matter though they contradict each other. Absurdities engender absurdities, and contradictions are fruitful in contradictions. From one error incautiously admitted, a thousand others spring up and hold to it for support. If we admit, as the

author desires we should, that in every cognition we are cognizant of self as object, not as subject of the cognition, we must admit the two elements which he contends enter into the composition of the object, the *ego* and the *non-ego*, the *me* and the *not-me*. They are then inseparable, and the knowledge or ignorance of the one involves the knowledge or ignorance of the other. But the starting-point of his philosophy in this sense is contradictory and absurd. Subject and object are essentially distinct, they cannot become identified. Subject can never become object without ceasing to be subject, nor object become subject without ceasing to be object. The one opposes the other, and they can be reconciled only by being kept distinct. This is the very principle of contradiction, that it is impossible for anything to both be and not be at the same time. The real distinction of subject and object thus vindicated and firmly established, the whole fabric of Professor Ferrier's philosophy falls to the ground. The identity of the two is the starting-point and the result of his system. The first proposition asserts it, and the last goes no further. The following extracts will show that we do the author no injustice.

“ Novel, and somewhat startling, as this doctrine may seem, it will be found, on reflection, to be the only one which is consistent with the dictates of an enlightened common sense; and the more it is scrutinized, the truer and the more impregnable will it appear. If we are ignorant at all, (and who will question our ignorance?) we must be ignorant of something; and this something is not nothing, nor is it the contradictory. That is admitted on all hands. But every attempt to fix the object of our ignorance as anything but object + subject *must* have the effect of fixing it either as nothing, or as the contradictory. Let it be fixed as things *per se*, or as thoughts *per se*, — that is, without any subject; but things or thoughts, without any subject, are the contradictory, inasmuch as they are the absolutely unknowable and inconceivable. Therefore, unless we can be ignorant of the contradictory (a supposition which is itself contradictory, and in the highest degree absurd), we cannot be ignorant of things *per se*, or of thoughts *per se*. Again, let it be fixed as a subject *per se*, as the *ego*, with no thing or thought present to it. But the subject *per se* is equally contradictory with object *per se*. It cannot be known on any terms by any intelligence; and therefore, unless we entertain the absurd supposition that we can be ignorant of the contradictory, we cannot be ignorant of the subject, or *ego*, or mind, *per se*. Again, let

the object of our ignorance be fixed as nothing. But who was ever so foolish as to maintain that we were ignorant of nothing? By the very terms of the research, in which our ignorance is admitted, we confess ourselves to be ignorant of something. And therefore, since this something cannot be things by themselves, or the non-ego *per se*, and cannot be the mind by itself, or the ego *per se*, and moreover cannot be nothing, it must be the synthesis of things and some mind, — the non-ego *plus* some ego, — in short, some-object-plus-some-subject. If any other alternative is left which the object of our ignorance may be, this system will be glad to learn what that alternative is.

“It is scarcely credible that, at this time of day, any philosophical opinion should be absolutely original, or that any philosophical truth, of which no previous hint exists in any quarter, should now, for the first time, be brought to light. Nevertheless, the doctrine now under consideration is believed to be altogether new. If it is not so, the present writer will be ready to surrender it to any prior claimant who may be pointed out, and to give honor to whom honor is due. But meanwhile this system may be permitted to hold possession of it as its own peculiar discovery, — a circumstance which is mentioned, because those who may favor these Institutes with their attention may perhaps have some inclination to know wherein, more particularly, their originality is supposed to consist. They claim to have announced for the first time the true law of ignorance, and to have deduced from it its consequences.” — pp. 426 – 428.

“The short summing up is this, — a summary which refers in part to the epistemology. The ordinary thinker — that is, every man in his habitual and unphilosophical moods — supposes, first, that he can know *less* than he can really know; hence he supposes, that *mere* objects can be known. Secondly, he supposes that he can think of *less* than can be known; hence he supposes that *mere* objects can be conceived. Thirdly, he supposes that he can be ignorant of *less* than can be known; hence he supposes that *mere* objects are what he can be ignorant of. The first and second of these inadvertencies are corrected in the epistemology. It is there shown that we cannot know less than we can really know, and that, therefore, *mere* objects cannot be known, but only objects along with one's self or the subject; further, that we cannot think of less than can be known; and that, therefore, *mere* objects cannot be conceived, but only objects along with some self or subject. The main business of the agnology has been to correct the third inadvertency, and to show that we cannot be ignorant of *less* than can be known, and that, therefore, *mere* objects cannot be what we are ignorant of, but only objects along with some self or subject. From these considerations it is obvious that philosophers have erred, not,

as is usually supposed, in consequence of striving to know *more* than they are competent to know, but in consequence of striving to know *less* than they are permitted to know by the laws and limits of intelligence ; and further, that they have gone astray, not, as is usually supposed, in consequence of denying our ignorance to be *as great* as it really is, but in consequence of maintaining that our ignorance is not *so great* as it really is, — in other words, in consequence of maintaining that we are ignorant of *less* than it is possible for any intelligence to be ignorant of.” — pp. 438, 439.

We come now to the third and last part of the work, the Ontology, in which the author establishes the nature of absolute existence or true being : —

“The problem of ontology, as announced in the Introduction, § 54, is, What is ? in the proper and emphatic sense of the word IS. What absolutely and independently exists ? What, and what alone, possesses a clear, detached, emancipated, substantial, genuine, or *unparasitical* Being ? What can that which possesses this be declared to be ? What is its character ? What predicate can be attached to it ? This is the problem which ontology is called upon to resolve ; and it will be seen as we advance, that, without the whole of the preceding demonstrations, this question is insoluble, but with them its reasoned settlement may be reached.” — p. 444.

Absolute existence, he says, must be either that which we know, or that which we are ignorant of, or else that which we neither know nor are ignorant of. He contends strongly for the importance of the third alternative. Without it, he thinks the enumeration incomplete ; for there is a medium between the two, something which we neither know nor are ignorant of. This is the contradictory, or that which is not knowable. But absolute existence is not the contradictory, therefore it is either that which we know or that which we are ignorant of. It is unnecessary to say which it is ; for in either case its nature is established as the synthesis of subject and object, or *mind-together-with-that-which-it-apprehends*. The author prints these seven words together, in order to make their unity more apparent. He does not see that this argument may be used against him, that it proves too much, and *Qui nimis probat, nihil probat*. The same argument may be applied to contingent existence. It is either that which we know or that which we are ignorant of, or that which we neither know nor are ignorant of. That which we neither know

nor are ignorant of, is the contradictory; but there is no contradiction nor absurdity in the supposition that something contingent exists, therefore contingent existence is either that which we know or that which we are ignorant of. That which we know and that which we are ignorant of, is the synthesis of subject and object, mind-together-with-that-which-it-apprehends. Contingent existence is then the synthesis of subject and object, mind-together-with-that-which-it-apprehends. It is thus proved that the same thing is both absolute existence and contingent or not absolute existence. The same argument proves both. Which conclusion is true? Why is not the latter as certain and undeniable as the one deduced by Professor Ferrier? It is a matter of vital importance to his system that it should not fail here. All that has hitherto been established amounts to nothing, he can deduce nothing from it, if his argument fail him here.

Thus each of the three parts of our author's work has its peculiar error. His Epistemology asserts the identity of subject and object; his Agnoiology denies all ignorance; and his Ontology is based on an argument which proves as much against him as for him. These are the three counts in the indictment, any one of which is sufficient to hang — not the author, but his system.

When the author declares that absolute existence is not the contradictory, he is guilty of what logicians call *petitio principii*. The author is accustomed to reason on two distinct sets of principles, the one opposed to his system, the other sustaining it. When a thing cannot be proved by one, he has recourse to the other. Thus, in the present instance, to eliminate the third alternative as to the nature of absolute existence, which it is essential to the progress of his system to be got rid of, he declares that it is not the contradictory, because there is no contradiction in supposing that something really and truly is. How does he know this? The contradictory in his system is object without subject, the *egō*, *per se*, or the *non-ego*, *per se*. How does the author know that either of these is not absolute existence? In denying that absolute existence is the contradictory, he assumes that it is neither subject nor object *per se*. If, therefore, it is anything, it is both. This is the very thing the author has to prove, and he does not prove it, for he assumes it as his premises.

Another fault of the author's system is, that he deduces the category of existence from that of cognition. Things are, according to him, only because we know them, and in proportion as we know them. He regards the object as the creation of the intellect, the product of the *me*. The true doctrine is precisely the reverse of this. Things are not because we know them, but we know them because they are. This seems to us so plain, that it need only be pointed out to be admitted. For we cannot see how any one can so far reject reason, as to hold that we may know an object when there is none to be known.

We might also object to the improper, or at least extraordinary, use which the author makes of words, and which in some instances, as when he says of *absolute* beings that one only is *necessary*, is incorrect. But our object is not to find fault with Professor Ferrier's language or his style. And even while pointing out the errors of the work, which are not few nor slight, we have no wish to deny that there is much that is good in the book. There are frequent outbursts of eloquence, which would afford grounds to believe that the learned professor, whatever may be said of his philosophical genius, might rise to eminence in other occupations would he but be persuaded to try them. His mind is not subtle or acute enough for the depths of metaphysics into which he would dive. He has glimpses of truths which he thinks have heretofore been overlooked; but not making nice and accurate distinctions where they are requisite, he is led to deduce what he supposes is a newly discovered truth, but which, not unfrequently, is an old, exploded error. Accuracy is as essential as depth of thought, in a metaphysician. Better that the last should be dispensed with, if either, than the first. Professor Ferrier, like the German speculators almost without an exception, makes small account of the former in comparison with the latter. Truth is not their chief aim, and consequently they cannot be expected to attain it. To philosophize for the sake of philosophizing, is so much labor thrown away, and the sooner those who are speculatively inclined become convinced of this, the better it will be for the human race generally.

In taking our leave of the author, we feel that when next we meet him, in whatever dress he may appear, it will be as a friend with whom we may have differed, but with whom we have had no wish to quarrel.

ART. IV.—*An Inquiry into the Principles of Church Authority; or, Reasons for recalling my Subscription to the Royal Supremacy.* By the REV. R. I. WILBERFORCE, M. A. Baltimore: Hedian & O'Brien. 1855. 12mo. pp. 333.

MR. WILBERFORCE appears to have written this book before his reception into the bosom of the Catholic Church, and while still an archdeacon in the Anglican Establishment. It therefore cannot be regarded precisely as a Catholic work, and if it should not always speak in a Catholic tone or in strict accordance with Catholic doctrine, no particular blame can attach to the author. He does not appear while writing it to have fully made up his mind to do more than to divest himself of the preferments which he held in the Establishment, and to "put himself as far as possible into the condition of a lay member of the Church." Yet, though he speaks perhaps of the Episcopacy, as distinguished from the Papacy, somewhat too much as an Anglican, his work is substantially Catholic, and admirably adapted, we should think, to make a favorable impression on all Anglicans who really mean to be Churchmen, or who believe the Church to be a Divine, and not a mere human institution. We have read it with deep interest. It is written with rare ability and great learning, and we see not how any man can read it without being convinced that the Anglican Establishment is no part of the Church of God.

The great trouble with Protestants in discussing the question of Church authority is, that they have no principles, and always reason from detached facts, which are often no facts at all. They run over ecclesiastical history, and seize upon certain statements, sometimes true, sometimes false, and bring them forward as disproving some Catholic doctrine or some claim of the Catholic Church, without ever stopping to inquire on what principle they do it, if they do it at all. A Father says all bishops are equal; therefore say they, The Bishop of Rome has no primacy, forgetful that all bishops, including the Bishop of Rome, as bishops may be equal, and that the Papacy, that is to say, the Apostleship, a distinct office from that of Bishop, though including it, may be attached to the

See of Rome, and inherited by its occupant. Mr. Wilberforce in this work proves that his mind has attained to unity, and that, though educated a Protestant, he is capable of reasoning from principles, and of explaining facts and appearances by them. He starts from something solid, clear, and definite, and shows a firm basis for his superstructure. He sees that at the outset of his inquiry it is necessary to settle what is to be understood by the Church. He proceeds first to determine the nature of the Church, and then to prove, as Anglicanism concedes, that "the Church hath authority in controversies of faith." What he says on the nature of the Church is so true, so profound, so important, and so well said, that we cannot forbear laying it before our readers.

Now that a paramount authority was possessed by Our Lord Himself, and that He committed the like to His Holy Apostles, is admitted probably by all Christians. The question in dispute is, whether any such powers outlasted their times; whether they founded any institution, or appointed any succession of men, to which the office of judging in matters of faith was intrusted in perpetuity. Before considering what can be said on this subject, it will be well to ask, what was meant in those days by the Church, what were understood to be its characteristic features, and the origin of its powers. For there are two leading views respecting the nature of the Church; and according as men take the one or the other view of the nature of the Church, they will commonly adopt a corresponding hypothesis respecting its authority.

"Was the Church, then, a mere congeries of individuals, gathered together, indeed, according to God's will, but not possessing any collective character, except that which is derived from the conglomeration of its parts; or was it an institution, composed indeed of men, but possessed of a being, and action, which was irrespective of the will of its individual members, and was impressed upon it by some higher authority? This, in fact, is to ask whether it had any inherent life, and organic existence. By a wall is meant a certain arrangement of bricks, which, when united, are nothing more than bricks still; but a tree is not merely a congeries of ligneous particles, but implies the presence of a certain principle of life, which combines them into a collective whole. Such a principle we recognize, when we speak of an *organic* body. Our thoughts are immediately carried on to one of those collections of particles, which Almighty God has united according to that mysterious law, which we call life. Thus is an impulse perpetuated, which having its origin from the Author of

nature, displays its fecundating power in all the various combinations of the vegetable kingdom. Its sphere, indeed, is inert matter, and the continual assimilation of fresh portions of matter is necessary to its prolongation; but its *being* is derived from a higher source; it is the introduction of a living power into the material creation.

"The notion entertained of the Church, then, would be entirely different, according as it was supposed to be merely a combination of individuals, or an *organic* institution, endowed with a divine life. In the first case it would have no other powers than those which it derived from its members; in the second, its members would be only the materials, which it would fashion and combine through its own inherent life. In one case it would stand on human authority; in the other, on Divine appointment. On one side would be reason, enlightened it may be, but still the reason of individuals; on the other, supernatural grace.

"Now there can be no doubt which of these views is favored by Scripture; whether we look to its express words, to the general tendency of prophecy, or to the analogy of doctrine. The word *Ecclesia*, indeed, by us rendered Church, is used for any combination of men: but of that particular combination, which Our Lord established, we have a specific definition, wherein it is declared to be 'the Body' of Christ. This definition, repeatedly given, implies certainly that the Church is not a mere combination of individuals, but possesses an *organic life* from union with its Head. No doubt it has been affirmed to be merely a figurative expression, founded upon the use of certain analogous words. But it is the only definition we have of the Church; it is a definition frequently given; and if we are at liberty to get rid of such Scriptural statements by saying that they are figurative, the use of Scripture as a guide to our belief is at an end. Besides, the word which St. Paul employed could not have been understood by his readers in a figurative sense, because it has no such meaning in the Greek language. The English reader is so familiar with the application of the words *body* and *head* to those who are merely related together as members of the same community, that he not unnaturally supposes St. Paul's expression to be founded upon a similar idiom. But in Greek such an usage was wholly unknown: the word *σῶμα* (body) was never used for a society composed of different persons; nor *κεφαλὴ* (head) for its chief. And though there are a few expressions of the sort in Latin, yet the prevalent use of the words *body*, *corporation*, *corps*, &c., in modern languages, appears to be founded upon the analogy which St. Paul suggested, and which has since given shape to the languages of Christendom. So that to assert St. Paul's words to be figurative, because the terms have gained

this force in later times, is to mistake an effect for a cause. To cross the Rubicon has been a figurative phrase since the time of Cæsar; are we to suppose, then, that the Rubicon was not *really* crossed by Cæsar himself?

“Again: When we turn from individual expressions to the general course of prophecy, we find its whole scope and tendency to be built on some real identification of the great Renewer of man’s race with the race which He was to renew. The prophecies of Isaiah associate the new system which was to prevail in the world with the Rod, which was to ‘come forth out of the stem of Jesse’; and Daniel beheld that stone that was ‘cut out without hands,’ that is, the Incarnate Nature of the Son of God, expand itself into a mountain, which was to fill the earth. And this exactly accords with what is revealed to us respecting the purposes of our Lord’s Incarnation. For was not Godhead and Manhood combined in Him, that the inferior nature, which was exalted in its Head, might be communicated to His brethren? ‘He shall see His seed, He shall prolong His days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in His hand.’ To resolve St. Paul’s assertions, therefore, into a figure of speech, is not only to violate the analogy of language, but to detract from the mystery of our redemption. The Apostle surely was well aware how wonderful was the truth which he was communicating, when he affirmed Christians to be ‘members of’ Christ’s ‘Body, from His Flesh, and from his Bones’; for he himself declared it to be ‘a great mystery.’ There can be no pretence, therefore, for refusing to take his statements in that natural and obvious sense which his words imply. He declares the Church to be that which Our Lord had Himself predicted it should be, an *organic* body, deriving its life from perpetual union with the Humanity of its Head. ‘I am the vine; ye are the branches.’ As the whole race of mankind inherits that life which was infused into nature in Adam, so the Church’s life results from that power which was bestowed upon humanity, through the taking it into God. The mystical Body of Christ has an organic life, like His Body natural; for Christ was personally Incarnate in that Body which was slain, but by power and presence will He be Incarnate in His Church till the end of the world. As the Gospels are the record of His Presence in the one, so is Church History that of His Presence in the other. What else could be intended by His promise to His chosen representatives? ‘Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world.’ Or what less could be implied in that Scriptural statement which identifies His members with Himself? ‘For as the Body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body being many are one body, so also is Christ.’

“The Scriptural statements, then, respecting the Church of Christ, represent it to be an organic body, whereby that life which had entered into humanity through the Head of our race was extended to its members. And so St. Irenæus speaks of those ‘who are not nourished at the breast of their mother,’ the Church, as ‘not discerning that clear fountain, which flows from the Body of Christ.’ And on this principle depends the whole idea of the Christian Sacraments, as the media of Church union, and the gift which the Church was commissioned to convey. Holy Baptism was instituted that ‘by one Spirit’ we may ‘all be baptized into one body’: and the Holy Eucharist transmits that life, which had its source in God, and which was imparted to mankind through the Mediator. ‘As the living Father hath sent Me, and I live by the Father, even so he that eateth Me, even he shall live by Me.’ Those who do not recognize this *organic* action in the Church of Christ, must find a large part of St. Paul’s language unintelligible: What can be meant by the being ‘buried’ with Christ, and ‘raised up’ with Him, by the ‘putting Him on,’ the being ‘found in Him,’ by our relation to ‘the New Man,’ by the position and work of the ‘last Adam’? These words surely look to some actual set of events as their counterpart. The notion of a mere sympathy of feeling, and accordance of purpose, is not enough to bear their weight. They cannot be got rid of as parabolical expressions, unless the Incarnation of the Son of God, and the whole mystery of the New Creation, is resolved into a fable. And, therefore, ‘we affirm that the sacred Scriptures assert the whole Church of God to be the Body of Christ, endowed with life by the Son of God. Of this Body, which is to be regarded as a whole, the members are individual believers. For as the soul gives life and motion to the body, which of itself could have no living motion, so the Word, giving a right motion and energy, moves the whole body, the Church, and each one of its members.’” — pp. 26–31.

We commend this to all our Protestant readers, for after all the whole controversy between them and us lies here. Is the Church a mere congeries of individuals, with no life but that which is in them as individuals, and derived from them, or is she an organism, an organic body, living a life of her own, which she derives not from her members, but which they by communion derive from her? Protestants generally hold that the body derives its life from the members, not the members from the body; that is to say, they deny the Church to be an organic body living its own divine life derived from Christ its head. They thus really deny that our Lord founded any Church, and reduce him

to the rank of a mere preacher of truth and justice. They assert a system of pure individualism, and lose the whole benefit of the atonement and salvation through Christ. On what condition could Christ make satisfaction for my sins? My sins were not his, and how could God's justice be satisfied by the punishment of the innocent for the guilty? Say our Lord offered a full equivalent, how can that affect me? It was I who owed the debt, and not another, and how can I be said to have paid it because Christ has paid it? In no other way than on the ground that he is my head and that I am his member, and so united with him as a member to the head that I paid it in him as the member shares in what is done by the head. Before, then, I have practically made satisfaction to God's justice, or before I can receive the application of the atonement to myself personally, I must be joined to Christ as a living member of his body. But if you deny all such body of Christ, you deny me the possibility of being united to it, and consequently the possibility of sharing in the atonement. In order to be saved, or to attain to eternal salvation, we must live the life of Christ, not a life like his, but his identical life, as the members live the life of the body, or the body the life of the head. How, if the Church is no organic body, living a divine life derived from its head, are we as individuals to come into real and living communion with Christ, and partake of his divine life? Deny the Church as an organism, as the body of Christ living his life, and you deny the whole Gospel; you deny the whole scheme of salvation through Christ, and fall into the naked rationalism and naturalism of the Unitarian. Without the Church as an organic body living an interior life of its own, or the life of the indwelling Holy Ghost, Christianity is but one among a thousand systems of moral and intellectual philosophy, and as powerless as any other.

We are well aware that it is exceedingly difficult for our materialistic and atheistic age to understand how the Church, which appears to be composed of individuals, can have any other life than what is brought to her by her members. Men in our age have lost the conception of unity, or confounded it with that of totality. They have lost, as had the old Gentiles, the conception of creation. With them it is not God who makes the world, but the world that makes God. They have multiplicity without

unity, and suppose everything operates from low to high, and nothing from high to low. They have no conception of spirituality, and cannot conceive how a multitude of individuals can live one and the same identical life. Yet a moment's reflection might satisfy them that the thing is not only possible, but an actual fact. In the natural order all men live one and the same identical life. Humanity is one, and men are men only by virtue of living its one life. Without individuals you may say there is no really existing humanity, but you must also say that without humanity there are and can be no individuals. All men live the one life of humanity, a life which they do not give, but which they receive. They as individuals do not precede humanity, for without humanity they are not conceivable.

Now conceive the Church to be a new humanity, the human race supernaturalized by grace, deriving from Christ as natural humanity from Adam, and you will have no more difficulty in conceiving the unity of the life of Christians than you have in conceiving that of men and women in the natural order. Christ is called the new Adam, and Christians in the supernatural order bear to him a relation analogous to that which individual men bear to the first Adam in the natural order. We live the natural life of humanity by natural generation and communion with our natural head, and we live the supernatural life of Christ by spiritual generation and communion with him through his body. Grace in the latter performs the part of nature in the former. The earthly mirrors or copies the heavenly, the natural the supernatural, and hence the study of the life of humanity in the natural order helps us to understand the life of regenerated humanity in the supernatural order. The Church under the present point of view is simply regenerated humanity, humanity living not solely the natural life of Adam, but the supernatural and divine life of Christ, the second Adam. Its life flows from Christ, as the natural life flows from Adam, and as he is one, it is one and the same life in all who are in communion with him, or are begotten by the Holy Ghost unto him, and binds them all into one living body. It is easy in this way to conceive the Church, not as a congeries of individuals, but as a living organism, with, so to speak, a collective unity, and collective faculties and functions.

Once conceded that the Church is an organic body liv-

ing the life of Christ, made an organism by the indwelling Holy Ghost, there can be no question as to what body is the Church. The common sense of mankind would pronounce it the Roman Catholic Church, for the simple reason that it obviously can be no other. There is no Protestant sect that dares call itself the one only body of Christ, or restrict the Church of Christ within its own narrow limits. Even Episcopalians, who have so much to say of *the Church*, only call their association a "branch" of the Church, and the Calvinistic divines consulted by Henry the Fourth of France gave it as their belief, that salvation is attainable out of the bosom of the Calvinistic Church in the communion of the Roman Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic Church is the only visible body extant that can be traced back through a regular descent to the Apostolic communion, and identified with the primitive Church. She alone has maintained the unity of the body of Christ in space and time. The man who would deny it proves his lack of honesty or his ignorance of history, and they who deny the Roman Catholic Church to be the true Church of Christ either formally or virtually deny the Church to be an organic body, and therefore that our Lord founded any Church, or instituted a regenerated human race. No Protestant really believes in any Church, any collective body of Christ. It is only by denying the Church as such body, and looking upon it as a voluntary association formed by individuals, that any Protestant can regard himself as in communion with Christ. Hence we find that, just in proportion as the members of any Protestant sect entertain Church views, they lose their hostility to Rome and tend towards Catholicity. This is clearly proved by what has been called the "Oxford movement." We therefore commend most earnestly to all our Protestant readers the extract we have made from Mr. Wilberforce on "the Nature of the Church."

Having defined the nature of the Church, the author proceeds to prove that the Church hath authority in controversies of faith, and to discuss the nature of that authority. From his chapter on the Nature of the Church's Authority we must be permitted to make a few extracts.

"A clear understanding of the principle on which Church authority stands is necessary to its just appreciation. It is needful to

guard, for example, against the not unusual opinion, that it depends *merely* upon the accidental circumstance that the Primitive Church was less remote from the age of the Apostles than ourselves. No doubt this is a consideration of great importance; and it enables us, as was shown in the last chapter, to appeal to the writers of that period as witnesses of the Church's position on the removal of the Apostles. For who so likely to carry on the true line of doctrine and discipline, as those whom the Apostles had appointed to govern after them? Who better fitted to understand St. John than his disciple, St. Ignatius? Who more sure to hand on the system of Polycarp, than St. Irenæus, who had sat at his feet? But a further step is taken when those who witness to the fact, that the Church is possessed of authority, go on to explain the principles of that authority of which she is possessed. The office, indeed, of building up the Canon of Scripture, which was imposed upon the Church of the second century, leads, of necessity, to some higher view of its position and character. Did the sacred Scriptures consist only of ordinary writings, the ordinary rules of evidence would suffice for their support. It would be enough that the writings of Paul and John may be identified like those of Livy and Cicero. And, therefore, those who take a low view of the authority of the sacred writers are easily satisfied of their authenticity. But in proportion as we esteem highly of their authority, we must assign a higher function to that Body, which not only had to fix their authorship, but to attest their inspiration. Had the Books of the New Testament, indeed, been exclusively Apostolic, there would have been some speciousness in the attempt to transfer the authority which sanctions them from the Church to her first founders: but it has been already observed, that our Canon contains books which are not the work of Apostles, — two Gospels, the Acts, and possibly the Epistle to the Hebrews, — while an Epistle has been excluded from it which was anciently attributed to an Apostle. And the decision is known not to have turned on a bare inquiry into the external evidence of authenticity, but likewise on the conformity of the documents adduced with the analogy of faith. So that we are led, of necessity, to that deeper view of Church authority which the two preceding chapters suggested. They compel us to seek for it in those fundamental characteristics of the Gospel Covenant which are revealed in Holy Scripture, and are witnessed by the undoubted consent of the Catholic Church.

“For Church authority has its basis in the principle, that all wisdom comes from God, and that it is communicated to mankind only through the Incarnation of Christ. And therefore, as it dwelt entirely in His Manhood when He was present in the Flesh, so its presence ever since is to be sought in that community ‘which is His Body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all.’ The Presence

which was to be found in His Body Natural, when He was upon earth, is to be sought, since His Ascension, in that Body Mystical, which is His perpetual medium of approach. For the gifts of grace, which had their dwelling in the one, are imparted through the other. And therefore Our Lord concluded that address to the Father with which he ended His earthly ministry, by setting forth the twofold presence of Himself and of the Blessed Spirit, by which the Church was to be sanctified and possessed. 'I have declared unto them Thy name, and will declare it; that the love wherewith Thou hast loved Me may be in them, and I in them.' Inasmuch as the attributes of Deity pertain to the essence of Itself, therefore the love wherewith the Second Person in the Glorious Godhead is for ever bound to the First is no other than that Blessed Spirit who is the bond of the whole Trinity. So that in these words we are assured of that indwelling of the Holy Ghost whereby He animates the Body of Christ, while Our Blessed Lord is present likewise Himself, through the power of His Godhead, and through His Flesh and Blood, which is bestowed in the Holy Eucharist. The Church's authority, therefore, is no accidental office with which she happens to be intrusted, — it has its basis in the laws of her nature, and in the original constitution on which she was built; it flows directly from that life, which emanates from her Head, and cannot be dissociated from her existence. So that Our Lord set forth the principle and measure of her coherence by reference to the highest of all standards: 'As Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in Us.' And therefore do we read that 'there is one Body and one Spirit, even as ye are called in one hope of your calling'; 'for by one Spirit are we all baptized into one Body.'

"This principle was so fully recognized by the early writers, that they attribute all separation from the Body of Christ to the lack of Christian love. For since the Holy Ghost, who is the very principle of love, is the life of the whole Christian society, its dissolution and division into parts can result only from the withdrawal of this principle of coherence. This is the great truth inculcated in every part of St. Ignatius's Epistles. He identifies any lack of concord among Christians themselves with the loss of that Divine life which has its source in their Lord. So long as they obey that attraction which binds them to their Head, they must needs be attracted to one another. 'Where division and anger is, God does not dwell. To all, therefore, who repent, the Lord forgives, if they enter by repentance into the oneness of God.' So possessed is he of the oneness of that principle which has its root in God, and diffuses itself as the impulse of life through Christ's mystical Body, that he identifies faith which apprehends the mysteries with love which binds together the members of Our Lord.

When speaking of persons who rejected the Holy Eucharist, he says, 'Those who contradict the gift of God perish through their reasonings. But it had been better for them to love that they might share in the resurrection.'

"To the same purpose is the assertion of St. Irenæus, that those who 'separate themselves from the Christian body' do so 'from self-conceit, vainglory, blindness, or ill-judgment.' The like conviction respecting the moral guilt of division is expressed by all the writers of the second century, — St. Ignatius, Hermas, Justin Martyr, Theophilus of Antioch, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, — as it was also by their successors. Neither ought their conduct to be attributed to a narrow jealousy, or to any wish to institute a spiritual monopoly, which might restrict the religious privileges of mankind. The point aimed at was, not to impose a restraint which might limit the gifts of grace, but to secure the unity which might preserve them. Its cause was a deep conviction of the reality of that Divine system which had been committed to human hands, and could only be maintained through the permanence of the Society through which it was communicated. Hence St. Cyprian's well-known statement: 'He cannot have God for his Father, who has not the Church for his Mother. If any one could escape who was out of Noah's Ark, then he who shall have been out of the Church can escape also.' He explains his principle, when stating the grounds on which he denied the validity of heretical baptism; he identifies the life of the Christian community with the agency of that Blessed Spirit, who takes up His dwelling in Christ's Mystical Body. And so, too, St. Augustine, who, though not asserting the invalidity of lay-baptism, yet affirms as strongly as St. Cyprian, that forgiveness can only be obtained through the Church, because her life is that gift of the Spirit, which she ministers to individuals.

"The principle, then, of Church authority, as understood by the ancient writers, is that the mystical Body of Christ is an organized whole, inhabited and guided by the Holy Ghost, who by dwelling in it gives it life, and infuses charity and concord among its members. So that the interpretation of doctrine and custody of truth is no separate and accidental office, with which it is intrusted, but a function of its life, and a consequence of its being. 'We guard the faith which we have received from the Church, and which proceeds perpetually from the Holy Spirit, as though it were some precious deposit, in an excellent vessel, which can renew itself, and can make new the vessel which contains it. For this is the office committed to the Church of God, that it should, as it were, breathe inspiration into His creatures, so that all its members should receive the gift and live. And here lies the principle of our communication with Christ, that is, the Holy Spirit, the pledge

of incorruption ; here is the confirmation of our faith, and the ladder whereby we ascend to God. For in the Church, St. Paul says, God has placed Apostles, Prophets, Teachers, and all the rest of that system whereby the Spirit operates, of which Spirit they are not partakers who do not betake themselves to the Church, but defraud themselves of life by ill-thinking and worse deeds. For where the Church is, there is the Spirit of God, and where the Spirit of God, there is the Church, and all Grace ; and the Spirit is truth. Therefore, those who do not participate in it are neither nourished to life from the breast of their mother, nor do they taste of that purest fountain which proceeds from the Body of Christ.' So does St. Cyprian speak of the Church, which, 'having its Lord's light diffused through it, extends its beams throughout the whole world'; and Origen says, that 'the Church enlightened by the light of Christ, is herself also made the light of the world.' — pp. 55 – 61.

And again : —

"Since the Church, then, is an organized Society, and its life is derived from that presence of the Holy Ghost, by which the whole Mystical Body of Christ is inhabited, it is plain that her authority in controversies of faith cannot be limited. To say that her authority extends to all subjects, and is final in each, is only to say that God is wiser than man. Can it be admitted that in easy questions we are to refer to God's Spirit, but in difficult ones to trust to our own? Is grace to decide in usual cases, but the final appeal to be left to nature? 'Having begun in the Spirit, are we made perfect in the flesh?' And is not the fit answer to such difficulties as have been suggested, that a contradiction between Scripture and the Church is an impossible supposition, seeing that the Divine Spirit, whose presence is her life, is the same 'who spake by the Prophets'?

"All this, which is manifest from the nature of the case, is fully borne out by the Church's own testimony respecting her office. It is witnessed by her manner of proceeding in Councils, which always professed to refer to the Scriptures, but to be guided in their interpretation not by logical argumentation, but by the Spirit of God. A certain habitual, inherent indwelling of the Holy Ghost was supposed to preserve the collective Body of Christ in that ancient track, which had been marked out by the Apostles. As new errors arose, and new emergencies, the Spirit of a Divine wisdom was believed to supply the materials for meeting them, out of the inexhaustible storehouse of the original revelation. If a fresh meaning, or an additional force, was given to ancient statements, it was only because the 'instructed scribe' was bringing 'forth out of his treasures things new and old.' And this constant practice of the Church in her public actions is avowed by her writers from the very beginning. They all assume her to possess a col-

lective wisdom, to which individuals were bound to render practical submission; and how could practical submission be claimed, save for a body which had the right of final adjudication? For why would it have been men's duty to submit, instead of adopting that course which was suggested by their private reasonings, unless the body, which demanded their obedience, had been guided by a higher wisdom? And this, accordingly, is the principle which is asserted by ancient writers, — that men ought not to set up their private reason against the judgment of the Church, because theirs are mere human theories, whereas she is guided by the Spirit of God. Thus does St. Irenæus speak of the duty of obeying those 'who with the succession of the Episcopate have received the un-failing grace of truth, according to the pleasure of the Father': and again, 'where the gifts of grace have been deposited by Our Lord, there we ought to seek the truth, among those who possess that succession of the Church which is derived from the Apostles.' And while in the former of these places he censures those who from their own reasonings depart from the 'great succession of the Church,' he finds fault elsewhere with the Marcosians, who pretended to a private inspiration, and asserted that they could 'announce the unknown Father,' 'boasting themselves to be the pure and discerning ones.' 'Unhappy people,' he says again, 'who choose to be false prophets, and deny the grace of prophecy to the Church.'

"These passages not only exhibit the Church as a final authority, and as supplying interpretations which did not admit of being carried on appeal before the higher tribunal of individual reason; but they illustrate the principle on which this belief depends, namely, that the Divine Spirit which has its dwelling in the collective Body, is our sole guide in the things of God. So that, as Origen expresses it, Scripture cannot be properly understood unless men keep to 'the rule of the heavenly Church of Jesus Christ, as it has been handed down to us by the Apostles.' And therefore, in speaking of the Old Testament, he says, 'if the Law of God is received according to that mode of understanding it which the Church teaches, then it plainly excels all human laws.' But the ultimate proof of this, after all, is the Church's practice. For as time went on, new points of doctrine were continually decided, and the Creed grew up from the primordial simplicity of the second century until it attained the structure of the symbol of St. Athanasius. How could the Church have required assent to the various results which were thus evolved, unless she had been conscious of authority to propound them? How could she have been justified in excluding objectors from those sacraments which she held to be necessary to salvation, or in giving opportunity for those divisions which formed the most effectual obstacle to the growth of

Christ's kingdom, unless she had been possessed of some peculiar office, and some unfailing criterion? Yet was this the whole course of her history. And her greatest minds refer, like St. Augustine, to that 'most firm corroboration, which was derived from the consent of the Catholic Church throughout the world,' and excuse those who had previously held erroneous opinions on an important point of doctrine, 'because the Church had not as yet the decision of a plenary Council concerning this subject.' 'For if it be always open to human opinions to dispute,' says St. Facundus, 'there will never be wanting those who dare to resist the truth. And truly what will be the end of contentions and disputes, if it be allowed that those things, which have been settled by the consent of the whole Church, should again be brought to judgment? Why may not this further judgment itself be judged over again?' — pp. 63 — 66.

After proving that the Church's authority was to be perpetual, the author concludes this part of his subject by answering some objections.

"It may be thought that this view of things is derogatory to the dignity of Holy Scripture, and an infringement on the rights of individual conscience. On this subject something has been said in another place, where it was shown that the existence of Church authority is in perfect harmony with the principles of the Christian Dispensation, and results from that law of the New Creation, whereby the natural reason of the children of Adam has been exalted into the higher wisdom of the family of Christ. And this was shown to be so far from being derogatory either to Scripture or reason, that it has been found, in fact, to be the real means of preserving the one, and of perfecting the other. For reason has attained its most perfect growth where a central authority has restrained its eccentricities; and Scripture has been most revered by those who admitted that its custody was with the Church. Here, then, it will be enough to make a few remarks of a more practical character.

"The objection that Church authority interferes either with the respect which is due to the Inspired Volume, or with its use, arises entirely from a forgetfulness that the real question is, not what is the law, but who is the judge. The laws of the land do not lose their validity, because one judge succeeds another; why should the laws of God suffer detriment, because their appointed interpreter is not individual reason, but the collective wisdom of the Body of Christ? It is idle, therefore, to allege passages from the ancient writers, in which they insist either on the perfection of Holy Scripture, or on its capacity to render those who duly study it wise unto salvation. For the question is, Who is the right stu-

dent? the failure is not alleged to be in the rule, but in its interpreter. And the same writers who know not how to express themselves highly enough respecting the perfections of Scripture, are as express as possible in declaring that it cannot be studied rightly without reference to the guidance of the Church. "They all quote Scripture," says St. Hilary of the heretics, 'but without the sense of Scripture'; for 'those who are out of the Church cannot have any understanding of the Divine word.' 'In this matter,' says St. Augustine, 'we hold the truth, when we do that which has been decided upon by that Church Universal, which is commended to us by the authority of the Scriptures themselves; that since sacred Scripture cannot be erroneous, he who fears to fall into error through the obscurity of this question may consult about it that same Church which Holy Scripture unambiguously points out to him.' The Holy Apostles, we may well suppose, discerned the whole scope and relations of the covenant of God: the secrets of His unknown kingdom were laid open to them; but they applied themselves to the correction of existing evils; and they fed their converts with milk or with meat, according to their need. Hence, many points of great moment did not become subjects of detailed instruction in the Apostolic writings. We hear little about the existing office and duties of the Christian Priesthood; and nothing respecting that interference of kings and governments in the affairs of the Church, which is now a subject of so much perplexity. For the one was not disputed apparently in the age of the Apostles, and the other had not yet commenced. On such points, then, we may argue from the principles which have been laid down in Holy Writ, and we may draw inferences from the allusions which have been made to them. But who is to judge the fairness of our inferences, and the cogency of our arguments? Is it the private reason of men, or the Divine Wisdom, speaking through the Church? Whichever *judge* we take, it is plain that the authority of the *law* remains unaltered. 'The sacred Scriptures themselves are of no use unless you understand them rightly. For all heretics, who admit them to be of authority, appear to themselves to follow them, when they rather follow their own errors; and it is not, therefore, because they condemn the Scriptures, but because they misinterpret them, that they are heretics.' For 'the Scripture does not consist in reading certain words, but in understanding them.'

"But, then, it may be said, this is to dethrone human reason, which God has given to every man as his guide in the determination of truth. Now, it is not disputed that reason has its functions: reason is supreme in things natural, and it is the guide which leads us to that higher Teacher, by whom we are instructed in things divine. But it cannot, surely, be maintained that a man's own

reason ought always to be confided in, even by himself. Is it ever made a ground of complaint, that the private reason of the people of England is interfered with by the decisions of the Courts of Westminster? Yet many a law would be interpreted differently, if men were left to apply it by individual reason to their own case. But that laws may not be a mere mockery, it has been found necessary that there should not only be a statute-book, according to which justice should be administered, but a judge to administer it. Now, if men are admitted to be partial in deciding for themselves things earthly, why should they be supposed infallible in interpreting things divine?

“Further: If it is inconsistent with reason to allow of a judge of faith, it is inconsistent with it also to allow of a revelation. For is not our reason interfered with by the fact, that God spoke once, as really as it is by the fact, that He speaks always? It requires to be proved, of course, that God has given his Church ‘authority in controversies of faith,’ and grounds for believing it have already been adduced; but if this fact be rejected as an infringement on the independence of human reason, why should we not also reject revelation at large?” — pp. 71–74.

We cannot follow the author through his volume, but the extracts we have made will satisfy our readers that the work is the production of a scholar, a profound thinker, an able writer, and a sincere and earnest-minded man, and that it is full of interest and instruction. It is clear from the doctrine he establishes that the Church is a spiritual body, — a spiritual kingdom, complete in herself, and subsisting by the indwelling Holy Ghost, who is her life, her light, and her authority. She is a supernatural body, not superseding the natural, but lying in a sphere above it and independent of it. Hence any attempt to subject her to the temporal authority, or to make her dependent on the secular order, as is the case with Anglicanism, is to strike at her essential nature, and to deprive her of her distinctive character as the Church of God. Obviously, then, the author, as an honest man, wishing to belong to the Christian Church, could not remain an Anglican.

- ART. V. — 1. *Il Protestantismo e la Regola di Fede.*
Per GIOVANNI PERRONE, della Compagnia di Gesù,
Prof. di Teologia nel Coll. Romano. Roma: Coi Tipi
della Civiltà Cattolica. 1853.
2. *Dissertazione Storico-Teologica, del P. GABRIELLE BIB-
BIA, del terz' Ordine di S. Francesco, contro le Bibliche
Società de' Protestanti.* Assisi. 1852.

THE work by Father Perrone, together with a number of other books written since 1848 by Italians and by others, some of them devoted children of the Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, some of them her sworn enemies, and all of them interested in the affairs of their country, was noticed in a former number of this Review; but as it excelled the others in point of size, importance, scope, and thorough management of the Italian question, we promised to recur to it on a future occasion. We expressed a hope, at the time, that some person well qualified for the task would translate it for the American Catholic public. We are a little surprised that it has not been already done in England. The close, though generally indirect connection, in an official sense, of England with Italy for the last sixty years, and the silent, though effective, influence which English statesmanship has brought to bear upon the affairs of that peninsula, would serve to prove that a well-planned translation of the work of Father Perrone might in no small degree advance the interests of Catholicity in England. The work was projected, begun, and finished in England, while the author was an exile, driven from his native land by the whirlwind which the unhappy Gioberti strove to ride, and the storm which he sought to direct against the Society of Jesus, but which turned out to be an anti-Catholic whirlwind, — an anti-Christian storm, which the providence of God so rode, and so guided, that, while the intended victims are now seated under their own vine and their own fig-tree, with no one to disturb them or make them afraid, the authors of the mischief either sleep in dishonored graves, or wander abroad with the mark of Cain — the evidence of murder done and further murder planned — upon their brows, stamped in characters of everlasting fire. Like the master whom they serve, and who is the Prince of this world, disasters, defeat, ruin, teach them

nothing. They will try, as they have tried, again and again, to raise the storm which the breath of God has so often quelled in his own time and in his own way, they themselves being not seldom the very instruments chosen by him for the irretrievable destruction of their own work, and they themselves being not seldom the only victims borne by the tempest to the depths from which it was evoked. The race of Pharaohs, whose hearts are hardened, whose eyes are closed, and whose ears are stopped, still lives. So long as man is free, so long as the partial darkness of the understanding, and the weakness of the will, the sad effects of the Fall, remain, so long as Satan be not wholly chained, the heathen *will* rage, the PEOPLE *will* imagine vain things, and He who sitteth in the heavens will laugh them to scorn. In the course of this mundane contest the Church appears to be, humanly speaking, always falling, and the enemy always about to conquer. The enemy will not be blamed herein by the man who looks at the field of battle from an earthly point of view. No precaution that human intellect aided by diabolical malice can suggest, is omitted in the assault. Hence, when the Church is attacked, she prays. She rests mainly upon the promises of Christ, which cannot fail. And the enemy, being earth-born, when dashed to the earth rises, like the fabled earth-born giant of old, deriving new strength from the infernal source whence he sprung.

The work of the illustrious Perrone is directed against Protestantism, considered in its relations with the Rule of Faith. But it contains much more matter than one would be led to suppose from its title. It is written chiefly for Italians at home. It passes over modern Pyrrhonism, inasmuch as it assumes, as a starting-point, that every man who is a man holds certain truths to be incontestible; believes in some higher and better state than the present; hopes to enjoy that state, and receives or proposes to himself some rule of faith and of conduct by which he may obtain the fruition of his desires. He writes for his beloved Italy, and especially for those generous but misled young men of Italy whose cry is that they were Italians before they were Catholics. Let us remain true to our Church, say they, but, while we shut our eyes to the evidences of her increasing age, let us take from her hands, gently but firmly, lovingly but with such force as may be necessary

to accomplish our purpose, that temporal sceptre which she once knew so well how to wield, and which she refuses to drop now, because her hands are so accustomed to its touch, because she does not know how to drop it, and because there are no hands strong enough to take it from her. She clings to it, not because she loves it, but because she cannot bring herself to resign it. Ours are the hands of her own most beloved children, and she will yield to their gentle force what she would refuse to ruder hands. We are of age, and it is the will of God that we direct our own concerns in all things that pertain to this life. Let our mother, the Church, tell us what to do for the life to come. Is not that work glorious enough, even for her? And if she tell us that, in order to obtain the life to come, we must subordinate the temporal to the spiritual, and therefore in all things which pertain to this life receive our direction from her, we will listen respectfully, we will love her as dearly as ever, yet we will be firm in our just resolve, understanding well that she is from the mere force of habit repeating words which may have been not only true but efficacious once, but which are now as empty and as inoperative as the words of the Sanhedrim or of the schools would be, if uttered in tones of authority in this enlightened age.

Father Perrone does not fear that Protestantism in its theological or in its philosophical form will ever find favor in Italy. She long since weighed Protestantism under these forms in the balance, found them wanting, and threw them aside as rubbish. Still, there was a moment when the faith of Italy seemed to her enemies to waver.

“From the evil moment when the Protestant rebellion began in the heart of Germany to rend asunder the unity of Christendom, the eyes of the pretended Reformers were turned with guilty desire towards the beautiful plains of Italy, for they knew well that immense gains and a hitherto unheard of triumph would await them, if they would but transplant and cause to take root their deadly Upas-tree in that Italy which is so loyal to Rome and to the Popes, precisely because it is so warmly attached to the Catholic faith. They omitted no means, spared no pains, and left no one of the powerful men who favored their cause uninvoked, in order to spread the poisonous air throughout Italy. And they succeeded to a certain extent. John McCrie, a Scotch Protestant, is the author of a book called *Memoirs concerning the Reformation in It-*

aly, which was translated a few years ago at Paris by one of those Italian refugees who would redeem Italy by making her a Protestant nation, thereby bringing upon her the very greatest of evils. The book deserves no credit whatever. The author alters, maliciously colors, or exaggerates facts, he suppresses truth, suggests falsehood, invents pleasant fictions, and not seldom tells slanderous lies. He would have us believe that all the best and greatest Italians of that age were infected with the German poison, and in his career of slander he does not spare the memories of such venerable men as Sadoleti and Contarini. Yet it is but too true that some of the men of that day who called themselves *literati* touched the pitch, and were defiled, while a few of them turned their backs upon Catholicity, and became proselytes and preachers in Italy of the new gospel according to the unhappy founders of Protestantism, who could never agree among themselves as to what the gospel was. Several causes combined to procure the apostasy of these Italian Catholics. The superstitious reverence which, by many at that time, was affectedly or really felt towards Pagan antiquity, not only as a repertory of true eloquence, poetry, and art, but as a receptacle for all things that savored of Gentilism, license, and every kind of mere worldliness; the dark and silent hatred against the Popes which was nourished in the breasts of some; and, finally, an inordinate desire, not peculiar to that age, to live a life free of all laws, and to let loose the passions natural to man without fear of punishment, at least in this life, were so many helps to the men who had made the perversion of Italy the sole object of their unholy mission. The names of Italian families, which one occasionally hears mentioned in Germany and in Switzerland, as names well known there centuries ago, serve to prove that the labors of the emissaries of Satan were not wholly without fruit! Nor should we conceal the fact, that two Italian cities and courts, both famous for their magnificence and for the protection afforded by them to letters, to the arts, and sciences, gave aid and comfort to the pretended Reformers, and favored the introduction and spread of their insidious writings in the land. These cities were Ferrara and Venice. It was the misfortune of Italy that the then reigning Duchess of Ferrara was a Navarrese princess, infected with Calvinistic doctrines, of which sad fact she gave a proof when she welcomed Calvin, who had come to do the work of his infernal master in Italy, to the honors of her palace and court. Venice, at that time not well disposed towards Rome, and filled with a disloyal spirit towards the Popes, yearning to assert her dominion, not only over the seas and over her subjugated neighbors, but also over persons and things consecrated to God, eagerly seized the occasion to destroy the pontifical authority; and thus she prepared the way for the lamentable scenes which were

not long afterward enacted under the malign influence and by the direct instigation of that unworthy friar, Paolo Sarpi. Let no enemy reproach us for the evil deeds of this Sarpi, — he was not a Catholic.

“ Still, the merciful providence of God saved Italy. The Italian populations were not harmed by the noonday demon of Ferrara and Venice. The Catholic faith, fifteen hundred years old in Italy, had taken too deep a root in the Italian heart, the love of the people for the beauty, majesty, and holiness of Catholic worship was too great, and their reverence and gratitude towards the successor of Peter were too profound to permit even a partial Italian apostasy, or to render it possible. The good sense of Italians could not endure the illogical principles, the patent absurdities, the endless schisms and variations of Protestantism, nor could it stomach the miserable fruits which Protestantism, from its very infancy, had produced in Germany, distracted by civil wars among populations which had been united as one family, and which then offered a wretched spectacle from which Italians knew how to derive a profitable lesson. Was it possible that the love of the beautiful which lies deep in the Italian heart, the fine and impassioned national taste for the arts, and the well-tempered science so visible in the Italian method of philosophy, could ever have accommodated itself to the crude and frozen *cultus* of the Reformation, which, after it had despoiled the Christian soul of her faith in the consoling and saving truths revealed by Christ, with equal cruelty and sacrilege despoiled the house of God of all beauty, and of all holiness? No, Italy was not a soil for Arctic Protestantism; there was and there is an intrinsic and essential antagonism between Italy and Protestantism. Moreover, other causes were in operation for the preservation and defence of Italy. The pastors of souls, the sentinels of Israel, the bishops, ably assisted by their clergy, watched over their threatened flocks with all vigilance and solicitude. The Italian princes, in their zeal for the Church of God, supported her with the authority and the power of the civil arm. But above all, the Roman Pontiffs, the teachers, governors, and guardians of the whole flock committed to their care by Christ, while on the one hand they fulminated their anathemas against the rising heresy of the North, on the other hand they took care to uproot the poisonous plant, and to build good solid walls for the vineyard of the Lord.” — Vol. I., *Disc. Prel.*, pp. vi. — ix.

Italy then has nothing to fear from Protestantism considered as a religion or as a system of philosophy. The effect of the French Revolution upon Italy was, not Protestantism, — that was always too cold, vulgar, and illogi-

cal for the Italian mind, but unbelief. The second attempt to make Protestantism live in Italy has been made in this century, with what success remains to be seen. In the year 1844, Gregory the Sixteenth, of blessed memory, a Pontiff of great wisdom and inextinguishable zeal, detected and condemned the proceedings of the New York Christian Alliance, which had undertaken the work of seducing Italy from her allegiance to the successor of Peter. Protestant Bibles and tracts were to be scattered in profusion over the land. The avowed object was to revive in the Italian population the spirit of religious liberty; the real object, which some of the bolder or more incautious conspirators would now and then darkly indicate, was the political independence of Italy, and its union, federative or consolidated, as a prelude to the revival of the re-establishment of the republic. Some mischief was done by a wretched band of apostate friars and priests, who fled to Malta, and there, under the protection of the British flag, established a paper called the *Maltese Indicator*, which, being circulated by stealth, but in great numbers, throughout Italy, was expected to be no inefficient aid in the work of making the Italians Evangelicals, that is to say, Protestants, meaning by this term revolutionists and parricides.

“At the same time there became apparent a state of things and a change in the popular mind, which the enemies of the Church of God and of His people saw, and of which, to the cost of Italy, they took every imaginable advantage. A yearning after some vague, indefinable species of liberty, of which no one knew either the object or the end, took sudden possession of the fantasy of the multitude. Marching under the banner upon which was inscribed that magical word PROGRESS, change, incessant change, and novelty for its own sake were sought in every department of life; every knee was bent in homage to the new idol called Italian Unity and Independence. Perverse and irreligious men, who had long been united in the bonds of a secret conspiracy against the altar and the throne, regarded Italy with a bitter smile of derision and contempt. They saw their unwearied efforts about to be crowned with success, and their deep designs on the eve of accomplishment; they saw thrust into their hands the means of obtaining the good things for whose possession they had given over their souls to Satan,—their own aggrandizement and political domination under the specious names of the unity and independence of Italy. Yet they saw clearly that their

hopes and their expectations were in vain so long as the true Catholic faith had a place in the Italian heart. It would be too violent a step to promulgate the doctrines of socialism and communism, involving the abolition of all the dogmas and positive institutions of Christianity. Insurmountable resistance might be expected from the people. But, in view of the existing state of the popular mind, another course, more cunning and more likely to succeed, was adopted by these men. So the warm passions of Italians were aroused and made to burn fiercely, the instruments of mischief being dark insinuations, periodicals, tracts, sheets, and books prepared for the purpose, popular meetings, lectures, assemblies, secret clubs, and all the means which political conspirators know so well how to employ, and all designed to convince credulous and superficial persons that the only proper method of driving Austria [*lo straniero*] from Italy, and of restoring to the nation not only her long-lost unity and independence, but her Primacy over the nations, was, to deliver her from priestly tyranny, and from the servitude imposed upon her by her own superstitious fears. A purer and a more spiritual religion, free from the bonds which had dragged generous spirits to the earth and had fastened them to it, was the religion which the newly awakened dignity and liberty of the Italian nation called upon her to profess. Mark, said they, the prosperity and grandeur of the British nation, the greatest empire in the world! See you not that the power and the glory of England are the legitimate effects of what some call the Anglican schism, but which should be termed the emancipation of that kingdom from Rome?

"In this style the conspirators wrote and talked. Their way was but too well prepared for them by a fervid and powerful writer, (Gioberti,) who had written several volumes in order to prove that the sun of Italian regeneration was about to rise. Almost every one read his books. His style is vivid and moving, and he well knew how to employ every art that the most refined sophistry could invent. The new Italian heavens described by him were colored with the tints of refined Paganism; the new era promised by him was an era of Paganized Christianity. It was necessary, in order to chase away the clouds which yet hovered around the birthplace of the rising sun of Italy, to array the worn-out and ragged *cultus* of the old Church in modern, classical, and Italian garments. Under the name and species of Jesuitism he sought to plant in the Italian heart an aversion and contempt for all religious orders, societies, and congregations; for all secular clergymen who would not, or could not, understand and embrace his dazzling theories; for all salutary exercises of devotion which practical Christians are accustomed to perform, and, finally, for all Christian ascetic life.

“ Meanwhile the faction calling itself the party of Progress, that is to say, the demagoguery, waxed stronger and stronger; it domineered over Italy, and felt itself powerful enough to be insolent in Rome, the centre and seat of Christianity. Tracts, cunningly prepared as arguments against Catholicity and in favor of Protestantism, were distributed in great numbers by unseen hands. The Holy Father warned his people against this new plot designed for their ruin, and the bishops of Italy, especially the bishops of Tuscany, raised their voice to sound the alarm to their flocks. But the warnings evoked by pastoral zeal were, for the moment, in too many places rendered inefficacious by the artifices of the demagogues.

“ The state of Italy grew worse and worse every day. The Holy Father was insulted, his liberty abridged, and his life menaced by the triumphant faction, and he was at last compelled to leave Rome, for a season, to the mercy of the demagogues. There hastened to Italy, and especially to Rome, foreign preachers sent by the wrangling sects. Most of the intruders were from England. Italian apostates ran to Rome, there to parade their apostasy as if it were a triumph over God, and to drag in open day as many poor souls as they could cajole or frighten into submission, into the mire in which they were plunged. A very large edition of the corrupt Bible most Calvinistically rendered into Italian by Diodati, was prepared and distributed throughout the country. It was seriously proposed to seize the Pantheon, known as the church dedicated to all the Saints, and to desecrate it by restoring it to its old, Pagan uses,—that is to say, by making it a Protestant place of meeting. [The Paganism inherent in Protestantism was clearly seen in this thing, for the Pantheon, the only old Pagan temple now in a state of preservation at Rome, was the very church of all others coveted by Protestants. Symmachus, the last high-priest of Pagan Rome, made the same demand on the forbearance of the Emperor Theodosius.] All the signs of the times were such as are wont to indicate a formal renunciation of the Catholic faith on the part of the people. Members of religious orders, and virgins consecrated to God, were driven from their peaceful retreats; the churches were despoiled of their sacred ornaments, and even the bells which called the people at stated times to the house of God were stolen; clergymen were exposed to every species of affront, and compelled to abandon the open exercise of their ministry or to fly for their lives, and the pulpits and confessionals, some of them wrought most exquisitely in precious wood, were sold at mock auctions or burned in the public squares by the Vandals, as a mark of their hatred and contempt for the religion of the priests. The blood of the priests flowed plentifully, for it is well known that many of them were inhumanly butchered.

“ With such a beginning, and with such rapid progress, who at that time could foresee what would be the condition of Italy and of Rome, with respect to religion, after the lapse of five or ten years? But God loves Italy, and delivered her also this time from the apparently insurmountable dangers which menaced her. When the winds and the waves in this horrible tempest seemed about to do their very worst, God spake, the winds ceased to blow, the sea became calm and the heavens serene. Demagogues were overcome, public order was restored, religion returned to its former splendor, and the successor of Peter was borne back in triumph to his Chair, and quietly resumed the exercise of his legitimate authority as temporal sovereign. What true Catholic witnessing these things could refrain from exclaiming, in the fulness of his heart, ‘ O Lord! who is like unto thee? Who can resist thy will? A little while, and the wicked shall be no more! I passed by, and lo! he was not. I sought him, and he was not to be found.’

“ The Catholic, while pausing to reflect upon the desperate attempts which have been made to introduce Protestantism into Italy, will not fail to observe, that at the very time when Protestantism, as a religion, was dead, and had been transformed into indifferentism, rationalism, pantheism, and Manicheism,—at the very time when this deadly Upas-tree had shown to the world what fruits it would bring forth during its accursed life of three centuries, when it had made patent to the whole world the intrinsic barrenness of its nature,—when so many noble intellects of divers nations, after a protracted combat with their own reason and with the grace of God in the vain attempt to defend the errors in which, as in a raging whirlpool, they were hurried to the depths, rendered themselves willing captives to Christ, and obedient sons of the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church, and in their writings tell the whole world that they have found in the Church, and only in her, the Truth which satisfies the mind, and the Good which fills the heart, while they demonstrate the absurdity, the nakedness, the emptiness, and the principles destructive to human reason of Protestantism,—finally, at the very time when in Protestant Germany, in Holland, and in England there is a general movement, growing stronger every day and now well-nigh resistless, towards the Church, as the only refuge for those the sons of Adam who seek peace, true liberty, and the salvation of their souls,—at *this* very time the enemies of Italy, some of whom call themselves her sons, would force upon her this miserable Protestantism, which has cursed every soul that loved it, every king that protected it, and every people that received it. They would have her repudiate the Power which conferred upon her the primacy over all the nations, which secured to her the purity

of her faith, and the sublime privilege of being the moral centre of the world by the location in her midst of the Apostolic Chair, and the supreme visible Governor of the Church of God. They would have her forget in one instant the sublime dogmas, the august traditions, the illustrious memories, and the immense benefits which she has received from the Church during eighteen centuries. They would thrust Italy into the beginning of that terrible cycle which the Protestant nations have well-nigh completed, through rivers of blood, to anarchy in all orders, civil, social, political, and religious." — *Disc. Prel.*, pp. x. — xvi.

Such persons as may think that Perrone assumes too much and proves too little in the last few sentences, have only to glance at the helpless and almost anarchical condition of Protestant England, the political head of Protestantism, at the present moment. She is near the end of the terrible cycle.

It is quite evident that Father Perrone, as an Italian and a priest, does not fear Protestantism, considered as a *quasi* system of religion. He fears it, inasmuch as it is, in the hands of the bigots of Exeter Hall, of the "Christian Alliance," and in the hands of the Italian demagogues, a powerful instrument in the mad attempt at the establishment of democracy in Italy. The democratic and socialistic republic is the end sought by the demagogues who really direct the movement. The phrases, Italian Unity, Italian Independence, are mere mottoes inscribed upon the democratic banners. Some would make the state of things indicated by those phrases the end of their labors for the "regeneration of Italy," but these persons are comparatively few, and powerless withal. Moreover, they are dreamers, and while they dream, Mazzini works. He most skilfully uses them as tools convenient for a season, but let them beware of the day when their services are no longer needed, and when the revolution sweeps beyond them, and carries them away, not as men floating securely down the stream in a good boat, but as poor wretches hurried by the raging torrent far out into the bottomless ocean. Their experience during the years 1848–49 should serve to convince them that in Italy there is at present no practical medium between the Red Republic and Italy as she is. There are theoretical media in abundance, but of what value are these when those stern facts, the sword of legitimate authority, and the dagger of the

Republic, are at their deadly work. These theorists are the Girondins of Italy. Upon them rests much of the responsibility and the guilt of the dreadful work which was done in Italy during the last revolution. They cannot plead, in extenuation, that they desired *only* to unite the states of Italy, and to expel the Austrian from Italian territory; that they never proposed to dethrone the Pope, far less to deprive him of the free exercise of his spiritual powers in Rome; that they are not Jacobins; that their theories were, at worst, harmless; and that many of their number profess to be Roman Catholics, try to be peaceful and loyal citizens, and, in fact, lead ethically irreproachable lives. These very facts, if truly stated, serve but to prove that they are guilty men; that they are among the worst enemies with whom Italy has to contend, and that their death at the hands of the Jacobins is certain. The very talents, moderation, and irreproachable lives, if they lead such, which they plead in mitigation of sentence, while they furnish the democrats or Jacobins with characteristic and potent motives to destroy them, furnish the real friends and sons of Italy—we mean all true Catholics—with motives sufficient to insure their condemnation. They are thus placed between two fires, from neither of which can they escape. Precisely because of their talents and natural virtues should they have foreseen the sanguinary end of their theories. *They* began the revolutionary work. They gave the premises, from which was drawn the conclusion of 1848–49. The democratic revolutionists outran them, and laughed them to scorn when they cried, Hold! enough! To these misguided men, many of them naturally good and generous souls, Father Perrone addresses his argument. The Italians who are ranged under this division are more numerous than is commonly supposed. They are at least one third of the people of Italy.

“I know well that political liberty and independence form the bait with which these regenerators of Italy hoped and expected to take her captive, inasmuch as she was to be persuaded that her newly found liberty and independence were the legitimate and necessary result of her repudiation of Catholicity and her acceptance of Protestantism. Unhappy Italy, if thou, or any of thy states prove insensate to such an incredible degree as to be caught by a bait so flimsy as this! I do not speak only of the shame and

impiety of procuring merely civil and political ameliorations, however important they may be, at the price of a monstrous apostasy, which necessarily involves the irreparable loss of the eternal rewards of the life to come, because it imports an utter neglect of the most sacred duties incumbent upon the Christian man in this world, and, among them, the duties payable by him to his country, which are not satisfied, but outraged, by the course which the demagogues would have Italians pursue. I speak also of the natural operation of the demagogical scheme in the historical, civil, and philosophical orders, according to which it has now become evident that the so highly vaunted natural union between Protestantism and civil liberty is eminently sophistical and false." — p. xvi.

Father Perrone proceeds to illustrate this position, which scarcely requires additional proof, so clearly does it appear to thoughtful men who watch the current of events as they pass, by citations from Guizot, Chateaubriand, and others. The passage quoted from Guizot is the noted one from the twelfth Lecture of his Course on Modern History, where he says that the Protestant Reformation rather strengthened than weakened the power of the princes, while it tended to repress the liberties of the people. It was rather inimical to the free institutions of the Middle Ages than favorable to their healthy development. He also says that the triumph of Protestantism and of despotism in Europe was simultaneous. Chateaubriand, in the work cited by Perrone, *Etudes Historique — Analyse Raisonnée de l'Histoire de France*, enumerates the countries in which the people lost by the Reformation such liberties as they had enjoyed before. "The early Calvinists declared themselves republicans, but their republic was an aristocracy itself governed by a secret club of the elect. It was one of the most oppressive of tyrannies, as the melancholy story of Geneva while it groaned beneath the atrocious domination of Calvin plainly demonstrates. In France the Calvinists nearly succeeded in obtaining possession of the land. The history of modern France contains many dreary pages, but the permanent ascendancy of Calvinism would have made its later history far more terrible than it is. The revocation of the edict of Nantes was a harsh measure, but it was not unjust, and it was necessary to the safety of the king and of the people. The tendency of the Reformation was to re-establish feudalism in Europe. The nobles, who had by this time lost much of the

power which they had misused so cruelly, were instinctively attracted by a movement which promised to restore to them their ancient might-begotten privilege to resist the Pope and the king, and to oppress the people, — an iniquitous privilege which the Popes, after a long struggle, had succeeded in wresting from them. Sweden, Prussia, and Saxony remained absolute monarchies; Denmark fell into the hands of despots, and the aristocratic Cantons of Switzerland have been enabled by it, though at the cost of much blood, to oppress the others, and to withhold from the people that freedom which Swiss republicans regarded as their birthright. In England the people not only obtained no enlargement of their liberties in consequence of their apostasy, but they lost nearly all the substance of what is proudly termed British freedom. That freedom was protected by the British constitution, itself the work of Catholics in the Ages of Faith, and under the malign influence of Protestantism it has been so mutilated that it is but a shadow of its former self. It at first made the sovereign absolute, and now makes him a ruler only in name. It surrounds him with all the ensigns of a power which he cannot wield, and so the masses have an excuse for counting the cost of the crown, and for comparing profit with loss. It so degraded Parliament that not even the abject Senate of Tiberius exceeded in slavishness the Parliaments of Henry the Eighth and of Elizabeth." In due time the alteration of the constitution, effected by Protestantism, produced its logical and inevitable effects, which were, in part, a general disruption and confusion among all orders and estates of the kingdom. The king lost his head, his dynasty was overthrown, and the crown, which had been the first to lay violent hands upon the constitution, lost its constitutional, together with its usurped power. Then came the turn of the Lords, who had first so basely yielded to the king, and finally betrayed him. The lords spiritual, the bishops, cannot meet, they cannot decide what is of faith and what is not, but in all matters appertaining to the exercise of their ministry they and the parsons form a spiritual police, as wholly subservient to the government as the armed lay police, and disobedience in them is neither overlooked nor unpunished. The most astounding proofs of the subserviency of the Establishment to the crown have recently been given to

the world. The lords temporal have so far lost their voice in the administration of the government, that, although their assent is necessary in order that a bill may become a law, yet on one occasion, when they were unwilling to pass a bill which had passed the other house, and was supposed to be popular, the leader of the House of Commons, in his place in Parliament, boldly told their lordships that their house was generally regarded by the nation as an institution to be spared as a venerable, though nearly useless, portion of a majestic whole, and that, although their assent was needed, it was needed only as a matter of form. He told them that the bill *must* pass. Otherwise the nation would begin to inquire whether, without abolishing their order or their house, it might not be expedient to compel them to listen to the public voice. Their legislative powers might be abridged, or it would be easy to create a number of new peers, sufficient for the purposes of the government. Lord John Russell adopted the tone, and almost the language, of Henry the Eighth when Parliament was unwilling to pass one of his bills. The menace was equally successful in both cases. The mutilation of the constitution has also changed the character of the House of Commons. The sovereignty of the nation is in the majority of the House, and of this majority it is said that it is nearly omnipotent, being able to do everything, except to make a man a woman. And this majority is ordinarily the organ of ministers, a body unknown in its present form to the constitution, and in which the sovereignty predicated of Parliament really resides. The constitution recognizes counsellors, or advisers of the crown, but it supposes that the king can reject advice as well as take it. Such is not the case now. Ministers govern the crown, both Houses of Parliament, the nation, and the empire. True, a minister can be impeached, and it is said that some members of the lower House are disposed to test, in the person of an ex-minister, the question whether ministers are not really, as well as nominally, responsible to Parliament, and whether the country should be satisfied with the retirement of a minister who has failed to do his duty. Finally, a new element, unknown to the constitution, has entered into the composition of the House. This is the urban interest, or the representation of overgrown, manufacturing cities. The agricultural in-

terest in the House received a death-blow at the passage of the famous Reform Bill. A door was opened for the DEMOCRACY to enter the House, and this door, instead of being shut, is gradually becoming wider, and the people are pouring in. In the old Catholic Parliament, the people were represented in a way which was, at any rate, satisfactory to themselves, inasmuch as the poor were shielded from oppression, so far as Parliament could shield them. After the Reformation, Parliament ceased to protect them, or to represent them, and it aided and abetted the crown in oppressing them. The inevitable reaction against the consequences of the Reformation came, the king lost his life, the nobility were either exiled, or in other ways deprived of the constitutional rights of their order, the gentry were compelled to stay at home, and among the fragments, if any were left, of their ruined estates, to meditate upon the instability of human affairs, and upon the Divine saying that the sins of the fathers should be visited upon the children unto the third and fourth generations of those who hate God. And while the royal, noble, and gentle descendants of the apostates were thus visited for the sins of their fathers as well as for their own, the democracy, represented by Hampden, Cromwell, and Praise-God-Barebones, and which had been forced, against its will, by the three estates of the kingdom, to apostatize, rushed into power, and, in the person of Cromwell, wielded it as no Protestant sovereign ever did. The people lost the reins of government because there was but one Cromwell among them. Yet they remember to this day what their fathers did, and they are not content to see themselves growing poorer, more helpless, more ignorant, more powerless, more brutal, and more like slaves, under the blighting influence of the apostasy consummated by England of the sixteenth century, and visited with ever-increasing severity upon each succeeding generation, until the burden has become too heavy to be borne. The cry of Reform, now raised, has swelled into a terrible cry; it is heard in the House of Commons, where the democracy — we do not employ this word here in its political sense — are already represented, and where they will before many years be more fully heard, if they even do not for the second time rush into power, and rule or ruin England in their own way. The cry is heard in the House of

Lords, and the startled peers hear words which sound strangely in their ears. They hear it said that noble birth, though a *prima facie* recommendation to civil and military office, is neither the only nor the chief requisite. The story that Russia regards merit rather than rank, in her appointments to office, and that Tottleben, a man raised from the ranks a few months ago, has defended Sebastopol against the allies, and that he is ready to defend the place so long as the allies may be willing to expend their blood and treasure in trying to take it, has been told all over Europe. The English people think that, while there are many Raglans among the noble and gentle officers, there are many Tottlebens in the ranks. The demand in its present form is, to open the career of office to merit, wherever it may be found. If one of the aristocracy deserve office, let him have it. If a plebeian deserve it more, let him have it, and tell the aristocrat to stand aside. These words fall with startling distinctness upon the ears of men who have been bred to believe that the aristocrat is naturally an officer, and the plebeian is necessarily a private. Like rats deserting a sinking ship, the *Times* and *Punch* desert the aristocracy, and pronounce the demands of the people to be reasonable and just.

Indeed, who can look at the conduct of the war thus far, and deny that those Englishmen who pay the expenses and expose their lives in a campaign so disastrous as this has been to England have some reason to complain, when money is squandered by millions, and lives lost by thousands upon thousands, with no other result than apparently to strengthen the enemy, and to make the relations of the two allied powers substantially as they were when Charles the Second was a sort of dependent upon France? It is not easy for Englishmen to look on quietly, and see the nation dwindling into the condition of a second-rate power, through the mismanagement of all concerned, or, as we would prefer to say, through judicial blindness. These evils, which have at various times overtaken kings, lords, commons, and people of England, are as clearly traceable to the workings of the Protestant rebellion, as effects are traceable to logical and necessary causes. What has happened in England has happened in all countries where that rebellion occurred, and was accepted by the estates of the kingdom.

The generative idea of the great work of Perrone which we have under consideration may now be clearly understood. The book is an appeal to the young men of Italy to repel these new attempts to force Protestantism upon the Peninsula, upon the ground that, while it furnishes no means to obtain eternal life, it most miserably fails to fulfil its promises of political and civil ameliorations in society. Make that clear to the Young Italian, and Protestantism will woo him in vain. He despises it heartily as a system either of philosophy or of religion, but, as the "Christian Alliance" presents it to him as a thing which may enable him to obtain the political, civil, and social reforms which he so ardently covets, an essential service is rendered to him when he is made to understand that Protestantism never did, and never can, satisfy his desires, and that it is in the political, civil, and social orders, as well as in the religious, not a creator, not a preserver, but a destroyer. It never built up anything, and its seat is a pile of ruins. Negation is the essence of Protestantism, as such, and nothing multiplied by nothing brings nothing. If the Young Italian tells you to pause, and look at England and America, two Protestant nations, and to mark how Protestantism has increased their prosperity to an almost fabulous degree, tell him that he knows as little about England and America as a certain Italian did who once asked us if America were not an island near London; or another, who asked us why we were a white, and not a copper-colored man; or yet another, who, hearing that Massachusetts was our native State, requested the favor of a song in the Choctaw tongue. The poor Young Italian knows nothing of England or of America. He has been misled by the agents of the Christian Alliance. The prosperity of the two countries is partly apparent, partly real. This is an age of "shams," and there are political and social shams in abundance, as any English or American politician will be willing to testify, provided he be not required to criminate himself. The Young Italian will not care to introduce Protestantism into Italy, if he favor its introduction at all, for the sake of any other than real, lasting prosperity. Here Perrone makes him understand, if he will read and think, that Protestantism, as such, cannot fulfil its promise. It is like a fraudulent bank, that pays only in worthless paper, and runs away

with the gold of its dupes. It always promises to pay, but never pays. Next, it must be asked how much of the real, lasting prosperity of England and America is due to Protestantism, as such. The result will be a cipher. England received her constitution, her common law, her independent judiciary, and all those permanent institutions which she is accustomed to regard as absolutely essential to the preservation of her liberties, from Catholic sources, and her Protestantism has more or less mutilated all of them. On striking the balance, it will be found that whatever real good there may be in English and American political, social, and civil life was derived from Catholic sources,—the very sources which Exeter Hall and the “Christian Alliance” tell the Young Italian to dry up, and that Protestantism of itself brought only evil, and its pretended efforts to reform old Catholic institutions have served only to mutilate them. As to the merely apparent prosperity of the two nations, we need say nothing here. The present state of English affairs does not look very prosperous. America is yet young, but, like many young people of this age, she crowds the life of two years into one. A premature death closes a life led thus. The Young Italian, of all others, has reason to say, “I fear those Greeks who bring me presents.” There are evils in Italian political and civil life, and he may without blame wish for reformation and improvement. But if Protestantism were planted in Italy, would they be removed? If so, would they not be succeeded by evils far worse? If not,—and this is the true state of the case,—how much would the Young Italian gain by superadding new and wasting, to old and endurable evils?

We have seen that Protestantism was once planted in Italy, but the seed died in the ground. The stoutest resistance to it was made in the republics of the Continent. Schwytz, Uri, and Unterwalden, the three Catholic and most republican Cantons of Switzerland, made a successful stand against the enemy. Genoa and Venice were for a short time infected with the plague, and the two rival republics, particularly Venice, owe no thanks to themselves if the evil spirit was driven away. Venice was never thoroughly loyal to St. Peter’s Chair, and her present temporal condition may be her recompense for so tenaciously insisting upon the necessity of a separation of the

spiritual and the temporal orders. Ferrara cast the Northern demon out of her gates. As serpents are said to die when they are brought into contact with Irish soil, so the serpent of Protestantism died when it wriggled into Italy. Chateaubriand says that the rays of the Italian sun killed it.

“The impartial reader of modern history cannot but observe that one of the first temporal results of the acceptance of Protestantism was to arrest the action of that reasonable form of government which respects both the principle of authority and human liberty, and asserts the rights of each in its own sphere. All the Catholic nations of Europe had such a government before the Protestant rebellion. They had each a constitution, not a mere parchment, but a framework of government and safeguards for the freedom of the subject, growing out of the genius, character, and wants of the respective populations. The problem to be solved was to harmonize the monarchical, the aristocratic, and the democratic elements; to secure to the people a good government, and the peaceable enjoyment of their rights; to give the aristocracy a bond of union and a principle of life; and to secure to the throne due loyalty, reverence, and love. The common bond of these three elements, their balance, and their harmonizing element, was the Catholic Church. With a little reflection, it is easy to conceive how the priesthood was the only power equal to the work of preserving an equilibrium and a lasting harmony between three such dissimilar elements, because the priests are from the democracy, they form a part of the aristocracy, and the principle of church government is monarchical. Strong and independent, the priesthood could afford to others the example of a temperate opposition to the unjust exactions of the king. Possessing great influence, and being naturally familiar with the idea of an enlightened subordination, they were efficient supporters of the throne, when unrighteously menaced by the other two orders. Here we have a satisfactory explanation of the fact, that, in every country which accepted Protestantism, the constitution was mutilated, and despotism was substituted for constitutional government. Take from the machinery of representation that principle of harmony, and the movements of the machine will become confused and erratic. Protestantism sowed the seeds of anarchy everywhere, and so completed the downfall of political and civil liberty. The states, menaced by the anarchical principle, saw no remedy except in the centralization of power. The little republics of Italy were absorbed by their more powerful neighbors. The Cortes of Spain, and the States-General of France, once strong bulwarks of the throne and fearless defenders of the con-

stitutional rights of the people, fell into discredit, and then into disuse. Throughout Europe, the regal office, once elective, became a hereditary dictatorship.

"Protestantism substituted the State for the Church as an authority binding the consciences of men, and thus it lessened the dignity and diminished the liberty of man considered as a Christian and as a member of civil society. On the one hand, it proclaimed the absurd doctrine of the absolute right of private judgment in matters of religion, thus opening the way to fatal error, affecting not only religion, but every department of life; and, on the other hand, it subjected conscience to the despotic will of the ruler, by degrading religion to the condition of a mere creature of the state, and a branch of the public service, to be supported and governed like the army and navy. It was not in the power of the Reformers to do otherwise. The people, that is the majority, of those days, were not of themselves disposed to accept Protestantism. It required thirty or forty years of the most cruel legislation in order to force the new Gospel upon their acceptance. But even if they were favorably disposed, their aid alone would not have enabled the Reformers to prosecute their work against the will of the princes. The only instrument fitted to the purpose of the Reformers was the civil power, with the means of coercion which it has always at hand. Hence it is that, wherever Protestantism became rooted in the soil, its success was entirely due to the aid afforded by government, which accordingly regarded the Reformation as its own property, took possession of it, and imposed it upon the unwilling people with cruel laws and with fire and sword. Sweden under Gustavus Vasa, Denmark under Christiern, England under Henry and Elizabeth, Prussia and other nations of the North, and the democratic states of Switzerland, all afford historical evidence of the truth of these statements. The Protestants themselves are disgusted with the vassalage which state autocracy has imposed upon them. Hence there is among them at this day a general movement in favor of the emancipation of their church, and of its right to govern itself. As a proof that it can do this, and that both the State and the Church will be served by the formal recognition of the essential distinction without separation between the two orders, they point to the history and actual state of the Catholic Church, with its independence and autonomy. In truth, what species of servitude can be more degrading than to be compelled by penal laws to receive the religion of the state, that is, from a power which has no legitimate mission to teach, to preach, and to make laws concerning articles of faith, and to bind the conscience of the people, over which it has no such right. The Church claims the exercise of this right because she received it

from Christ; because she can demonstrate to every man, who is not judicially blind, the divine origin of her mission; because her title to be regarded as the infallible teacher of truth is indisputable; and because the articles of faith revealed by Christ and taught by her, as they transcend the sphere of the natural intellect of man, ought to rest, and do rest, upon an extrinsic authority so weighty, that a reasonable man, who is willing to confess the truth, not only can, but must, yield, not a blind, but an intellective assent to them. [Even in yielding merely intellective assent, he merits nothing, — he goes not beyond the devils, who, as the Apostle says, yield this same assent, and tremble. The intellect is a necessary power.] By the grace of Christ, which always accompanies the authorized preaching of the word of God, he is enabled to give a saving assent to the truths of religion, as proposed to him by the Church. But the state has no such power as that which we have described, — it is not within its sphere, — it was not instituted by God to conduct men in relation to the end which the Church proposes to them, and the means which she has at her command are far from being in proportion to that end, inasmuch as they lie in an entirely distinct, though not a separate order, and the end to which they are naturally fitted is the conservation of civil society." — *Disc. Prel.*, pp. xviii. — xxiii.

This very civil society is a means provided by God for a higher end, — the establishment of an everlasting society of redeemed men beyond the heavens. The Church of God is the only interpreter and administrator of the laws which must be observed in order that a man may be aggregated to that society. From this principle flows the conclusion that the temporal order is subordinate to the spiritual. The state cannot make laws concerning religion, it can only aid the Church in the execution of her laws. If the state go beyond this, it transcends its powers, and logic tells us that anarchy *must* be the result, while history tells us that it *always* has been, and our own observation tells us that it *is*. Ideas are not abstractions; they are things, real acts of real beings, or, if you will, real forms of real entities. The best proof of it is the generative or fructifying power of an idea.

These sentences are not exaggerated declamation, or fantastical views of a narrow and retrograde mind. They are easily verified historical truths, and our beloved Italy is warned by them not to repose her confidence in her degenerate sons, who, affiliated to secret societies, have forsaken her for the worship of strange gods, and, while they pro-

fess to be associated for the sole purpose of restoring to her the primacy which she once claimed and exercised among the nations, they forget that this primacy stands or falls with the primacy of Peter, and, reading history by contraries, they propose as her highest good, and as a sovereign remedy for the evils which afflict her, that formula of all evils, religious, political, and social, called Protestantism. Our socialists even are far more reasonable in their restorative formulas, because the society which they propose to reform is, and for many years to come will be, Protestant society. Scarcely any change for the worse in it could be devised by the wit of modern philanthropists. But it is far otherwise with a society that is and always has been Catholic. The promised mountain of reformation brings forth a mouse with the negative sign. In algebra, negatives multiplied by positives produce negatives. The conclusion is of the same nature with the weaker or negative part. There is something positive in Protestantism, and that is the remnant of truth which it has been gradually rejecting in every department of life these three hundred years. In itself, it is merely negative. Following the inflexible laws of logic, she has been engaged, age after age, in multiplying her positive by her negative elements, and the result has been necessarily a series of negations, the sum of them growing greater and greater, of course, as the work goes on, until the negative mouse has produced a mountain of negations, thus reversing the sense of the proverb, as Protestantism reverses the sense and goodness of everything it touches. *Nihil tetigit quod non fœdavit.* The degenerate sons of Italy who so treacherously hold to her lips a poisoned chalice, the ingredients of which were concocted in London and New York by her deadly enemies, imitate the example of Aaron, of Jeroboam, and of other men who have at various times set up vile idols, and have bid the people to behold in them the gods in whom alone safety was to be found. While the children of Israel were encamped at the foot of Mount Sinai, and before their eyes had ceased to be dazzled, and their ears stunned, with the lightning, voices, trumpeting, and thunder which accompanied the presence of the majesty of God as he descended upon the mountain and said to the people, "I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee forth from the land of Egypt, and from the house of

bondage; thou shalt have no strange gods before me," — Aaron set up a golden calf, made of the earrings of the women, and he said to the people, "These are thy gods, O Israel! which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt." Jeroboam did the same thing while the children of Israel were a united and a powerful nation, and under the reign of Solomon enjoyed the primacy among the nations of the earth. The power and the glory of the nation, and the material prosperity of the people under the reign of the wisest and greatest king that ever lived, were fresh in the remembrance of the people when three fourths of them most servilely followed Jeroboam, rent asunder the nation, and worshipped the calves which he set up, in imitation of Aaron, and presented to them as the gods which had brought them forth from Egypt. The idolatry of Aaron was punished by the instant loss of life to thousands, by the forty years wandering in the desert, and by the death of all the people who had left Egypt, two only excepted, before the promised land was reached. What a lesson for Italy! The idolatry of Jeroboam was punished by the laying waste of the land with fire and sword; by the final captivity of the people. As the Popes, after similar reverses, have in every case returned in triumph to Rome, so the children of Judah returned to Jerusalem, and rebuilt the temple, while the children of the men who adored the calves set up by Jeroboam were dragged into a captivity from which they never returned, and from which history cannot trace them. They are one of the few peoples who have not only lost their national unity, but their existence, and have been so effectually scattered, or hidden, or spirited away, that the most patient researches are not rewarded with the remotest trace of them. One of the most interesting historical problems of our day is, to find the missing ten tribes of Israel who apostatized under Jeroboam. What a lesson for Italy! What a warning to her, not to heed the Aarons and the Jeroboams, the Gavazzis and the Mazzinis, who erect golden calves, and say to her, These are thy gods, O Israel, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt, and from the house of bondage! Protestantism is the golden calf of Italy! If she *will* worship it, let her look for a forty years' travel in the desert! Let her look for the death of all her children before the promised land is reached. Where will the dead

conspirators be then? In the grave of Core, Dathan, and Abiron, whom the earth swallowed up! The fate of these conspirators, and of their deluded followers, has been ever the fate of men who conspired, not only against the Lord and against his Christ, but against Moses and Peter. In the time of Aaron, the alternative offered to the people of God was, Mount Sinai, or Death. The people chose to die. In the time of Jeroboam, the alternative offered to the same people was, the Temple of Jerusalem, or Death. Ten of the twelve tribes chose to die. In the time of Mazzini, the present time, the people of Italy — who regard the primacy among nations, which was won for them by the Popes, and which was lost by their disloyalty to the Chair of Peter, as theirs by all divine and natural law — are offered the alternative between Rome and Death. It remains to be seen which part the people of Italy will choose. The idea of the unhappy Gioberti, divested of its Pagan and ultra federative elements, was and is the true idea for Italy. Rome or Death! exclaimed Gioberti to distracted Italy. The mischief was, that he wanted a Rome coined in his own mint, and the coin would bear the impress of the Pontifex Maximus, not of Christian, but of Pagan Rome.

“An illustrious and most religious writer of our own age, M. Martinet, a man who understands well the wants of the age and their remedy, says that the arm of God is now visibly raised on high over the world, to bless it or to curse it. The choice rests with us. Society is on the verge of ruin, and it asks, What shall I do to be saved? It looks to the heavens for an answer, and from the stars it receives no sign. It turns to the earth, and finds only earth. It interrogates itself, and it sees only evidences of decay and ruin. Disgusted with its present, afraid to think of its future, it looks at its past, and there, in the valley of dry bones, it discovers a germ of life. It is Rome, the source of the only true life it ever lived. And crumbling society looks at the hideous valley of bones, at herself, at the future which threatens her, and exclaims: Rome or Death!”

The beginning, progress, and end of the attempt of the degenerate sons of Italy, who are the slaves of the secret societies, to make their mother worship the empty idol of Protestantism, are so clearly described in the accounts given in the Old Testament concerning the movements of

Aaron and Jeroboam, that it is only necessary to change the names of persons and places in order to have a satisfactory history of the Italian revolution as designed by Mazzini:—

“And the people, seeing that Moses delayed to come down from the mount, gathering together against Aaron, said, Arise, make us gods that may go before us; for as to this Moses, the man who brought us out of the land of Egypt, we know not what has befallen him. [How often have the degenerate sons of Italy uttered the same words concerning the Pope! Yet, as Moses, in God’s own time, descended from the mountain and made himself heard and felt, so, in God’s own time, when wicked men declared the Papacy to be an obsolete idea, just then the Pope reascended his throne and appeared in fuller majesty than ever.]

“And Aaron said unto them, Take the golden ear-rings from the ears of your wives, and your sons and daughters, and bring them to me. [So did Mazzini in Rome.]

“And the people did what he had commanded, bringing the ear-rings to Aaron. And when he had received them, he fashioned them by founders’ work, and made of them a molten calf. And they said, these are thy gods, O Israel, that have brought thee out of the land of Egypt.

“And rising in the morning, they offered holocausts, and peace victims; and the people sat down to eat and to drink, and they rose up to play.

“And Moses said unto Aaron, What has this people done unto thee, that thou shouldst bring upon them a most heinous sin? And he answered him, Let not my lord be offended, for thou knowest this people, that they are prone to evil.

“Then Moses, standing at the gate of the camp, said, If any man be on the Lord’s side, let him join with me. And all the sons of Levi gathered themselves together unto him.

“And he said unto them, Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, — Put every man his sword upon his thigh, go and return from gate to gate through the midst of the camp, and let every man kill his brother, and friend, and neighbor.

“And the sons of Levi did according to the words of Moses; and there were slain that day about three-and-twenty thousand men.

“The Lord therefore struck the people for the guilt on occasion of the calf which Aaron had made.”—*Exod. xxxii.*

We have dwelt at some length upon topics suggested by the Preliminary Discourse of Father Perrone, because he therein takes a comprehensive and profound view of the field from which he culled the materials for the work be-

fore us. It is, as we have already said, divided into three volumes, which might easily be reduced to the compass of one, without the loss of any substantial portion of the argument. His plan is, to attack Protestantism by destroying the root, and not by cutting off the branches. Every system of doctrine, whether philosophical or religious, in order to be a system, must have a fundamental, supreme, and vital principle, which sustains it, and pervades every part of it, so that it stands or falls with the principle which gives it real or apparent life. Catholicity has such a principle, — so has Protestantism. This principle is in each respectively its *Rule of Faith*. To the examination of this rule may be reduced all the elements of warfare between Catholicity and Protestantism, and upon this field the battle must be fought. Accordingly, this work of Perrone is given to an examination of the demerits of the Protestant rule of faith. The term *Rule of Faith*, as applied to Protestantism, is not strictly correct, for it has no faith, and consequently no rule of faith. Its rule is, to have no rule. Yet the term is convenient, and no one need be misled by its use in a controversy like this. An objection, however, may here occur to some persons. This is not an age in which people care much for dogmatic discussions. They prefer the examination or the fruition of results to the resolution or establishment of principles. These are taken for granted by the masses, who accordingly are content with a system of grovelling materialism for their philosophy. They will have nothing to do with science unless it is made easy, so that he who runs may read; they care nothing for the speculative sciences, while they are interested in those which are practical, which may be put to some use, and serve as instruments for the acquisition of wealth; they would not bestow a thought upon the systems, speculations, and dreams of socialists and other self-elected reformers, were it not that these profess to be able to cure some, if not all, the evils which afflict society, and which every one feels in a greater or lesser measure; they read, not heavy tomes and really scientific books, but popular Penny-Magazine and Household-Words abridgments and diluted expositions of scientific matters, and hardly even these, while the paper-stitched romance and the newspaper ordinarily satisfy their thirst for knowledge. Those who go farther rarely go beyond the mag-

azine and the review. So, in matters of religion, they care not for the first principles upon which a system rests; they ask you to describe the practical applications of those principles to the ordinary affairs of life, and they will take your principles for granted, — the Catholic from his habit of faith, the Protestant from his habit of materialism. Controversial sermons, tracts, and other books are not absolutely set aside, but their day has passed, not for ever, but for a season; and, in the Catholic Church, the Catechism, moral theology, and an application by each pastor to his congregation of the principles of the Catechism and of moral theology, have in a great measure superseded the controversial sermon, while the Catholic newspaper, magazine, (the Review is of its nature controversial, — *Judex damnatur dum nocens absolvitur*.) the Catholic devotional book, the story, and the class of books, now become very large, in which Catholic principles are in various ways applied to the common affairs of life, have nearly consigned the old-fashioned books of controversy on matters of faith to the upper and less frequented shelves. Meanwhile the Protestant stock of devotional books is excessively meagre, and, with the exception of some vulgar re-hash of stale objections against Catholicity, answered a hundred times, there is no Protestant controversial literature worth mentioning. In the Protestant pulpit, the custom of introducing politics, socialism, *rapperism*, abolitionism, and all other “ismitic” topics of the day, and of seizing upon passing events, such as murders, shipwrecks, fires, riots, processions, and visits of distinguished strangers like Kossuth, as appropriate and popular material for sermons, has become inveterate. The pressure of the spirit of the age upon even good, faithful Catholics may be partially estimated by this change in the Catholic public taste, which, in this respect, has consulted the peculiar character of the times. Catholics must be in the world, but not of it, and the line between the two forms of life cannot be drawn by any other than an infallible hand.

Father Perrone has written a complete essay upon the Protestant rule of faith, and the nature of his work required a scientific examination of the principle upon which Protestantism rests. He addresses a people whose logic is passably good, and who have rejected Protestantism

more than once, on account of its intrinsic absurdities, but who are somewhat puzzled by this new device of heresy, in representing itself as the political and civil regenerator of nations. As these Italian liberals form a large minority of the nation, as there is danger that a considerable portion of the rising generation may be seduced into the ranks of liberalism, as the majority of the liberals profess to believe in the Holy Catholic Church so far as they have any supernatural belief at all, and as they generally declare that their only quarrel with the Church is based upon the supposition that she is unfriendly to a free government, and that their only reason for favoring the introduction of Protestantism into Italy is, that it professes to be favorable to the modern doctrine of progress, to human liberty, and to Italian unity and independence, and may therefore be used as a convenient instrument for the accomplishment of their ulterior purposes, to be afterwards thrown aside as a useless, worn-out, and by no means honorable instrument of warfare, it follows that Father Perrone had to do three things. He had to show that every nation which, by its three estates,—by whatever name these may be called, or under whatever form they may appear,—has definitely accepted Protestantism, is either ruined, or is on the road to ruin. It sows tares, apples of Sodom, Upas-trees, and the evil tree brings forth its evil fruit. Like the Upas-tree, it presents a comely appearance to the superficial observer from a distance; let him draw near, and, if its odors do not poison him, its fruits and juices will. Like the apple of Sodom, it may look beautiful to the eye while it affords no nourishment to the eater. Like the tares, it is in the beginning, when it is young, not so easily distinguished from the good wheat, and it is only in the season of fruits that it proves to be a vile weed, fit only to be burned as rubbish. It promises to the people civil, political, social, and religious reform, and it in the end brings political, religious, social, and civil ruin. Current events in England, as we have already remarked, illustrate this position of the illustrious Perrone.

The decline of Protestant nations is a living fact to which no man can shut his eyes. The model of those nations is England. Her own statesmen and chief writers begin to despair. A few years of war will show how reasonable

their forebodings are. Yet, lest any man accuse Perrone of availing himself of the argument that ruin follows the introduction of Protestantism, and is therefore its legitimate consequence, he devotes two books to the development of the following propositions:— The intrinsic qualities of Protestantism are such, that, by every rule of logic, it *must* produce the ruinous effects which have everywhere followed its acceptance by a nation. The nature of Catholicity is such, that the nation which abides by it loyally will secure the fruition of the end for which God formed civil society.

The thread held by Perrone in tracing his way to the conclusion that Protestantism is a destroyer, and not a conservator, is this. Both parties agree that God has left to man a rule of faith to which all men who profess to believe in a positive religion of divine origin, such as is Christianity, are bound in conscience to yield their assent. Professed atheists may pass over this part of the discussion, if they will. The whole controversy turns upon the answer to the following question: Is this rule of belief one of the *three* professed by Protestants,—the theosophic, the “rational” (*rationale a non ratiocinando*), or the heteroclite rule,—or is it the rule professed by the Roman Catholic Church?

The true rule cannot be the theosophic, that is, the rule which says that each man must model his creed according to the immediate and internal communications which he may receive from the Holy Ghost. Luther at first intended to adopt, or rather to cause his dupes to adopt, this rule. Not a small portion of the Protestant world has at different times accepted this rule, from the Gnostics of the first two centuries to the Montanists of the third, and so on down to the Anabaptists of the sixteenth, the Independents of the seventeenth, the Swedenborgians and Methodists of the eighteenth, and the Irvingites, Mormons, and other fanatics of the nineteenth century. This rule is a source of misrule. It is against the clear warrant of Scripture; it is a rule of its own nature suggestive of the most deplorable hallucinations; it has given birth to numerous sects professing extravagant or impious doctrines, and it has opened a wide door to immorality, unbelief, fanaticism, and rebellion. And so it is one of the gates of hell.

It will be borne in mind, that we are giving but a very

brief analysis of the argument of Perrone. Each of the heads or topics which we only mention is illustrated with an erudition which would surprise one who does not know who and what Perrone is. The second rule of belief among Protestants is the so-called "rational" rule, or the rule of private judgment. This rule is most critically examined by the illustrious author. He subjects it to a Biblical, historical, theological, rational, ethical, and polemical dissection. Under the Biblical head he demonstrates that the rule fails, because the genuineness, integrity, and inspiration of the Holy Scriptures cannot be proved from the Bible itself, nor from any external source, excepting the Roman Catholic Church; because this rule of faith is condemned by the Bible, even in its mutilated state, as Protestants have it; because the Protestant Bible is a mutilated Bible, and any reformer, any Bible Society, or any person of great influence and wealth, can at any time issue editions of the corrupted word, and, being corrupted, useless as a rule of faith; and finally, because, admitting for the sake of argument that these objections can be answered, there remains the fatal one, that no book or document can be a rule of faith which is interpreted in contradictory ways by different readers, all equally honest, and each guided, consciously or unconsciously, by his own opinions, prejudices, and passions. The *word* which the Protestant reader gets while reading the Bible is not God's word, it is *his* word.

Historically examined, the Protestant rule is found equally wanting. It was not only unknown to Christian antiquity, but so contrary to it, that even the heretics of the first ages, in their worst aberrations, never thought of it as a rule of belief. It has been *in practice* adopted by all heretics, and *in theory* it justifies all manner of heresy. Its adoption as a rule was reserved to modern times. It was adopted *in theory* by the self-elected Reformers, and *in practice* repudiated by every one of them, as it is, in fact, by every true Protestant. We have yet to see the Protestant who makes it the living rule of his conduct in religious matters.

Theologically considered, the Protestant rule destroys the unity of faith and of love which Christ willed should subsist in his Church; it annihilates the very conception of faith, substituting for it mere opinion; and it leads di-

rectly to rationalism, either vulgar or philosophical. The Church of Christ becomes according to it a philosophical school, and not the most noble one, inasmuch as the entrance of positive theology, which Protestant masters at times would fain teach, makes it a very ridiculous school.

Examined in a rational and ethical point of view, the difficulties attending the Protestant rule are so numerous and so great, as to make it repugnant to the common sense of mankind. No man ever embraced Protestantism unless moved by some worldly cause, which made him shut his eyes to the absurdities of the rule. No man ever adopted it to save his soul. It presupposes Satanic pride in the heretic, and it is thus diametrically opposed to the humility prescribed by our Lord. It is impracticable for believers and for unbelievers; that is, no Protestant and no Pagan either can or will follow it. The Protestant may adopt it as his motto, and talk lustily about it, but that is all. Considered in a polemical or controversial light, the rule is worse than useless. It not only fails to prevent controversies concerning matters of faith, but it gives them new food, increases them, multiplies them, and renders them interminable.

The third rule of faith among Protestants is called by Perrone the heteroclite rule. The name is new in this connection, but it is an appropriate name. The author applies it to the Church of England, which, according to its own account, is neither Protestant nor Catholic, but is at the head of the Protestant world without being of it, and is a branch of the Catholic Church, though cut off long since from the tree planted and watered and blessed by Christ. It tries to pursue a middle course, and, as happens in all cases where a middle course is absurd, its way is erratic or heteroclite. It contrives to be nothing, while striving to be something original.

Perrone concludes his argument on the negative polemic side with the following observations:—

“From the argument developed in this first volume, we infer that the pretended Reformation of the sixteenth century has enacted the part of a destroyer, not of a reformer, unless reformation means a change from good to bad. It was an aberration of the public mind in Germany and in England, governed by human pride, and by the innate tendency of all men to be free from the requirements and prohibitions of even the law of God. Under

the name of 'evangelical liberty' it sought to create an independence from that divine authority which Christ established in his Church. Protestantism is a downright negation, — it is a real apostasy. It may be that the children of the wicked men who did all that they could to rend asunder the seamless garment of Christ are less malicious than their fathers. Perhaps some of them may believe themselves to belong to the flock of the One Pastor, Christ Jesus. It may be that the prejudices which they imbibed in their infancy, which were made stronger by their Protestant education, and confirmed by the Protestant atmosphere in which they live, prevents them from understanding thoroughly the nature of the evil work done by their ancestors. Christian charity tells us to pity them, and to do all in our power to remove the deep, black veil which hangs between them and the truth, and makes it obscure to them. But the notion of bringing this negation, this apostasy, this Trojan horse, as a present to Italy, is an outrage upon common sense. As such Italians will receive it." — Vol. I. pp. 329, 330.

Having shown in the first volume that Protestantism is in every order a destroyer, Perrone gives his second volume to the argument showing that Catholicity is of its own nature a preserver. It is on earth the kingdom of God. Whosoever seeks it first, finds that all other things are added to him. In this stage of his argument Father Perrone shows that the Roman Catholic rule of faith is the only rule which has a Scriptural basis. It is the only rule which embraces the *whole* Word revealed by God. This last chapter is a very important one, and so is the next, to all Protestants who still profess to believe that the Bible is truly the Word of God. The author demonstrates that the Roman Catholic rule of faith, looked upon in a Biblical light, is the only one which proves the holiness, dignity, and fully divine origin of the two Testaments, Old and New. Historically considered, the Catholic rule of faith is shown to have been professed by all Christians in every age of faith; to have alone preserved the sacred deposit to the saints delivered of God from the attacks of heretical pravity, and to have alone served apostolic missionaries of the Gospel in the work of converting the nations to Christ. Considered theologically, the Catholic rule appears to be the only one which fulfils the conditions required in a true rule of faith, — the only rule which preserves in the Church a perfect unity of faith and the communion of love, and the only rule offered in the

name of Christ to the world which is inflexible, — applied in the same way in all ages and in all places to the dogmas of faith revealed by our Lord to his Church in the beginning, and capable of maintaining the faith unaltered to the end of time. In a theological point of view it is shown that the Catholic rule is the only one which at all justifies and makes reasonable the establishment of an institution such as the Church of God, even in the mind of heretics, claims to be. Considered in the light of what is commonly called pure reason, Perrone demonstrates that the Catholic rule is the only rule suited to the wants and capacities of all men, — the only one which satisfies the intellect and the heart of a reasonable man, and the only rule of faith which saves the intellectual and moral dignity of man in submitting himself to any rule of belief. The principle developed in this chapter is, that all other rules of belief are from man, so that he who is called upon to receive, being naturally equal to the giver, becomes the slave of a vagabond master, whereas the true rule is received from Christ, our God, to whom we owe service, and whose service ennobles us. Polemically viewed, the Catholic rule is the only one which can bear examination, — can overcome all reasonable difficulties. This rule, which we have called the Catholic rule, is to be found only in the Roman Catholic Church, because such was the will of Christ, because only the Roman Catholic Church has the marks by which the true Church of Christ may be distinguished from all others, because the words *Catholic* and *Roman* were always regarded as synonymes and as convertible terms by all ecclesiastical antiquity, and because to the existence of the Catholic rule of faith the primacy of Peter and of his successors is indispensable.

“ This Roman Catholic Church alone is that bright column of fire given by God as a safe guide to man that he may find his way through this desert to the promised land, which is the only object of the aspirations of the true sons of God. She is the unshaken pillar which divides the children of Israel from the Egyptians, the merciless persecutors of the people of God. Wherefore those unhappy men who turn away from the fiery column erected by God, and follow the treacherous lights of the quagmire, may attribute to their own fatal imprudence the dreadful state of blindness with which they are cursed. If, instead of serving faithfully under the leadership of a Moses and Joshua, appointed by God, they march,

under captains of their own capricious choice, against their gigantic enemies of Canaan, and are shamefully routed, let them blame only themselves. The men of our day who do this are Protestants, who, while they profess to be guided by the Bible alone, really follow an idol set up by themselves. The Bible without an authorized and legitimate interpreter is a gnomon without the sun. They who confide in their own private interpretation for the production of a symbol of faith are like the pilot who trusts for the guidance of his ship to a confused and senseless mass of drawings thrown together without knowledge or skill. What wonder if the pilot runs his vessel upon the sands, the rocks, or upon some deserted and inhospitable shore? The Bible in the hands of Protestant ministers is the sacrifice which in Hebron served as a pretext to Absalom for the rebellion which he stirred up against his own father, David the king. It is a murderous instrument for destroying the life of the mother who gave them life.

“Unhappy Protestantism, which cannot justify itself without justifying also every extravagant and impious heresy which has appeared in the world since the days of the Apostles, or may appear in the days to come! It cannot accuse the Church of error without accusing her Founder of falsehood, of impotence, of utter want of foresight, or of unfaithfulness to his promises. It includes in the act of permanent rebellion of which it is guilty a formal apostasy from Christianity, and its followers, who know this, cannot hope for salvation. Let them not deceive themselves. It is an immutable decree of God, that there is no heaven for the man who dies in the state of mortal sin. Now heresy and schism are mortal sins, and the guilty soul will be judged by God, who alone can infallibly know what is the degree of malice in rejecting a Church which presented herself before them at every step and way as a light shining for their sakes upon every spot in the world, but for which they cared not, while they sedulously turned their eyes away that they might not see her. She alone is the Church in which are deposited the tables of the law written with the finger of the living God; in which alone the crown of Aaron in the exercise of his eternal priesthood is ever vernal; in which alone is the altar upon which the only sacrifice which honors him and renders him placable is offered to the God of nature and of grace; in which alone is sent up to heaven the fragrant offerings which return in copious showers of graces and of benedictions upon the people of God; yea, she alone is the Church upon whose brow are stamped in characters of living light the everlasting marks of truth and of holiness. The Protestant who rushes forth from this unique sanctuary of truth and of holiness to offer profane sacrifices upon the high places of the green hills to the lying Baal, there prostitutes unto wretched adventurers, who laugh him to

scorn for his folly, the dignity which was his as a child of God. His earthly life endures but an instant; a mathematical point is the formula for the space and time touched by him in the universe, and in his own despite he is hurried to the house of his eternity, where the veil which he *will* wear falls at last, and for ever, from his opening eyes; where he will see the truth, at last, as he might have seen it on earth, one, pure, and saving; where repentance is vain, and the yearning to retrace false steps is folly." — Vol. II. p. 413.

In the third and last volume of his work Perrone makes an application of the principles which he has established in the previous volumes. He considers at length the moral effects of the Protestant rule as displayed by history. We can give only a portion of his summing up in conclusion.

"The *origin* of Protestantism was not in the abuses of the Roman Church, nor in the usurpations of her pontiffs; it was not in the feeling of the want of intellectual liberty, nor even the emancipation of reason from the tyranny of authority. No; nothing of all this, as we have seen and have proved. These were only the false and specious pretexts which the first innovators made use of to mask their rebellion in the face of the people. The true and only cause of the Reformation was *independence* in belief and action; pride and the ambition on the part of the Reformers to be the heads of a faction; incontinence and lasciviousness on the part of its propagators; rapine and spoil of Church property on the part of the princes and nobles; the violence and force to which the sound part of the population was subjected; nothing more or less.

"The *nature* of the reform, or of Protestantism in its *theoretic* part, is a chaos of confusion and absurdity, making God a capricious tyrant, and man a being that believes without freedom, that sins against his will, that interprets the Bible without understanding, is damned without any fault, and justified and saved without good works. In its *moral* part it is a most fruitful source of wickedness, since it makes man a machine, the victim of an invincible concupiscence, and the slave of sin. In its *organization* and *worship* it presents a total absence of unity through its infinite divisions and subdivisions; absence of Church, for it is still forming and not yet formed; absence of worship, because it has no faith of which this might be the expression or manifestation; absence of love, for it is nourished only by hatred of Catholicity; absence of profession, because there is no symbol to constitute it.

"Its *effects* are a bottomless abyss of doubt, perplexity, and uncertainty, a fountain of bitterness without consolation or comfort, no solid peace in life, and most bitter agony in death." — Vol. III. pp. 441, 442.

"On the other hand, Catholicity, through its character full of coherence and union, appears eminently social. It excludes the Mosaic horror for strangers, under the old law necessary to the Jewish people, who were called the people of God; that wall of separation is now taken away, the divisions are abolished, Jew and Gentile become one in Jesus Christ, before God all men are equal, and all the law and the prophets are reduced to this one command, *Diligite alterutrum*; and thus the Apostle says that the whole law *in hoc verbo instauratur, Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum*.* This law belongs to all times and to all places, to all climes and men. It is adapted to the wants of all ages and to all forms of government, is in accordance with the duties of every rank and condition of life. It purifies the affections, strengthens virtue, destroys vice. To it the moral world is indebted for its power, and the physical for the alleviation of its miseries. It contains mysteries for the wise, and parables for children. In its prayers for the dead it records the past, it governs the present by charity, and possesses itself of the future by hope. By the unity of its faith, it unites all intelligences in the profession of the same truths, and takes away even the possibility of divisions. Thus there is unity of intelligence, unity of will. Who will now hesitate to confess it *catholic* and *universal*?

"And yet those demagogues who strive to substitute Protestantism for Catholicity wish to deprive Italy of so great a possession. They would steal from her in these unhappy times the most precious of all goods, the unity which we have described, and make her instead the most pernicious of all gifts.

"God through his especial providence preserved our peninsula from the terrible scourge of Protestantism when in the sixteenth century its poisonous breath was borne over these smiling countries with such force. Nor were frivolous and superficial men wanting in those times, particularly among literary men, who allowed themselves to be carried away by the seductive prospect which the heresy of the frozen North offered. Still all their endeavors were vain, and the thousand attempts which they made to surprise the good faith and the good sense of the Italian people were void and unsuccessful. But now, in the middle of the nineteenth century, when all danger seems past, when Protestantism is in its greatest decline, and has lost credit with all persons of sense, and even the opinion of the world is giving it up, — when this poisonous tree has produced its last fruits of indifferentism, rationalism, pantheism, socialism, and communism, — when the public inclination is borne towards Catholic unity, — now is the epoch of the greatest danger for Italy. . . .

"In order the better to lure the less wary, they offered them the

* 4 Rom. xiii. 9.

British greatness and prosperity as an effect of its schism and emancipation from Rome. And to this end an eloquent writer published many works of not a little magnitude, in which, as in a panorama, the approaching prosperity of Italy is pictured with the colors and the tints of Paganism. To the same end, under the shadow or mask of Jesuitism, the religious orders and the whole clergy, if not all Catholics of sincere piety, were brought into hatred. The way thus prepared and religious anarchy and faction ruling at Rome and throughout a large part of Italy, treatises against Catholicity and in favor of Protestantism were profusely scattered among the people, so that the Pope and the bishops of Tuscany had to raise their voices to admonish the faithful of the danger that hung over them. The faction becoming more furious, many Italian apostates who were joined with other preachers of different nations hurried to promote the work begun under these auspices, and assisted to plant in this classic land the so-called Reformation. These wicked persons, renewing the ever execrable scenes which took place in past times in establishing Protestantism on the ruins of the Church in Catholic countries, did not cease to provoke the people against the religious and virgins consecrated to God, furiously driving them from their peaceful asylums with tumultuous threats and demonstrations. They obliged the ministers of the altar to conceal themselves, and to assume the dress of laymen, in order that they might not be known as dedicated to the sanctuary and to the sacred ministry. Nor did they stop till they had gathered an immense mass of the rabble, despoiled churches, burnt or torn down the convents and religious houses, and put to the sword the priests who were firm in the execution of their duty. With such enormities and violences and cunning arts, in less than ten years the old religion would cease to be the ruling faith in the peninsula. But God, who loves Italy, saved her; he commanded the threatening waves, and they were still; yet still the deep and stormy waters cease not to roar and threaten." — Vol. III. pp. 449, 450.

We have left ourselves no space to speak, as we had intended, of the second work named at the head of this article. We may say, however, that it is an able and valuable work, and well worth the serious attention of the thoughtful student. Catholics are not opposed to the circulation of the Holy Scriptures in the vernacular tongues in faithful versions and a correct text, but they are opposed to the Protestant Bible Societies, because they are formed in a spirit of hostility to Catholicity, because they do not confine themselves simply to the circulation of the Scriptures, and because they circulate only mutilated copies and corrupt versions of the Word of God. Protes-

tants are not honest in our regard. Because we oppose their editions and versions of the Bible, they represent us as opposed to the Bible itself, and because the Church prohibits the reading of them to the faithful, they allege that she prohibits to her children the reading of the Scriptures. This is bad logic and bad morality. At the very lowest, the Church has as much authority to say what is a true recension or a faithful version of the Scriptures as have the Protestant sects. We cannot allow these sects, after having denied infallibility to our Church on the ground that our Lord founded no infallible church, to assume it for themselves.

In conclusion, we may say, that, while we perfectly agree with Father Perrone as to the madness of the attempt to Protestantize Italy, we cannot deny that there are many political and social grievances in the peninsula that demand redress. These are the relics of old feudal customs and usages, which, however good and laudable in themselves, or however useful they may have been in their day, or would be now, if the old feudal society subsisted in its integrity and full vigor, are no longer in harmony with modern society, and are offensive and burdensome to the people. If the Catholic party associate Catholicity with the retention of these usages, and make it a part of religious duty to support the secular princes who have re-established them after they had been abolished by the Code Napoleon, there assuredly will be a powerful disaffected party in Italy, who will seek to introduce what they regard as ameliorations by hostility to religion. We are obliged to take men as we find them, and Catholics should always take care to show that their religion has no solidarity with any political or social abuses, and to go before all others in correcting them. Till this is done, the attempts to Protestantize Italy from without will always find more or less support within. Yet we would say to our Italian Liberals, that, if the project for opening a ship-canal across the Isthmus of Suez, uniting the Mediterranean and Red Seas, were once carried into effect, they would find that Italy would soon regain her former primacy among the nations, and prove to the world that Protestantism has had nothing to do with creating the commercial and industrial superiority, and alleged temporal prosperity, of Great Britain and the United States.

The construction or restoration of that canal would turn the scale anew in favor of Catholic Europe, and therefore we may expect Great Britain and our own country to oppose it.

- ART. VI.—1. *“Our Houses are our Castles” : a Review of the Proceedings of the Nunnery Committee of the Massachusetts Legislature ; and especially their Conduct and that of their Associates on Occasion of the Visit to the Catholic School in Roxbury, March 26, 1855 ; with an Appendix containing several Documents relating to the Subject.* By CHARLES HALE. Boston. 1855.
2. *Report of the Joint Special Committee appointed to Investigate the Conduct of the Committee on the Petition of E. P. Carpenter and others, and the Charges and Imputations against the Committee contained in the Boston Daily Advertiser.*
 3. *Report of the Special Committee appointed to investigate the Conduct of Joseph Hiss, Member of the House, and one of the Committee on Nunneries.*
 4. *Report of the Joint Special Committee on the Petition of E. P. Carpenter and others, Sylvanus Adams and others, John A. Coddington and others, Curtis Morse and others, and Wm. H. Hayden and others, in Relation to Nunneries, &c.*
 5. *Report of the Committee to whom was referred the Report of a former Committee appointed to investigate the Conduct of Mr. Hiss.*

WE feel some little repugnance to allude to the general character and conduct of our Legislature during the late session. It was such a Legislature as Massachusetts never had before, and, there is little doubt, such as she will never have again. Massachusetts has many faults, and a portion of her people are affected by various disgraceful fanaticisms ; but it would be gross injustice to suppose her fittingly represented by her present government. She has had the misfortune to fall into the hands of a faction, and the majority of her sons have no sympathy, it is our firm belief, with the insane proceedings of

her present General Court. Thousands at the late election voted with the Know-Nothing party who were deceived as to its real character and purposes, and who now are heartily ashamed of having deserted their old party friends; and we entertain not a doubt that the Commonwealth at the next election will fully redeem her character, and prove to the world that, however she may have been betrayed into a passing folly for a moment, she is still sound at the heart, and attached to the Union and to republican institutions.

The Know-Nothing party, most appropriately named, calls itself the American Party, and professes to be truly American. Now we are among those who believe that there is a real American character, and not unworthy of the love and respect of every American citizen; but we confess that we cannot see one single American characteristic in this new party. The American has undoubtedly his faults, many and great, but he is open, straightforward and manly. What he does, he would do openly and aboveboard. He has a natural dislike to secret cabals and midnight conspiracies, and a generous love of fair and honorable dealing. In the way of trade or *dicker* he will undoubtedly make as good a bargain as he can; he may be bold and rash in his speculations, but even in the way of business the genuine American is as honest and as high-minded, as fair and as honorable, as the citizen of any other country on the globe. Nothing is more repugnant to his innate character than a political party that covers itself with secrecy, and operates in the dark. Secret organizations are not native to him, and are borrowed from abroad. This very American party so called owes its very conception, its plan, its organization, and its rules, to foreign nations, and does but copy the Orange Lodges of Ireland and the Carbonari of Italy. It is un-American, and opposed to the great principles of general suffrage and eligibility which lie at the foundation of our American system. It is at war with the free and manly exercise of that dearest right of freedom, the elective franchise, for it subjects it to the decision of irresponsible chiefs, unknown to the Constitution and disowned by our laws.

The Free Soil and Anti-Catholic character of this party is of foreign, not American origin, and is borrowed from

our most formidable rival, Great Britain. Every charge it brings against Catholics and Catholicity is of British manufacture, and glutted the English market before it was thrown upon our own, and in its Abolition movements it is but following in the wake of British philanthropy. It is un-American in its hostility to foreigners. Americans have always boasted something of a cosmopolitan character, of being superior to the narrow prejudices of race or nation, and of estimating men by what they are in themselves, not by the accident of birth. When they won independence and liberty for themselves, they wished to do it for mankind. They threw open their doors to the oppressed of all lands and of all creeds, and said, Here be the home of virtue and the asylum for the oppressed to the latest generation. On these broad and generous principles we founded our society and our commonwealth. Yet this pseudo-American party disowns these principles, and founds itself on those very narrow-minded and ignoble prejudices of race or nation which we begun by discarding. We had declared all professedly Christian denominations equal before the state, and this party, copying the bad example of England in Ireland, seeks to establish by the Constitution and laws a Protestant ascendancy. We are republican, and boast that the people are sovereign; but this party, by transferring the authority from the people to the lodge, and from bodies freely chosen by the people as their representatives to the unknown and irresponsible chiefs of a secret society, belies this boast, and destroys the very essence of our republicanism. Indeed, we know nothing distinctively American that is not warred against by this new party. As an American we disown and discard it.

Nevertheless, the party calls itself, in spite of the misnomer, the American party, and seeks to make itself a national party. It aspires to the Presidency, and hopes to rule the Union. We have seen what it is in its principles, and, happily for the American people, our Massachusetts Legislature during its last session can show what it is in practice. We have neither the space nor the disposition to review the proceedings of the Legislature during its session, but we select a passage from its history which may serve to show what is the spirit, the elevation of mind, and the gentlemanly bearing of Know-Nothing legislators. All

the members of the Massachusetts Legislature for 1855, with only two exceptions, were elected on the Know-Nothing platform. Their membership of the new order was duly vouched for in its lodges or secret councils, where their nominations were severally made. The nature of the obligations assumed by members under oath, itself in violation, in this State, at the time, of positive law, and therefore the nature of that platform, have been ascertained, in part at least, by witnesses in some of our courts of justice, drawn out on interlocutory questions as to bias, the judges having decided that witnesses could not plead their oath to maintain secrecy in bar to answering the interrogations as to the intent and purpose of obligations unlawfully taken. The two principal propositions of the platform, as thus judicially determined, are, in substance, —

1. Exclusion from office and the exercise of the elective franchise of all persons whose parents and whose grandfather or grandmother were not born in the United States; and
2. Exclusion from office and the right to vote of all Catholics, regardless of ancestry; so that persons who, like ourselves, are descended from the first settlers of New England, would be deprived, if Catholics, of all political rights.

The obligations imposed by the order on its members were occasionally referred to in legislative debates, when members betrayed symptoms of manly independence, and of an intention to evade the secret orders of its council in reference to matters pending in the General Court. That the members of the Legislature had taken the unlawful oaths which gave them this secret power over each other was quietly confessed in the course of the session, by the passage, without discussion, of an act repealing the provisions of the 128th chapter of the Revised Statutes, which imposed a penalty for taking or administering oaths not authorized by law. Thus was constituted a body of law-makers, who, with but two exceptions, obtained their seats by violating an express law of the State, and bound to obey implicitly an authority unknown to our Constitution and laws.

During the first week of the session, operations were commenced under both branches of the platform. Some of the measures proposed were nipped in the bud by the discovery that they were not within the jurisdiction of the State; — and of these we will not now speak. The first

demonstration against Catholics, resulting in any sort of action, was in relation to nunneries. In the House of Representatives, on the eighth day of the session, Mr. Joseph Hiss, of Boston, who in the end was "hoist with his own petar," moved an order instructing the Judiciary Committee to consider the expediency of a law providing for the inspection of nunneries. Then were received several petitions, painfully lugubrious in style, setting forth that the petitioners believed "that acts of villany, injustice, and wrong are perpetrated within the walls of said institutions with impunity, as a result of their immunity from public inspection." These petitions were referred to a joint special committee, together with the order of Mr. Hiss, relinquished by the Judiciary Committee for that purpose; and Mr. Hiss was appointed on the special committee. Shortly after, at the instance of this committee, the following order was passed in concurrence:—

"Ordered, that the joint special committee on the inspection of nunneries and convents be authorized and instructed to visit and examine such theological seminaries, boarding-schools, academies, nunneries, convents, and other institutions of a like character, as they may deem necessary to enable them to make a final report on the subject committed to their consideration."

Under the Constitution, the Legislature had no power to authorize any such visitation and examination, and the committee made no attempt to act under the order, except so far as it embraced Catholic institutions. And under this convenient view of the power intended to be granted, they visited the Catholic educational institutions at Worcester, Roxbury, and Lowell. Undoubtedly this was the extent of their purpose when they obtained the authority; but an application limited to a visitation of Catholic institutions only would have been a little too barefaced to be granted by a Legislature sitting by virtue of a Constitution which secures to the whole people the right to be governed by "general laws." After the lapse of more than nine weeks, the committee submitted their report, which amounted so nearly to nothing, that it would have been impossible, except in a "mock session," to have raised a discussion upon it, considered by itself, and without reference to a bill, from the Committee on Education, in relation to private teachers, then pending in the House. The

twenty-second paragraph of their report concludes by asserting, "that it is the duty of the *State* so to educate the young that they may be fitted to enjoy in their own persons, and to transmit to their posterity unimpaired, a glorious heritage of civil and religious liberty." And the report concludes with recommending the passage of the bill from the Committee on Education, which bill, if passed, would have deprived parents of the right of employing instructors for their children and guardians for their wards, unless such instructors were duly *certified* by some committee authorized by law to license them to teach. There is a degree of unconscious simplicity on the part of the nunnery committee in favoring such an invasion of private right in the name of "civil and religious liberty," which our readers will not fail to admire. How Catholic teachers would have fared under such a restriction may be inferred from the refusal of a comparatively liberal Legislature, in 1849, to incorporate the Catholic College at Worcester. But the bill was broad enough to cover Protestants, and might possibly have interfered with the right now exercised, by those whose means are adequate to the expense, of employing private teachers for their children; and for this reason it was finally rejected.

From several passages in the report, the committee would seem to wish to have it understood, that their visits to the Catholic institutions, male and female, were very well received by those in charge of them; in fact, that they "rather liked it than otherwise." To be sure, the committee display a little querulousness because they were not complimented with an extempore exhibition at the female school at Lowell; nor do they appear quite satisfied at being refused admission into "some rooms" of the establishment. They forget, however, to mention that the "some rooms" of which they speak were the sleeping-apartments of the ladies who had charge of the school, though they were informed of the fact at the time,—a fact which might be supposed to excuse the refusal, in the minds of *gentlemen*. Are we to ascribe the suppression of the satisfactory reason for the refusal complained of to wilful disingenuousness on the part of the committee, or to a partial oblivion caused by indulgence in certain beverages furnished to them at their hotel, in violation of law, but paid for by the State?

Dismissing their report from further consideration, we turn to the conduct of the committee itself. We do not understand that they have been charged with personally conducting themselves in an unbecoming manner at the Worcester College, or at the Lowell school, after requesting permission to enter and examine them, — a permission which could not have been refused without exposing those institutions to the most injurious suspicions. But it is otherwise with regard to the visit to the female academy at Roxbury, to which the attention of the Legislature and the public was called by a strong article in *The Boston Daily Advertiser*, March 31st, headed "Our Houses are our Castles." The statements were denied in both branches of the Legislature, and a joint committee was appointed to investigate the charges preferred by the *Advertiser*.

There were only five members of the committee, but they took with them at least fourteen other persons, whose names were subsequently ascertained; and this large and unauthorized body was falsely introduced as a committee of the Legislature, instructed to visit and examine the institution. And in this manner a common dwelling-house, of ordinary size, occupied by seven female teachers and twelve female children, was invaded by at least nineteen strange men, without even the authority of the Legislature, supposing that it could give authority for forming such a party. They examined nearly every nook and corner of the establishment, having scattered themselves about for that purpose, as a flock of children may be seen to do when taken into a menagerie of curious animals. Even a small apartment occupied by a sick pupil was not held sacred, and although her face was turned to the wall, she was made sensible of the proximity of one of the intruders by the smell of tobacco, which indicated his presence near her bed. Respecting their supposed official character, the ladies treated the party as civilly as they could under the circumstances, and from that civility the members of the party pretended to draw an inference that their visit and deportment were very acceptable to them, and they testified to that effect, when they undertook to purge themselves under oath from having committed any impropriety or rudeness. Each, for himself and his associates, denied any unbecoming acts, or any indecorous familiarity in the conversations had with the ladies. But it was drawn out

from two of them, that one of the ladies, while attempting to escape from the chapel, was arrested by a tap on the shoulder, which caused her to turn round, so that she unintentionally was brought *vis-a-vis* with one of the inquisitors, who proceeded to avail himself of the opportunity he had so rudely sought. It is quite probable that, as the ladies were Catholics and nuns, the party thought that they might be dealt with as rare curiosities, rather than as cultivated and respectable ladies who had dedicated their lives to the work of education, and as such entitled to more than a common share of respectful consideration. Hence perhaps the difference between the opinion they had of their own deportment and the opinion of it entertained by the ladies themselves.

The investigating committee were unanimous in their report, which, in view of the peculiar composition of the Legislature, was very skilfully drawn up by the chairman, Mr. Griffin, of Charlestown. It was quite delicate and velvet-footed on the sensitive points of civility and propriety of deportment; but the decided conviction was apparent that the committee regarded the order directing the visitations as asked for by the nunnery committee without any sufficient evidence that there was cause for such inquests; and that the order was unwarrantably passed, and executed in a manner equally unwarrantable, on account of the large number of unauthorized persons who participated in it. On the subject of the large retinue enlisted for the occasion, the report facetiously quotes the remark of Falstaff,—"I have misused the king's press damnably." And that was as fair a compromise as the committee could be expected to make between their convictions of right and their desire to deal as mercifully as possible with their sworn brethren of the order, whose "sprees and rambles" at the expense of the Commonwealth had been so unpleasantly made public. They find that the information communicated to the editors of *The Daily Advertiser* justifies them in animadverting upon the transactions complained of; but they do not find all the facts stated proved.

With the conduct of the party after leaving the Roxbury institution we have no particular concern. The nineteen had a good dinner at the Norfolk House, where some of them drank liquors, furnished in violation of law, and

paid for out of the State treasury, which, as they were nearly all Maine Liquor Law men, need excite no surprise or comment.

We now come to the pamphlet of Mr. Charles Hale, the junior editor of *The Daily Advertiser*. In it will be found ably, warmly, and manfully discussed, in its full length and breadth, the unwarranted nature of the visitations for the purpose of examination, in violation of the provision of the Constitution on the subject of unreasonable searches.* The manner of the visit and the incidents connected with it, the denials in the Senate and House by the members implicated, and the unsatisfactory statements of the accused before the investigating committee, are also vigorously and sharply handled. On both lines of attack, the assault is completely successful, and the substantial correctness of the first article in *The Daily Advertiser*, which was written by the author of the pamphlet, fully established; and we tender Mr. Hale our respect and our cordial thanks for his able, straightforward, and manly defence of our constitutional rights. Mr. Hale gives the ingenious, half-condemnatory and half-exculpatory report of the committee on the proceedings of the nunnery committee entire in his appendix, and to it and his pamphlet generally we refer our readers.

But there are yet two other documents named at the head of this article, on which we must make a remark or two. In the course of the hearing before the committee whose report we have just commented on, some facts were unexpectedly drawn out, tending to show that the conduct of Mr. Hiss at the hotel in Lowell demanded investigation, and another special committee was appointed. Mr. Hiss at first protested against the jurisdiction of the committee, but did not persevere in his protest. The hearing was private, and the testimony taken was of such a character that the committee had objections to reporting even the substance of it in open session of the House. It related to a female, for whose accommodation at the hotel Mr. Hiss made provision before her arrival, and he had her hotel bill included in that of the committee, which was paid by the State; yet, notwithstanding the character of the evidence, the committee reported that they could not

* Mass. Const., Part I. Art. 14.

say they had obtained "indubitable evidence" of criminal conduct on the part of Mr. Hiss on the occasion referred to. This queer report, and a summary of the evidence, were considered in a secret session of the House, and the conclusion of the report modified by a most unintelligible amendment. The report was thus accepted, as amended, in the House. This result appeared to be very satisfactory to Mr. Hiss, for upon the strength of it he forthwith addressed a letter to the Speaker of the House, setting forth that, inasmuch as his "personal honor" had been "entirely vindicated" by the action of the House, he would resign his seat for the benefit of the "American party," that it might not be injured by its enemies, through him.

Unfortunately for Mr. Hiss, a large majority of the House did not regard the action of the House in the same agreeable light; and instead of accepting his resignation, they referred it to a new committee, with instructions to re-examine his conduct both at Lowell and Roxbury. He was defended by counsel before this committee. Several days were occupied in the re-hearing, and the testimony from the hotel was somewhat enlarged on some pressing points. On the fifth day of this examination, Mr. Hiss sent in a letter withdrawing his resignation. On the sixth day, the committee reported. The report, drawn up by Mr. Kimball of Salem, was a shrewd and decided production. Its design was to make a scape-goat of Mr. Hiss, and, in order to insure this result, it was artfully framed so as to secure the support of those who voted for the visitation order, of the remaining members of the nunnery committee, and of the members of the House who were implicated with them, as *attachés* on the Roxbury visit. With this view the new report from new hands justified the passage of the order, acquitted the nunnery committee and their invited friends of all impropriety in executing the order at Roxbury, and even praised Mr. Hiss for surpassing his colleagues in fidelity to his duty by the greater thoroughness of his inquiries and investigations at that humble institution. The anti-Catholic sentiment of the House is angled for by adroit allusions to the interference of the bishop, the priests, a Jesuit, and a political lawyer, who is much opposed to those innocent victims of persecution, the Know-Nothings. And then comes the fatal conclusion. The evidence in relation to the female at the hotel

in Lowell is stated and reviewed, and the unanimous judgment of the committee against Hiss rendered in the following terms:—"We consider his conduct upon the committee at Lowell highly improper and disgraceful both to himself and this body, of which he is a member, and we deem it such as to render him unworthy longer to occupy a seat upon the floor of this House." Mr. Hiss met this report by a memorial demanding a trial at the bar of the House, with liberty to introduce testimony that other members were no better than himself, in certain respects.

The report, however, was accepted by a vote of 203 to 30; and then, after an excited debate, protracted beyond midnight, Mr. Hiss was expelled by a vote of 137 to 15.

There is one feature of the last report which displays an audacious confidence in the disposition of the House to whitewash the Roxbury visit. In regard to the affair at Lowell, the committee find distinctly that Hiss did not tell the truth when under oath, and yet, when the entire Roxbury visit is to be protected, the committee profess to believe Hiss in preference to believing the Lady Superior, by whom he is directly contradicted, upon a point in relation to which she could not, under the circumstances, have been mistaken. She testified that, at the close of his conversation with her, Hiss requested permission to call again for the purpose of further conversation on the subject of his religious condition, and that she asked his name, in order that she might know it was he when he should call again. He replied that his name was *Evans*. Now Hiss, not denying the name thus given, undertook to explain it by saying that he understood her as asking the name of the chairman, Mr. Senator Evans, and that he answered accordingly. But as the conversation had no reference to the committee or its chairman, but was wholly in relation to Mr. Hiss's feelings and wishes, and compunctions for backsliding from the faith of his childhood, and his desire for another and more private interview, it is utterly incredible that he could have understood her as asking about the chairman of the committee, who was not then within sight or hearing. It would have been quite remarkable if she had not asked for Hiss's own name, when he spoke of another visit, and it is altogether improbable that he could have misunderstood her. At Lowell he had registered a female under a false name, and then denied under oath

all knowledge of the affair; and why may he not have intended to use his chairman's name in his future private visit at Roxbury? It is not a sufficient answer to say that he could have had no motive for such an apparently senseless attempt at deceit; for who can understand the motives which occasionally influence a man so destitute of correct moral sense as the investigations have shown this unhappy man to be.

The constitutional power of the House to expel Mr. Hiss was tested on a writ of habeas corpus before Chief Justice Shaw of the Supreme Judicial Court, who affirmed the existence of the power, and held that the claim of Hiss to the privilege of a member was concluded by the record of his expulsion, signed by the Clerk of the House. And thus terminated a Know-Nothing drama which extended over a period of seven weeks.

We could find matter equally illustrative of what we should have to expect from the accession of the Know-Nothing order to power, in the address of the two Houses of our Legislature to the Governor to remove Judge Loring from the office of Judge of Probate, because as Commissioner he had executed faithfully, as he was bound to do, a law of the United States; and also in what is called the Personal Liberty Bill, evidently in direct conflict with the Federal Constitution; but we pass these abusive measures over for the present. The sketch we have given of the nunnery committee, or smelling committee as popularly designated, is sufficient for our purpose. The maxim of the common law is that our houses are our castles, and the Constitution of this State secures our houses from unreasonable searches. Yet the Legislature disregard both law and Constitution, and appoint a committee of inspection of the private establishments of education. Our houses of education are not public schools; they are in law and in fact simple private residences, — as much so as the private dwellings of any of our citizens. No instances of abuse in any of these were alleged, no criminal transaction on the part of their occupants was specified, and consequently the visitation and search authorized by the legislature was a high-handed violation of the natural and constitutional rights of their inhabitants. The fact that the occupants were Catholics, and engaged in instructing Catholic youth, makes no difference as to the character of

the act. The principle that authorizes the invasion of the sanctity of a Catholic dwelling will not protect that of a Protestant dwelling. It is the turn of Catholics to-day, it may be that of Unitarians, Episcopalians, Methodists, or Baptists to-morrow. The act of the Legislature proves that the new order hold themselves above the Constitution and laws, that they are prepared to trample on all private rights, and ready to violate when it suits their purpose the sanctuary of our private dwellings. No despotism can go further, and yet they have the singular effrontery to tell us, that they go thus far in the name and in the interests of civil and religious liberty! Let the order accede to power, and it is easy to see that civil and religious liberty would be not so much as an empty name. The most odious despotism imaginable would be established.

The appointment of such a committee strikes at the freedom of education. One of the most subtle devices of modern tyranny has been to seize upon education, and to subject it to the absolute control of the public authority. In denying the freedom of education, in subjecting private schools to public inspection, and forbidding any one to teach even in his own house without a license or certificate from public authority, the order or party strike at the rights of parents, and make war on family, the basis of the whole social fabric. If parents wish to be deprived of the right of selecting schools and instructors for their children, and have carried out in practice the principle that children belong not to their parents, but to the state, or rather to a self-created secret society, let them support the Know-Nothing order. They will soon see family ties rudely broken, and the family itself in ruins. They may introduce into our hitherto free country the worst features of European despotism, and fully rival Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and surpass in the suppression of freedom the present imperial *régime* of France. To take from parents the liberty of education, and to place education under the control of the state, involves all the principles of a religious establishment, or of a state religion.

The committee of the Legislature, in its inspection of the private school kept by some estimable and highly accomplished Catholic ladies in their private residence in Roxbury, proved by their conduct that they were deficient in the feelings, manners, and breeding of gentlemen, and that

they were ignorant or disregarding of all the proprieties and decencies of civilized life. They seem to have been wholly under the influence of their lecherous tastes and prurient fancies, and to have imagined they were sent to visit a brothel, and not the residence of reputable and highly respectable ladies. Their presence, their looks, their words, their motions, were all so many gross insults, and sufficiently proved to be so. But the Legislature approves their conduct, especially the conduct of Mr. Joseph Hiss, who seems to have been the most offensive in his language and manners amongst the number. It is true the Representatives expelled him from their body, as unworthy to sit with them, but not for gross insult to the Catholic ladies at Roxbury. In the question between him and Catholic ladies, they believe all he says, and indorse all he does. It is for other matters, which we need not specify, that they expel him. The truth is, public opinion ran high against the committee and the Legislature, and it was necessary to do something to appease it, and the House resolved to sacrifice Mr. Hiss. In this they acted, no doubt, cunningly, but hardly fairly towards their colleague, who offered to prove that, in the matters which so shocked the pure feelings of the House, he was not much more censurable than other members of the committee. The whole proceedings of the Legislature to redeem itself, after public opinion had condemned it, were marked by great unfairness, by a total want of high-minded and honorable feeling, and even of common justice. As they of course in the whole matter acted under the direction, and even orders, of the secret order, the order is responsible for those unfair, unmanly, and dishonest proceedings. Those proceedings serve, then, not merely to characterize the Legislature, but the whole Know-Nothing order. In this sense an additional point might be given to the following Epigram from an unknown author:—

“ One after one the honored Bay-leaves fade,
And ancient glories wither in the shade.
The Solons of the State, at duty's call,
Have hissed a *loving* member from the Hall.
Take courage, Joseph, in thy great ado,
The world has hissed the Legislature too.”

This is very true, but if the world will be just, it will *hiss* the whole Know-Nothing Order, of which the Legislature was but the creature and pliant tool.

Of course we are mortified that such things as we have touched upon could have occurred in this ancient Commonwealth; but to those who would throw them in our face we answer, that nowhere have they been more severely or effectually condemned than here in our own State and city. The proceedings have excited very general disgust and reprobation, and we have not seen a man that does not regard the Know-Nothing Legislature as utterly disgraceful to the State. Here we Catholics have not had to appear in our own defence. The secular press has nobly defended our rights, as well as the rights of other citizens, and that sense of justice which has never forsaken the heart of our people, whether Catholic or Protestant, has proved sufficient for the crisis. Know-Nothing stock was at a heavy discount here before we heard the news of the election of Mr. Wise in Virginia, and there are now no sales. Our people have recovered from a momentary folly and confusion, and we need not doubt but they will prove themselves not unworthy of the ancient fame of our Commonwealth.

As a Catholic, looking solely to the interests of Catholicity in the Union, we are opposed to this Know-Nothing party only as we are opposed to the principle of doing evil that good may come; for its hostility only disposes sensible and liberal-minded Protestants in our favor, while it binds Catholics more firmly together, strengthens their attachment to their faith, and leads them to a more faithful practice of their religion. But as an American citizen, attached to the free institutions and jealous of the honor of our country, we feel it our duty to oppose it in all legal ways to the full extent of our power. We oppose it, not in the interest of Catholics as such, and still less in the interest of our foreign-born population, but in the interest of American citizens and American institutions. Good sense, good faith, and true American feeling require every American to oppose it, and we think we see, in the defeat of the party in the Virginia election of last May, an indication that all the patriotic and sensible portion of the American people will set their faces against it. The parsons, we think, are not likely to keep the control of the order, and as a purely political order it cannot succeed. Politically considered, the order was cunningly devised to divide the Democratic party, and to restore to

power a party that under its own name and organization had lost all chances of success. Its design was, by appeals to the anti-Catholic and anti-foreign feeling of a large portion of our countrymen, to draw off from the Democratic party a sufficient number, when united with the radical and demagogical portion of the Whig party, to make up a majority. But all appearances indicate now that it will not succeed. The administration party seems to have taken a decided stand against it, and the administration seems to be taking a course much more satisfactory to the conservative portion of both the old parties than it appeared to have at first decided upon. We are much mistaken if it do not succeed, before the presidential election of 1856, in reorganizing a stronger and a more respectable party than that which elected General Pierce. The old questions which separated Whigs and Democrats are for the most part disposed of or grown obsolete, and we think the honest and patriotic portions of both parties will unite to form a true American party against the party falsely so called. Everything we see indicates to us the probability of such a result. All the signs now are, that the secret order as a political party has culminated, and that it will descend rapidly to the condition of a contemptible faction.

However this may be, there is no cause for our Catholic friends abroad to feel any alarm for American Catholics. Annoyances, vexations, and petty persecutions we have always suffered, and shall continue to suffer; but nothing can justify the desponding tone of those who are advising Catholics to emigrate to Canada, to South America, or to some other country. There is no country where the Church is freer than she is here, and no country, Protestant or even Catholic, where, after all, ecclesiastical property is safer than with us. Look at Mexico, New Grenada, Central America, Spain, Portugal, Sardinia, the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Baden, Bavaria, and Austria, and tell us if Catholics are freer, or their church property safer, than in our republic? We can speak as freely in our Review on political and religious topics as we please, and yet the *Civiltà Cattolica*, published at Rome, an eminently Catholic periodical, is prohibited in the Catholic kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and has lost, we are told, four thousand subscribers by the prohibition. The *Corre-*

spondance, a truly Catholic periodical published in French at Rome, was suppressed, in order not to offend French sensibilities. Nothing of the sort has taken or is likely to take place here, and this is probably the only country where the Catholic press is absolutely free. Let us not be insensible to the advantages we enjoy, nor tolerate without rebuke those misguided journalists, who, under pretence of defending Catholic, but more especially Irish, interests in America, traduce the country abroad. The honor of our country is as dear to us as that of our own mother, and we do not think it the best way for a naturalized citizen like the editor of *The American Celt* to prove his American patriotism by holding up the country which opened her arms to receive him as a refugee from his own, to the scorn and contempt of foreign nations. When a reaction against Catholicity for her supposed alliance with absolutism is taking place, and the exaggerations of centralized monarchy in France and Austria are preparing the way for another Red-Republican outbreak, to under-rate the advantages we enjoy in this, the only free country on the globe, and to blacken the fair name of the republic abroad, is anything but to serve the cause of our religion. We see much to blame in our countrymen, many faults that we deplore, and have no disposition to conceal or extenuate, but we remember that they are faults of our countrymen, and we labor, not as foreigners, but as Americans, to correct them. They are faults in our own family, and as such we seek to treat and remedy them. Our own lot is bound up with those who commit them, and we cannot think of withdrawing it. We have too much patriotism and too little cowardice for that, as we trust is true of American Catholics generally, whether native or foreign-born. Catholics have a mission to perform here, a great and glorious work, and it would ill become them to grow faint-hearted at the first approach of difficulty, and to meditate running away. As men we trust they are made of sterner stuff, and as Catholics they have more confidence in God than that would imply. Mr. D'Arcy McGee may think it wise and prudent to recommend such conduct, and therefore to urge a new exodus of the Irish Catholic settlers in the country, but in doing so he proves that, if naturalized, he is not yet nationalized, and we greatly mistake the genuine Irish character if he

finds many to listen to him. The great mass of the Irish who have migrated hither from their own loved Ireland have come determined to make this country their home, and the home of their children, and here they will remain, Americans in thought, feeling, and action, whatever their imprudent and ill-advised would-be leaders may attempt to the contrary.

The present storm will soon pass over, without doing us any substantial injury. Foolish and vexatious laws may be made, but they will either be repealed on the returning good-sense of the people, or suffered to fall into desuetude. The great body of the Catholic community have felt, and feel, no alarm. They have been and are perfectly at their ease. Let them remain so. American non-Catholics come, and will come, to their defence. There is yet a sense of justice in the American people, and the country is by no means prepared to make an exception even against Catholics to the great doctrines of equal rights and religious liberty which it has hitherto so loudly and energetically professed. This very pamphlet by Mr. Hale, which we have referred to, and the reception it has met in our non-Catholic community, would prove it, if we had no other evidence. For our part, we have placed, and we intend still to place, a generous confidence in our countrymen, and we will not readily believe that they will suffer their Protestant prejudices to carry them so far as to deprive us of our rights as a citizen, because we have exercised our natural and constitutional right to embrace the Catholic religion. We do not believe, and we will not believe, that this Know-Nothing party represents the real sentiment of the American people.

We have spoken of the anti-Catholic proceedings of our Massachusetts Legislature, not as illustrative of the popular sentiment of the State or of the country, but as illustrative of the character of this new party, which has the impudence to call itself American. If we know our countrymen, it is as anti-American as *The American Cell*, or *The Irish American*, or its late organ, *The New York Herald*, and the Massachusetts Legislature, elected by a stupendous fraud on the people, shows what havoc it would make with all Americans hold most dear, if it should once attain to power. It behoves every loyal citizen, every lover of his country, every advocate of republican institutions,

every man who believes that popular government is a blessing, and that the people are more trustworthy than absolute monarchs, to set his face against it.

ART. VII. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *The Primacy of the Apostolic See Vindicated.* By FRANCIS PATRICK KENRICK, Archbishop of Baltimore. Fourth Edition. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1855. 8vo. pp. 440.

THIS is a revised and enlarged edition of a well-known and in general highly appreciated work. We have not compared it throughout with the third edition, nor with the edition in German, but we recognize in it several improvements. It is altogether superfluous for us to praise this popular work, and to find fault with it might be regarded as indecorous, to say the least. The author is by general confession the most learned of our theologians, and his opinions on any point of theology, or ecclesiastical history even, must always have great weight, at least with mere laymen like ourselves. Yet he will permit us to say, and we do so with the profoundest respect, that his work would please us personally far better if it was marked by greater firmness and decision. Lest he should be accused of overstating his case, he seems to us not unfrequently to understate it, and on several points of no little importance, which he takes up and discusses, we regret a certain vagueness and indecision, a certain non-committalism, which leaves the reader sometimes in doubt as to his real opinions. We refer more particularly to the third and fourth parts of his work. The majority of readers will understand him, we apprehend, to discard the doctrine of Bellarmine and Suarez, which we have endeavored to defend, as to the mutual relations of the spiritual and temporal orders; and yet the careful student of his pages is well aware that this would be to do him great injustice. It is clear to us that he does not in reality differ from Bellarmine and Suarez as to the prerogatives of the Papacy, and that his doctrine, when fairly and distinctly drawn out, is substantially that of our Review, and by no means that of the Hon. Joseph R. Chandler's speech on the temporal power of the Pope, delivered last January in the Congress of the United States. Of course he disclaims for the Pope all civil or temporal power or jurisdiction, strictly so called, out of the States of the Church, and so do we; but he asserts, if we are to give his lan-

guage its proper sense, the power of the Pope, as representative of the spiritual order on earth, to loose the Catholic subject from the *religious* obligation of fealty to the temporal sovereign, when that sovereign by the law under which he holds has forfeited his powers by his abuse of them, or lost his right to reign by his tyranny and oppression; and this is all that we have ever asserted.

To understand this, it must be borne in mind that for Catholics what is called *civil* allegiance is a religious duty. The Church binds the subject to submission to the prince, under pain of damnation. "Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God, and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God. And they who resist purchase to themselves damnation."* Civil allegiance being a religious duty, binding in conscience, it is elevated from the purely temporal order to the spiritual, and therefore necessarily comes under the jurisdiction of the spiritual order. In that it is purely temporal, the Church has nothing to say in regard to it; but in that it is spiritual, a religious obligation, and pertaining to eternal salvation, it is for all Catholics under her authority. We cannot deny the religious character of civil allegiance without going against the express declaration of Scripture, and leaving every man free in conscience to obey or not to obey, as seems to him good, which were to assert political atheism, or modern revolutionism in its most offensive form, and to undermine all political and social order.

But if it is a religious duty, binding in conscience, the Catholic is held to unqualified submission to the powers that be, till released by his Church. No matter what the tyranny and oppression of the rulers, he is bound to submit, and under pain of damnation to resist, "for they who resist purchase to themselves damnation." We cannot suppose the illustrious author of the *Primacy* stops there, for that would be to bind the subject, and to leave the prince free to tyrannize at will,—to make the Church the accomplice of the civil despot, and to confirm the standing charge of the Liberals against her. Nothing is more certain than that power is a trust held from God for the common good, and may be forfeited by abuse; or that the people are not bound to obey the tyrant and oppressor, but may lawfully resist him, rid themselves of him, and choose a new sovereign. This is the common doctrine of our theologians, confirmed by the practice of the Church for ages. But the Catholic, it is equally certain, cannot act on this doctrine till the Church through the Sovereign Pontiff has loosed his conscience from the religious bond, and declared that under the circumstances he is no longer held to obedience, but may rightfully resist. That

* Romans xiii. 1, 2.

is, the subject, if a Catholic, cannot lawfully resist even the tyrant till the Church has declared the prince for his crimes and cruel oppressions fallen from his dignity, and his subjects released from their oath of allegiance. From this oath or religious bond the illustrious author asserts that Popes have absolved and may absolve subjects, and to deny it would be to place the Catholic at the mercy of Cæsar, and give, so far as religion is concerned, free scope to the civil despot. The Archbishop of Baltimore has not placed and never will place himself so unequivocally on the side of civil despotism, has not sanctioned and never will sanction by his high authority such a low and degrading Cæsarism, worthy only of the eunuchs and courtiers of a Byzantine Emperor in the worst days of the Low Empire. God, in giving the Church power to bind, gave her also power to loose, and we need not prove that he gave her power to protect the just liberty of the subject, as he did to protect the rights of the prince. If not, how could we maintain that our Church favors freedom?

On this point, the indirect temporal authority of the Pope, we are confident that the illustrious Archbishop has been misunderstood, and misrepresented,—not less so than we ourselves have been on the same subject. He as well as we asserts the Papal authority in so far as relates to the religious sanction, and we no more than he assert it in relation to the civil bond as indifferent to conscience. But we wish the learned author had in the ninth chapter of the Fourth Part of his work more energetically vindicated the memory of those great Popes who have been so grossly calumniated by their enemies. We do not think Catholics are called upon to perpetuate calumnies against the successors of St. Peter. The author, in our opinion, might have gone further in vindicating the memory of Alexander the Sixth. That Alexander, while he was simply a soldier, lived in sin, nobody denies; but there is no evidence that he ever violated his vows of chastity after entering the ecclesiastical state, and his conduct as Pope was irreproachable, and his death peaceful and edifying. He was a great and good Pontiff, and in no sense can we look upon his pontificate as “disastrous.” On this point, as on the conduct of the Pontiffs generally, we commend to our readers an excellent article in the last number of the *Dublin Review*, entitled “Bad Popes.”

2. *A Statement of the Trinitarian Principle, or Law of Tri-Personality.* Boston: Jewett & Co. 1853.

THIS book has been lying by us for a couple of years, and we have all along been intending to take some notice of it, more out

of personal regard for the author, however, than for its own intrinsic interest or merits. The work bears the marks of a good deal of speculative ability, and of much painful study, but a total ignorance of the sacred mystery of the Trinity as set forth in Catholic theology. As a psychological study, or as another proof of the sad wanderings of the human reason divorced from the light of revelation, it has a certain value; but in any other respect it is worse than valueless. We have read it with care, and perhaps may avail ourselves of an early opportunity to point out to the author, who regards his work as unanswerable, some of his mistakes.

3. *A Vindication of the Catholic Church, in a Series of Letters addressed to the Rt. Rev. John Henry Hopkins, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Vermont.* By FRANCIS PATRICK KENRICK, Archbishop of Baltimore. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1855. 12mo. pp. 332.

WE are promised from a competent hand a review of this work for our next number. We have only partially examined it, but, like all the works of its eminent author, it is erudite and scholar-like. We thank the author for doing us the justice to state that, in our doctrine on the mutual relations of the temporal and spiritual powers, we follow Bellarmine and Pope St. Gregory the Seventh, and for saying that he does not believe that we claim for "the Pope any right to interfere with our civil allegiance." Of course we do not, in so far as it is only civil. We claim for the Pope no civil or temporal authority or jurisdiction out of the States of the Church, but we do claim for him plenary spiritual authority to govern Catholics in all things that pertain to salvation. Moreover, we are not an advocate for political atheism, nor do we think ourselves called upon, because a clamor is raised against us just now, to abate one jot or tittle of the power we have heretofore asserted for the spiritual order. It is when and where truth is most strenuously opposed, that we believe it our duty most strenuously to insist on it. Dr. McClintock's letters to Mr. Chandler show what utility there is in shrinking from high-toned Ultramontaniam, and in attempting to make those outside believe that Gallicanism is Catholicity. The illustrious author speaks of a letter which he says he addressed to us in 1846, two years after our conversion. The letter to which he refers was addressed to us in 1849, three years later, and five years after our conversion.

4. *History of the Life, Writings, and Doctrines of Luther.* From the last French Edition. By WILLIAM B. TURNBULL, Esq. London: Dolman. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1854. 2 vols. 8vo.

WE have here the second and last volume of Audin's brilliant work on Luther, the first of his series of works on the Reformation. We gave our opinion of this and the other works of the series in our Review for last January, and have nothing to add to what we then said. History is a record of the past, and the history of Protestantism may now be written. M. Audin has made a good beginning, and opened the way for others, who will complete what he has left unfinished.

5. *A History of England, from the Invasion by the Romans to the Accession of William and Mary, in 1688.* By JOHN LINGARD, D. D. A New Edition, as enlarged by Dr. Lingard shortly before his Death. In Thirteen Volumes. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1855. 16mo. Vols. VIII. — XIII.

THESE volumes complete Phillips, Sampson, and Company's edition of Dr. Lingard's History of England. We have so frequently expressed our opinion of this work as decidedly the best History of England extant, that we have no occasion to do anything more than to congratulate the Boston publishers on the completion of their edition of it. Anybody who henceforth shall cite Hume as an authority will be inexcusable, — as much so as any one would be who should regard Robertson's History of Charles the Fifth as any thing more than a clever romance.

6. *History of the Life and Institute of St. Ignatius de Loyola, Founder of the Society of Jesus.* By Father DANIEL BARTOLI, of the Society of Jesus. Translated by the Author of "Life in Mexico." New York: E. Dunigan and Brother. 1855. 2 vols. 12mo.

WE thank the publishers for this translation of the work of Father Bartoli. There are few writers of the Italian language who have equalled the learned Jesuit in classical purity and beauty of style; and this History of the Life of St. Ignatius is one of the few biographies of the saints we have met with which contain anything more than a barren relation of events, with anecdotes and miracles confusedly thrown together, without either discrimination in their

choice or order in their arrangement. A book may be edifying without being necessarily dull, heavy, and offensive to good taste. Such books may promote the spiritual advancement of their readers, by affording opportunities for the exercise of patience; but we do not think they incite us to the love of a saintly life. This biography of the founder of the Society of Jesus is free from this fault. It charms and interests, whilst it edifies and instructs, the reader. It is also the best defence of the Order against the calumnies of its enemies, who hesitate at no falsehood, however glaring, when their object is to malign the Jesuits. St. Ignatius prayed that they might always be persecuted by the world, as a mark that they were loved by God. Truly his prayer has been heard, and these holy fathers, whose only object has been to promote the greater glory of God by devoting themselves to the salvation of their neighbors, have received in return for their charity only hatred and persecution. We do not pretend to assert that the Jesuits have no faults; for they are but men, and *humanum est errare*; but we do not believe a single one of the many charges brought against them. We think this work of Father Bartoli's their best defence, and we earnestly recommend it to our readers.

It is well and faithfully translated, and published in a neat and convenient form. We have often remarked the excellent style in which the publications of Dunigan and Brother are issued, but there is one thing which we dislike and to which we wish to call the attention of the publishers. It is to the catalogue of their books bound with the first volume. We would suggest to them, that it would answer the purpose just as well if they would send a catalogue with the book, but still keep it separate from it.

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7. *Florine, Princess of Burgundy. A Tale of the First Crusaders.* By WILLIAM B. MACCABE. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1855. 12mo. pp. 424.
 8. *Growth in Holiness: or the Progress of the Spiritual Life.* By F. W. FABER, D.D. Philadelphia: H. & C. McGrath. 1855. 12mo. pp. 490.
 9. *The Young Man Advised: or Illustrations and Confirmations of some of the Chief Historical Facts of the Bible.* By E. O. HAVEN, D.D. New York: Carleton and Phillips. 1855. 12mo. pp. 329.

BROWNSON'S QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1855.

ART. I. — *The Temporal Power of the Pope ; containing the Speech of the Hon. Joseph R. Chandler, delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States, January 11, 1855. With Nine Letters, stating the prevailing Roman Catholic Theory in the Language of Papal Writers, by JOHN M'CLINTOCK, D. D. New York: Carlton and Phillips. 16mo. pp. 154.*

THIS publication by an able and learned Protestant divine is one which we cannot, with our sense of duty as a Catholic reviewer, pass over in silence. The authority of the Pope in relation to temporal princes and governments is the great question of the day, and we cannot blink it out of sight, if we would. We must meet it fairly and fearlessly, let us offend whom we may. In open questions among Catholics, each party must be free, and silence must be imposed on both or on neither. But at present our controversy is with non-Catholics rather than with a school in our own Church.

Dr. M'Clintock proves in his *Nine Letters* to Mr. Chandler that it is idle to attempt to ward off the objections of non-Catholics to the Papal power on the ground assumed by that gentleman in his well-known speech, apparently the ground taken by the learned and excellent M. Gosselin ; for it is a ground widely rejected by Catholics themselves. It cannot be asserted as Catholic doctrine, and no non-Catholic, for no Catholic, can be required to accept it as such. At best it is an opinion in the Church, not of the

Church; and if Catholics may hold it, they may also reject it. When Mr. Chandler urges it as Catholic doctrine, he assumes authority which does not belong to him, decides a question which the Church has not decided; and it is sufficient for the non-Catholic to tell him, that no Catholic is bound to hold it, and they who follow Rome rather than Paris, as Paris was in the last century, do not hold it, but reject it as incipient Protestantism, tending in fact to political atheism. Whether we are Ultramontanists or not, till Ultramontanism so called is condemned, we must in our arguments with non-Catholics, if they insist on it, defend our Church as if it were true.

Every Catholic controversialist knows that the question of infallibility is much embarrassed by the Gallican doctrine that the Papal definitions are reformable till accepted by the Church; but in our arguments with non-Catholics we are not at liberty to relieve ourselves by denying that doctrine, since it is tolerated and they who hold it may receive absolution. We must defend the infallibility of the Church even on the supposition of its truth, for if it were absolutely incompatible with that infallibility it would not be tolerated. So with regard to the so-called temporal power of the Pope. That power has been asserted on very high authority, defended by doctors of the greatest respectability and weight, and acted on time and again by the greatest and holiest Pontiffs that have ever sat in the chair of Peter. You may say, no Catholic is obliged to assert it, but at the same time you must concede that every Catholic may assert it, and therefore, in relation to those without, you must defend the Church, if they insist on your doing so, as if every Catholic were obliged to maintain it. In regard to non-Catholics, we must defend the Church in what she allows, or gives a tacit consent to, as well as in what she commands. We cannot, in dealing with them any more than when dealing with Catholics, treat our Church as if she were a human institution, changing her spirit or modifying her doctrines with the times, or as a fallible institution, tacitly countenancing in her children errors which strike at her very existence, or which, if practically carried out, would change her essential character or unduly enlarge her powers. With the greatest respect for the good intentions of Mr. Chandler, we doubt, therefore, the wisdom and propriety of the ground he takes in

his speech. He re-opens in it an internal controversy among Catholics, for only a portion of the Catholic body, and they not those in best repute at Rome, will accept that ground; and it counts for nothing with non-Catholics, for they look upon it, not as a ground sanctioned by the Church, but simply as the opinion of those whose devotion to the Papacy is not very deep or ardent, and upon the whole as evasive and unsatisfactory. They do not believe Mr. Chandler's statement to be frank and straightforward, and it creates in their minds a doubt of Catholic sincerity and candor. Every intelligent Protestant knows how the Gallican doctrine has always been regarded at Rome, and when we put it forth as the ground of our defence, he suspects we do it not so much because we hold it as because we shrink from incurring the odium of the opposite opinion. He may be wrong in this, but as a matter of fact it is not unfrequently his conclusion.

Prudence is a cardinal virtue, and there is a wise and allowable policy that should never be neglected. But whoever has read the history of the Church knows that she does not stand in human policy, and that her worst enemies have always been those of her children who relied the most on human prudence. The general impression of non-Catholics is that Catholics are deficient in frankness, candor, and plain, straightforward dealing. They regard our apologists as special pleaders, evading the real points at issue by their logical subtlety and refinements. In a word, they believe us, in the Protestant sense of the term, *Jesuitical*. It is their prejudice against us on this account that creates a greater obstacle to their conversion than any prejudice they have against the most high-toned Catholic doctrines ever put forth. They think that we do not deal frankly, honestly, with them; that when we speak for them we trim, smooth down the asperities of our doctrines, round off their sharp angles, and present them something quite different from what we really hold. Unquestionably in this they do us foul wrong, but such is undeniably the fact. They lack confidence in us and in our statements. This is the state of mind which we have to deal with, and we submit, if the best method of dealing with it is to do our best to make our doctrines appear as near like their own crude opinions as possible. Policy, true prudence, it strikes us, is to deal frankly with the non-Catholic portion

of our countrymen, to place a generous confidence in their understanding and in their love of truth, and to shrink from the avowal and defence of no doctrine we hold, however offensive it may be to them, whenever it is called in question. Mr. Chandler would have pleased us better, and have, in our judgment, better served the cause of Catholicity, if he had in his place repelled the charge brought by Mr. Banks against Catholics, and shown that, even on the highest-toned Ultramontaniam, so called, there is nothing in Catholicity incompatible with the loyalty of the subject, or the autonomy and independence of the state in its own order. That would have been high-minded and manly, and would have commanded confidence and respect. It would have met the question openly and fairly, and carried with him the sympathies of the whole Catholic body, whether Gallican or anti-Gallican.

Dr. M'Clintock attempts, and we think successfully, to show that the doctrine defended by our Review on the temporal power of the Popes is the prevailing theory among Catholics, and that the opinion defended by Mr. Chandler is not the proper Catholic doctrine on the subject. He has done this in an able and scholar-like manner. He cites largely from our pages, it is true, but he cites fairly, and he states our view correctly, which is more than we can say of some of our friends. He concedes that the power we claim for the Pope is not a civil or temporal power, but spiritual, and is a power over temporals only in the respect that they are spirituals. He shows that Mr. Chandler's authorities are not to the purpose, for they simply disclaim what no Catholic does or ever has asserted. This is all true. We could ourselves say, with the exception of his hypothetical abuse of the Pope, all that Mr. Chandler and his authorities say, for neither he nor they disclaim the doctrine we assert; they only disclaim the doctrine which Gallicans accuse us of asserting. But with Dr. M'Clintock all this fairness, this apparent honesty, has a purpose. He thinks that to prove that Catholics do hold the doctrine we maintain is enough to condemn the Church for ever in the estimation of the American people. He calls the doctrine "a fearful doctrine," and thinks that all he need do in order to render the Church odious is to convict her of holding it. He offers no argument against the doctrine itself, for he regards it, like vice, as

"A monster of so frightful mien,
That to be hated needs but to be seen."

But we are disposed to argue this point with the learned Doctor. We are inclined to think that he has overshot the mark, and we believe that, after the passions of the moment have subsided, his hate will serve powerfully the cause it was intended to ruin. We have great confidence in truth, and we believe that, whatever the motive for which it is told, it will always, if told, tend to gain credit for itself. We are as much of an American as Dr. M'Clintock, and know the American people as well as he does. We are of them, were brought up with their sentiments and opinions, and till forty years of age our own heart responded, beat for beat, to every pulsation of theirs. A very considerable portion of them are now carried away by this or that fanaticism; but at bottom they are a noble people, high-minded and honorable, and naturally love what is clear, strong, and consistent. They are not a timid people, frightened at their own shadow, nor an unreasoning people, scared at the first sparks of logic and sound sense. Their most marked characteristics, when left to themselves, are plain, honest good-sense, and a love of fair play. They are strong rather than acute, bold rather than subtle, and practical rather than speculative. They are un-Catholic, often anti-Catholic, but naturally disposed to be religious, in fact, no people more so. They have lost their religious faith, but not the heart which Tertullian says is naturally Christian. Though immersed in business and apparently sunk to the lowest depth in the worship of Mammon, there is a large fund of latent chivalry at the bottom of their character, and a deep sense of the superiority of the spiritual to the material.

Now we believe the doctrine we set forth is precisely that view of Catholicity most likely to arrest their attention and win their respect. If there is anything which is a settled conviction with them, it is the incompetency of the state in spirituals, and that there is a law higher than the civil constitution, a law of eternal justice, which binds the prince no less than the subject, the state no less than the individual. There is not an American fifty years old who did not suck in this conviction with his mother's milk, and has not grown up with it. Dr. M'Clintock believes it as firmly as we do, and, if a natural-born American citizen, would

fight to the death for it. All our institutions presuppose it, our system of law consecrates it, and without appealing to it we could not justify our separation from Great Britain, the country of our ancestors.

We are well persuaded that Dr. M'Clintock has not well weighed his words, when he calls the doctrine we advocate an abominable doctrine, and we are equally well persuaded that he has mistaken the convictions, the intelligence, and the spirit of the American people. He does them infinitely less than justice. They all, with one accord, subscribe to the doctrine which forms the principle of the argument in the Declaration of Independence, that the tyranny of the prince absolves the subject from his allegiance, and that there is a moral order above the civil, to which the temporal authority is subjected. Is there a single American who does not believe in the reality of such moral order, who would make right and wrong mere creations of the civil government? The American people solemnly asserted that power is a trust, not an indefeasible right, when they declared the Colonies absolved from their allegiance to the British crown, for the reason that George the Third had proved himself a tyrant, and they reassert it every Fourth of July, when they publicly read the Declaration of American Independence. They assert the reality of the moral order, superior to the civil, and independent of it, in their doctrine of the rights of man, or when they precede their constitutions by a Bill of Rights. These rights are not created or conferred by the state or the civil society; they are older than civil society; they are derived not from the state, but from Almighty God, and are held under the law of nature, or the Divine law in the natural order, and are founded in what is called natural right. They are the natural and inalienable rights of which the Congress of 1776 spoke in their Declaration of Independence, and the state, so far from conferring them, is bound by them, and has for its chief office to guarantee and vindicate them for each individual citizen. The private citizen may come into court and plead these rights against the state, and any enactment of the legislature that invades them or conflicts with them is null and void from the beginning, and the court is bound to set it aside as contrary to natural right, to natural justice, — as a violence, in the language of St. Augustine, rather than a law. It is

because our government by its very constitution is supposed to recognize and guarantee these rights, the natural rights of every man, that it is called a free government, and we who live under it are called a free people.

Dr. M'Clintock is a Protestant divine, of what particular denomination it matters not, but he is a Protestant divine of some sort, and evidently a man of intelligence, learning, and ability. Is it necessary that we should tell him that every Protestant sect in this country asserts the very doctrine, in principle, that we maintain? Every man who has any religion at all, whether Catholic or Protestant, Jew or Gentile, holds his religion to be for him the law of his conscience, therefore the highest of all laws, *lex suprema*, — in fact, the law of laws. No man claims the right to worship God contrary to religion, but every man does claim before the state the right, the inherent and inalienable right, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, or the prescriptions of what he holds to be the religious authority; and when the state law comes in conflict with the solemn obligations of his religion, he answers with the Apostles of our Lord, "It is necessary to obey God rather than man." Whenever the civil law comes in conflict with the religious law, the civil, not the religious, must give way. No Protestant, no Mahometan, no Gentile even, will deny this. The American people have asserted it in declaring, not religious toleration, but religious freedom. The state does not grant or confer this freedom, but recognizes it as a right, which it is bound to respect and to protect. Should the state ordain something against this freedom in any sect; should it command Methodists to become Presbyterians, Presbyterians to become Episcopalians, Episcopalians to become Catholics; should it forbid Baptists to baptize by immersion, or Presbyterians to baptize infants, or prohibit any sect from governing in all ecclesiastical and religious matters its own members according to its own discipline, would the sect feel itself bound to obey? Would it not tell the state, You transcend your province, and meddle with that which is above your power, and independent of it? Most assuredly. Then every Protestant sect asserts the spiritual order as above the temporal, religion as superior to politics, and therefore a law higher than the civil law, and to which, in case of conflict, the civil law must yield. Here, in princi-

ple, is the whole doctrine which Dr. M'Clintock and those who cry out against us call "abominable." Is this doctrine abominable in the eyes of the American people? Are they prepared to declare the state omnipotent, supreme in both spirituals and temporals, and surrender their consciences to its keeping? We do not believe it, and we are sure that Dr. M'Clintock and his friends do them foul wrong, and also wholly misrepresent themselves. They may wish to use the state as an instrument of propagating their religion, or of suppressing others opposed to it; but surely they would not suffer it to change or modify it.

To deny the supremacy of the spiritual order is the denial of both civil and religious liberty. What is tyranny but a denial of this supremacy, the denial of right, and the violation of justice between man and man, or between sovereign and subject? There is no tyranny where there is no violation of liberty, and no violation of liberty where there is no violation of justice. Justice, we need not say, pertains to the moral order, or rather is that order itself. The essence of tyranny, therefore, consists in that it is an encroachment of the political upon the moral order, that is to say, upon the spiritual order, which includes as the one law of God for the Christian both the natural law and the revealed. If we understand by liberty true liberty, not license, its necessary condition is in the maintenance of the independence and supremacy of the moral order, the supremacy of right over might, the spiritual over the material, the divine over the human. The very end of government is the maintenance of justice in all political, social, and domestic relations, and all its powers are given it for this end, and no other. It is the reason and end of the state; and therefore the very idea of the state presupposes the supremacy of the moral, that is to say, the spiritual order.

Dr. M'Clintock is in his own estimation, whatever he may be in ours, a minister of the Gospel, and, as such, his whole labor is to impress upon those who come within the sphere of his influence the superiority of the spiritual and the subordination of the temporal. The *Westminster Catechism*, which we learned before we were yet able to read, tells us, "The chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy him for ever." All religious instruction, all moral culture, has for its object to introduce and sustain in individuals and nations the supremacy of the moral order, of reason

over passion, right over brute force. Nobody does or can doubt it. It is not necessary to undertake to prove it to the American people; none of them are so stupid as not to recognize it. Assuredly, then, we may assume it as a settled American conviction, that the spiritual is supreme, and the temporal subordinate. Can we suppose, then, that they are such poor logicians as not to perceive that, in case of conflict between the two, the temporal, not the spiritual, politics, not religion, the state, not the Church, must give way?

Let us take the old Puritans of New England. We say Puritans, not Pilgrims, too often confounded with them. The Pilgrims, founders of Plymouth Colony, were a small band of English Dissenters, who had separated from the English Establishment and formed themselves into a separate sect before leaving England. They were Independents, which the Puritans never were. The early Puritans who founded the Massachusetts Colony, in our early history distinct from that of Plymouth, or the Old Colony, as we now call it, were not Dissenters in England. They belonged, up to the moment of their leaving England, to the English Establishment. They were Anglicans, and they brought with them the intolerant and persecuting spirit of the Anglican Church. The persecutions which are so deep a stain on our early Colonial history were not the work of the Pilgrims who landed at Plymouth, nor of their descendants, but of the Puritans of the Massachusetts Colony, under the Endicotts, Winthrops, and other early Colonial governors,—a fact which we would commend to the attention of Mr. Marsden, a recent historian of the Puritans, who confounds the persecutors of Boston with the “Pilgrim Fathers,” as does also the *Dublin Review*. But this by the way. We will take these Puritans, who, after they came to New England, set up an ecclesiastical establishment for themselves. And what was their principle? What was their objection to remaining in England, and members of the Anglican Establishment? It was, that the Church of England gave to the state or temporal authority jurisdiction in spiritual matters. The principle of their separation was precisely the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order. This they asserted; and, that they might maintain it, they submitted to exile, and dared brave all the hardships of a new settlement amidst merciless savages on a bleak and inhospitable coast.

If there are any people in the Old World with whom the larger portion of our American Evangelicals more especially sympathize, they are the old Scottish Covenanters and the modern Free Kirk. The old Covenanters separated from their brethren on the very principle we assert, and the Free Kirk is a solemn protest of a large portion of the Scottish people against the Erastian heresy. In both, the solemn assertion is of the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order. The Free Kirk asserts with all its energy the incompetency of the state in spirituals, and the old Covenanters asserted with even more energy the obligation of the state to conform to the teaching and precepts of the Church. Who then will dare maintain that the assertion of the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and the subordination of the temporal, is the assertion of an abominable doctrine in the estimation of the American people? Have the American people become a body of atheists, denying God as King of kings and Lord of lords, denying moral justice, and the supremacy of right? Has not Dr. McClinton in his insane hostility to the Catholic Church forgotten himself, and unwittingly branded as abominable the very principle he asserts, and must assert, in every sermon he preaches, or else shock all the moral convictions of his hearers? Has he, or any other who cries out against the doctrine we in our humble way have defended, the audacity to maintain before his class as a professor, or an assembly of Americans as a citizen, the contrary doctrine, that is, the independence and supremacy of the temporal, and the subordination of the spiritual, — that the political law overrides the religious, and that conscience must submit to the civil magistrate? No man not in need of physic and good regimen has the effrontery to do it. He who should do it would be hissed as a fool, abhorred as a moral monster, or confined as a lunatic. The native instincts of the human heart, the simplest common sense, would pronounce him a demon rather than a man. There is not a human being, be he who he may, that has attained to the first glimmerings of reason, who does not hold that the spiritual order, that is, truth and justice, ought to prevail. Even the fool who has said in his heart, There is no God, dares defend his atheism only by alleging that it is true, and tends to promote true morality. He can deny God only

in the name of God, truth only in the name of truth, justice only in the name of justice. Falsehood whenever advocated is advocated as truth, not as falsehood; wrong whenever defended is defended as right, not as wrong. He who would deny the moral order must pay homage to it, must assert its supremacy; for man is a rational animal, and has inherently a moral constitution. They who oppose the principle we assert, are themselves obliged to assert it as the very principle of their opposition. Here as elsewhere our Protestant ministers, in their eagerness to raise objections to Catholicity, forget to examine whether the principles on which they must rest them are not principles which they no more than we can consistently maintain. It is neither fair nor honorable, neither logical nor just, to assume principles of reasoning against us which they reject the moment they are put upon their defence.

Christianity is unquestionably supernatural, but it does not oppose or supersede the natural. It enlightens and elevates natural reason, purges and extends its vision, but it does not contravene it. It recognizes and consecrates every principle of natural justice and equity, every truth apprehensible by natural reason; for it is adapted to our rational and moral constitution, and presupposes and sustains with all its supernatural energy, instead of subverting it. Nothing really true in natural reason is or can be false in Christian revelation, any more than what is true in Christian revelation can be false in natural reason. In no instance does the Christian abrogate the natural law. Whatever is really just and true, right and obligatory, under the natural law, is equally so under the revealed law. God is consistent with himself, and does not assert one principle in one part of his works and a contradictory principle in another. All his works, whether of nature or grace, harmonize, as proceeding from one and the same eternal and immutable Reason, and one and the same eternal, supreme, and unchangeable Will. This great principle of the independence of the spiritual and the subordination of the temporal, which we have found it necessary to assert under the law of nature, and the denial of which is simply atheism, must equally be asserted under the Christian or revealed law. No Christian, as no moralist, can then assert the independence and supremacy of the temporal in face of the spiritual. So much the American people assuredly

hold, at least in theory, and so much Dr. M'Clintock will himself, no doubt, cheerfully concede. Where, then, is the difference in principle between us? And wherefore is the doctrine we advocate more fearful or more odious than the one he does and must advocate as a professedly Christian minister?

Let us fairly understand the matter. Dr. M'Clintock charges Mr. Chandler with evading the real question, and maintains that all the authorities he cites to prove that the Pope claims no civil or temporal power or jurisdiction, out of the Ecclesiastical States, by divine right, that is, as Vicar of Christ on earth, prove nothing to the purpose, for nobody contends that he does. Here we must let the learned Doctor speak for himself.

"My dear Sir,—Five hundred years and more have passed since Pope Boniface died a miserable death. From that day to this, the Popes of Rome have either explicitly avowed doctrines equivalent in substance to his, or, by silence, have given them a tacit consent. No Pope has authoritatively denied the *indirect temporal authority* of the holy see: I defy you to produce the instance. Your speech promises one, and I looked for it with eager eyes; but could find nothing nearer to it than the *declaration of the cardinals* (made in 1791, to serve a pressing political exigency in Great Britain), that 'the see of Rome never taught that an oath to kings separated from the Catholic communion may be violated; or that it is lawful for the Bishop of Rome to invade their temporal rights and dominions.' Begging your pardon, this does not touch the point at all, and you know it. Appeal no more, then, to the Pope, 'lest a worse thing come unto you.'

"But you bring up, with some degree of parade, the opinions given by the Universities of Paris, Douai, Louvain, Alcala, Salamanca, and Valladolid, in view of certain propositions submitted to them, at the request of Mr. Pitt, by the Catholics of London, in 1789. They make a fair show on paper, I grant you; but a few simple statements will make manifest to you their utter want of bearing on the real question.

"1. These Universities were, at the time, under the influence of Gallicanism; and of course their answers were of the Gallican sort. But between 1789 and 1855 there has been a great 'revival' in European Romanism; and Gallicanism is now, in these Universities, nearly if not quite defunct. The University of Louvain, for instance, which gave so strong an opinion then, is now strongly Ultramontane; the very Dr. Rohrbacher, of whose fidelity to the Papal theory Brownson speaks so strongly, in a citation

given to you above, is now, and has been for many years, one of the Louvain professors. [Not fact.]

"2. But even had the Universities been at that time Ultramontane, they might have answered Mr. Pitt's questions (or rather the questions proposed by the Romanists at his request) without touching the real point at issue at all. The first and most important question asks whether the Pope 'has any civil authority, power, jurisdiction, or pre-eminence whatever, within the realm of England.' The answer is, of course, in the negative; for every tyro knows that the Pope never claimed any 'civil or political authority' out of his own dominions. The question is, whether he has an 'indirect temporal authority' over kings and people, 'in virtue of his spiritual authority'; and this point the Universities do not touch at all." — pp. 118 – 120.

Here Dr. M'Clintock, more just to us than have been our Catholic opponents, concedes that the power we claim for the Pope is not civil or temporal, but spiritual, and that it is only a power in regard to temporals claimed for him as the representative of the spiritual order on earth. Let this be remembered, no Catholic claims any but spiritual authority for the Pope as Vicar of Jesus Christ, and no authority at all save as the supreme representative on earth of the spiritual order. Whatever his powers, they are simply the powers of that order represented by him in the plenitude of its authority. At bottom, then, the question is simply a question of the rights and prerogatives of the spiritual order in face of the temporal. That order we have found to be by its own nature independent and supreme. Every Christian, every moralist, every man, does and must concede it, however by so doing he may reflect on his own practice. If, then, that order be represented on earth in its plenitude by the Pope, he must necessarily be independent and supreme in face of the representative of the temporal order, that is, in face of the secular authority, the prince or state. This is evident, and nobody in reality does or can deny it.

The difficulty men feel on this point arises from their confounding the Church on the one hand with the spiritual order, and on the other the state with the temporal order. They forget to recognize the spiritual order as back of the Church, and the temporal order as back of the state. The Church is not the spiritual order, does not make that order, but simply represents it. The Pope is not God, he is only his Vicar. The state neither is nor

makes the temporal order, it simply represents it. Both orders exist prior to their representatives and independent of them. The mutual relations, then, of the respective representatives must be precisely the mutual relations of the two orders themselves, or those which naturally subsist between the spiritual and the temporal. Naturally the spiritual is independent and supreme, so then must be its representative; naturally the temporal is dependent and subordinate, and then so must be its representative, the state.

Thus far there is and can be no controversy. Gallicans and Protestants, who have the air of disputing us, do not correctly apprehend the question, or, if they do, fail to meet it fairly. They seem to us, in fact, to lose sight of it, to run off into details, and to bewilder themselves with vain subtilities and a mass of disconnected facts. They seem to us to forget to recur to first principles, and to discuss the question in the light they furnish. The question for the American people does not lie where even some of our friends suppose. They concede without a dissenting voice the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and therefore necessarily of its divinely authorized representative, if such representative there be. The controversy does not lie there, but is elsewhere. The real question is, Has Almighty God instituted a representative on earth of the spiritual order? If so, Who or what is it? Suppose such representative to have been instituted, suppose it to be the Pope as supreme visible head of the Church, and no intelligent American, Catholic or non-Catholic, will deny him all the power we assert for him.

Now as to the fact that the spiritual order is represented on the earth, there really is no doubt in the minds of the American people. For let them say what they will, they in the bottom of their hearts believe in the reality of the spiritual order, and in the distinction between it and the temporal order, and they need not be told that the spiritual unrepresented in the government of human affairs is practically null. Every man who believes in the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, believes that it has even on earth a representative of some sort. Here the Protestant and the Catholic, the Churchman and the No-Churchman, are agreed. Every Protestant sect is for its members a representative of the spiritual order. Even

those who reject all ecclesiastical organizations, all creeds and confessions, and plant themselves on pure individualism, still recognize private conscience, and hold it to be representative of the spiritual order, the voice of God in the soul. All in principle recognize and insist on the fact that the spiritual has an organ of some sort, and a representation on earth through which it may make itself heard in human affairs. The Holy Scriptures clearly prove that our Lord did not leave the spiritual without any organic representative. He was a king, and came to set up his kingdom on the earth. He himself said so. He established his Church, and that Church is called his body. It is spoken of in prophecy and sacred history as a kingdom, as the city of God, and these words mean something or nothing. No man who believes in the inspiration of the Scriptures will dare assert that they mean nothing. Then they mean something. The words *kingdom* and *city* are words expressive of authority, and mean with the ancients what we mean by the word *state*, when used to express the secular authority. They mean that our Lord founded a city or kingdom, organized a body, which represents the spiritual as the state represents the temporal. There is no use in denying this, and in reality no American who believes in Christ at all does deny it, when presented to his understanding as a distinct proposition.

We run counter to no American prejudice, then, when we assert that the spiritual order is represented on the earth. We say no more than every one claims in principle, when we assert that this representative is independent and supreme in relation to the secular authority. We know no Americans who do not, unless in a moment of mental confusion or forgetfulness, deny the competency of the state in spirituals. Some may wish, as we have said, to use the state as an instrument for suppressing a religion they do not believe, or for promoting their own, but no one recognizes the authority of the state to determine what shall or shall not be his religion, or to interfere with its free expression and exercise. They who go furthest in denying all spiritual organizations, and in asserting private conscience as the only representative of the spiritual, are most strenuous in asserting the independence and sovereignty of conscience, at least for themselves. Not one of them but will say to the state, "My conscience bounds in my

regard your power, and where that begins your authority ends. Before you my conscience is independent and supreme." So says every sect, however small or insignificant. It is for its members the representative of conscience. It holds itself for them free, independent, sovereign, for it represents for them the spiritual authority in its plenitude, of which conscience is the interior expression. Wherein then do we, in asserting the independence and supremacy of the Pope as Vicar of Christ in face of the secular authority, assert anything that is not asserted in principle by the American people? What right has Dr. M'Clintock to assume that our doctrine, when they understand it, will be regarded by them as "fearful," or as in any sense objectionable?

We think that Dr. M'Clintock and our Gallican friends not a little mistake the American people. The American people do not and will not object to the Church because she asserts the independence and supremacy of her Sovereign Pontiff, but they object to the assertion of that independence and supremacy because they do not believe that she is the Church of God. We cannot believe them so stupid as to suppose that a man can consistently assert a divinely commissioned representative of the spiritual order, and not claim for that representative the independence and supremacy which inhere in that order itself. Here our Gallican friends lose their labor, for they do and can gain no credit with our non-Catholic countrymen. Non-Catholic Americans have enough of logic and good sense to see that the Gallican theory, if it means anything in opposition to us, is inconsistent with the inherent powers of the Church as the divinely commissioned representative of the spiritual order, — enough of logic and good sense to see that, if the Pope be the Vicar of Christ on earth, representing in the government of human affairs Him who is King of kings and Lord of lords, he must be independent and supreme before the secular authority. To pretend the contrary is to sport with their understandings, and to gain their contempt, not to win their confidence. The Gallican argues always the question on a false issue, and proves, when he proves anything, what nobody denies, and refutes, when he refutes anything, what nobody asserts. He argues as if the Papist asserted for the Pope independence and supremacy in the temporal order, that is, independence and

supremacy as a temporal power, — as a secular sovereign or prince. But in this he is inexcusable. Neither they who assert the indirect, nor they who assert the direct temporal power of the Pope, maintain anything of the sort. There was never a Catholic of any note at all, who denied the independence and supremacy of the state in its own order. The question is not there. The state has no superior in the temporal order. *That* no Catholic denies. What is denied is that the temporal order itself is independent and supreme, and no Catholic dare assert that it is; for whoever holds to any religious ideas at all holds that it is subordinated to the spiritual. If the sovereign prince has no superior in the temporal order, he still has a superior in another and a superior order, in Him who is King of kings and Lord of lords. Even Bossuet and the English Solomon, James the First, acknowledged that the king is responsible to God for the exercise of his kingly power. It is absurd, then, if you distinguish between Church and state, and make the Pope as head of the Church the representative of the spiritual order, that is, the Vicar of Christ on earth, to deny that the state is subordinate to him, as the temporal is to the spiritual. You may deny it as much as you please, but you will never gain credit for your denial with the American people. One thing we look upon as certain, that the American people, if they become Catholics, will never become Catholics of the Gallican stamp. They have too much logic for that.

The American people see clearly enough that, if we assert the Church as the divinely constituted representative of the spiritual order, and the Pope as its supreme visible head, the Sovereign Pontiff must, from the nature of the case, from the very fact that he represents the supreme order, be independent and supreme in relation to the temporal power. They do not in reality object to this, and if once convinced of the premises, they would by no means shrink from the conclusion. An old Catholic people, trained under monarchical despotism, and feeling the necessity of managing the susceptibilities of power, may gradually lapse into Gallicanism, for Gallicanism was born and brought up in the courts of despots, and is essentially a courtier or a slave. But we are a new people, a republican people, accustomed to treat our rulers as our servants, not as our masters. We are strangers both to the

timidity and to the servility of the Gallican, and do not fear to offend his Majesty, lest we compromise the civil *status* of the Church. Our Gallican friends do not take sufficiently into the account the stern, independent, and inflexible republican character of the American people, so different from that found under the old monarchies of Europe. They are unconsciously affected by the traditions of the court of Louis the Fourteenth, or of Elizabeth of England. The non-Catholic American people hold from Puritanism, rather than from Anglicanism, and are more ready to resist the temporal power than to quail before it. Gallicanism and republicanism will not and cannot go together. When the Gallican becomes a republican he becomes an apostate and a Jacobin, as the European revolutions during the last seventy years amply suffice to show. A republican people can be Catholic only on Ultramontane principles, for it is only those principles that comport with their national independence and love of liberty, or that can sustain true republicanism if once established. Take the Catholic laity in our own country who have been accustomed to assert the independence of the temporal power, and to abuse the Pope hypothetically, and you invariably find them incapable of appreciating legitimate republicanism. True to their Gallican instincts, they are courtiers of the people when they cannot be courtiers of the monarch, and run off into wild and destructive radicalism. The republicanism they advocate is the Red Republicanism or Jacobinism of the French Revolution, which asserts for the ruling majority the absolute power claimed by Louis the Fourteenth in his famous *L'état c'est moi*,—I am the state. Their political tendency is to establish either an absolute monarchy or an absolute democracy,—the despotism of the one or the despotism of the many. Always do they tend to magnify the secular power, and to enlarge the sphere of its action, whether that power be vested in the king or in the people. Even the excellent Chief Justice of the United States has not escaped this tendency, as may be seen in his decision in the Charles River Bridge case, some few years since,—a decision, if we are not much mistaken, which strikes a severe blow at the security of vested rights.

The characteristic of American republicanism is the limitation and responsibility of power. Its aim is to restrict

power to the narrowest sphere compatible with the maintenance of order, and to leave the broadest margin possible to individual freedom and activity. One of its maxims is, "The world has been governed too much." Another is, "That is the best government that governs least." It may even have gone too far in this direction; but if it has, it is a less evil than to have gone too far in the opposite direction. Now, what is there under Gallicanism to keep power within its constitutional limits, and to resist it when it transcends them? In this respect it is no better than Protestantism, nor in fact so good as modern Protestantism; for modern Protestantism allows rebellion and revolution, at least it does so in Great Britain and the United States, but Gallicanism does not. It says: "Let every one be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but from God, and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore, whosoever resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation." It thus binds the conscience, with the whole authority of the Church, to submission, and denies to her all authority to loose it when the power abuses, and by its tyranny and oppression forfeits its rights. Never was conceived a doctrine more favorable to despots, or more hostile to civil and religious liberty, than that of the Four Articles of the assembly of the French clergy in 1682. It does not assert simply the independence of sovereigns in their own order, which nobody denies, but in the constitution and government of society the independence and supremacy of the temporal order itself. American republicans will never accept a church which commands them on pain of damnation to submit to the civil ruler, and is incompetent to release them when the civil ruler becomes a tyrant, and uses his power only to outrage and oppress his subjects. It is because the Catholic Church has been represented, though falsely, as such a church, that so many of the friends of republican liberty throughout the world are in arms against her.

What the American people want in the church under a political and social relation, if they are to have a church at all, is a spiritual power invested with plenary authority to assert the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and to confine the state within the strict limits of the temporal. They want something which limits the

secular power, and can call it to an account when it usurps what does not belong to it, or forfeits its rights by abusing them. This, we take it, is regarded by the whole American people as essential in a church, and this is what they are continually seeking. But where is this to be found? In the people? But what if the people — as they may, since they are no more infallible or impeccable collectively than individually — abuse their power, and themselves encroach on the rights of individuals and the prerogatives of the spiritual order? Where is the power to maintain the sovereignty of conscience, the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, against popular despotism? To declare the people supreme and absolute, is only another form of declaring the temporal order independent and supreme, and is just as much to declare civil despotism, as to declare the king or emperor supreme and absolute. You have changed the form, but not the nature or extent, of the civil power. We see every day that the people may be misled by demagogues, by their own ignorance and passions, to trample on the rights of conscience, and to perform acts of gross injustice and cruel oppression. A party at this very moment is laboring to make the government an instrument of injustice to a portion of the community, of oppressing conscience, and violating at once the rights of property and of family. Let the Know-Nothing party but succeed in securing a majority of votes, and all this will be done. It is plain, then, that democracy alone does not and cannot furnish the check on power so much needed.

What is needed is a representation of the spiritual order strong enough to retain its independence in face of the representative of the temporal order, and to restrain it within its legitimate sphere. The people evidently cannot be this representation, for they, at times, need resisting and restraining themselves. It cannot be the individual or private conscience, because the individual or private conscience is that which needs protection, because it is not strong enough to resist the action of the state, and because if it were, it would, since it is fallible and variable with almost every individual, render civil government itself impracticable, and conduct to anarchy and barbarism. The state must have authority sufficient to maintain order, and to protect and foster the interests of temporal good; but this it would not and could not have, if the individual

could effectually resist its action, for often the public good requires the individual to be restrained, and even punished. It cannot be found in the state itself, for the state, no less than the individual, needs to be restrained; and every people loses its liberty just in proportion as the state absorbs the church, or arrogates to itself spiritual functions. Pagan Rome lost the last vestige of its liberty when the Emperor became *ex officio* Pontifex Maximus. England sunk into Oriental despotism, when, breaking from Rome, she recognized her king as supreme head of her church establishment, and suffered him to declare himself supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals; and she recovered some portion of her ancient freedom only as the progress of dissent and recusancy reduced those who recognized the spiritual supremacy of the crown to a minority of her population. English liberty is sustained now, as far as sustained it is, by those who make light of the queen's supremacy; not by genuine Anglicans, whose doctrine was and is, "the divine right of kings, and passive obedience."

The sects, though intended as organic representatives of the spiritual order, and regarded as such by their devout members, are obviously insufficient, and in reality tend rather to exaggerate the evil than to prevent or to cure it. They are all creatures either of the civil power or of their individual members, and have no authority not derived from either the one or the other. This fact renders them impotent to maintain, even if we could suppose them to represent, the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order in the practical government of human affairs. They may, in this or that locality, influence or perhaps control the action of the commonwealth for a brief time; but sooner or later they must yield to the changes of public opinion, or fall under the domination of Cæsar. No national church can maintain its independence. It must submit to the national authority, or cease to exist. The Scottish Kirk, so proud and haughty in the face of Queen Mary, supported as it was by the turbulent barons backed by the power of Elizabeth, was obliged to yield to the secular arm under a Protestant sovereign. The Established Church in England is a slave of the state; and the same Church in Ireland would long since have succumbed to the national spirit of the Irish, if it had not been sustained by the power of England, — a power decidedly foreign to Irish nationality. In

this country, where the sects are left to themselves, they are so divided and so weakened by their division that they are comparatively powerless. Each tries, in its own fashion, to assert the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order; but they neutralize one another, and leave the secular authority, so far as they are concerned, free to do very much as it pleases. They have, in fact, in order to save themselves, to pander to public opinion; and their ministers are obliged to study and practise all the arts of the demagogue. Not directly sustained by the state, their only resource is public opinion, is to do all in their power to influence the people regarded as back of the state or the administrative authority. In this way they become exceedingly dangerous to the stability and perpetuity of our republicanism; because, instead of wedding themselves to justice, they waste their virtue in wooing a temporary expediency. They avail themselves of every popular tendency, every popular excitement, every popular *ism*, every popular fallacy, and push it to the most dangerous extreme.

The real danger we Americans have to apprehend is social despotism, — the absorption of all power by society, to the extinction of individual freedom. Protestantism as representing the spiritual order is with us as good as dead. Its religion does not, speaking generally, rise above philanthropy, and under pretence of promoting great philanthropic objects, such as the abolition of slavery, and the suppression of intemperance, the sects are urging the state to usurp and exercise powers which are incompatible with the moral freedom and the natural rights of individuals. In this the sects are subjected by a public opinion, which sprung up in the last century, outside of Christianity, and which seeks to embody itself in legislative enactments. Philanthropy is the sentiment which unbelievers substituted in the last century for the charity of Jansenists and Calvinists, which they confounded with the charity of the Gospel. The sects have undergone notable modifications, in consequence of the popularity given to this sentiment by infidel writers; and they rely almost solely on that popularity to extend their credit with the people, forgetful that every human sentiment, however pure and good in the natural order, necessarily becomes despotic in proportion as it becomes exclusive. Forgetful again of the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, which they have the

air of asserting, the sects continue to court and exaggerate the popular anti-Catholic prejudices of the country, and aim through those prejudices to direct the action of the state against Catholicity, without seeing that in this they contradict their own deeply cherished principles, and subject the spiritual to the temporal. In fact, the sects are obliged to follow the fluctuations of popular opinion, at least to a degree, and thus, while they may aid the government in doing the same, they can never resist its encroachments upon the liberty of conscience or the rights of individuals. They are not strong enough to be logical, are too weak to be firm, and are carried away by the popular tendencies they foster. The very means they take to strengthen themselves destroy their influence as representatives of the spiritual order, and eventuate in confirming the independence and supremacy of the secular power in spirituals, the principle of all tyranny.

It is clear from these considerations, that the American people cannot find in the state, in private judgment, or private conscience, or in the several Protestant sects, taken separately or collectively, a representative of the spiritual order adequate to the practical assertion of that independence and supremacy which they themselves, in general thesis at least, claim for it, and without which it is impossible to preserve our republican freedom, either from running on the one hand into civil despotism, or on the other into pure individualism, anarchy, and therefore barbarism. Not a few of them see this, and are as firmly convinced of it as we are. There are sober, thinking men among our non-Catholic countrymen, who, though no alarmists, see and feel the dangers to which we are exposed. They see at work a strong tendency to sweep away every institution in the land, everything that rests upon a fixed and solid basis of its own, and is capable of imposing a momentary restraint upon popular will or popular passion, inflamed and excited to frenzy by the declamations of unprincipled and selfish demagogues, or ignoble aspirants to place and power. The independence of the judiciary is destroyed in most of the States, the common law is tampered with, and to a fearful extent deprived of its efficiency as a protection to individual liberty, and a war to the knife is waged upon the Catholic Church, solely because she is an institution not controllable by popular passion, will, or opin-

ion. Think you these men do not see and feel that our only salvation is in the *institution* of the spiritual order, in an organic representation of it, distinct from the political organization, independent of the national authority, which is secular, and superior to it? No representation of the spiritual order within and confined to the nation will suffice. It must be one and catholic, above and over all nations; and, moreover, it must be a divinely constituted and divinely protected and assisted organization, not a mere human device or contrivance. Such an organization the Church claims to be, and such a Church, governed by the Sovereign Pontiff, the real Vicar of Christ on earth, is precisely what we want. The whole thinking portion of the American people, the non-Catholic full as much as the Catholic portion, to say the least, feel this, and in their confidential conversations acknowledge it. We therefore must believe that Dr. M'Clintock is mistaken in his conviction, that to prove that the Church claims the independence and supremacy we assert for her, is to insure her rejection by the American people. We believe, on the contrary, that it would in a certain sense recommend her to their respectful consideration; for it is precisely what they would naturally expect her to claim, and what, if they are to accept her as God's Church, they would wish her to possess, since it is that which they more especially feel the want of.

Dr. M'Clintock's implied objection is not well taken. The great body of the American people are unquestionably strongly opposed to the Catholic Church, — have an almost invincible repugnance to her, — are in fact as anti-Catholic as any people on the globe; but there is not one among them who would deliberately argue that she cannot be the Church of God, *because* she asserts her independence and supremacy as the representative of the spiritual order; for every one feels in his inmost heart that, if such representative, she must be in relation to the secular order independent and supreme, and therefore it is that the Gallican explanations gain so little credit with them. Reason and common sense tell them this. We do not need revelation to teach us that the temporal is subordinate to the spiritual, for it is a simple dictate of natural reason; nor do the American people fear the independence and spiritual supremacy of the Church, in case she is God's Church,

founded by him, and protected and assisted by the indwelling Holy Ghost, for they have sense enough to perceive that she then would be divinely commissioned, and that God, who cannot countenance error or injustice, would vouch for her, and himself take care that, as a faithful and obedient spouse, she should always do the will of her lord. God would himself be sponsor for her, go, so to speak, security for her, and that is security enough for any reasonable man. The real objection lies further back. The doubt or disbelief is as to her being the Church of God, instituted and sustained by him as the representative of the spiritual order on earth. Satisfied on this point, they would have no difficulty in yielding all the rest, because then all the rest would appear to them just and desirable, — precisely what they see to be necessary.

It does not enter into our present purpose to discuss the question as to the divine origin and constitution of the Church. That has been done sufficiently in the pages of this Review. But at the very lowest, her claim to be God's Church is as good as that of any of the sects. They are all confessedly of human origin, founded either by individuals or by states, acting without any divine commission. Yet they all claim each for itself to represent the spiritual order, and seek to be independent and supreme, wherever they are not practically repressed by the secular authority, tyrannically exercised as they must regard it. Why then should the power we assert be more dangerous in her hands than in theirs? Because in her hands it may be efficient, while in theirs it must always be practically inefficient? Whoever heard a man objecting to a power he demands on the ground of its efficiency, and defending it only on the ground of its practical inefficiency? The Presbyterian sect claims all the independence and supremacy for itself before the secular power that we claim for the Catholic Church. Will the Presbyterian step forward and argue that his sect is to be accepted, and our Church rejected, because it can never practically assert its claim, while she can practically assert hers? This would be to stultify himself. Other things being equal, he should infer directly the contrary. A power incapable of serving a practical purpose is as good as none at all; and a power whose practical efficiency would be dangerous, is not and cannot be legitimate, and ought never to be asserted at all.

The Presbyterian either believes the power he claims for his sect a power that ought to be practically efficient, or he does not. If he does not, he condemns his sect for asserting it; if he does, he equally condemns it in asserting its practical inefficiency.

But one thing we may remark as not ill adapted to allay the fears of non-Catholics. We suppose it is the common doctrine of our countrymen, that power is a trust, and may be forfeited by abuse; therefore that there may arise cases in which princes may be justly deposed, and subjects released from their oath or obligation of fealty. Now we claim to have read history, both as a Catholic and as a Protestant, with at least ordinary diligence, and we venture to assert that in no instance in the contests between the two powers. have the secular authorities been in the right and the Sovereign Pontiff in the wrong. Whatever may or may not be said of their title, the Sovereign Pontiffs have invariably used their power on the side of justice, and never have they deposed a prince who did not for his tyranny, his oppressions, his frightful iniquities, deserve to be deposed. They whom they struck were moral monsters, and the cause for which they struck was that of religion, virtue, and innocence. Those emperors of Germany and those kings of France and England against whom the Popes had to exert all their apostolic authority, were not meek, peaceful, wise, and just sovereigns, seeking only the common good of their subjects; they were licentious tyrants, cruel oppressors, for whom no right was sacred, no virtue a protection. They were not patriotic monarchs, seeking to defend their crowns against the arrogance of pontiffs and the insolence of churchmen, as their unscrupulous defenders and traducers of the Popes would persuade us; but insolent and ambitious seculars, seeking to usurp the rights of the spiritual order, and to make themselves popes as well as princes, to absorb the spiritual order in the temporal, so as to be able to outrage and oppress the souls as well as the bodies of their subjects. All who have read history with any degree of honesty and discernment now know it, and none but the ignorant or the uncandid pretend to the contrary.

If during eighteen hundred years the Popes have never encroached on the just rights of the secular authority, have been in no case guilty of injustice to the representatives of

the temporal order, what reason have you to fear that they will change hereafter? You agree at least, we believe, that the Church does not change, and that the policy once adopted is the policy she always pursues. The past is a sufficient pledge of the future. True, she asserts the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and so do you; true, she asserts the supremacy of the law of God for princes and states as well as for individuals and subjects, and so do you, when you do not turn political atheists; true, she seeks by all the means in her power to maintain the supremacy of that law in the practical government of society, and so do you, if you have any reverence for God or respect for morality; true, she aims to do, and where her action is free does do effectually, what every sect professes to have at heart; but this is a reason why you should love her and give her your confidence, not why you should distrust and oppose her. With her, religion, order, liberty, justice, may be maintained in our republic, and without her they cannot. Are the American people so blind, so bereft of common sense, as to fear her, because she is fitted to accomplish their most ardent wishes and the purest and holiest desires of their hearts?

It is not very wise, in opposing a church we happen to dislike, to deny the only principles on which we can defend the one we like. We are not a Protestant, but we will go as far as any Protestant in asserting the freedom and independence of the sects before the secular authority. We cannot in our horror of them consent to throw doubt on the great principles we plead in our own defence. As long as they do not trample on the equal rights of others, as long as they do nothing to disturb the public peace, we will maintain their freedom before the state, and deny in their case as much as in our own the right of the secular authority to interfere with them. It is madness to deny the freedom and supremacy of the spiritual order for the sake of opposing Catholicity. The American people may allege that the Church is not the divinely commissioned representative of the spiritual order on earth, and for that reason oppose her; but to oppose her because she asserts her independence and supremacy in face of the temporal power, the very thing she should do, and must do if she is what she professes to be, is to deny the independence and supremacy of the moral order, and to give up the world to the government of lawless passion or brute force.

That a portion of the American people, misled by their prejudices and influenced by the misrepresentations and calumnious charges brought against us by No-Popery publications, are violating against us some of their own most deeply cherished principles, and for which in their own case they would fight unto death, is unhappily too true. Of them we may truly say, "They know not what they do." The American mind at the present moment is all out of joint on religious matters, and they are like an army in the dark, thrown into confusion, and unable to distinguish friends from foes. They fire as often upon the former as the latter, yet at bottom they are a brave people and mean well. Their confusion will not last for ever, we hope, and they will recover themselves when the day, not far distant, begins to dawn. They will then see distinctly that society reposes on the maintenance of the independence and supremacy of the moral order in its practical government, and they will see that there can be no greater madness than that of warring against the only institution which is able to maintain that independence and supremacy. Religion and morality do not hold so high a rank with us, that we can afford to reject any help in their favor offered us. There is with us a sad want of high moral principle, of strict honesty, of conscientiousness. In public life we look to the expedient rather than to the right, and honor success rather than integrity and justice. In private life we abandon ourselves to the world, forget God and duty, and think only of multiplying sensible goods. We are becoming material, and rapidly falling into practical atheism. One half of our adult population are unconnected with any religious denomination, and probably a still larger proportion have grown up without having even been baptized. Everybody now sees that Protestantism can neither make nor keep a people practically religious. Lord Shaftesbury stated in the House of Lords not long since, that there are five millions of the adult population of England and Wales that never attend any place of religious worship. To a Christian mind, nothing can be more horrible. All is not as we could wish it in Catholic countries. Owing to the jealousies of the governments, and to the power heresy and schism have given them to oppress the Church, she has not even there been able to do all her work. The tyranny of despots has restricted her freedom and lessened

her practical efficiency. But in no Catholic country is the moral and religious state of the people so deplorable as in Great Britain and the United States. Catholic populations, however far below what they might be and ought to be, have yet a sensibility to moral ideas and to religious considerations that we look in vain for in Protestant populations. They are more under the influence of the spiritual order, and are more easily affected by appeals to conscience. In our own country they almost alone keep alive in practice the memory of religious ages, and, whatever may be the estimate in which a worldly-minded community may hold them, they are the main hope of our country. They have their faults, their vices even, but they are a Christian people, and feel that man's first duty is to God, and his dearest hope is hope of heaven.

ART. II. — *The Philosophical Works of DAVID HUME.*
Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1854. 4 vols. 8vo.

THE publishers deserve the thanks of philosophical students for this complete and very handsome edition of the philosophical works of David Hume. We have little sympathy with this much over-estimated writer, who was an unbeliever in religion, a sceptic in philosophy, and of no remarkable worth or moral dignity as a man; but he is one of the great names of British metaphysical speculation, and no student of the aberrations of the human mind for the last century and over, whether in Great Britain or on the Continent, can safely overlook his Essays. His *Treatise of Human Nature*, published when he was only twenty-seven years of age, rewritten and republished some ten years later, under the title of *An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, provoked a good deal of philosophical inquiry, and gave rise to the Scottish school of Reid and the German school of Kant, the two most widely diffused and influential schools of recent times.

Hume is usually classed among sceptical philosophers, but he was no dogmatist, and originated no school of his own. He arrived speculatively at sceptical conclusions, it

is true ; but it would be doing him injustice to suppose that he practically accepted or wished others to accept them, for he says that he did not, and that nobody does or can. What he did was to show, that, if the sensist philosophy in vogue in his time is accepted, genuine science is impossible. Whether he had adopted a different philosophy for himself, or not, does not appear ; but most probably he had not, and his real aim was to disparage all philosophy and bring men back to what in our language is called good sense. But be this as it may, without much erudition, and no great aptitude for metaphysical pursuits, he succeeded in showing that the empirical philosophy favored by Bacon and Hobbes, and elaborated and defended by Locke, conducts every one of its disciples of a little logical nerve to mere egoism and scepticism.

Hume has the merit of being — in his speculations — a consistent sensist. According to him all the objects of human knowledge are *Impressions* and *Ideas*. The *impressions* are external and internal, and are what we now call *sensations* and *sentiments*. *Ideas*, as he defines them, are not an image or representation with which the mind in all its operations is immediately conversant, as Locke pretended ; the simple mental apprehension of the object, as maintained in most of our own schools ; the *species* or phantasms by means of which objects themselves are attained, as Aristotle and the Schoolmen taught ; the forms or essences of things, detached from the Divine Reason and clothed with material bodies, as Plato held ; or the intelligible reality in contradistinction from the sensible, intuitively apprehended by our intellect ; as we ourselves hold ; but feeble images or faint copies of sensations and sentiments, formed by memory, imagination, and reflection operating upon them, as furnished by the senses. All human *knowledge*, then, as to its matter, is confined to our external and internal impressions and their pale reflex in the understanding.

All the objects of human *reasoning* or inquiry, it follows from this, are reducible to two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. As the ideas are simply images or copies of facts of consciousness, formed by the mind operating upon its own impressions and lying wholly within its sphere, the understanding has no occasion to appeal to experience, or to go out of itself to find

or determine their relations. In regard to these relations our reasoning is intuitively or demonstratively certain, and has a solid support in immediate consciousness, and the principle of contradiction, or that of identity. But in reasoning concerning matters of fact, the case is different. We can in it support ourselves on neither. Matters of fact are contingent, and in every instance the contrary is conceivable. The proposition, that the sun will *not* rise to-morrow is intelligible, and no more implies a contradiction than the proposition that *it will rise*, and we should therefore in vain attempt to demonstrate its falsity. Yet nothing is more certain than that we do continually reason concerning matters of fact, draw inferences from them, from the presence of some infer that others have been or have not, will or will not occur, and are obliged to do so in all the practical business of life. Now, what is the principle of this reasoning?

The principle of this reasoning is, apparently, the relation of cause and effect. It is only by that relation that we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If asked why you believe a matter of fact not present, as, for instance, that your friend is in the country or in France, you give as a reason some other fact, — a letter which you have received from him, the report of an acquaintance who has been there, or your knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. Were you to find a watch or some other piece of mechanism in a desert island, you would conclude that men have been there. All our reasoning concerning matters of fact is of the same kind, and it evidently rests on the supposition that the two facts are related as cause and effect, so that the one necessarily implies the other. It is only by the supposition of this relation that we can *infer* the one from the other, or regard the present fact as a proof of the absent fact. But whence do we obtain our knowledge of this relation?

This relation is not discoverable from reasoning, *a priori*. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if it is entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not from the fluidity and transparency of water have inferred that it would suffocate

him; or from the light and warmth of fire, that it would consume him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence or matters of fact. The effect is a distinct event from the cause, and no analysis of either or both can enable us to say, beforehand, that the one is the cause or the effect of the other; for there is no sensible intuition and no principle of contradiction in the case to support the inference. Our knowledge of the relation can be attained, then, only from experience. It is only from having observed for a long time, in a great variety of instances, that one event is uniformly preceded or followed by another, that we come to regard them as connected by the relation of cause and effect.

But experience gives us what we are accustomed to call cause and effect only under the relation of time, the one as preceding and the other as following, never as *necessarily* connected. It merely informs us that, so far as our observation extends, the one never occurs without the other. It shows us what we call the effect following the cause, but not the cause by its secret power or energy producing it. Wax placed near a fire is melted; but nothing in experience enables us to say that the fire melts it. We can, then, from experience obtain absolutely no cognition of the necessary connection between cause and effect, or of cause in the sense of power or productive energy. All we do or can obtain is a cognition of uniform precedence and consequence. Hume here refutes in advance the theory of the origin of the idea of the causal *nexus*, or causative power, developed by Maine de Biran, an acute and able French metaphysician, as well as that of the German Fichte. Hume says that it is only from long experience of the uniform appearance of one event following another that we conclude the relation of cause and effect subsists between them. This may be true. But this applies only to cases of particular causes and effects, not to the origin of the notion as a fact of consciousness; for, as a matter of fact, we have the notion of cause and effect from the first dawn of reason, and long before we have had the experience supposed. Whence its origin? Locke had maintained that we first derive our idea of power from the

operations of our own will, from the consciousness of producing effects in ourselves. This view is taken up and developed at great length and with consummate ability by Maine de Biran. But, as Hume remarks, there is no sensible connection between the *nisus* or voluntary effort and anything which follows. We are conscious, if you will, of the external and internal phenomena, but not of a causal *nexus* between them. I will to raise my arm, my arm rises; but I cannot say that my volition does anything more than precede the rising of my arm, for experience shows me no necessary connection between the volition and the muscular contraction and rising of the arm which follow. Leibnitz went so far as to deny all causal connection between them, and maintained that the movements of the body are not produced by the action of the soul, but simply correspond to it by virtue of a pre-established harmony. Certainly there is nothing more inexplicable to us than the reciprocal influence of soul and body. Cousin sees the defects in the reasoning of Locke and Maine de Biran, but still maintains that we are conscious of a causal *nexus* between the voluntary effort and a following phenomenon. I will to raise my arm, it may or may not rise; but I have produced an effect, to wit, a volition to raise it, and am conscious of the causal *nexus* between the voluntary effort and the volition. But perhaps, properly speaking, the volition and effort are not in reality distinguishable; and even if they were, all I am conscious of is of the effort and of the volition as facts, not of a power in the former that has produced the latter.

Hence it follows that the idea of the causal *nexus*, or of causative power, is not derivable from sensible experience. If, then, with the sensists, we make that experience the sole source of our knowledge, the only notion of cause possible is, as Dr. Thomas Brown, the successor of Dugald Stewart, maintained, that of "invariable antecedence and consequence," which excludes entirely the notion of power, and resolves the relation of cause and effect into the relation of time. As all our reasonings concerning matters of fact rest on the supposed necessary connection between cause and effect, it follows, as a matter of course, that those reasonings have and can have no scientific value. If we must abandon the assertion of that connection, give up the idea of power, either as not entertained or as

not assertable, we can assert no reality as the objective cause or condition of our impressions, sensations, or sentiments, and therefore no real objective existence. Thus, as ideas are nothing but copies of the impressions, all the existence we are able to assert is simply our own sentient subject and its modes or states. Nay, if the causal connection be denied, we can assert our own existence only as an impression or sensation, as the Abbé Condillac maintained. Hence we lose, not only the external world, all objective reality, but all substantive existence, and fall into pure nihilism, since phenomena cannot exist without a subject.

Here is where Hume shows us, if we accept the sensist philosophy and derive all our knowledge from sensible experience, we do and must come. Let it be understood that he is not dogmatizing; he is only showing the necessary and legitimate consequences of the empirical philosophy rendered popular and nearly universal in Great Britain and France by Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding*. He does not by any means accept the conclusions of that philosophy. He says over and over again that he does not, and that nobody can. His speciality does not consist in denying the necessary connection between cause and effect, or the reality of the causal power, as some have foolishly imagined, but in showing that it cannot be derived from sensible experience, or asserted on the principles of the empirical philosophy. In this he was unquestionably right; and no one, on the principles of that philosophy, has ever been able, or ever will be able, to refute him. Hume was not by any means the first to show that the sensist philosophy, by excluding the idea of power, inevitably leads speculatively every one capable of consistently carrying it out to scepticism and nihilism; but he nevertheless did show it. And it was he more than any other that, in Great Britain, Germany, and France, provoked those new philosophical investigations intended to save science. In this lies all the value of his labors, and in this consists all the service he has rendered to intellectual philosophy.

Dr. Thomas Reid, a countryman and contemporary of Hume, one of the great men of the eighteenth century, entered the lists against him, and endeavored to reconcile philosophy with the common beliefs of mankind. Reid

was not a learned man, and was far from being well acquainted with the course of philosophic thought through the ages; but he was a robust, original, and independent thinker, and his influence on philosophical speculation has been great, and, upon the whole, not unsalutary. His philosophy is in the main practically sound, as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough to place metaphysical speculation, as was his wish, in complete harmony with common sense; for he did not scientifically vindicate what he calls common sense as the test or criterion of philosophic truth. He considered that the errors of philosophers arose from two sources,—from their regarding external perception as representative rather than presentative, and from their overlooking the fact that the first principles of all science are indemonstrable. He undertook to refute the former by showing that it is not an image or representation of the sensible object that we perceive, but the real object itself, and that all reasoning must proceed from principles which reasoning does not furnish and cannot establish. These principles are the principles of common sense, the common notions or primitive beliefs of mankind. Among these is the notion of power, or the necessary relation of cause and effect; and therefore it is that all men entertain and believe it, though no reasoning can obtain or demonstrate it.

But this did not meet the reasoning of Hume. Hume frankly admitted that all men have the notion, that all act on it, that none are able to divest themselves of it, and that it is sufficiently evidenced for all practical purposes. Yet, speculatively, he said, you cannot assert it, because it is no object of experience, and cannot be detected in the observable phenomena. But all our knowledge, all our ideas or notions, are derivable from experience. Therefore you cannot have the notion. Yet you have it, all men have it. Whence do they get it? It is not detected, responds Reid, in the observable phenomena, is not derived from experience, for it is underived, is in the observer as a primitive belief or principle of common sense. But Hume concedes all this. All have the notion, and cannot practically divest themselves of it. But if in the observer, it is subjective, and of no objective value or application. You call it a primitive belief, a necessary belief. Be it so. But what is its authority, since there is observable no objective real-

ity to respond to it, no objective evidence to support it? — No such evidence is needed. — For practical purposes, agreed; but if the belief has no objective evidence, it is only subjectively certain, and science is only subjective, and reduced to the simple knowledge of our internal modes or states. Here is the difficulty which Reid nowhere gets over, for his primitive beliefs are not intuitions of the objective reality, are not supported by any objective evidence, but are mere psychological facts, entirely subjective, for aught he shows to the contrary, and therefore can never be the first principles of the science of things. With all his honest endeavors, Reid did not succeed in solving Hume's problem, and establishing, as he was bound to do, the objective reality of the notion of power, or of the causal *nexus*. With him, as with Hume, the judgment of causality remains a purely psychological fact.

About the same time with Reid in Scotland, Immanuel Kant — through one parent of Scottish descent — took up in Germany Hume's problem, and solved it virtually in the same way; that is, he did not solve the difficulty at all, but accepted and confirmed by a masterly analysis of reason the sceptical conclusions deduced by Hume from the empirical philosophy. Kant saw that the real question lay deeper and was more general than Hume had supposed, and that it resolves itself into the question, How are formed synthetic judgments *a priori*?

All our judgments are divisible into two classes, analytical or explicative judgments, and synthetic or amplicative judgments. The former are judgments in which the subject contains the predicate, and are formed on the principle of contradiction or of identity. They add nothing to the subject, but merely explain or unfold its contents. The latter are judgments in which the predicate is not contained in the subject, but is added to it, and are subdivided into empirical judgments, or judgments from experience, and judgments *a priori*. That a body has extension, figure, &c., is an analytical judgment; for the predicates, extension, figure, &c., are contained in the original conception of body. That a body has weight, is a synthetic, empirical judgment, because the predicate is not contained in the primitive conception of body [a disputed fact in physics], but is added to it from experience. But that whatever happens must have a cause, is a synthetic

judgment *a priori*, because the predicate, *must have a cause*, is added to the subject, *whatever happens*, and because the judgment involves the conception of necessity, not in any way derivable from experience. The characteristic of synthetic judgments *a priori* is this conception of necessity. Thus far Kant is admirable, and his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and between synthetic judgments from experience and synthetic judgments *a priori*, though not absolutely new in the history of philosophy, is of great importance, was never more finely marked, and leaves nothing on that head to be desired.

The possibility of empirical synthetic judgments depends on the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori*; for in every empirical judgment or particular experience we apply a synthetic judgment *a priori*. The empirical judgment, fire liquefies wax, is only a particular application of the judgment, whatever happens must have a cause. That is, before we can assert any particular and contingent cause, we must have the notion of universal and necessary cause. The possibility of experience, and therefore of all empirical knowledge, depends on the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori*, which are the indispensable condition of every fact of experience. How, then, are they formed? To this question Kant devotes his *Critik der Reinen Vernunft*, or Critique of the Pure Reason, that is, of reason regarded as subsisting prior to all experience and independent of it. His answer denies that they are intuitions, or formed by the presentation to the mind of their subject, predicate, and copula, as objectively existing *a parte rei*, and asserts that they are simply forms or categories of the understanding, which is in substance the very doctrine of Reid; for Kant's categories are precisely the first principles, the constituent elements of reason, the common notions, or common sense of the Scottish school. Kant agrees with Hume that the idea of cause is not in the observable phenomena, nor empirically obtainable, but maintains that it is in the observer, a necessary form of the understanding itself, and simply applied by it on occasion of experience.

But this does not solve the sceptical doubt of Hume, for the Kantian categories are not the prædicaments of Aristotle, they are not forms of things, or the objective conditions under which things may and must be thought, but

the forms of the subjective intellect. The category cause is simply the intellect itself under one of its aspects, and is that in the thought which the intellect supplies from itself, and we think it because in every thought the soul thinks or recognizes itself. It is, therefore, purely subjective, and without the least conceivable objective force or validity, as Hume himself, in other terms, labored to prove.

Kant's *Critique of the Pure Reason* is nothing but a masterly development of the old Stoical maxim with the famous exception suggested by Leibnitz, *Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu, — nisi ipse intellectus*. The only objective existences he pretends to recognize are sensibles. We have, he maintains, intuition only of sensible objects. But without the conception of cause objectively valid, we are unable to assert the sensible intuitions themselves as objectively valid. They are then in the predicament of Locke's *sensations* and Hume's *impressions*, and all that we can affirm is pure idealism, — with which pure sensism is at bottom always coincident, — or the subject and its modes or states. But as Kant denies all intuition or cognition in any form of the *noumenon*, that is, the intelligible, we can have no cognition of the subject even, and therefore cannot affirm it. If we cannot affirm the subject of our own phenomenon, we can affirm nothing, and we are in the universal doubt suggested by Hume. We place here no forced interpretation upon Kant's *Critique*, for he himself expressly says that the result of his critical labors will be to demolish science to make way for faith, — a result not relieved even by the dogmatism he attempts in his later work, *Critique of the Practical Reason*; for it is idle to attempt to found a dogmatic system on practical reason, after having proved speculative reason to be good for nothing. Moreover, in his *Practical Reason* Kant only follows Hume, who conceded that our reasoning concerning matters of fact is sufficiently evident for him as an agent or actor.

The fact is, that at bottom both Reid and Kant, as to the origin and grounds of our knowledge, agree with Hume, and their philosophy is substantially that which he proves leads to scepticism, with the exception in favor of Reid, that he denied the representative character of perception, and asserted, without proving, that we apprehend things themselves, not merely their mental images or rep-

resentations, — an important step in the right direction, we cheerfully concede.

In the Scottish school has followed Sir William Hamilton, a psychological observer of rare sagacity, and, after old Ralph Cudworth, perhaps the most really erudite philosophical writer in our language. He has that acuteness and that knowledge of systems which Reid lacked. He attempts a new explanation of the judgment of causality, which he derives not from intuition, experience, ratiocination, custom, or a special psychological power or faculty, but from the impotence of our nature to think the unconditioned. He makes it "a derivation of the condition of relativity in time." "The mind," he says, "is restricted to think in certain forms; and under these thought is possible only in the conditioned interval between two unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles, each of which is altogether inconceivable, but of which, on the principle of Excluded Middle, the one or the other is necessarily true." "We must think under the condition of existence, — existence relative, and existence relative in time." Existence relative implies, — "1. That we are unable to realize in thought, on the one pole of 'the irrelative, either an absolute commencement or an absolute termination of time; as, on the other, the infinite non-commencement or an infinite non-termination of time; 2. That we can think neither on the one pole an absolute *minimum*, nor on the other the infinite divisibility of time. Yet these constitute two pairs of contradictory propositions; which, if our intelligence be not all a lie, cannot both be true, while at the same time one or the other must. But as not relatives they are not cogitables. Now the phenomenon of causality seems nothing more than a corollary of the law of the conditioned in its application to a thing thought under the form or mental category of existence relative in time."

This we suppose must be regarded as perfectly intelligible, and yet some people may think it might have been more clearly, as well as more elegantly, expressed. But what first strikes us in this barbarous statement is that it resolves the judgment of causality into the judgment of the non-commencement of existence, which, if it means anything, is a denial of the relation of cause and effect. The phenomenon to be explained, we are told, is this: "When aware of any new *appearance*, we are unable to conceive

that therein has originated any new *existence*, and are constrained to think that what now appears to us under a new form had previously an existence under others. These others are called its cause." "Our judgment of causality simply is: We necessarily deny in thought that the object we apprehend as beginning to be, really so begins, but, on the contrary, affirm, as we must, the *identity* of its present sum of being with the sum of its past existence." That is, no new existence is ever caused, but new phenomena only. Effects are only changes in the forms of the cause, that is, are only the cause under new forms. This, we think, is not the judgment of causality as a psychological fact, for it eviscerates the judgment of the conception of power, whereby the cause places an effect distinct from itself, which is, if we mistake not, the essence of the judgment. Sir William then explains the judgment by identifying cause and effect, that is, by denying both. A cause which places no effect distinct from itself, or only exhibits itself under new forms, is in reality no cause at all.

That we do not misrepresent the illustrious Baronet, is evident from his express statements. "The mind is compelled to recognize an absolute identity of existence in the effect and in the complement of its cause, — between the *causatum* and the *causa*." "Each is the sum of the other." An absolute identity is a perfect identity, complete in all its parts, and then no real distinction is conceivable between the *causa* and the *causatum*. Then there is really neither *causa* nor *causatum*, neither cause nor effect. "That the phenomenon presented to us did, as a *phenomenon*, begin to be, — this we know by experience; but that its elements only began when the phenomenon which they constitute came into manifested being, — this we are wholly unable to think." "We are compelled to believe that the object, (that is, the certain *quale* and *quantum* of being,) whose phenomenal rise into existence we have witnessed, did really exist prior to the rise, under other forms. But to say that a thing previously existed under other forms, is only saying in other words, that it has had causes." Then to say a thing has had causes, is only saying in other words, that it previously existed under different forms! It is clear from this that the only distinction of cause and effect recognized by Sir William is the distinction of being and phenomenon. But we need not tell him that phenomena

are indistinguishable from their subject, and therefore the phenomenon is, so far as it is anything, being itself, not something produced by it. The phenomenon distinguished from the subject in which it subsists is nothing at all. The resolution of cause and effect into being and phenomenon is the radical error of the Pantheists, for then we can assert only being and its phenomena, and to assert only being and phenomena is precisely to assert Pantheism, which excludes the judgment of causality.

It is true, Sir William says he speaks only of second causes, for, as he alleges, "of the Divine causation we have no conception"; but this cannot avail him, for he is treating of the judgment of causality in general, and having resolved the relation of cause and effect into the relation of being and phenomenon, he can assert no second causes. Phenomena cannot be causes either first or second; for they have no subsistence, are unsubstantial, and therefore cannot act or operate. To assert second causes is to abandon his whole theory. Moreover, he illustrates his own definition of causality by express reference to the Divine causation, and makes the relation of God and the universe identically that which he asserts between cause and effect. "When God is said to create the universe out of nothing, we think this by supposing that he *evolves* the universe out of himself, in like manner as we conceive annihilation by conceiving him to withdraw his creation from actuality into power." He says this in order to show that we can conceive neither the real beginning nor the real cessation, and neither the increase nor the diminution, of the sum or *quantum* of existence. We have the right then to assume that he does apply his conception of cause in the order of the first cause as well as in that of second causes. Second causes only copy or imitate in their sphere and degree the first cause, and the conception of cause, in so far as cause it is, must be the same in whatever order we conceive it. If, then, Sir William resolves, as he does, the relation of cause and effect into the relation of being and phenomenon, or existence and its forms, he can assert as existing only being and its phenomena, — therefore the universe only as substantially identical with God; which is to deny all causative force which places an effect distinct from itself, asserted in every judgment of causality, and to fall into sheer Pantheism.

Sir William Hamilton's theory is as inadmissible as Hume's, because it denies the judgment of causality itself, and conducts to Pantheism, and all Pantheism undeniably conducts to scepticism and nihilism. But his doctrine that the judgment is derived from "the condition of relativity in time," is to us equally inadmissible. He says: "The phenomenon of causality"—that is, our judgment of causality, we suppose—"seems to be nothing more than a corollary from the law of the conditioned in its application to a thing thought under the form or mental category of existence in relation to time." Does he mean to say that existence is a form or category of the mind? If so, he falls into pure Kantism. We had supposed that he regarded existence as objective, and existing *a parte rei*, and that we apprehend things themselves as really existing independent of the mind, and that, without an object so existing, thought is impossible. But let that pass. "We cannot know," he continues, "we cannot think a thing, except under the attribute of existence; we cannot know or think a thing to exist, except as in time; and we cannot know or think a thing to exist in time, and think it *absolutely to commence*. Now this at once imposes upon us the judgment of causality." We see not that. That we cannot think it absolutely to commence in time, is very true; but this does not prevent us from thinking it absolutely to commence out of time, namely, in its cause. Sir William says we can think only existence, and existence only in time; but we cannot think existence as absolutely commencing. This is a singular statement, for to think existence, and to think it not commencing, is not to think it in time, but out of time. We think existence, he says, and we are unable to think it either as absolutely commencing or as absolutely ceasing, or to think any increase or diminution of its sum. Now to think existence without thinking its beginning or end, its increase or diminution, is to think existence without beginning or end, increase or diminution; which, if we know the force of words, is to think real, eternal, and necessary existence or being, unconditioned by time or anything else,—precisely what the illustrious Scottish Professor maintains as the basis of his whole theory,—we cannot do. His real difficulty, according to his own statements, is, not in thinking existence without the relation of time, but in thinking it under that relation;

and he in fact denies it under that relation, by recognizing no effects but phenomena, which are not existences in time, since phenomena, aside from their subject, are not existences at all.

It is, no doubt, true, that we are unable to think existence as absolutely beginning, for if we could we could think absolute non-existence, which is impossible, since to think absolute non-existence is simply not to think at all. But this is true only when we take *existence* in the sense of real and necessary *being*, in contradistinction from contingent existences, as the *esse* *div*, or being of beings. In this sense we cannot think it either to begin or end, to be augmented or diminished. But it is not true of contingent existences, for we cannot think them at all, save as we think them as beginning to exist, — not in time indeed, for time is only a relation of contingents to one another, beginning and ending with them, — but in the cause, or creative act of God, in which the relation of time itself commences. In this sense we can think both the beginning and end of existence, and both its augmentation and diminution; for God was not obliged to create, and he may, if he chooses, withdraw his creative act; and nothing hinders him, so far as we know, if he chooses, from creating new worlds, since creation has not exhausted his creative power. The reasoning of Sir William rests on the ambiguity of the word *existence*, and therefore on an undistributed middle, a sad vice in so admirable a logician.

Sir William we fear uses the word *existence* as the excellent Abbate Rosmini uses the term *being*, in an abstract sense, as existence *in genere*, without reflecting that existence is always concrete, and can be predicated only of something really existing. He says, we can think only under the condition of existence, and only existence relative. Now as we cannot think existence without thinking something existing, this means, if anything, that we can think only relative, that is, contingent existences. But to think relative existences is to think relation, and no relation is thinkable, or cogitable with a single term. We cannot then think relative existence without at the same time thinking that to which it is related, that is, the irrelative, — the contingent without thinking the non-contingent, that is to say, real and necessary being, the *ens simpliciter* of the Schoolmen. Relative

or contingent existence, *ens secundum quid*, must be thought, if at all, either as *ens secundum quid*, or as *ens simpliciter*. But not the latter, for that it is not, and what is not cannot be thought; not the former, unless there be at the same time thought that which is not contingent, but absolute or necessary being, because without that it is not. In thinking contingent existence as contingent, there is a comparison made of the contingent with the necessary, and no comparison can be thought without intuition of both terms. Then we cannot think contingent or relative existence without thinking necessary, absolute, or unconditioned existence. Either then we must be able to think the unconditioned, or we cannot think the conditioned. To say that we can think existence without thinking it either as conditioned or as unconditioned, will not answer, for existence so thought is simply *ens in genere*, existence in general, in which nothing is thought as being or existing, and is the *reine Seyn* of Hegel,—merely possible existence or a mental abstraction, which cannot be thought without the real and concrete. All existence is the existence of something, is being, either real and necessary, or relative and contingent, and therefore must, if thought at all, be thought either as one or the other. When, then, Sir William says we think only under the condition of existence, he must either mean that we think something really existing, or existence where nothing exists. If the latter, he falls into pure Kantism, or scepticism; if the former, then he must concede that we do actually think, that is, intuitively apprehend, real and necessary being, without which there is and can be no relative or contingent existence.

We do not forget Sir William's reply: Only relatives are cogitable. Relation is cogitable only between correlatives, and the relation between correlatives is reciprocal; each is relative to the other. All thought is dual, and embraces at once subject and object in their mutual opposition and limitation. The subject thinking conditions the object thought, and the object thought conditions the subject thinking. Therefore the unconditioned cannot be thought. But this is to confound the condition of the thought with the condition of the object, that is, to confound, in the very act of distinguishing them, subject and object. The cause conditions the effect, but not the effect

the cause, for the very conception of cause presupposes it to be independent of the effect. If then I think the object as my cause and myself as its effect, I do not think myself as limiting or conditioning it. If I think myself as the effect or creature of the infinite, I do not think myself as its limitation, and therefore may, although thought is dual, think the infinite, though of course not in an infinite mode. But to think the infinite in a finite mode is still to think the infinite, otherwise we must say, whenever we do not think the object adequately, we do not think it at all. This will not do, unless you deny us all thought, for only God can think, that is, know, adequately any object whatsoever. My thought is limited, but the limitation is of the subject, not of the object, comes from myself, not from the object thought, and is negative, not positive. I cannot think God infinitely, but I can think God who is infinite, and though in thinking him I distinguish myself from him, I do not think myself as limiting him, for I think myself as dependent on him, as his product, effect, or creature, and him as my cause or creator. The mistake of Sir William arises from his not considering that the only conceivable relation between the finite and infinite, the conditioned and the unconditioned, or, as we prefer to say, between existence (from *ex-stare*) and being (*ens secundum quid* and *ens simpliciter*), is the relation of the effect to the cause, or of creature to creator, and therefore cannot be thought as a relation of reciprocity, but as a relation in which the former term is related to the latter, though the latter is not related *in se* to the former. Consequently we never can think ourselves as limiting or conditioning the infinite object, but must always think it as conditioning or placing us. If Sir William had considered the thought not solely as a fact of consciousness, that is, on its subjective side, as a conception, but in the real existence thought, he never could have denied our ability to think the unconditioned, that is, real, necessary, and infinite being, for he would have seen that we have intuition of it in every thought, and could not think a single thought if we had not.

The illustrious Scotsman tells us that our conception of the infinite, the unconditioned, is negative. Negative of what? Of the conditioned? But the conditioned can be denied only by proposing its contradictory, that is, the unconditioned. Of the unconditioned? Then it is the

denial of the unconditioned by the positive conception of the conditioned. But the conditioned affirms, not denies, the unconditioned, since without the unconditioned the conditioned is not cogitable. We confess, then, that we are totally unable to understand the process by which the learned and acute professor derives the judgment of causality from our inability to think the unconditioned, or from the negative conception of real and necessary being. Our inability to think the absolute commencement of existence, must, according to his own statements, be regarded as resulting from the fact that we think contingent existence as originating in the non-contingent, that is, in real and necessary being. We should, therefore, reverse his doctrine, and say that the judgment of causality originates in our ability, not in our inability; in the fact that we can and do think both the unconditioned and the conditioned, and always think the latter as the effect or creation of the former, that is, from our ability to think things as they really exist; and the only inability to be noted in the case is our inability to think things, and not to think them in their real relations.

But denying that we have any intuition of the unconditioned, or, as we prefer to say, of the Ideal or the Intelligible, and yet maintaining that we do and must believe it, Sir William is obliged to represent the judgment of causality as simply a belief, though a primitive and necessary belief, in which he coincides with Reid, and does not differ essentially from Kant. He denies it to be a fact of science, and boldly takes the ground that the first principles of our knowledge can in no instance be themselves objects of cognition, mediate or immediate. He admits a *vois* or noetic faculty in man, the *intellectus* of the Latins and the *Vernunft* of the recent German philosophers, but he makes it the *locus* or place of first principles, rather than the power of apprehending them objectively in immediate intuition. They are then beliefs, not cognitions, and beliefs which not only cannot be demonstrated, but of which we have and can have no objective evidence. They are therefore purely subjective; and as all science must repose on them, and follow their law, all our science is purely subjective, as Hume maintained. Hence Sir William Hamilton, decidedly the most learned man of the Scottish school, and the first metaphysician in Great Brit-

ain, coinciding with Reid and Kant, leaves us in the same speculative doubt in which Hume himself had left us. The Scottish school, which originated in the laudable attempt to refute that doubt, and to reconcile philosophy and common sense, has then undeniably failed.

Perhaps French Eclecticism, founded by M. Victor Cousin, one of the ablest philosophers and best writers of our age, has succeeded better. M. Cousin is as learned, as erudite, as Sir William Hamilton, and far surpasses him in brilliancy of genius, and in simplicity, clearness, beauty, vivacity, grace, and elegance of style. He commenced his philosophical career under the auspices of M. Royer-Colard, as a disciple of Reid and Stewart, whom he soon abandoned for Immanuel Kant, and subsequently for Schelling and Hegel. His pretension is by a broad and scientific eclecticism to mould all systems of philosophy, in so far as affirmative, into one harmonious system, which reconciles all differences, and affords a complete and solid explanation of human science. He recognizes a rational or non-empirical element in all the facts of experience, and makes the judgment of causality a revelation or inspiration of the spontaneous or impersonal reason, which he assumes to be objective, and of which this judgment is one of the constituent elements. But though he calls the spontaneous or impersonal reason objective, he identifies it, save as to its mode of operation, with reason as our faculty of intelligence. Now if reason be our faculty of intelligence, the only faculty, as he maintains, by which we know, whatever the sphere or degree of our knowledge, it is our self; for though faculties may be distinguished *in* the soul, they cannot be distinguished *from* it, and therefore cannot be objective, but are really subjective. In this case, M. Cousin coincides with Kant and the Scottish school. If, however, he insists that it is objective, then we have no faculty of intelligence, are irrational and unintelligent by nature, as much so as a plant or a mineral. How then are we capable of receiving the revelations or inspirations of reason? We have no intellect to correspond to the intelligible, and then cannot know anything at all.

M. Cousin seems to be aware of some difficulty of this sort, and, while representing reason as our faculty of intelligence, identifies it in its spontaneous activity with the reason, λόγος, or Word of God. But this only involves him

in a more serious difficulty. Reason is one in all its modes, and M. Cousin's distinction between the spontaneous, or, as he says, *impersonal* reason, and the reflective or personal reason, is only a distinction between indeliberative and deliberative activity, — the distinction which our theologians make between the *voluntarium* and the *liberum*, or between *actus hominis* and *actus humanus*. The actor, the *vis activa*, is the same in both, and differs only as to the mode of its operation. As the Word or Reason of God is God in the Unity of the Divine Being, the identification of reason in its indeliberative operations with the Divine Reason is to identify the human and Divine natures, and to deny all but a modal distinction between God and man, which is Pantheism or Egoism, either of which necessarily excludes the judgment of causality, and therefore all science founded on it.

M. Cousin, moreover, resolves being into cause, and tells us that it is only in that it causes. But what is not cannot cause, and if being is only in causing, then it cannot be at all, for it cannot cause unless it is. Therefore neither cause nor being can be asserted, and we have pure nihilism. If being is only in that it is a cause, and is cause only in that it causes, cause and effect must reciprocally depend each on the other, and each is merely the other's complement. M. Cousin sees this, and hence he places cause and effect in the same category. If in the same category, they are indistinguishable save as the two poles of one and the same existence, and then neither is conceivable as the product of the other, — the cause is as dependent on the effect as the effect on the cause. In this case the relation of cause and effect is resolved back into the relation of being and phenomenon, which, as we have seen, excludes the judgment of causality. If being is only in that it causes, the causative act is necessary. This necessity must be either extrinsic or intrinsic; extrinsic in the case of the first cause it cannot be; then intrinsic. Then the effect can be only the evolution or emanation of the cause, and save as a mode indistinguishable from it, which makes the effect a mere phenomenon, a form or mode of the cause, and we are back in Pantheism; for the essence of Pantheism is in denying all substantive existence distinct from God, and asserting only being and its phenomena.

M. Cousin then affords us no refutation of Hume's

scepticism. He has done much to break down the gross sensism and materialism of Locke and Condillac, and has latterly manifested, not in his philosophy, but in his personal dispositions, tendencies which we cannot deny ourselves the honor of applauding; but presenting the ideal element of thought as the constituent element of reason, not as an object apprehended by our noetic or intellectual faculty, immediately presenting itself in intuition, he has no more than Kant, than Reid, than Sir William Hamilton, than Hume himself, been able to present a solid basis for science, for he has not been able to present the first principles of science as objectively evident, and a science based on principles not objectively evident is simply no science at all, and however irresistible it may be, it is only a subjective belief.

Rosmini, a really eminent as well as a truly pious man, one of the greatest recent glories of Italy, has made some earnest and laudable efforts to redeem philosophy from the charge of scepticism; but at bottom his system seems to us to coincide with those we have just dismissed. Like Sir William Hamilton, like Kant, like Cousin, the illustrious Italian recognizes, in words at least, a non-empirical element in our cognitions, which he calls the idea of being or existence, and which the mind applies to every fact or object of sensible experience. This idea is not, according to him, the intuition of real and necessary being, or of actual or concrete existence, but of being in general, existence indeterminate and abstract. Then it is not, as he supposes, primitive, for we must conceive the concrete before we can conceive the abstract, since the abstract without the concrete is a pure nullity. The abstract is a mental conception formed by the mind, operating upon the concrete intuitively apprehended. We cannot think or affirm existence without thinking or affirming the existent. Sir William Hamilton says we cannot think without thinking the attribute of existence, as if existence, or being, which is the term he should have used, is an attribute. He who says *being*, says being is. Being is ultimate, and though it may have attributes, it is not and cannot itself be an attribute. We may distinguish between real and necessary being and contingent or created existences, but not in being itself between *essentia*, or *substantia*, and *esse*, or *existere*, for being which exists not, is not being. The primitive conception

of God is that of being; hence he names himself, I AM THAT AM, Ego Sum Qui Sum. Being in general, *ens in genere*, then, is inconceivable, and is not only an abstraction, but even an impossible abstraction. We have then, and can have, no idea of being which is not either real and necessary being, — *ens necessarium et reale*, the *ens simpliciter* of the Schoolmen, that is, God, — or contingent existence, that is, creature, *ens secundum quid*.

But passing over this, Rosmini cannot, from the idea of being or the judgment, Being is, arrive at the judgment, Being is cause or creator. The first principles of philosophy, from which our whole intellectual life flows, are, according to Rosmini, the idea of being, and the sensible object. These are the primitive *data*. How from these two, being and a sensible object, obtain the judgment of causality, or conclude the existence of a causal *nexus* between them, — that being creates or places the sensible object? He must connect them in some way, or else deny the existence of the sensible object, and he can connect them only as being and phenomenon, which excludes the judgment of causality, and renders it impossible for us to refute the doctrine of the identity of substance and phenomenon of God and the universe, of God and man, — which we have seen neither Cousin nor Sir William Hamilton escapes, — or the nihilism of Hegel.

Schelling maintains the doctrine of the identity of subject and object, the contingent and necessary, the relative and absolute, and therefore cannot help us, though he asserts the absolute, the unconditioned. Hegel starts with the conception of pure being, *das reine Seyn*, which in his view is identical with not-being, that is, with indeterminate, unreal, or mere possible being. But the possible cannot be prior to the real, for it is the power or ability of the real to place the contingent, and is intrinsic in the real and necessary. Hence Hegel, placing the possible before the real, begins and ends in nullity. The common error of the pseudo-ontologists is, that they start from the object, not as real being, objectively existing, and simply presented in intuition, but as a conception, and thus give us no real ontology, but a pure ideology. The being they assert is no real being. But even if it were, they could not assert the judgment of causality, because it is not contained in the judgment, Being is. Hence they fall inevitably into Pantheism.

The school which, among us, professes to follow St. Thomas, and which is the more prevalent as well as the sounder school we have, denies that it is a psychological school, and in its origin it certainly was not. It professes to proceed from *notum*, or something known, to the unknown, by the way of demonstration. But this is no more nor less than a Cartesian would say. It merely defines a method, not a philosophy; and though it proves that the school is faithful to the method, it by no means proves that it is faithful to the philosophy of St. Thomas. What is this *notum*? What is the *principium* of the school? The question of principles is prior to the question of method, and far otherwise important. Your method may be good, but if your principles are bad, you can never arrive at the truth but by an inconsequence, by a violation of good logic. The *principium* of this school is a sensible *datum*, that is, a contingent existence taken from sensible experience; from this it professes to proceed demonstratively, by the principle of contradiction, to the assertion of the necessary; that is, from the *ens contingens* sensibly apprehended to demonstrate the *ens necessarium et reale*, which is not apprehensible at all.

But Hume has settled it for ever that the judgment of causality cannot be obtained from sensible experience, either intuitively or demonstratively; and without the judgment of causality we can never conclude real and necessary being from contingent existence, nor contingent existence from real and necessary being. If the professors of this school will examine it, they will find that this judgment is the very principle of their demonstration, for the principle of contradiction, without it, gives only the possible, not the real. They have, therefore, the judgment of causality prior to their demonstration, and do but apply it in their demonstrative process. How did they come by it? As they do not concede it to be an intuition, they can give only ~~some~~ one of the answers we have already found to be insufficient.

There has recently sprung up, principally in France, another school, called the Traditional School; but what are their precise doctrines is a matter of dispute between them and their opponents. But if they mean that tradition is necessary only in regard to the superintelligible, or that it is necessary only as an assistant in the order of the intelli-

gible, they are so far unquestionably right; but if they mean that the first principles of science are known only as learned from a teacher, they apply in all its rigor to the natural order, in which St. Anselm did not apply it, the maxim, *Crede ut intelligas*, and thus found science on faith. Judging from M. Bonetty's criticisms on Gioberti, we should say this is their doctrine, and this is only a form of Jansenism. But judging from some of M. Bonetty's disclaimers, we might be inclined to think it is not. He says expressly, that he recognizes reason as a faculty of the soul, a natural power of knowing truth; but he denies that it is a power to invent—*discover*—truth. We suppose he means the first and necessary truths of morals and theology. But this is not decisive, for he leaves it in doubt whether he means morals and theology in the superintelligible order only, or in the intelligible order. If the former, all Christians agree with him, and he utters only a truism; if he means the latter, then he either means simply that, though man is able to know these first principles or necessary truths, the foundation of what is called natural theology and ethics, when supernaturally revealed, he could never have discovered them by his own unaided efforts; or he means to deny that we can either discover or know them by our natural reason. If the former of these sub-distinctions, he coincides with Gioberti, and we see not why he should combat him; if the latter, which we suspect to be the case, when he is of his own opinion, he denies all science of principles or necessary truths, and really founds science on faith; which St. Anselm certainly never did, for St. Anselm professes to demonstrate the existence of God from the idea of the most perfect being, which the human mind has naturally. If this be the doctrine of the school, as their opponents allege, the Traditionalists are, in regard to human reason, like Pascal, Lamennais, Bayle, Kant, and Hume, really sceptics.

Now none of these philosophers and schools are practically sceptical, and we call them so only in regard to the tendency or result of their speculative systems. There is a common sense which directs, to a certain extent, all men in their practical judgments, and prevents them from running as wild in practice as in speculation. Amongst Catholics, speculation is held in check by theology, and philosophers are obliged to assert, whether legitimately or

not, a sound ontology; but for the most part, they borrow it from Catholic theology, instead of obtaining it from their philosophical speculation. "What is taught in our schools under the head of philosophy," said an eminent Catholic bishop to us one day, "is some fragments of Catholic theology, badly proved." But where there are no theological restraints, philosophy almost invariably runs into Pantheism, scepticism, and nihilism. Certainly none of the great philosophical schools of our day, none of the distinguished philosophers whom it is counted lawful to cite, have been able to solve Hume's problem in favor of science.

Yet let us not for this despair of human reason or of human philosophy. All the great men we have cited were much nearer the truth than at first sight would seem. They have all failed, and failed because misled by Des Cartes, who converted philosophy from a science of principles into a science of method,—from the science of human and divine things in the natural and intelligible order, into what Fichte calls very happily *Wissenschaftlehre*, or science of science, that is, the science of knowing. They have been thus led to the investigation of conceptions instead of things, the object thought in the respect that it is the correlative of subject, instead of contemplating it in the respect that it is thing, and exists independent of the thinking subject. Modern philosophy, at least the philosophy in vogue, is nothing but a methodology, and very wretched at that. The investigation of principles should always precede the investigation of method, for it is the principles that determine the method, not the method that determines the principles.

Principles no doubt must be taken from thought, but from thought as objective, not as a fact of consciousness. Sir William Hamilton has well corrected the error of Reid, who made consciousness a special faculty distinguishable from our general cognitive faculty; but he has himself mistaken the true character of the fact of consciousness: He says consciousness is dual, and in thought we are alike conscious of both subject and object. This is not exact. Pierre Leroux says, more correctly, that consciousness is simply the recognition of ourselves in the act of thought as the subject thinking. We see, perceive, or apprehend the object, and are conscious that it is we who see, perceive, or apprehend it. The fact of conscious-

ness is simply this recognition of self as subject. This distinction is important; for, if we include under the fact of consciousness the thing thought as well as the subject thinking, we can include it only in correlation with ourselves, simply as the objective terminus of thought, and have still the question to settle whether it be placed by the subject, or whether it exist as thing independent of subject. It is this confusion of the object with the fact of consciousness that has led Sir William Hamilton to deny that the unconditioned can be thought, and Professor Ferrier to represent the *scibile*, or the knowable, as the synthesis of subject and object, which supposes nothing to exist save as known, and thus confounds existence and knowledge, thought and being, conceptions and things.

The correction of this fatal error lies in taking our principles, not from the object as *perceptum*, but as *res*, — not as object perceived, but as thing existing *a parte rei*, and which is object because it is thing, and not thing because it is object. Etymologically, to *think* is to *thing*, for the two words are from the same Anglo-Saxon root; but this does not mean that the thought gives to the object its reality, but a thing or reality to itself; that is, presents a thing or reality to the apprehension of the subject, in the sense in which the word *realize* is sometimes used even by Sir William Hamilton, as when he says, *realize is thought*, that is, bring distinctly before the mind the thing or reality with which the thought is conversant. Strictly speaking, to think is to judge, that is, to judge or affirm the *perceptum* is *res* or thing. It declares the fact, but does not create it. Let this be borne in mind, that to think things conditions the object as object thought, but not as thing existing in the order of reality. This done, we must take our *principium*, not from the object as object, but as thing or reality. It is the reality we must contemplate, not the reality as object, or conditioned by our act of thinking, which is not the thing itself, but our conception. In this way our *principium* will be the *principium* of things, which must be the *principium* of all real science, of all science that is not subjective and illusory.

Now our solution of the problem we have been considering has already been foreshadowed. The judgment of causality is a primitive judgment or first principle, and is embraced in the *principium* of all human science as in the

principium of things. All philosophers, not excepting even Hume, if he understood himself, do really admit a non-empirical element in all our cognitions, ideal and apodictic. This element Reid calls the principles of common sense; Kant calls it a form or category of the reason or understanding; Cousin, a revelation, inspiration, sometimes the constituent element, of the spontaneous reason; Rosmini, the idea of being or existence in general, which precedes and accompanies all our empirical judgments; Sir William Hamilton seems to call it a primitive and necessary belief, arising from the impotence of our reason to conceive the unconditioned; but however they call it, they all in some form or other assert it, or at least concede it. All agree, with the exception of the so-called Thomists, that it is indemonstrable, for it is the principle or basis of all demonstration. Now we think philosophers here lose themselves in a fog, and make a great mystery of what is in reality very plain and simple. This ideal element is the *principium* of things, and simply affirms itself to us intuitively. Say with Rosmini that the idea of being precedes and accompanies every one of our judgments, only that it is the idea or apprehension of real and necessary being, you have then the intuitive judgment, Real and necessary being is. Add the judgment of causality, that is, Real and necessary being is cause or creator, that is, as Gioberti expresses it, Real and necessary being creates existences, and you have an ideal formula or judgment which at once is the *principium* of things and of science. Say now that this ideal formula or judgment affirms itself in immediate intuition, and you have our solution of the problem. Real and necessary Being, *Ens simpliciter*, is God, though we do not always advert to the fact, as St. Augustine says, and thus we have the judgment of causality, because God reveals or affirms himself to our noetic faculty, and affirms himself as creating existences or the universe, and we assist, if we may use a Gallicism, at the spectacle of creation. The origin of the judgment is in intuition of the creative act of God, and is therefore, though indemonstrable, except *ex consequentiis*, objectively evident, and therefore knowledge, not merely belief, as Sir William Hamilton pretends. To clear up all this and establish it satisfactorily would require a volume; but it is not necessary to attempt it here, since it has already been done in the

metaphysical articles inserted in our Review during the last five years. It is enough for the present to say that this judgment, formed by intuition of the reality, enters as an integral element into every one of our empirical judgments, and forms the necessary, apodictic, and infallible element of those judgments, from which there is and need be no appeal. Our judgment of causality in the order of second causes copies or imitates our judgment in the order of the first cause, and, like that judgment, has one term necessary, the other contingent. When we see an event happen, we judge at once that it has a cause; for we know, as it happens, that it is in the order of contingents, and that contingents cannot come into existence uncaused, since they are not God, and nothing not God can exist but by his causative or creative act. So far, then, as the judgment affirms that the event has had a cause, it repeats the primitive judgment, and is infallible; but so far as it assigns this or that particular cause for this or that particular event, it depends on experience, and may or may not be just. Here the judgment is not apodictic, and has only probability, or what is called moral certainty.

Our solution, it will be seen, differs in only one respect from that of the so-called Thomist school, a school which has not wholly broken with the past, and which retains many traditions of the ancients, the greater Fathers, and more distinguished scholastics. This difference is, that we begin intellectual life with the intuition of the principle of things, and it begins it with a sensible fact, and ascends, by way of demonstration, to that principle. But the principle once obtained, we proceed alike, and come to the same conclusions. In this we think the members of this school mistake the real sense of St. Thomas, and suffer themselves unconsciously to be affected by the conceptualism of Des Cartes. The state of the question has been changed since the time of St. Thomas, and involves now, as it did not then, a discussion of the principles of demonstration itself. Certainly St. Thomas teaches that God can be known, though not *per se*; but this does not necessarily imply that we cannot have intuition of real and necessary being, which is God, or of real and necessary being creating existences, which is at once the principle of things and the principle of science. No doubt this judgment, though intuitive, becomes clear and distinct to reflective

intellect only by a process of reasoning. What St. Thomas really does, is to clear up and render this judgment distinct by what he calls demonstration. The question as to the origin of the judgment of causality, the real basis of all demonstration, was not debated in his time. He finds the mind in possession of it, and uses it without further question. But if he had been asked its origin, it is not to be believed that he would have said we obtain it from demonstration. Then again, though he appears to start from the sensible element, his real process is not to infer the ideal or noetic element from it, but to disengage it, and to show that it is the Divine judgment. To this process well understood there is nothing to object, and it is the very process we are ourselves obliged to follow in order to show that our *principium* is really the principle of things, that is to say, is really God by his act creating the universe. The Thomist seems to us to confound the method it is necessary to follow in *teaching* with the method the mind follows in its own intellectual life. Whoever teaches philosophy must follow his method, but it will not do to confound it with the method of that which the teacher has to explain and systematize.

ART. III. — *The Know-Nothing Platform.*

THE article in our last Review, on *A Know-Nothing Legislature*, was written and in type before the meeting of the delegates of the Know-Nothing party in their National Council in Philadelphia, and consequently before we were aware of the apparent split in the secret order on the question of slavery. Had we foreseen that the order would agree to play the game of being pro-slavery at the South and anti-slavery at the North, we should have expressed ourselves less decidedly as to its failure as a political party in the country. We look upon the protest and apparent separation of the Northern Know-Nothings as a mere *ruse*, designed solely to secure sectional votes. We do not believe that there is any real division in the order, or that there has been any real modification of its principles, and

perhaps it has never been more formidable than at the present moment.

Massachusetts had rendered herself so odious to the South by her Know-Nothing legislation, especially on the slavery question, that it was idle for the party to go into the canvass in any Southern or Southwestern State without having ostensibly disowned all fellowship with her. The Council felt it necessary, to enable the party to assume a national character in some States and a sectional character in others. Hence we regard the protest and withdrawal of the Northern members as mutually concerted, and done to enable the order to have some chance of securing the votes of the Southern and National Whigs. But there is, in our opinion, no real breach between the two sections of the organization. The Northern Anti-Nebraska Know-Nothings and the Southern and Western Nebraska Know-Nothings stand, we have no doubt, equally well in the order; and if the order puts up a national ticket, both will be found voting in loving harmony for the same candidates, whether those candidates are Nebraska or Anti-Nebraska. We therefore believe our Massachusetts Know-Nothings are in as good standing in the order as any others. Of course, this is only an opinion; but we think the public will by no means find it an idle opinion.

The Know-Nothing party originated we know not when, where, or by whom, but we make little doubt that its organization has been favored and supported principally by that section of the Whig party, who, after their terrible defeat in the election of General Pierce, despaired of ever attaining again to power under their own name and organization. The Democratic party was so strong at the moment of the election, that its division or the disaffection of a large portion of its members, when the distribution of offices came, might be reasonably expected. The master-stroke of policy, then, would be to seize upon an organization that would secure the support of the main body of the defeated Whigs and Free-Soilers, and attract the co-operation of disaffected Democrats. Out of these three elements it would not be unreasonable to hope for the forming of a party strong enough to elect the next President. Such was the calculation. Fortune seemed to favor the conspirators. The disaffection in the Democratic

ranks was even greater in several leading States than could have reasonably been counted on, and the passage of the Nebraska Bill and the repeal of that absurdity called "the Missouri Compromise," came most opportunely to infuse new life and energy into the Free-Soil party, and to draw into a sympathy with them a large number of Northern Whigs who had hitherto stood up manfully in support of the Constitution and the Union. So great was the real or affected wrath of our Boston Whigs, of those even who had sustained Mr. Webster in his national policy, and had some distant hopes of making Mr. Everett the Whig candidate for the Presidency in 1856, that they were at first indisposed to execute the Fugitive Slave Law in the case of Anthony Burns. For ourselves, though not opposed to the Nebraska Bill, and having always disapproved the Missouri Compromise, as unconstitutional and absurd, we were provoked at the introduction of the bill, because it seemed to us inopportune and uncalled for. Once introduced, of course, we must support it; but we believed it bad policy on the part of the friends of the administration to introduce it, and we think so still.

With the views of a large number of individual Whigs we have of late years had many sympathies; but we have never had any sympathy with the Whigs in their party action. They have since assuming the name of *Whig*, in 1832, seldom had any firm and fixed principles by which they seemed prepared to stand or to fall. They have, especially since 1838, as a party, seemed too fond of making up false issues, and availing themselves of every temporary and local excitement, and every temporary and local fanaticism, that promised to give them a temporary and local accession of numbers. The reason of this is not in their natural sympathy with these excitements and fanaticisms, but in the fact of their weakness as a national party. There is no use in denying or seeking to disguise the fact, that the Democratic party represents the national sentiment, and is, whenever that sentiment can fully express itself, the dominant party of the Union. It can never be defeated, save in certain localities, when the issue is fairly made up, and the people come to a direct vote between it and its opponents. It is the only party, when in place, strong enough to propose and carry its measures. Twice since 1840 the Whigs have been in place, and in neither

case have they been able to carry out their avowed policy ; but in both they have been obliged to abandon their distinctive measures, and to adopt a policy, in the main, acceptable to their Democratic opponents. Hence the accession of the Whigs on a distinctive policy of their own, or by a firm and manly reliance on their own strength, is, whether desirable or not, out of the question, and they are obliged to remain in opposition, or resort to stratagem, to avail themselves of collateral issues and temporary expedients.

Now this Know-Nothing order, whether it was conceived and brought forth by Whigs as such or not, — and for our part we do not believe that it was, — seemed admirably adapted to their purpose ; and when its managers proposed it to the Whig members of the last Congress, all but two or three of them, if our information be correct, agreed to adopt it. It professed to be wholly independent of all existing party organizations, and therefore it appealed directly to the members of those party organizations which it was felt were effete, or too feeble to attain to power in their own name, and to a considerable number of persons who were dissatisfied with all the old parties, and desirous of seeing a new party arise from their ashes. The number of these last was much larger and more important, two or three years ago, than is commonly supposed. The Whigs had no well-settled policy, and they had proved themselves unable to administer the government to the satisfaction of the country. The Free-Soilers were fanatics, and hostile to the Union, and the Democrats were tainted with fillibusterism, and tending to ultraism under the seductive name of progressive democracy with fearful rapidity, and seemed on the point of abandoning for ever the American for the European democracy, that is, American Constitutionalism for French Jacobinism. We ourselves should have been most happy to have seen a new party springing up, that should have been neither Whig nor Democratic, but which should combine the conservative elements of both parties. Such a party seemed to us at one moment not wholly impossible, and if it could have been formed on truly American principles, it would, though not immediately, but in time, have attained to power ; and even before doing so, it would have exerted a wholesome restraining influence upon the action

of whatever party might be in place. To persons desirous of a truly conservative party, that is, conservative in a good, not a bad sense, the Know-Nothings pretended to be such a party, although we never for a moment believed them. Being a secret order, and their real principles, if they had any, being unknown, except to the managers, they could profess anything according to the predilections of the persons they addressed, provided those persons were non-Catholics. With men of a conservative tendency, they were conservative ; with radicals, they were radicals ; with Fillibusters, they were Fillibusters ; with Free-Soilers, they were antislavery ; with the friends and supporters of the compromises of the Constitution, they were organized for the purpose of putting down the Free-Soilers, and protecting the Union.

But they must, in order to be able to draw largely from the Democratic ranks, appeal to other sentiments. They therefore professed strong American and anti-foreign sympathies, which would attract what remained of the old " Native American " party, and also strong Protestant, anti-Catholic sentiments, which would enlist the Evangelical and No-Popery party of the country. It was from their opposition to foreign residents and naturalized citizens and their strong appeals to Native American prejudices, and their opposition to the Catholic Church and strong appeals to Protestant fanaticism, that they hoped to enlist under their banner a sufficient number of the Democratic party to secure them, with the despairing Whigs, the Free-Soilers, and the no-party men, a majority of voters in a majority of the States and in the Union. The Native American and anti-foreign appeals were intended principally for the South, and the anti-Catholic and Protestant appeals principally for the North. These appeals, with the hope of office held out to a large class of men who under any other organization knew they had and could have no chance of attaining to place, it was thought, not wholly without reason, would suffice to give them the political power of the country.

Such are the Know-Nothings and their hopes regarded as a political party. While we are writing, important elections are taking place in several States at the South and Southwest, the result of which has not reached us, but which will most likely prove to be of a mixed character.

The success of the party as a political party depends on its ability to draw off from the Democratic party voters enough, when added to the main body of the old Whig party, with the Free-Soilers, Anti-Nebraska men, and office-seekers, to constitute a majority in a Presidential election. Whether they can do this or not, is as yet undecided. If the old Democratic party rally to their old principles, and vote according to their old party associations, they will be able, with the recruits they will obtain from those honorable and high-minded Whigs who, though disliking the Democratic party, will vote for it in preference to the Know-Nothing party, and among whom we may reckon with certainty the large body of Catholics, who have generally supported the Whig party, they will be defeated in the coming Presidential election, and the country will be saved from the indelible disgrace so cunningly prepared for it. The duty of every high-minded and patriotic American citizen would, therefore, seem to be plain. Whatever may have been our dislike to the Democratic party, or to the present administration, we must rally, it seems to us, to its support, and do all in our power in the State and Federal elections to prevent its defeat. There is really no room for hesitation. The Democratic party to-day represents the honor and good faith of the nation, and we are called upon by every consideration which can weigh with freemen and patriots to give it our firmest support, whatever may have been its errors and short-comings.

But it is not precisely under its aspect as a political party that we wish principally to consider this Know-Nothing organization. We wish rather to consider it in its relation to civil and religious liberty. We have before us, in *The Boston Daily Advertiser* of August 8th, the platform adopted on the previous day by the Know-Nothing State Council at Springfield in this State. We do not propose to examine this platform in all its parts. We propose to examine only a part of the sixth article, which we copy entire.

“ 6. The right to worship God according to the dictates of one’s conscience, to be preserved inviolate. Resistance to any politico-ecclesiastical hierarchy, which, through its agents, be they pope, bishops, or priests, who attempt to invade this right, or acquire political power. Hence, we rebuke all attempts to appropriate the public funds to the establishment of sectarian schools, all attempts

to exclude the Bible as a text-book therefrom, and all attempts to wrest from the laity and give to the priesthood the control of church property. We also rebuke in indignant terms such sentiments as these, put forth by the representatives of the Papal power: — that ‘Protestantism has no rights in the presence of Catholicism’; that ‘religious liberty is only to be endured until the opposite can be established with safety to the Catholic world’; and that ‘the Catholics of America are bound to abide by the interpretation put upon the Constitution of the United States by the Pope of Rome.’”

It is one of the most painful things, in our controversy with anti-Catholics, to be obliged always to complain of their perversions and misrepresentations of Catholic writers. We say it, and in sorrow, not in anger, that we have never, since we became a Catholic, found the least approach to loyalty and good faith in a No-Popery opponent. In this short article three sentences are cited, as if from Catholic writers, two of which are sheer forgeries, and the other a perversion. No Catholic writer has ever written that “religious liberty is only to be endured till the opposite can be established with safety to the Catholic world,” or that “the Catholics of America are bound to abide by the interpretation put upon the Constitution of the United States by the Pope of Rome.” These are pure inventions, gross fabrications. Undoubtedly, Catholics oppose what passes with many people for religious liberty, that is, the liberty of infidelity to enslave religion, or to make the civil magistrate the director of conscience; but no Catholic has ever opposed, in any form or shape, in any age or country, the liberty of religion, or true religious liberty. We have ourselves uniformly opposed, both before and since our conversion to Catholicity, the liberty of infidels, Evangelicals, and politicians, to enslave religion and trample on the rights of conscience, which is accountable to God alone; but we have as uniformly, and with all the energy of our soul, in speaking and in writing, defended *religious* liberty full and entire. So has our excellent young friend, a sincere and earnest-minded Catholic, Robert A. Bakewell, late editor of *The Shepherd of the Valley*, who, we regret, has received harsh measure at the hands not only of Protestants, but even of some of his Catholic contemporaries. All we ask for our Church, we have said over and over again, is “an open field and fair play.” We demand

for her as a right, which the state and all individuals are bound to respect, full liberty to profess and practise her faith and discipline; and what we claim for her in face of the civil authority, or of secular society, we have uniformly expressed our readiness to concede to the sects, nay, if it were necessary, to defend for them, for we hold the absolute incompetency of the state in spirituals.

The sentence, that "the Catholics of America are bound to abide by the interpretation put upon the Constitution of the United States by the Pope of Rome," we have seen, in some secular prints, ascribed to the editor of this periodical; but its very style should have saved him from such an indignity. We have never, in speaking or in writing, in public or in private, expressed any such doctrine, for we have never claimed for the Pope any power at all to interpret the Constitution of the United States, or any other civil constitution, except that of the Papal States themselves. What we have said is, that Catholics are bound in conscience to obey the civil government in all things not repugnant to the law of God; and we envy not the man who will maintain, either that he is not bound in conscience to obey the civil authority at all, or that he is bound to obey it when it commands what the law of God forbids. Assuming that we are thus bound, we are bound to obey every constitutional enactment, unless the Constitution itself authorizes things repugnant to the law of God. Thus we have reasoned against those who, on the ground of conscience, or the Higher Law, as they call it, object to the Fugitive Slave Law. That law is constitutional, and the Constitution authorizes nothing repugnant to the Divine law, and therefore you cannot plead conscience or the Higher Law against it. Now here are two assumptions, one as to the constitutionality of the law, and the other as to the repugnance or non-repugnance of the Constitution to the law of God. These are two questions, neither of which can the private citizen decide for himself. The former, the constitutionality of the law, is a question for the Supreme Court, the proper civil tribunal, and does not for Catholics, any more than for non-Catholics, come within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical authority, for it is a purely civil question. But the latter, whether the Constitution is or is not repugnant to the law of God, is a spiritual question, and touches conscience. We can

conceive that a civil constitution may be incompatible with the Divine law. Such was the constitution of Rome under the empire, which made the emperor a god, supreme pontiff, and supreme civil ruler, and gave him the civil right to command incense to be offered to his statue, to the statue of Jupiter, or any of the heathen gods. Here was a civil constitution repugnant to the law of God, for that law forbids idolatry. So would be a civil constitution that should command us to embrace Mormonism; and so is the civil constitution in every Mahometan state, and in nearly every Heathen state. The French people, led away by Jansenists and infidels, abolished Christianity, forbade the exercise of the Catholic religion, and adopted a constitution forbidden by the Divine law. It is clear, then, that a civil constitution may be repugnant to the law of God. But who is to decide whether it be so or not? Not the private citizen for himself, for that would be anarchy; not the judiciary, for that holds under the constitution, and cannot go behind it; not the people, for it is precisely their act that may be in question. It is evident on the least reflection, that it must be decided for each citizen by that authority, whatever it be, which for him is the supreme judge in questions of conscience. This in the case of Catholics is, as everybody knows, the Church, or the Pope as head of the Church. The doctrine we maintain is, that the supreme court interprets the constitution, and decides whether a given enactment be or be not constitutional, and from its interpretation and decision there lies no appeal; and that *for Catholics* the Church or the Pope is the proper judge of the spiritual question, whether the constitution itself is or is not repugnant to the law of God, does or does not ordain anything contrary to conscience, or what the law of God forbids. Now, what we claim here for the Pope is something very different from the power to decide on the constitutionality of civil enactments. However repugnant to American politicians may be the power we do claim for the Pope, they need feel no alarm; for the Pope, in permitting Catholics to take the oath to support and defend the Constitution, has already decided that it ordains nothing contrary to the Divine law. That question for Catholics is settled for ever, and no Catholic can ever plead conscience for not obeying any law passed in accordance

with the Constitution. We are bound in conscience to obey every law authorized by the Constitution of the Union, and therefore it is that we cannot join with Abolitionists and Free-Soilers, as little favorable as we are to slavery. We can advocate the emancipation of the slaves, but their compulsory emancipation only on condition of full indemnification of their owners.

We are not quite so simple as to suppose that even this explanation will satisfy No-Popery politicians, for they hate the Papacy with a perfect hatred, and are as much opposed to the Papal authority in spirituals as in temporals. But our only reply to them is, that the supreme authority of the Pope under God, in all questions which touch conscience, is a part of the Catholic religion, of the Catholic faith itself; and you cannot object to the power we claim for the Pope without objecting to Catholicity that it is Catholicity, not Protestantism. You may object to us on theological grounds, if you choose, but not on political grounds, for the political law is and must be subordinate to the religious law; and we have, as American citizens, the right to profess and practise our religion without restraint. We are willing to do all we can in conscience to pacify our enemies, and would never let slip an opportunity to throw a sop to Cerberus, but we cannot be so complaisant as to sacrifice principle itself. We shall never, to gain friendship for ourselves or our co-religionists, do the foul dishonor to religion of subordinating her to politics. If your civil *régime* contradicts religion, correct it, and not ask us to correct religion; if we are to enjoy in this blessed land religious liberty, we must enjoy the right of appealing to the Supreme Pontiff in every matter which touches our consciences as Catholics. You can deny us this right, if you choose, and burn or hang us, if we presume to exercise it; but you can do so only by violating that religious liberty you say in this very platform is "to be preserved inviolate."

"Protestantism has no rights in presence of Catholicity." This sentence is, we believe, from our Review, and was written by its editor. We do not deny it, and are prepared to stand by it. But we have never said, "*Protestants* have no rights in presence of *Catholics*." Between the two assertions there is a distance. We speak as a Catholic, and as a Catholic we of course hold Catholicity

to be the true and the only true religion. We do not concede that Protestantism is or possibly can be true. In the mind of a Catholic there is no room for doubt, and on this point there is nothing left to be settled. Catholicity is true, and Protestantism, as its contradictory, is and cannot but be false. We do not admit the possibility of our being wrong in this, or of Protestants being right. We are as certain that we are right as we are that we exist, or that it is impossible for God to lie; and as certain as we are that we are right, so certain we are that Protestantism is a huge error, a Satanic delusion. Now, as error can never have any rights in presence of truth, Protestantism can have none in presence of Catholicity. This is what we do and must say as a Catholic, for we are not seeking for the true religion. We have found it. You may prove us wrong if you can. But this much you must concede, that, if Catholicity be true, in its presence Protestantism has and can have no rights, unless you are prepared to say that error has rights in presence of truth.

But Protestants are men as well as Catholics, and they have, in the presence of Catholics, who are also men, the common rights, that is to say, the natural rights of all men. They are citizens, and in their capacity of citizens they and Catholics stand on a footing of perfect equality. Before the state, for the state is incompetent in spirituals, Catholics and Protestants are equal, and have the same rights. This doctrine we have never denied, but always maintained. We claim the free exercise of our religion in this country, on the ground of our equal rights as American citizens; whether our religion be true or false is no concern of yours as politicians or statesmen. You are free to controvert it on theological grounds, but not on political grounds. The American doctrine is that of the equal rights before the state of all American citizens, and consequently, if one class of citizens have the right to the free and full enjoyment of their religion, every other class have an equal right to the free and full enjoyment of theirs. The free and full enjoyment, the free and unrestricted profession and practice of our religion in its unity and integrity, whether pleasing or offensive to Protestants, is included in our equal rights as American citizens; and you cannot in any respect restrict our religion, without doing violence to the American doctrine of equal rights. But

that same doctrine gives to the adherents of the sects, so long as they do not encroach on the equal rights of others, or disturb under pretence of liberty of conscience the public peace, the same rights before the law. But under our system they possess these rights not as Protestants, but as citizens, any more than we possess ours as Catholics; for neither Catholicity nor Protestantism is known to our laws; and the protection the professors of either can claim from the government is simply their protection in their equal rights as citizens.

We can hardly suppose that the Know-Nothings are competent to understand these distinctions; and if they were, they have given us no reason to suppose that they have the good faith and simple honesty to regard them. The way in which they fabricate false charges against the Church, and pervert the most innocent expressions of her writers from their plainest and most obvious sense, in the connection in which they are found, renders it impossible for us to give them more credit for honesty than discernment. We make these explanations not for them, but for Catholics and for those liberal and honorable Protestants who have the feelings, manners, and tastes of gentlemen, and who, though not without some anti-Catholic prejudices, would scorn to use any but fair and honest means against the spread of Catholicity. These gentlemen must see the falsehoods and calumnies circulated against us; they must see the ungenerous, the undignified, the untruthful, and even Satanic spirit manifested by our opponents towards us, and be led, we should think, to doubt the possibility of there being a good cause against the Church.

But this by the way. We ask our readers to note the admirable consistency of these Know-Nothings. They tell us, "the right to worship God according to the dictates of one's conscience is to be preserved inviolate," and in the same breath declare their intention to deprive Catholics, as far as the law can deprive them, of this very right! Everybody knows that the end and aim of the party, aside from the attainment of power and place, is to restrain the free profession and practice of the Catholic religion. They in our Legislature, last winter, even passed an act which, in their understanding and intention, discriminates between Catholics and Protestants, and ex-

cludes Catholics from every office under the State government. They have enacted an infamous test oath; but, happily, Satan failed them for the moment, and did not assist them to frame the oath so that a Catholic cannot take it, if he sees proper. Their iniquity lied unto itself. They not only aim to deprive us of our civil *status*, and therefore of our religious freedom, but they do it under the false pretence that our Church is "a *politico-ecclesiastical* hierarchy." This is false, and it cannot be doubted that they know it. Our bishops and clergy have, as citizens, the same political rights with other citizens, and the same right to interfere in politics, if they choose, that Protestant ministers have. But they have rarely intermeddled, save when the rights of conscience, the preservation of the Union, and the maintenance of social order, demanded the intervention of every loyal citizen; and even then they have done so simply in their capacity of private citizens, never in their capacity as members of the Catholic hierarchy. But we cannot say as much of Protestant ministers. There was, some time since, a solemn act of the Presbyterian Assembly, or at least of a Presbyterian Synod, reported in the newspapers, officially censuring a measure of the general government, and everybody must remember a solemn admonition, — for petition we cannot call it, — in respect to the Nebraska-Kansas Bill, signed by three thousand New England ministers, in their official character, presented to the Senate of the United States by the Hon. Edward Everett, a Senator at that time from this State. Was there the name of a single Catholic bishop or priest on the list? Have the Catholic hierarchy ever done anything of the sort? You know they have not. There are some twenty or thirty Protestant ministers, it has been said sixty, members of our present General Court, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives is, we believe, a Protestant minister of some sort, though of what sort we pretend not to say. Is there, or has there ever been, a Catholic priest in that august assembly? What simplicity or what rank hypocrisy for the Know-Nothings, then, to declare war against Catholics, on the ground that its clergy are a *politico-ecclesiastical* hierarchy! Men must be far gone in impudence, or laboring under a singular and most Satanic delusion, before they can stand up before the world and accuse an innocent party of the misdeeds of which they themselves alone are guilty.

The platform lays down as one of its planks, "resistance to any politico-ecclesiastical hierarchy which, through its agents, be they pope, bishops, or priests, attempts to invade this right to worship God according to the dictates of one's conscience, or to acquire political power." It were idle to affect to doubt the intended allusion. Every reader knows that the Catholic Church is meant. These Know-Nothings would have it believed that our Church is a political as well as an ecclesiastical body, that is, secular as well as spiritual, which is false; and that she is seeking to invade the rights of conscience, and to acquire political power, which is false and insulting. Can it be wondered at, that, when a party, professing to be in a special sense American, publishes such foul calumnies, foreign-born Catholics should manifest an unwillingness to Americanize and fraternize with the natives? Why, is there a man, woman, or child in the country, that does not know that we have, as Catholics, even more than we can do to defend our own right to worship God according to the dictates of our conscience, against the infuriated attacks of bigots and fanatics? What nonsense to talk of the Church invading the right of conscience, when it is she, as all the world knows, that is struggling in every land against politicians, schismatics, heretics, revolutionists, despots Pagans, Mahometans, and apostates, for that very right. Do the Know-Nothings imagine that the subjection of conscience to the political order is its freedom? Then as to political power, in no age or country has the Catholic hierarchy sought to acquire it. The charge betrays equal ignorance and malignity.

Hear again these sapient Know-Nothings: "Hence we rebuke all attempts to wrest from the laity and give to the priesthood the control of church property." The reasoning here is according to the Know-Nothing, rather than the Aristotelian logic, we suppose. But do not these men perceive that they are striking a fatal blow at the rights of property, one of the bases of society itself? What right has the state to meddle with church property? The right of property is a natural right, a right not derived from society, but held anterior to it, and independent of it. Civil society does not confer it, and its duty is to recognize and protect it. I have the right to dispose of my property in any way I please, not forbidden by the law of God. I may give it

to the Church if I please, and the state has no right to prohibit me from so doing. If I give it to the Church, it is hers, and it is for her, not the legislature, to say whether it shall be controlled by the clergy or the laity. Why, my dear friends, you have not as yet learnt the simplest elements even of civil liberty. You have not advanced beyond the liberty recognized by the Grand Turk, who has recently assumed for the lay society all the property of the mosques. You talk of wresting from the laity the control of church property. When, permit us to ask your wisdoms, was the control of *church* property vested in the laity. In point of fact, the larger portion of the property of the Church in this country has not even been contributed by the laity. The majority of the churches in the United States have been built, in much the greater part, by the clergy with their own means, out of the fruits of their own hard earnings. To whom in natural right, then, would belong the control of this property? How can placing its control in the clergy be regarded as wresting from the laity any right they ever possessed, or to which they have the least claim in justice? The property is vested in the Church, and it is for her to decide who shall control it. She has decided that the control of the temporalities of the Church shall be vested in the bishops and clergy under the Sovereign Pontiff. Whether she has done wisely or unwisely in so doing, is a matter that concerns her alone, and into which you have no right to inquire. It is a law of the Church, and, as such, a part of our religion, — a part of the Catholic religion itself; and you cannot oppose it without violating that liberty of conscience which you say must be maintained "inviolable." It is not for you to discriminate and say so much of the Catholic religion may be professed, and so much shall not. Catholicity, at least so far as the state is concerned, is a whole, and you must either recognize it in its unity and integrity, as the Church herself proposes it, and leave it thus entirely free, or you deny us all religious freedom. Our freedom consists in professing and practising our religion as we understand it, not merely as you choose to understand it for us. We cannot recognize the Papacy in the civil government, still less in a Know-Nothing Council, whether composed of political demagogues or of Protestant parsons.

But why continue this train of remark? Nothing we

can say will have any effect on the demagogues, bigots, and fanatics who are banded together against us. They can invent and circulate a thousand calumnies while we are refuting one. To make them hear reason demands more than a human power, and only the almighty hand of God can arrest them in their madness and folly. They have no candor, no loyalty, no rectitude of heart or of mind, and they will do against us all they are permitted, but happily can do no more than they are permitted. One thing, however, must strike every reflecting mind, namely, that while English and American Evangelicals, combined with the minor sects struggling into notice, and anxious to gain the recognition of their more orthodox brethren, are constantly prating of religious liberty, they are in both Great Britain and the United States conspiring to deprive Catholics of all their civil and religious rights. Nothing is more remarkable than the facility of Evangelicals at self-deception. We are inclined to believe that they are really so deluded as to imagine that they are the advocates of religious liberty, while they are warring against it with all their might, as the Long Parliament in fighting against the king professed to do so under the king's commission. But this much is certain, that the active and living portion of English and American Protestants, those, we mean, represented by Exeter Hall and Nassau Street, whatever their delusions or their pretences, have no conception and no love of religious, or even of civil liberty.

Protestantism has always been inimical to both religious and civil liberty, as we have on many occasions shown beyond the possibility of reply. Especially is this true of English and American Protestantism, confining the word, as we now do, to the Calvinistic and Methodistical sects. The eloquent and learned author of the History of the United States never made a greater mistake than when he made John Calvin the founder of civil liberty. Calvin was, no doubt, a man of extraordinary natural abilities; and, entering Geneva, whose citizens had recently rebelled against their prince, and by the aid of the Bernese had expelled him from their city, he no doubt favored a sort of republican government. But it should be remembered that the Swiss Cantons had been republics centuries before he flourished, and that he himself never had any concep-

tion of what, in our times, are called the rights of man. He recognized only the rights of the saints; that is, of Calvinists, at most a contemptible minority of the human race. It is impossible, by any logical process conceivable by us, to conclude from the equality of Calvinists, or even of Protestants, the equality of all men, as asserted by our American patriots in 1776. That equality, the equality of all men by the natural law, was derived from the practice of the Church and the teaching of her doctors in all ages. Hampden, Sydney, Locke, and even our own Jefferson, never taught it so clearly as it is taught by St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Suarez, and Bellarmine. Mr. Bancroft will find the doctrine he so ardently loves taught nowhere with more clearness, boldness, and energy, than it was taught by the French *Ligueurs* in their resistance to Henri Quatre, and the French Revolution only clothed the Catholic doctrine in a Pagan garb, and informed it with a Pagan instead of a Christian spirit. The liberty, equality, and brotherhood which that Revolution proclaimed, and sought to realize, were in themselves Catholic conceptions, and never could have been entertained by a people that had not retained a very distinct and vivid reminiscence of its Catholic culture. The error of the Revolution was not in entertaining them, or in seeking their realization in society, but in its practical perversion and misapplication of them, and in seeking to realize them by unwarrantable and improper means. They were great truths founded in eternal justice, and are dear to the better instincts of all human hearts.

Liberty, in every rational sense, is founded and supported by the principles of Catholic theology, and by them alone, because that theology asserts the reality and permanence of the natural law, deriving its force from the eternal law, the reason or will of God, and no other theology does it. The positive law does in no instance supersede or abrogate the natural law common to all men, and rights held under it remain always the same in the Christian and the infidel. The infidel prince has, over his Christian subjects, all the rights that he has under the law of nature over any other class of his subjects. If he violates their conscience, if he plays the tyrant over them and oppresses them, they may, if able, depose him, and elect another in his place; but they cannot refuse him their allegiance and

loyal obedience because he is an unbeliever, or force him either to abdicate or to become a Catholic. The Church always respects, and teaches her children and enjoins upon all tutors, rulers, and governors, under whatever name or degree, to respect, all the natural rights of the nation and the individual, and that no prospect of utility or of good to be gained in this world or the next can justify the violation of any one of them, for we may never do wrong that good may come.

Hence it is that Catholics always move slowly in reforming abuses which, through the frailty and perversity of human nature, accumulate with time; and the Church takes care, in removing either moral or social evils, to violate no natural or vested right; and impatient spirits, zealous for meliorations and progress, are not unfrequently tempted to murmur at what appears to be her dilatoriness and excessive forbearance. She detests slavery, but she has respect to the rights of the master as well as of the slave; and as long as he does not abuse his rights, she will not suffer him to be compelled to emancipate his slave without a full indemnification. She hates intemperance, and enjoins temperance as a cardinal virtue; but she cannot, in order to suppress intemperance, trample on the natural right of her children to use the good things of God as not abusing them. She respects the natural liberty of every man, woman, and child. In this she follows the example of her Lord. Almighty God could with a word put an end to all sin, and to its consequent evils, but he does not do it, because he respects that freedom, that liberty, with which he has created man, choosing rather to die on the cross than to offer it violence. The Church justifies the employment of force to repel force or to suppress violence; and in this sense she has authorized her children to defend themselves, their freedom, religion, altars, and firesides, against the attacks of heretics, schismatics, and infidels; but she has never authorized the employment of force against any class of persons guilty of no violence to the rights of their neighbor. The employment of physical force for the promotion of religion and virtue,—the resort of our Maine Liquor Law and No-Popery men,—she strictly and uncompromisingly forbids, and tells those who would thus employ it, “Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of.” She relies on doctrinal instruction, on moral suasion, the

supernatural grace of her sacraments and her own spiritual discipline, to suppress sin and advance men in the way of perfection. It is clear, therefore, that the Church can neither tyrannize herself, nor suffer her children to tyrannize; and that the natural tendency, so to speak, of the Catholic religion, is to liberty, equality, and brotherhood; and nothing is more historically certain, than that the tendency in the modern world to despotism, to absolutism, or Cæsarism, whether of the one, the few, or the many, has been in exact proportion to the decline of the influence of the Church, and the rejection of her faith and discipline.

The whole theory and practice of Calvinism, what we call Evangelicalism, are in singular contrast with those of the Church. The Calvinist—and the Calvinistic is the pervading spirit of most Protestants, if we except those amiable gentlemen and ladies called Puseyites, who *protest* against Protestantism without however abandoning it—holds that only the saints, only persons in grace, have rights, and in face of them all the rest of the world are outlaws, without any right whatever. Thus a Mormon elder, a true Evangelical, said to us one day: “The Lord has given the earth and all it contains to his saints. We, the Mormons, are the saints, and have a divine right to govern, to kill or slay, as we see proper, all who are not joined to us, and to enter into their possessions. We have the right from God himself to take the wives or the property of sinners wherever we find them, and whenever we please; but we are too weak at present to render it prudent to avail ourselves of this right.” This is the true Calvinist doctrine, or the strictly logical conclusion from the denial of the natural law, and the assertion that all rights are of grace,—a doctrine that has an invincible tendency to Antinomianism, if indeed it can be logically distinguished from it. To those who have no rights, it is impossible to do any wrong; consequently the saints are under no obligation to respect anything in sinners, that is, Catholics and unevangelicals, and may rightfully persecute, fine, imprison, exile, hang, or burn them as they please. Reading the Old Testament and misapplying the commands of God to the Jews to exterminate the Canaanites, they very naturally come to the conclusion, that it is not only their right, but their duty, to exterminate Cath-

olics — who are to them the Canaanites — with fire and sword, or at least to reduce them, as the children of Israel did the Gibeonites, to be “hewers of wood and drawers of water,” the condition to which England for three hundred years has tried to reduce the Catholics of Ireland. All sincere and earnest Evangelicals believe it a national sin to tolerate the Canaanites in the land ; and to have friendly relations with them, even in secular matters, is a concerting with the enemy, and a high-handed rebellion against God. They groan in spirit whenever they see a Catholic Church rise in their midst, and can hardly restrain themselves from pulling it down. Hence to persecute is not only lawful, but a duty, for Evangelicals.

Then, again, they find themselves impotent to meet what they regard as the evils of the day by any other means than force, for all civil action in the last analysis is force. We have assailed Protestantism with argument, and Evangelicalism has replied to us by calling on the state to deprive us of our civil *status*, to exterminate us, to drive us into exile, or to reduce us to slavery. Through a political necessity, the English Parliament, strongly against its will, passed the Catholic Relief Bill of 1829, which gave to the Catholics of the United Kingdom a partial freedom. Since then, Catholicity, which demands nothing but freedom, has reared its head, and attracted the choicest spirits of the land within its fold. Evangelicalism is alarmed. Men are everywhere praying for the conversion of England, and the Pope will, ere long, place her once more as a bright jewel in his triple crown. This must not be suffered. Exeter Hall cannot tolerate it. Englishmen must have an English, not a foreign religion, and worship an English God, a nice little national God, not the God who has created heaven and earth, and who drew their fathers from their savage state and heathen abominations. But to prevent it by argument, by fair and candid appeals to Scripture, reason, and history, is out of the question. Doctrinal instruction, moral suasion, the sacraments, are instruments which Evangelicals cannot use, and which can be and are used with fearful effect against them. They resort, therefore, to the civil arm. They demand and obtain legislation, acts of Parliament, against Catholics, and the most assiduous efforts are now making to prepare the way for the repeal of the Catholic Relief Bill,

and to re-enact the old penal laws. No one who has attended to the debates in Parliament on the anti-Catholic motions introduced by Messrs. Chambers and Spooner can doubt it. In strict concert with Exeter Hall are acting the Evangelical portion of our Know-Nothing party.

This is no accident. It lies in the very nature and necessities of Evangelicalism. We are, say the Evangelicals, the saints, and to us God has given the government of the world. We alone, of all the children of men, have rights, and hence with those not joined to us we may do as we please. Evangelicalism has then in its own view the right to suppress by violence, without regard to individual or personal rights, whatever it chooses to regard as sin or evil. Having no moral means, it is obliged to resort to civil force, or fail of its end. All its philanthropy, all its better affections, perverted by its principles, urge it to act the tyrant and the persecutor. And to do so is not an exception, is not an inconsequence, an aberration from its principles, but to act in strict and logical conformity with them. It is a necessity of its nature. There is not a single reform, of whatever name or nature, that it is able to effect without a resort to force, because it has no moral means that are adequate. Hence it is that under its influence everything wise and good turns to evil. All that is sweet in human nature it sours, or ferments into an intoxicating draught. It cannot meliorate the political and social condition of mankind without violence, trampling on natural and vested rights, and asserting the principles of the most odious tyranny. It cannot seek the emancipation of the slave without despotism to the master. It cannot labor to suppress intemperance, that crying evil, without its prohibitory legislation, which sacrifices individual freedom, and violates the rights of property, sacred in every civilized state. It has only one method of proceeding. This is to begin by agitating the public mind for the reform it wishes, and then through its agitation and affiliated associations to get possession of the legislature, and make a law enforcing it. It must do so, because it has not the sacraments or spiritual means by which it may reach the heart and remove evil by purifying its source. The whole history of the philanthropic and reform movements of the day proves it, and therefore that Evangelicalism is deadly hostile in its own nature to both civil and religious liberty. The great truth that this

age needs to learn is, that civil and religious liberty must stand or fall together, and that neither has any support, save in the doctrine, the discipline, and the sacraments of the Catholic Church, for save by their means there is and can be no harmonizing of nature and grace, liberty and authority. Out of Catholicity either nature is denied, as with Evangelicals, or grace is denied, as with the Rationalists; and to deny either is to render our civil liberty practically impossible.

The Evangelical, otherwise called the Puritan party, played a conspicuous part in what is called the Reformation. Imported into England originally by the Lollards, and subsequently from Geneva, that Rome of Protestantism, it attained to power under Cromwell, received a check in the Restoration, was successfully appealed to in the Revolution of 1688, and sunk into insignificance till revived and reinvigorated by Wesley and Whitefield. In this country it was predominant in nearly all the Colonies in their early settlement, but had been shorn in great measure of its power prior to the assertion of our independence of the crown of Great Britain. It made a rally under the elder Adams, but was defeated by the election of Mr. Jefferson in 1800, and fell into a minority. It has never had the control of the General government, and rarely has it ever been in power in any of the State governments. But ever since the rise of Methodism, under John Wesley, in the last century, it has been with us and in Great Britain steadily on the increase. It has worked in secret as well as openly, and with a perseverance worthy of the cause it professes to be, but is not. It has availed itself, with consummate address, of every popular incident or movement that seemed capable of being made to operate to its advantage. It has obtained the control of nearly all the great philanthropic movements of the day, directs your abolition and temperance societies, and enlists in its service the great mass of British and American infidelity. It has its affiliated societies for every kind of object subsidiary to its main purpose, spread as a vast network over the whole land, and has succeeded in making itself of importance to politicians. In a word, it has practised and still practises all the arts which it falsely and calumniously lays to the charge of the Jesuits and the Catholic hierarchy. It has once more, in the vicissi-

tudes of modern history, become formidable, and may be regarded as now on the point of seizing the political power in both Great Britain and the United States.

It is this Evangelical element, a singular compound of cant and hypocrisy, of cunning and impudence, of philanthropy and hate, of infidelity and fanaticism, that renders the Know-Nothing party dangerous, and this element enters into both sections or divisions of the order, and is that which distinguishes the so-called American party from the ordinary Whig party of the country. In this Know-Nothing organization, Evangelicalism hopes to accede to power. That it will succeed we are unwilling to believe, and if it were confined to our own country we should confidently count on its failure, for though it constitutes the life and vigor of Protestantism, it is very far from commending itself to the whole Protestant body. But the Evangelicals of the United States and of the United Kingdom constitute only one and the same people, acting in concert under the guidance of the same leaders, and its victory or defeat in one is its victory or defeat in the other. We fear the aid the American Evangelicals will derive from their brethren in Great Britain, where they are far more formidable than with us, and where, if not met with equal firmness and wisdom, they will soon have a Parliamentary majority.

The danger in Great Britain would not be so great as with us, were it not for the unhappy divisions among the Irish Catholics, which neutralize their influence in the House of Commons. However desirable may be the Tenant's Compensation Bill, there is at this moment a far greater interest for Catholic Ireland at stake. The accession of the Evangelicals to power would be the destruction of the little religious and civil liberty still remaining in the United Kingdom. All that was gained under O'Connell would be lost, and Ireland most likely would feel the curse of another Cromwell. We are much mistaken if the expulsion from the Cabinet of the Earl of Aberdeen, the Duke of Newcastle, Sir James Graham, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Sydney Herbert, the men who stood up so firmly against the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, and the elevation of Lord Palmerston to the premiership, ought not to be looked upon as a victory gained by the Evangelicals; and certain we are that civil and religious liberty

has nothing to hope, but much to fear, from the present administration. Still, such is the complexion of parties in the United Kingdom, that it must be difficult to say on what side the patriotic Catholic ought to cast his influence. The Tories can hardly be trusted for Ireland, and the Whigs just as little for England. The Tories insist upon governing Ireland through the Orange faction, and the Whigs by nature and tradition belong to the Evangelicals. It is not for us at this distance, and with our imperfect information, to say what is the political course most advisable for our Irish Catholic friends to adopt. It is not our business to decide the political dispute between the *Tablet* and the *Telegraph*, but our friend, the editor of the *Telegraph*, must allow us to say, that we have deeply regretted to find him laboring to bring national prejudices to bear against Mr. Lucas of the *Tablet*. It seems to us unwise, ungenerous, and uncatholic. Mr. Lucas is not infallible, and we are far enough from approving all we have seen in his journal; but we have full confidence in him as a sincere Catholic and a docile child of the Church. The Catholics of England and Ireland, and we will add of the United States, could ill spare such a man in the present conjuncture of their affairs. We could ill spare him from the House of Commons, where he has won by his ability, his honesty, and his straightforward, manly conduct, an honorable position. He may in his zeal have expressed himself on some occasions in terms not decorous to some members of the hierarchy; but to pretend that he is laboring to set the priests of the second order against their bishops, or to abolish the episcopacy, seems to us to be simply ridiculous. Bishops and priests, when they enter the arena of politics, expect to be treated as politicians, and it may sometimes well happen, that the well-intentioned layman, in a field in which he stands on the same level with them, may in the heat of debate or in the fervor of his zeal forget for a moment their sacred character. As we understand the case, the Callan speech of Mr. Lucas was objectionable, and we certainly disapprove in the strongest manner of some articles which we have seen copied into the *Telegraph* from the *Dublin Nation*; but Mr. Lucas is not Mr. Duffey, and we do not think that such a man as he should be cried down by Catholics, even had his fault been greater than it has been. These are not

times when we can afford to visit with excessive rigor the improprieties, imprudences, or indecorums of well-intentioned, able, sincere, and earnest laymen, who in good faith devote themselves to the defence of Catholic interests. Indeed, there are reasons why more than ordinary latitude should in our times be given them, and more than ordinary indulgence should be shown to their unintentional errors. The controversy between Catholics and Protestants is now mainly a secular controversy, in which laymen are far less unfitted to take part than they were in former times, when it was more exclusively theological. We have a high esteem for Mr. MacCabe, the distinguished author of *The Catholic History of England*, but we must remind him, and we do so in all kindness, that there are things to be pardoned in him as well as in the editor of the *Tablet*. In fact none of us are faultless enough to be inexorable to what we may regard as the faults of others. We hope that these remarks will be taken in the spirit in which they are made. We wish to see an end to the disedifying divisions among our Irish Catholic friends, for almost everything in the present crisis depends, under God, on their united, firm, bold, energetic, and manly action.

We like exceedingly the tone and advice of the last *Dublin Review*, which seems to be arming itself to meet the new phasis assumed by the controversy between Catholics and Protestants in the United Kingdom. It understands that the enemy, discomfited for the hundredth time in the field of theological controversy, and unable to meet the arguments, now proposes to shut the mouths, of Catholics. What we Catholics have now to do in Great Britain and the United States is to defend civil and religious liberty against the conspiracy of Evangelicals, led on by such men as Lord Shaftesbury, Achilli, Gavazzi, the Beechers, the Clarks, and the Ned Buntlines, aided, no doubt, by all the cunning, subtlety, and malice of Satan. In this grand contest it will serve little purpose to show that we are friendly to civil and religious liberty; we must take higher ground, and show from incontrovertible facts and arguments that Evangelicalism is in its very nature and tendency in the last degree hostile to every species of rational liberty, and that it is only on Catholic ground that either civil or religious liberty can be sustained. We must hurl back upon these Evangelical

canters and sniffers the charges which they falsely allege against us and our religion. Let there be no timidity, no trimming, no compromise. They are the party opposed to civil and religious liberty, ingrained tyrants and despots, who are ready to march to power over the grave of all that is dear and sacred to the human heart, all that is liberal and ennobling in human culture, all that is cheerful and recreating in human society, all that is true and holy in religion. We can speak to the public as well as they, and we must undeceive those whose confidence they have abused, and rally anew the real friends of British and American freedom.

We can do this if we will but heal our divisions, and venture to depart from the old routine of controversy, and meet the question as it is practically presented to-day. We must dare look it, in its present form, in the face, and approach it with strong, fresh, and fearless thought. Consult the old writers for principles we must, but in their application, in the forms of our expression, we must not fear to be original, however we may shock a superannuated pedantry or a cowardly imbecility. Our friends across the water are doing much, and doing it nobly. We are amazed at the marvellous fecundity of the English press. Let Ireland, who must cease to call herself "unhappy Ireland," feel that in the present crisis the hopes of Catholics in England and here turn to her. Let her, from her advantageous position, be true to herself, be bold, energetic, dignified, commanding, as becomes a Catholic kingdom, and this Evangelical party, composed of unbelievers and fanatics, assisted, as it may be, by Satanic cunning and malice, will fail of its purpose, and British and American freedom be saved from the grasp of its deadliest and only foes. Let American and British Catholics deserve success by their free and manly conduct, by their firm and heroic spirit, and they may count on success; for then Almighty God himself, and all the hosts of heaven, will be on our side, and fight for us.

ART. IV.—*La Raison Philosophique et la Raison Catholique*. Par le T. R. P. VENTURA DE RAULICA. Paris: Gaume Frères. 1851–1853. 2 tomes. 8vo.

A WARM personal friend of the distinguished Father Ventura has very obligingly presented us with a copy of this highly instructive and most valuable work of the ex-General of the Theatins, which consists of discourses preached during the season of Lent, at Paris, in the years 1851 and 1852, augmented and accompanied with remarks and notes by the author. The first volume had been previously noticed by a writer in this Review, but the second volume we meet now for the first time. Of the genius, learning, ability, and extraordinary eloquence of the illustrious Italian it is not necessary for us to say a single word. In these respects he is above any eulogism of ours. When Gregory the Sixteenth, of immortal memory, was asked by a Frenchman who was the first *savant* at Rome, he replied, after a moment's reflection, "Father Ventura." "We have," continued his Holiness, "no doubt, many distinguished theologians, apologists, philosophers, publicists, orators, and men of letters, but there is only the Father Ventura who is all these, and in himself alone."

In 1848 we made some strictures on Father Ventura's Funeral Oration on O'Connell, for it seemed to us to incline too much to the liberalism of the day. We regarded it as likely to encourage the revolutionary party throughout Europe, and as containing expressions which, in the state of men's minds at the time, were likely to be understood as conceding that the Church had not always been on the side of true freedom. His stay at Rome during the Roman revolution, and his conduct, as reported to us, during the short-lived reign of the Roman republic, gave us very unfavorable impressions as to his Catholic loyalty, and we feared that he would prove another Lamennais. But a friend of his, who professes to have been with him during the period we refer to, and to have shared his confidence, has assured us that the gravest things laid to his charge were false reports, and has satisfied us, if his account be correct, and we have no reason to doubt it, that the most to be said against him is that he suffered his impulsive nature to betray him into some imprudences, and perhaps

some improprieties. But his subsequent conduct, and his honorable submission to the censure of the Congregation of the Index on one of his discourses, have amply repaired whatever faults he may have been guilty of, and should restore him to the full confidence of the Catholic public. We have nothing to censure ourselves for in what we have heretofore said respecting him, for we were never animated by any uncatholic feeling towards him, and we spoke according to the best information at the time within our reach. But if we have expressed at any time any opinion respecting him personally founded on false or inadequate information, we of course regret it, and assure him that we are anything but disposed to persist in it.

In the confusion of revolutionary times, many false judgments of men and things are inevitable, even to the best disposed and the best informed. In 1848 and 1849, though ardent lovers of liberty, we found ourselves obliged to oppose what was called the republican or democratic movement, and to oppose it both in the name of religion and rational freedom. We thought we saw Father Ventura on the side of that movement, and aiding it against the Holy Father and the real interests of Europe, and we judged his doings and sayings by the position in which we saw him, and the company in which we found him. If he did and said the things ascribed to him, we did not judge him too severely. Many of those things, we are assured by his friend, were falsely ascribed to him. We are told that he did not celebrate High Mass on the grand altar in St. Peter's on a certain occasion, as reported, and that, though present, it was not as a priest, but as the Neapolitan [Sicilian?] ambassador. And we are further told, that he remained at Rome after the escape of the Holy Father to Gaëta, in order to do what he could to restrain the excesses of the republicans and to protect the interests of the Papacy. If this was so, we can exonerate him from the charge of disloyalty to religion, but we cannot think very highly of his discretion. But those things are past, and he has made all the submission that has been required of him, and we have no right to remember them against him. We shall make it a point, for ourselves, to give him all the respect and confidence due to his eminent ability, his profound learning, his rare genius, and his zealous and energetic labors as a Catholic priest.

Father Ventura is not, and never was, a sympathizer with Red-Republicanism; he is not, in the popular sense of the word, a democrat; but there can be no doubt that his sympathies are with the people rather than with their masters, — that he would wish to see the Catholics of Europe less disposed to make common cause with the superannuated dynasties and modern bureaucracy, and more in earnest to restore the free constitution of European society which generally obtained prior to the heresy and schism introduced by the so-called Reformation. In this there is much with which we agree, but there are serious difficulties in the way of realizing what he wishes, and the most serious of all is in the corruption of the people themselves. We are in favor of republicanism, but not on the principles of the party in Europe struggling for it. We like the general constitution of European society as it was during the Middle Ages, though not the barbarism we meet there, side by side with Christian civilization; but joining the democracy, and aiding what is called the popular movement of the day, will not bring back what was good in those ages, or advance the cause of civil freedom. The republic, on the principles of English, American, or French statists, is not a whit better than the *cæsarism* of the courts. The fundamental principles of *cæsarism* and modern democracy are precisely the same, and liberty, in any rational sense, is possible under the reign of neither. Liberty presupposes the sovereignty of the spiritual order, under whose dominion authority and liberty are harmonized. But this sovereignty is rejected alike by modern democracy and modern monarchy. The one places the monarch, the other the people, above all law, and the principle of both is political atheism. The people are as averse to recognizing the supremacy of the Divine law in the government of the world as are kings and emperors. The shallow and atheistical political system, which flows from the innovations of Luther in theology and of Descartes in philosophy, has penetrated nearly the whole modern world, and is embraced by the Catholic populations almost as generally as by the Protestant. Scarcely a Catholic statist of our acquaintance retains any conception of the profound political philosophy engendered by Catholic theology; and seldom do we meet one who seems capable of comprehending the state as it was comprehended by St. August-

tine, St. Thomas, or even Suarez and Bellarmine. In the political order the mass of Catholics, as well as Protestants and infidels, follow either Bossuet and James the First of England, or Locke and the shallow-pated Rousseau.

Here is the grand difficulty. If we side with authority and uphold the sovereigns, we favor, and cannot help favoring, monarchical despotism, — what we call Cæsarism. If we side with the revolution and support the popular party, we favor, and cannot help favoring, the despotism of society, the absolutism of the many, and the unlimited right of the majority for the time being, which is scarcely less intolerable. The essential element of liberty is rejected alike by princes and people, and we are compelled to alternate between the despotism of the one and the despotism of the many. Gallicanism so called with Catholics, and unbelief with Protestants, have excluded God from the state, and no place is given to the Divine Idea, or to the sovereignty of him who is King of kings and Lord of lords. Nor is this the worst. In countries where Protestantism prevails, we are obliged to wish for the success of the party that professes the least respect for religion, for, politically speaking, religious indifference is less to be deprecated than Protestant or Evangelical fanaticism. We have then in Protestant countries another difficulty. The support we give to religion as an element of government turns to the advantage of Evangelicalism, the predominant religion of Protestants, and the favor we show the party of indifference, though it may stave off the evil day, tends in the end to undermine society, and to render the catastrophe still more terrible when it comes. The truth is, modern society, in both Catholic and Protestant countries, is pagan, and is everywhere becoming a prey to pagan errors, vices, and corruptions. All we can do is to refrain from siding absolutely with either party, and to use what freedom we have to recall men to the recognition of the Divine sovereignty, to make our Catholic populations, who have as yet a conscience, as Catholic in their politics as in their religion.

The divorce of Christianity from the Church, proclaimed by Luther, led the way to the divorce of philosophy from theology, proclaimed by Descartes, which in its turn led to the divorce of religion from the state, proclaimed by Louis the Fourteenth and his courtier bishops, who forgot

their God for their king, and which was popularized by the philosophers and statists of the last century. We must labor to reunite in Catholic minds and hearts what God has joined together, and which no man had the right to put asunder; for it is only through the Catholic people that we can hope to save society. This is a great work, and a work that cannot be done without meeting opposition on all sides, — on the side of Catholics, who have become as Pagans as to their politics, as well as Protestants; but nevertheless we must labor to accomplish it, whatever the opposition, for the salvation of society, of freedom, of civilization, depends on it. We shall encounter persecution, and the land may be saturated with our blood, as was that of Pagan Rome with the blood of the early martyrs; but we know that we are following out the spirit of the Church, and that, if we proceed with singleness of heart, Almighty God will approve us, and give us success. We see nothing else for us here or elsewhere, but to devote ourselves, heart and soul, for life or death, to the great work of reconverting society relapsed into Paganism to the Gospel of our Blessed Lord, and, to do this, to begin with ourselves.

In one department of this work Father Ventura has, in the volumes before us, done manly and heroic service. His aim has been, if we may so express it, to undo the work of Descartes, that shallow thinker and but too successful corrupter of modern thought, and to reunite theology and philosophy, which he had divorced. He shows, by a wealth of erudition that astonishes us, and by an eloquence which, though he speaks and writes in a foreign tongue, hardly yields to that of the great Bossuet, that philosophy divorced from theology, or human reason proceeding by itself alone, has never in the moral and intellectual order discovered or established a single truth, but has uniformly made shipwreck of the common faith of mankind, obscured or lost sight of the most essential truths, and, falling from error to error, has uniformly ended in the frightful abyss of universal doubt. He contrasts, in all ages, the Catholic reason and the philosophical reason, and shows conclusively that by the former truth is attained and preserved, while by the latter it is lost and finally denied, even in relation to the natural order, as well as to the supernatural. This our readers

know is what we have uniformly insisted on, and though never accepting the doctrines ascribed to the Traditionalists by their opponents, we have never failed to assert that philosophy or human reason alone never can attain to any solid system of truth, even in the natural or intelligible order. We are most happy, therefore, to find this doctrine, which we regard as all-important, powerfully and conclusively vindicated by so distinguished an advocate as is the Very Reverend Father Ventura de Raulica.

"If," says the illustrious author, "man could by his own means and private reflection formula his beliefs and duties easily, with certainty, and without mixture of error, *de facili, sine miscela erroris, fixa certitudine*, as says St. Thomas,* it would be all over with revelation; *Si ratio humana sufficienter experimentum prabet, totaliter excludit meritum fidei.*† And in fact, what would be the use of a positive revelation, if man were able of himself to know what he ought to believe and what he ought to do? If such were the case, all the world would have the right to say, with the Genevan sophist, 'I have no need of a revealed religion; I am contented with natural religion'; and rationalism would be at the same time true religion and true philosophy. This is the doctrine, which, as Clement of Alexandria tells us, Plato summed up in these words: 'My system is to believe on no authority, and to submit only to the reasons which, after reflection, appear to me the best.' Cicero professed the same doctrine: 'Every one should follow his own reason, for it is difficult to obey the reason of others,'— '*Cum suo quisque judicio sit utendus, difficile factu est me id sentire quod tu velis.*'‡ It is this doctrine or this method that I call *the philosophical reason*.

"But if, on the contrary, man cannot without a superior revelation in an easy manner attain to a precise and certain formula of his beliefs and duties, it is necessary that our great philosophers, those lofty intelligences as empty as they are proud, should prostrate themselves before the doors of the Church, and listen to the instructions of life from the God-made man; *Ipsam audite*. If this be so, nothing is more reasonable than to submit their reason as their will, and rationalism is only a culpable delirium or an enormous extravagance. This is the doctrine of the Apostle St. Paul, who says, 'Subject your intellect in obedience to Jesus Christ, and believe that this obedience is reasonable,'— '*In captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi.* . . . *Rationabile*

* *Contr. Gent.*, Lib. I. c. 4.

† *Ibid. Summa*, 2. 2, q. ii. a. 10.

‡ *Nat. Deor.*, Lib. III.

*obsequium vestrum.** And this constitutes what I call the *Catholic reason*.

"In these few words is summed up the whole question debated to-day between the Church and the School, between Catholicity and Rationalism, between Religion and Philosophy. On the one side, we have the Philosophical Reason maintaining that man is sufficient of himself to know perfectly his own nature, his relations to other beings, and his final destiny; and on the other, the religious or Catholic Reason, asserting that, to know all these things, man has great need of God, and that he must submit his understanding to the teachings of the Son of God made man." — Tom. I. pp. 5–8.

The philosophical reason, so called by the author, because it pretends to be philosophical without being so, is human reason proclaiming its own sufficiency, operating without accepting any aid from revelation, and refusing to recognize any truth which it has not by its own unassisted efforts found out and established; the religious or Catholic Reason is the same human reason operating with principles originally supplied it by direct revelation from God, in submission to those principles, and for their preservation, development, and realization in the conduct of life, intellectual and moral. To enter fully into the thought of the very reverend author, we must bear in mind that the revelation of which he speaks dates from the origin of the world, and was made to the first man, and from him, by means of tradition and language, has been propagated through all the world, as has been material existence by natural generation. The first man had the same revelation that we have, and the same faith that we possess. The Catholic faith began with Adam before his prevarication, and has always been in the world as the

* 2 Cor. x. 5; Rom. xii. 1. An ill-natured critic might cavil at the application of the text from Romans, for the Apostle there does not say intellect, but body: "I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God, that you present your *bodies* a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God, your reasonable service." The doctrine is sound, but the text does not appear to us to contain it. This practice of forcing a meaning from a sacred text which it was apparently not designed to convey, though very well in ascetic writing, where the principal end is edification, is not very judicious, to say the least, when arguing in defence of the truth against its adversaries. It hurts rather than serves our cause. There can be no doubt, however, that St. Paul teaches all that the learned and eloquent author asserts.

one only true faith, as the one only means of knowing our duty and returning to God as our final destiny. The patriarchs believed as we believe, only for them Christ was to come in the flesh, and for us he has so come; and hence you find that to the question, What must I believe? the Apostles answered, In the Lord Jesus Christ; that is, that He who was to come had come, and was that same Jesus of Nazareth whom the Jews with wicked hands had crucified, and whom God had raised up on the third day from the dead; for this was all that was necessary to complete the faith of those who retained the primitive revelation. Our Lord did not come to give a new faith or to found a new religion, but to fulfil the promises, or to accomplish the things promised in the beginning, — to perfect the faith of the fathers, which otherwise would have been vain. The Church dating from our Lord and his Apostles is founded on the *fulfilment* of the promises, but it existed before, from the beginning of the world, as founded on the promise to be fulfilled; yet as it is impossible for God to promise and not fulfil, the Church has substantially existed from the beginning, as it will exist to the consummation of the world, the one and the same holy Catholic Church, *una sancta Ecclesia catholica*, the Spouse of God, and Mother of all the faithful. Hence the Abbé Rohrbacher with perfect propriety commences his Universal History of the Catholic Church with the creation of the world, and brings it down in an unbroken series to the pontificate of our present Holy Father, Pius the Ninth. We undoubtedly have an explicit belief of many things which the patriarchs believed only implicitly; but the world had in substance, as St. Thomas teaches, the same revelation of truth before as it has had since the coming of Christ. On this point the Holy Scriptures are explicit. "God created man of the earth; and made him after his own image. . . . He created of him a helpmeet like unto himself; he gave them counsel, and a tongue, and eyes and ears, and a heart to devise; and he filled them with the knowledge of understanding. He created in them the science of the spirit; he filled their heart with wisdom, and showed them both good and evil. He set his eye on their hearts to show them the greatness of his works, that they might praise the name which he hath sanctified; and glory in his wondrous acts, that they

might declare the glorious things of his works. Moreover, he gave them instructions and the law of life for an inheritance. He made an everlasting covenant with them; and he showed them his justice and his judgments. And their eyes saw the majesty of his glory; and their ears heard his glorious voice; and he said to them, Beware of all iniquity. And he gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbor.* Or, as rendered by Father Ventura:—

“God in creating man of the earth and in forming from his body the first woman, to be, since of the same nature, his companion through life, gave to both the perfect use of their senses and their faculties, the rule of the understanding, the law of the mind and heart, thought, sentiment, language; so that they might from the first moment walk, operate, think; understand, reason, will, and speak. God revealed to them evil that they might avoid it, and good that they might practise it. He deigned also to look with a peculiar love upon these first human souls, in order to elevate them even to himself. He showed them the divine magnificence of his works. He taught them to render worship unto his name, not only because that name is all-powerful, but also because it is alone holy. He taught them not to glory in themselves, but in him, considering themselves as the most noble works of his hands, and to relate to their children the wonders of the creation of the world. In fine, he taught them in what manner they should conduct themselves, in giving them the law of life, which they were to transmit as an inheritance to their descendants. He established with them, by his grace, an everlasting covenant of love, and fixed its conditions in the revelation which he made them of the sanctity of his precepts, and the severity of his judgments.” — *Ibid.*, pp. 8–10.

This rendering of the sacred text, if not literal, is just, and does but bring out its real sense. Hence the author may well say:—

“Thus, then, according to this admirable, this magnificent, this touching passage of the Sacred Books, God was for the first man what our parents, our fathers, have been for us. Our parents, our fathers, have not given us merely physical life, which consists in the union of soul and body, but they have also given us intellectual life, which consists in the union of the mind with truth. Yes, what all fathers in the succession of time have done for their

* *Eccles.* xvii. 1–12.

children, God did instantaneously for the first man. When, therefore, the Scriptures tell us (Genesis ii.) that man came forth from the hands of his Creator a living soul, *factus est in animam viventem*, it is manifest that the Holy Ghost would tell us that man from the first instant of his creation began to live the double life proper to him, — the life of the body by the soul, and the life of the soul by the truth.

“Of the grand fact of a primitive revelation, attested by Scripture, the great St. Thomas gives the reason and the proofs. In his admirable treatise *De Scientia [Cognitione] Primi Hominis*,* or on the Knowledge of the First Man, he tells us, ‘that Adam must have had from the very instant of his creation a knowledge of natural things, not only in their principles but in their conclusions, because God created him to be the father of the human race, and children must receive from their father not only material existence by generation, but also the rule of life by instruction. Adam must then have been perfect in all his parts, perfect under the relation of body, so that he could become a father, and perfect in relation to knowledge, so that he could be the teacher of mankind. We cannot conceive, we cannot admit, that the human mind was created a blank sheet on which the hand of his Creator wrote nothing. As the first man knew not the weakness of infancy in relation to the body, so he knew not the darkness of ignorance in relation to the mind. He obtained from the first moment, instantaneously, all that we learn successively during our early years. He received by the Divine operation what we receive by human education, a perfect body, and a mind endowed with the full and perfect use of reason admirably enlightened by the truth. It would have been contrary to the perfection necessary to the first man, to have been created without the plenitude of science, and obliged to learn it slowly and painfully from experience.

“‘But independently of natural knowledge, Adam received also the knowledge of grace. *In Adamo duplex fuit cognitio, naturalis et gratia*. He knew not only at once natural things, which the human understanding may know by the aid of first principles, but also many supernatural [superintelligible] things by virtue of a special revelation, to which reason by its own strength cannot attain; and in knowing these only by revelation, and receiving them solely on the authority of God revealing them, he had from the first faith. *Adam in primo statu fidem habuit*.’

“Now would you know who instructed Adam in the beginning of the world? It was, says Tertullian, ‘the divine person of the Word, who was to be made flesh, — it was he who instructed the

* *Quest. Disput. De Veritate*, Quest. XVIII.

first man.' '*Deus in terris cum hominibus conversari non alius potuit nisi Sermo [Verbum] qui caro erat futurus.*'* Thus he whom the Eternal Father constitutes now our Master in all things, he himself taught the first man all the truths of the moral and intellectual order, and even of the most elevated [the superintelligible] order; for St. Thomas adds that Jesus Christ taught Adam the mystery of his Incarnation even before Adam had sinned. '*Ante peccatum, Adam habuit fidem explicitam de Christi incarnatione, prout ordinabatur ad consummationem gloriæ.*'† It was then in testimony to this same Divine Word before he was incarnated, and in supporting itself on this primitive revelation of the Word preserved in the world by the Word, that human reason commenced from the origin of the world its progress; it was sustained by this faith, enlightened by this light, that the ancient patriarchs fixed the public worship, developed the truth, defended and preached it to the world, which obtained them the glorious title given them by St. Peter, of 'preachers of justice.'

"This is what the Apostle John would tell us when he says: 'The Eternal Word is the light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world,' — '*Lux vera quæ illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.*' And it is the light of this primitive revelation of this primitive instruction given by the Word to the first man, which, from the first man, through tradition and language, is diffused over the whole world, as by material generation is diffused through all the earth material life; and it is this instruction which has always remained, and which the darkness of idolatry has obscured, but has never been able to efface. *Lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebræ eam non comprehenderunt.* It was in applying divine revelations to the knowledge of causes, to the usages of human life, that the great men of antiquity developed the intellect of man, founded public society, established laws, created science, invented the arts. In the primitive revelation is the origin of true philosophy, proceeding always by the light of religion, having for its purpose to maintain and defend religion, and to procure man the greatest happiness on earth possible without losing sight of heaven. Thus true philosophy established in the world with faith commences also with the world." — *Ibid.*, pp. 10 – 15.

To avoid all misunderstanding here, and to keep clear of the Jansenistic heresy, which founds science on faith, and involves the denial of both faith and science, it will be well to remark, that, according to St. Thomas, the primitive revelation is twofold, of natural things and of things of grace, that is, of two orders, which we call, after

* *Advers. Præz.*

† 2. 2. q. II. a. 7.

Gioberti, the intelligible and the superintelligible. The primitive revelation makes known to man supernaturally, for all Divine revelation is supernatural, both orders, and in the conduct of life the knowledge of both constitutes one inseparable and indissoluble doctrine, what our author calls the religious or Catholic reason. But while the truth in either order is revealed, and never could have been found out by the human reason operating by itself alone, we must beware of confounding the truth of the one order with that of the other, or of maintaining that the truths of the intelligible order are held only on the authority of the revelation. On this point the illustrious author is not so clear and precise as we could wish, and he even seems at times to favor the notion, that the principles or first truths of natural science are held on the authority of faith, and are not, even when revealed, evident *per se* to natural reason. This is the error we have so often pointed out in the so-called Traditionalists, into which, as they are presented by their opponents, they certainly fall; and it is an error fraught with fatal consequences. We are far enough from charging this error upon Father Ventura, but we are obliged to say that, as far as we have seen, he does not take sufficient pains to guard his readers or hearers against it. He no doubt for himself observes the mean between the two extremes, but he does not always observe it for others.

We agree perfectly with the illustrious author, that all true science, all our knowledge in the intellectual and moral order, as distinguished from the material order, begins in the supernatural revelation made to our first parents; but we distinguish, without separating, in that revelation, between the truths of the intelligible order and those of the superintelligible. The latter constitutes the matter of faith, the former the matter of science, — the principles of knowledge, of philosophy, as distinguished from Catholic theology. The truths of the superintelligible order are inevident *per se* to natural reason, and are held by us as belief on the authority of the Revealer. The truths of the intelligible order, though they require, for our clear, distinct, and reflective understanding of them, to be revealed and presented to us through the medium of language of some sort, are, when represented by language, evident *per se* to natural reason. The principles of science, or the first truths

of the natural order, must, although indemonstrable, be evident to natural reason, or science is impossible; and if science is impossible faith is impossible, since *gratia præsupponit naturam*. The difference between science and belief is, that in science the matter received or assented to is, in principle at least, evident *per se* to natural reason, or our noetic faculty, whereas the matter of faith, even in principle, is inevident *per se*, and is evident only *per alium*, and is accepted on authority or testimony. It is not known in itself, and is cognizable only analogically, by the analogy it bears to the intelligible. If, then, there be for us no intelligible, no science proper, there can be no faith, as there can be then no analogical recognition of the unintelligible. While, then, we recognize that the primitive revelation contained a revelation of the principles or first truths of both orders, and that man never could have had moral and intellectual science if it had not, we maintain that only those which pertain to the super-intelligible are held on the authority of the revelation, and that those which pertain to the intelligible order are evident *per se*, and of the domain of science as distinguished from faith. We take as an illustration what Gioberti calls the ideal formula, *L'Ente crea l'esistenza*, *Ens creat existentias*, or Real and necessary being creates existence. This formula every Christian of course holds to be true, and every philosopher worthy of the name detects it as the ideal and apodictic element of every thought; but without the revelation, *In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram*, it never could have been discovered by the human mind, and held as a distinct truth. Yet when once represented to the human mind through the medium of language, it is evident *per se*, that is, it affirms or evidences itself to our reason as an intelligible truth, and therefore, as the principle of science, as of things. It is held as a formula known, not merely as a formula believed.

With these remarks, thrown out solely as a necessary precaution to our readers, we accept the doctrine of the author with regard to the primitive revelation without hesitation and without reserve, and contend with all the earnestness of our nature, that it is only from that revelation, as preserved by tradition and language, as the substance of the instruction which, through every generation,

children receive from their parents, we must take alike the principles of our faith and of our science.

The primitive revelation, however rejected by the philosophical reason in ancient or modern times, has never been wholly effaced from the minds of the race of Adam.

“ St. Irenæus, Tertullian, Minutius Felix, Arnobius, St. Augustine, — all the apologists of Christianity, all the theologians and Christian philosophers, — when wishing to demonstrate the existence of God from the general consent of mankind, have proved that the human race, even after the fall into idolatry, preserved the idea of one only God, Master and Governor of heaven and earth. Nothing more true. With Homer, Hesiod, Virgil, Ovid, those witnesses to the popular beliefs, Jupiter is the puissant God, the Father of gods and men, the superior God, the God whose will is the last reason of things, whose decrees are fate, which nothing can resist. It is from him that emanate wise laws ; it is he who gives to kings their power, who breaks the pride of cities, hurls the thunderbolt, raises the tempest, and holds the first link of the chain on which hangs the universe ; it is he who orders all events, who blesses the labor of the husbandman, inspires courage, assures victory, protects persons, gives mind, talent, well-being, riches, health, life.

“ With Cicero the orator, who, inspired by the beliefs of the people, speaks far otherwise than Cicero the philosopher, Jupiter was not the Jupiter of mythology, but the Jehovah, or very nearly the Jehovah, of the Jews ; for he was God supreme and most perfect, *Deus optimus maximus*, the Eternal Reason, the Sovereign God, *Ratio æterna summi Jovis*, Author and Preserver of nations, states, and empires.

“ ‘ Idolaters,’ says a great contemporary theologian, the Archbishop of Rheims, whose lofty science and merits the Sovereign Pontiff has just rewarded with the Roman purple, — ‘ idolaters have never confounded their celestial and terrestrial gods with the Supreme God. If by Polytheism you understand many sovereign, independent, increate, eternal gods, it is false that the people in this sense have ever admitted a plurality of gods. Polytheism means the belief, not in many equal gods, but in many gods subordinated to one Supreme God. The notion of the true God, it is agreed, has never been as distinct, as pure, as perfect, with the Pagans as with the Jews ; but it is nevertheless true, that, though altered or impaired by the superstitions of idolatry, this idea is found everywhere, and that, as the martyr Saturninus declared to the Council of Carthage in the year 258, the Pagans, although they worship idols, yet know and confess God sovereign, father, and creator, — *quamvis idola colant, tamen summum Deum patrem et creatorem agnoscunt et confitentur.*’ ” — *Ibid.*, pp. 21 – 23.

The Pagan nations never, in their most degraded state, lost entirely the notion of the true God, as we learn from St. Paul, who makes their guilt consist in not having worshipped him, although he was known by them. "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all impiety and injustice of those men who detain the truth of God in injustice, because that which is known of God is manifest in them. For God hath manifested it to them. For the invisible things of him are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and his divinity; so that they are inexcusable. Because when they had known God they did not glorify him as God, nor give him thanks; but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened; for professing themselves to be wise, they became fools. And they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and four-footed beasts, and of creeping things."* Polytheism may have grown out of a Satanic corruption of the true doctrine with regard to good and bad angels, and of ministering spirits. We know on divine authority that the gods of the heathen were demons, that is, fallen angels, who succeeded in seducing men from their allegiance, and in persuading them to render them that service and worship which they owed to God. But we are more inclined to believe that Polytheism originated in Pantheism, which certainly underlies all the mythological systems known to us. But be this as it may, all Polytheism bears witness to the fact that the notion of one God, supreme Author and Ruler of the universe, was never wholly effaced from the minds of the Pagan people, and that all traces of the primitive revelation were never wholly lost. The following, from our author, is strictly true:—

"By the side and under the shadow of this first truth of the existence of one eternal, increate God, Author and Lord of all, the various peoples of the earth still preserved, even after they had fallen into the absurdities and obscenities of idolatry, many other great and important truths. They all and always believed in the existence of a moral law, whose author is God, commanding obedience and respect to parents and superiors, and forbidding theft, murder, adultery, lying, and detraction,—a moral law which

* Rom. i. 18-23.

is obligatory on all, and the observance or violation of which constitutes justice or sin, virtue or vice. They have always believed that it is necessary to honor God by sacrifice, to propitiate him by repentance, and to seek his assistance by prayer; that, to show that we acknowledge him as the Lord of the earth, of life, and of the means of sustaining it, we must especially consecrate to him some portion of space, by erecting temples, — some portions of time, by setting apart certain days for festivals in his honor, — some portions of our aliments and goods, by the practice of fasting and almsgiving; that besides this Supreme Deity, we must also honor with a religious worship, always in his name and for his sake, those lesser spirits whom he has been pleased to use as his ministers in the government of the world, as also those great men who, by the perfection of their lives, or by the services they have rendered to other men, have visibly represented here below the most beautiful attributes, and exercised the providence of the invisible God. They have very nearly all and always believed that the human race have fallen from their primitive happiness and perfection; that they can be restored only by the sacrifice of blood; that the merits of an innocent, holy, and perfect being may be communicated to a wicked, guilty, and imperfect being; that the latter may be redeemed by the devotion and voluntary sacrifice of the former; and that the gifts of the gods and purely spiritual graces are conferred and spread over the human race by corporal and sensible means, rites, and ceremonies.

“They have all and always believed that virginity is a sublime virtue, which renders man pleasing to God; that the priest should be more or less chaste, according to the functions he is called upon to perform in the exercise of worship; that there is a communicable merit of expiation in the voluntary practice of chastity; that every guilty action displeases God, and cannot escape punishment, just as every virtuous action is pleasing to him, and will be rewarded either in this world or in the other; that in the other world there is a paradise and a hell, where the rewards of virtue and the punishment of crime are eternal. Finally, they all and always believed that, besides the place of eternal punishment, there is a place where the souls of the dead expiate their lighter faults, and are purified by temporal privations and sufferings; that in this state of expiation and suffering they may be assisted, and even entirely delivered, by the prayers and sacrifices of the living; that the body of man, no less than his soul, is destined to be immortal, to partake of his eternal happiness or pain. This is proved by the care and respect which have always and everywhere been paid to the human corpse, by the rites which have always accompanied its burial, and by the profound and universal respect for tombs.

“Certainly these truths have not been always and everywhere

believed, nor these laws always and everywhere understood, in the same manner. At different times and in different places error has been more or less mingled with truth, and vice with virtue. It is thus that the Holy Scripture understands the work of religious despotism of certain governments, and of the license of human reason and passions. Hence that prodigious difference of theogonies, worships, manners, and religion among the ancients. But it is not less true, that the symbol that I have just traced was, at bottom, the symbol of the human race, though more or less disguised by absurd superstitions in its results and application. The gods of the Hindoos were not the gods of the Medes and Persians, any more than the gods of the Egyptians were the gods of the Greeks and Romans. But the supreme, eternal, omnipotent God was everywhere the same, under different names, and even under gross and absurd forms; and Jehovah, whom the Jews alone knew in all his truth (*notus in Judæa Deus*), was worshipped by all men.

“Each people had its own religion, as it had its own language; but these different religions in their general and common principles were but the same religion differently understood and differently applied. Scarcely an error can be found in their beliefs which, as Bossuet has remarked, had not its root concealed in a truth. Scarcely a vice in laws or manners which, as St. Thomas has explained, was not the false and absurd application of some one of the immutable principles of the natural law. There is not a single nation which has not preserved more or less pure the primitive traditional beliefs of mankind. Constantly and everywhere we perceive these beliefs floating upon the ocean of errors, fables, superstitions, and obscenities which darken the surface of the earth. We see them everywhere standing up like an inextinguishable beacon lighted by the hand of God since the beginning of the world for the direction of man. *Erat lux vera, illuminans omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. Lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebræ eam non comprehenderunt.*” — *Ibid.*, pp. 24 – 29.

We have permitted the author the more fully to develop his views on this point, because many Catholic writers, misapprehending the relation between the intelligible and the superintelligible, and more or less affected by the philosophical reason, which is by no means confined to the non-Catholic world, make little or no account of the primitive revelation made by our Lord as a good father and a wise instructor to our first parents. In some Catholic writers even, we find a total forgetfulness of the real state of the first man, and the doctrine that the human

race were left, as to the natural or intelligible order, to find out everything by their own unassisted reason, to invent language, and to create for themselves all the moral and intellectual sciences. Hence even they favor the absurd doctrine that the savage was the primitive man, and barbarism the primitive state of human society. This doctrine is embraced by many educated Catholic laymen, and is one of the greatest obstacles we have to surmount in reconverting the world from Paganism. It places God at too great a distance from us, and obscures the close and tender relations which subsist between him and us as our Father, our Teacher, our Guide, our Director, and our Friend. It places a contradiction between what is called reason and faith, philosophy and religion, which it is all but impossible to remove. Men believe because they think they must or be damned, because they are unable to get over the proofs of the credibility of Catholicity, and because they see that the Church is indispensably necessary to the maintenance of order and consistency in religion and morals, since both are evidently shipwrecked among the sects; but it were idle to pretend, that between their faith and what they regard as science there does not appear to them an invincible mutual repugnance. Piety may prevent them from daring even to avow it to themselves, but they feel unable to reconcile the immovable character of their Church with what seems to them the progressive nature of man and society, and they would feel much better satisfied with her if she would accept what they regard as liberal ideas, and place herself in harmony with the spirit and tendencies of the age. They are disposed to believe that in process of time there has been discovered and accumulated in the intelligible order a large body of truth unknown in the primitive ages, and which the Church does not accept, nay, which she rejects.

Such is the fact as to the state of the minds of many, deny or disguise it as we will, and it is to this state of mind we must more particularly address ourselves. We may say that our Church accepts and teaches all truth, for such is the fact; we may say that it is impious to doubt it, for so it is; but the voice of authority, or the tenderness of conscience, may silence, but it cannot and does not remove, the difficulties which even well-disposed Cath-

olics, nurtured in the philosophy and literature of our age, do and cannot but feel. There is another task, and a more difficult task, imposed upon the instructors of our times, than that of mere appeals to extrinsic authority, because, whatever the respect felt for authority, or however clear and distinct its voice, it cannot reach the heart of the difficulty. What is wanted is not positive commands to the will, but instruction for the understanding, an actual clearing up of the intellectual difficulties felt. Our older controversialists did not come down at once with the authority of the Church upon misbelievers; they sought first to enlighten and to convince their understandings, by arguments drawn from sources which they admitted. Thus when the erring still recognized the Scriptures as the word of God, Catholics appealed to them, and sought to show the harmony between the Catholic doctrine and the manifest teachings of the Scriptures. The difficulty now lies deeper; for the philosophic reason of our age places the Scriptures and the Church in the same category, and in point of fact is even less indisposed to recognize the latter than the former. We have, then, in order to meet the difficulties now felt, to recur to first principles, and to show that the philosophical reason, in so far as it causes these difficulties, is demonstrably false, and that this supposed body of truth, discovered and accumulated by the ceaseless activity of the human mind during the ages, and which the Church disowns, is in reality no truth at all, but vain imagination, or idle theorizing. We must not merely *say* this is so, but we must take the pains to *show* it.

The first step to this is, with Father Ventura, to recall our Catholic laity, disturbed by the rationalistic philosophy of the times, to Catholic reason, and show them what in regard to the human race has always been the gracious providence of God, and under what conditions and what conditions only the human intellect has been developed and placed in possession of intellectual and moral truth. The second step is to show that, just in proportion as men, whether in ancient or modern times, overlook or depart from these conditions, they fall, not upon the truth, but into the gravest errors and the grossest absurdities, and therefore that what passes for philosophy as detached from theology is manifestly not true philosophy, but a

fatal illusion. Both of these points have been shown by the illustrious Ventura in these volumes. He proves that in the intellectual and moral order man started, through the bounty of his Maker, with the full complement of truth, and that philosophy, whether ancient or modern, has made no addition to the original stock, but has wasted the goods it received, and reduced itself to the condition of the Prodigal Son, that of tending swine and feeding on the husks they eat; that is, under it and by it men have been reduced to the low and ignoble condition of mere animal life. This is not idly said. Everybody knows that the ancient philosophy resulted in the denial of the moral and spiritual life of man, and in representing him as a mere animal. Horace did not blush to avow himself a pig from the sty of Epicurus, *Bene curata ente vises, Epicuri de grege porcum*, and a French philosopher at the beginning of the present century defined man to be "a digestive tube, open at both ends." Philosophy, taking its portion of goods and departing from its father's house, has squandered them, and found itself unable to discover and establish anything more in or for man than this pig of Epicurus, or this digestive tube of Cabanis. But surely this is not and never has been the belief of mankind. We have seen what were in ancient and what are in modern times the beliefs of the human race when not *enlightened* by philosophers; but if philosophy can attain only to the herd of swine or the digestive tube, whence came the human race by these sublime beliefs, which they have always had, and which they have for the greater part always in substance maintained, in spite of the corruptions, the darkness, and the abominations of Pagan idolatry, and in spite too of the speculations of philosophers? You can, on the principles of that very inductive philosophy you boast, account for them only by assuming the primitive revelation the Holy Scriptures assert, that God was himself the original instructor of mankind. If so, then nothing can be more reasonable than in our philosophizing to recur to that primitive revelation for our first principles, our primitive *data*, or, so to say, our premises.

The grand error of philosophers in ancient and modern times is, if they did but know it, precisely in that which they regard as their chief glory, namely, the divorce of the

natural from the supernatural and of the intelligible from the superintelligible, and the attempt to build up a complete system of moral and intellectual truth by the lights of natural reason alone. No doubt, the rationalistic philosophy begins with an effort, in many cases honest, to explain and account for the primitive beliefs of mankind; but it uniformly ends by denying them. And it cannot help it, because it seeks their origin and explanation in unassisted reason alone; because it seeks to be, not the servant, but the mistress, of faith. This rationalistic philosophy is of comparatively a recent date, and is commonly fixed for the ancient world with Socrates, and for the modern world with Descartes. In the ancient world prior to the rise of the Greek philosophy, and in the modern Christian world prior to Descartes, philosophy was not disengaged from theology, and, though cultivated, was cultivated as the rational element of faith, distinct but not separate from revelation. At these two epochs it was separated, and took up an independent course of its own. This it boasts, and this it calls its glory. But what has it done by its free and independent action? What new light on God, man, or the universe has it shed? You imagine that it has in its progress made a succession of brilliant discoveries, and amassed a body of truth unknown to the primitive ages and overlooked or denied by the Church. If this really were so, the Church would and ought to give way; but if you who think so were called upon to specify any one of these supposed discoveries, or any particular truth, held outside of the Church and rejected or not accepted by her, and from the first making part of her doctrine, you would be not a little embarrassed. In the purely material order, there have no doubt been discoveries and inventions of greater or less value to our simple animal life, and this we may well assert without supposing any corresponding discoveries in the intellectual and moral order; for the Holy Scriptures assure us that the Lord has given the earth to the children of men, and abandoned it to their disputations. Whatever the free activity of the human mind has accomplished in the material order, out of that order it has, unassisted, accomplished less than nothing. Your rationalistic philosophy, your philosophy emancipated from the tutelage of revelation, marching with its free and independent step, has reduced

man to a pig or a digestive tube open at both ends. It matters little whom we cite, in order to show that the rationalistic philosophy reduces man to a mere animal. Let us take Horace, that almost universal favorite with our polished classical scholars, — Horace, who owns that he is one of the swineherd of Epicurus. He tells us that

“The first human beings sprung, like animals, from the earth, — a mute and filthy herd, making war upon one another for an acorn or a den, at first with nails and fists, then with sticks, and afterwards with artificial arms. At length they invented speech, formed language for the expression of their sentiments, and gave names to things. They then desisted from war, began to build and fortify cities, and to found laws prohibiting theft, murder, and adultery. For even before Helen, woman had been the most shameful cause of war. Addicted to the pleasures of the flesh, without marriage, after the manner of wild beasts, they fought among themselves, the stronger overpowering the weaker, as a bull in a herd of cattle. But those men have perished unknown. Explore the annals and monuments of the world, and you will be obliged to admit that laws originated in the fear of the wicked, for nature is impotent to distinguish good from evil, the just from the unjust, and to separate what is permitted from what is to be avoided.” *

So sings the polished Horace. Cicero speaks to the same purpose : —

“There was formerly a time when men roamed the fields, fed themselves, and propagated their species after the manner of

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- “Cum proreperunt primis animalia terris,
Mutum et turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter,
Unguibus et pugnis, dein fustibus, atque ita porro
Pugnabant armis, quæ post fabricaverat usus ;
Donec verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,
Nominaque invenere : deinceps absistere bello,
Oppida cæperunt munire, et ponere leges,
Ne quis fur esset, neu latro, neu quis adulter.
Nam fuit ante Helenam mulier teterrima belli
Causa. Sed ignotis perierunt mortibus illi,
Quos venerem incertam rapientes, more ferarum,
Viribus editior cædebat, ut in grege taurus.
Jura inventa metu injusti, fateare necesse est,
Tempora si fastosque velis evolvere mundi.
Nec natura potest justo secernere iniquum,
Dividit ut bona diversis, fugienda petendis.”

(*Satyrar. Lib. I. 3.*)

brutes. In the conduct of life they followed the instincts of the body, instead of obeying the dictates of reason. They observed as yet no religion, no law, no duty. Legitimate marriage was unknown, and fathers acknowledged not their own children. No one understood the utility of right and equity. All was ignorance, error, abuse of bodily forces, and under the shadow of these most pernicious satellites, blind and reckless passion domineered over the soul.*

Whether you consult the ancient or modern philosophers, this is what the rationalistic philosophy opposes, on the explanation of the origin of man and civilization, to the doctrine of the Church and the universal traditions of the human race. Father Ventura may well ask, —

“Can anything more shameful, more degrading for man be imagined than such an explanation of his origin, nature, and condition? Can there be anything really more absurd than this system, which assumes that man, while ignorant and stupid as a sheep, was able to invent what is most profoundly scientific, what is grandest and sublimest in his possession, that is to say, reason and speech? That man, ferocious, degraded, corrupt as a wild beast, was able to create justice, duty, laws, and voluntarily submit to them? That by its sole means, by its own efforts alone, the brute is able to make itself a man, and that barbarism and savagism can spontaneously and without extrinsic aid transform themselves into civilization? But once impudently admitted that men originally sprung from the vegetation of the earth, as onions, or from the corruption of other beings, as insects, that they have created for themselves ideas, sentiments, reason, language, truth, justice, law, and religion, it is absolutely necessary also to admit, that man has nothing in common with God, holds nothing from God; that God has revealed him nothing, and imposed upon him no law whose execution he has a right to demand; that man is his own reason and law, and in that which concerns them he holds only from himself; that the reason of each individual must walk alone, and should acknowledge no superior law, no authority, but should regard itself as free to do whatever seems to itself good. Here

* “Nam fuit quoddam tempus cum in agris homines passim, bestiarum more, vagabantur, et sibi victu ferino vitam propagabant. Nec ratione animi quidquam sed pleraque viribus corporis administrabant. Nondum divinæ religionis, nondum humani officii ratio colebatur. Nemo nuptias viderat legitimas, non certos quisquam inspexerat liberos; non jus æquabile, quid utilitatis haberet, acceperat. Ita propter errorem atque incertitiam, cæca ac temeraria dominatrix animi cupiditas, ad se explendum, viribus corporis abutebatur, perniciosissimis satellitibus.” (*De Invent. 1.*)

is the doctrine which constitutes, as I have said, *the philosophical reason*. Here then is the ancient philosophical reason originating in a fable as absurd as degrading. Its origin is as ignoble, as abject, as that of the religious or Catholic reason is noble, worthy, and majestic." — *Ibid.*; pp. 19–21.

There is no difference between the ancient and modern philosophical reason, or, as we prefer to say, rationalistic philosophy. Waiving or denying the primitive revelation, it must suppose that man received no instruction, no reason, language, or science from his Maker, and therefore that he began his career on earth through the ages as an untutored savage, nay, as a ferocious beast, living a purely animal life. Now if man began as a purely animal life, and is left to his own resources, to his own self-development induced by his animal wants, nothing but a purely animal life can be arrived at; for you can have nothing in the development not contained seminally in the principle. Hence your modern doctrine of progress, of which you boast, and secretly or openly condemn the Church for not accepting, and which some few Catholic writers even take it upon them to inform her that she may accept with advantage to her cause, based as it is on the denial of the primitive revelation, and the assertion of the purely animal or vegetable origin of human beings, can at best be only a progress in the growth or development of the animal or vegetable life of man. It is a homely but true saying, that one cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. It is, we apprehend, equally difficult for a sow to develop into a moral and intellectual, a speaking and reasoning, human soul. Hence it is that, when we analyze the boasted progress of man, we find that it is progress in provisions for the wants of the human body, or man as an animal, alone. Nothing but the animal being in the premises, nothing but the animal can be in the conclusion. But this is not the worst of it. The soul is, as the Church has defined, *forma corporis*, and the life of the body, the animal life itself, depends on the union of soul and body as one person, and derives from the soul itself; so that in proportion as man neglects the proper life of the soul he loses that of the body, and suffers equally in his animal life. We are not to live the life of the soul for the sake of the body, but sensible goods are in their highest degree attainable only by those who live the rational life of the

soul for the sake of God. Hence our Lord says, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things—sensible goods after which the heathen seek—shall be added unto you." So it falls out that by neglecting or denying the primitive revelation, and living not according to the law of the soul, but according to the instincts of the body, we retrograde instead of making progress in that order where we freely admit a large margin for human progress was left, namely, in providing for the animal life of man. You do the Church foul wrong when you blame her for opposing the doctrine of progress asserted by the rationalistic philosophy of the day, because that progress is divorced from moral and intellectual truth, because it is no real progress even as to the actual enjoyments of animal life, and because its tendency is to destroy the animal life of the body as well as the moral life of the soul. It is not progress in earthly well-being the Church opposes, as you foolishly imagine, but the attempt to effect that progress in disregard of the only conditions on which it can be a progress and not a regress. The multiplication of sensible goods, or the increase and accumulation of material riches, do not of themselves constitute a progress even in earthly well-being, unless preceded and accompanied by the higher life of the soul, by conformity, after the inner man, to the truth and law of God made known to us in the primitive revelation. The mere man of the world, the epicurean, the sensualist, is, as all experience proves, whatever his material wealth, the most wretched of mortals. We know well that no Catholic denies this; but those Catholics who accept the modern doctrine of progress, and seek to incorporate it with the doctrine of the Church, should know that this modern doctrine has for its basis the vegetable or animal origin of man, or the mere animal and savage state of the primitive man asserted by Horace and Cicero, or the ancient rationalistic philosophy, and cannot be accepted without denying the nobler part of man, without neglecting the moral life of the soul, and therefore not without losing that very earthly well-being that is sought. This well understood, no Catholic can for a moment countenance the modern rationalistic philosophy, fatal alike to soul and body, or feel that his Church does not well in rejecting it. Let any man, Catholic, or non-Catholic, study

these volumes, and he will understand this, and understand it well.

We have neither the space nor the ability to give a complete analysis of these volumes, for they are themselves only an analysis of the subject they treat. We have indicated a few of their more salient points, and that chiefly for the purpose of stimulating the curiosity of our readers to master their contents. What chiefly arrests our attention is the necessity demonstrated by the author of reuniting reason and faith, religion and philosophy, society and the Church. The divorce proclaimed by philosophy in modern as in ancient times has led, and could not but lead, to the most fatal results. Religion divorced from reason becomes superstition or fanaticism, philosophy divorced from revelation becomes immoral, licentious, and falls into scepticism and nullity. But we must not misunderstand the nature of the union demanded. Science must take its data from faith, not on the authority of faith. The primitive revelation, preserved in its chief elements by universal tradition and language, in its purity and integrity with the patriarchs, in the Synagogue, and in the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, solves all the problems which require solution in our present state; but it does so in the intelligible order, not by force of authority, imposing dogmas, and enjoining obedience, as is too often imagined, but by unfolding, so to speak, the grand scheme of Providence in both the intelligible and the superintelligible orders, which orders, though distinguishable, are never separable in that scheme. What pertains to the superintelligible, being above but not against the intelligible, is received by faith, and on the authority of the revealer. That which is thus received, shows us the real character and relations of the intelligible, and puts us in the position to apprehend it as it is; but it is affirmed by us, not on the authority of faith, but on its affirmation of itself in noetic intuition or rational demonstration to our understanding, in its principles as in its conclusion, as must always be the case with *scibile* as distinguished from the *credibile*. The doctrine requires us to reason, to philosophize in the intelligible by the light of revelation, by the light which faith sheds on the natural order, but requires us to accept nothing in that order on extrinsic authority, and leaves us free to accept or reject in the region of the intelligible according to the presence or absence of intrinsic evidence.

ART. V. — *The Poetical Works of WILLIAM WORDSWORTH.*
Boston : Little, Brown, & Co. 1854. 7 vols. 16mo.

THE admirers of Wordsworth, late Poet Laureate of her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, must have been pleased with Messrs. Little, Brown, & Co.'s beautiful and complete edition of his Poetical Works. These admirers are much more numerous than they were; but Wordsworth, we confess, has never been a favorite of ours, and we have been, and even are, barbarian enough to relish these cruel but witty lines of Byron : —

“ Next comes the dull disciple of thy school,
The mild apostate from poetic rule,
The simple Wordsworth, framer of a lay
As soft as evening in his favorite May,
Who warns his friend to shake off toil and trouble
And quit his books for fear of growing double ;
Who, both by precept and example, shows
That prose is verse, and verse is merely prose ;
Convincing all, by demonstration plain,
Poetic souls delight in prose insane,
And Christmas stories tortured into rhyme
Contain the essence of the true sublime.
Thus when he tells the tale of Betty Foy,
The idiot mother of ‘ an idiot boy,’ —
A moonstruck, silly lad, who lost his way,
And, like his bard, confounded night with day, —
So close on each pathetic part he dwells,
And each adventure so sublimely tells,
That all who view the idiot in his glory
Conceive the bard the hero of his story.”

Yet we are willing to concede that Byron is too severe, and that Wordsworth never deserved all the ridicule of which he was at one period the butt. We are personally, no doubt, still under the influence of our early prejudices against him and his school, but we are disposed to be just, and we should like to be among the warmest of his admirers if we could. Most of our literary friends are Wordsworthians, and make, at least in fancy, annual pilgrimages to Rydal Mount. We should like to sympathize with them, and not be looked upon by them as an untutored savage, or a literary heretic; but with all our endeavors, we can succeed only in part, — only so far as not

to think it worth our while to quarrel with them on his account, or so far as to admit that Wordsworth tried hard to be a poet, and, if he has left us no considerable poem worthy of admiration throughout, he has manifested much true poetic sensibility, and written short passages and single lines not surpassed in their kind in our language.

But all this expresses only our individual taste and judgment, and is worthy of no respect from others. There is or should be some recognized standard by which to judge in matters of poetry as well as in other matters. But unhappily for us, we have in English no such standard, and consequently no scientific criticism. Alison has given us a work of some merit *On Taste*, Campbell says some good things in his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, and much just criticism may be found scattered through the English and American quarterly reviews and other periodical literature; but all is unscientific, empirical, founded on habit, prejudice, or fashion, varying every hour. We have no science or philosophy of art. Till we have such a science or philosophy, we can have no good literary or artistic critics, and as long as we are mere sensists or psychologists, we can never have it. Burke was a great man, but his *Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful* is not worth naming, far less worth reading; for the author had a false system of metaphysics, and wrote his work on the supposition that the sublime and beautiful are mere subjective affections, or exist only in the order of conceptions and emotions, not in the order of reality, and are therefore psychological, not ontological. The Germans, indeed, have what they call *Æsthetic*, or *Æsthetics*, but, as the word implies, they make the sublime and beautiful either sensations and emotions, or simply objects of the sensibility. Or if they rise higher, they base their science of art on a defective and false conception of being, and give us nothing but scientific ignorance, hardly superior, if indeed equal, to the practical good sense of English and American critics.

Art, according to the ancients, is imitative, and its aim is to give expression to the sublime and beautiful, or as we say now-a-days, all simply, to the beautiful. Being imitative, we have first to settle what it is that it does or should imitate? The answer usually is, that Art should imitate nature. This is correct, if we understand by the

nature to be imitated, the *natura naturans*, not the *natura naturata* of the Schoolmen. Its province is to imitate nature in her creative energy, and to realize, or to clothe with its own forms, the beautiful, which the soul of the artist beholds. The beautiful itself has an objective reality, and has been happily termed by an Italian, reviewing, in a French periodical, the works of Silvio Pellico, "the splendor of the true." The splendor of the true is not substantially distinguishable from the true itself. The true in itself is identically Being, according to the definition of St. Augustine, not rejected by St. Thomas, and according to the older philosophers, who teach us that the *summum verum* and the *summum ens* are identical, as are the *summum ens* and the *summum bonum*. The *verum*, the *ens*, the *bonum*, taken simply and ontologically, are God, who is in himself the true, the beautiful, and the good. The beautiful regarded in itself as that, to use the language of Plato, by which all beautiful things are beautiful, is therefore indistinguishable from supreme being, supreme truth, supreme good, or God himself, save as the splendor is distinguishable from the resplendent, that is, formally but not really. Hence, as Art seeks to realize the beautiful, to embody or express it in its productions, a true science of Art must have an ontological basis, and is not possible without a true and adequate ontology.

We do not say there can be no Art without a true and adequate ontological philosophy. What we say is, that without such philosophy there can be no true and adequate *science* of Art, and therefore no really scientific criticism. The artist may produce without fully comprehending his process; genius is not always, perhaps seldom, able to explain itself. There is a truth in these lines of Emerson: —

"The hand that rounded Peter's dome,
And groined the aisles of Christian Rome,
Wrought in a sad sincerity.
Himself from God he could not free:
He builded better than he knew,
The conscious stone to beauty grew."

The true ontology is expressed in the first verse of Genesis: "*In principio creavit Deus cælum et terram,*" — "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth."

This ontology, this ideal element of every one of our judgments, the principle of all science as of all things, comprises three terms, and forms a complete judgment, subject, predicate, and copula. Reduced to the language of philosophy, the judgment is, Being — God — creates existences. Being is the subject, existence the predicate, and the creative act, which is the act of being, is the copula; for existences are united to being, that is, exist only by virtue of creation, or the act of real and necessary being, creating them from nothing. This divine judgment affirms itself to us in immediate intuition, and is the principle of all our intellectual as of all our physical life. As thus affirming itself to us, it is the ideal, and necessary, as distinguished from the sensible and contingent. From our intuition of it conjoined with experience flow all the sciences.

Now we may direct our contemplation more especially to one or another of these three terms. We may contemplate being, so to speak, either as quiescent, or as in action, and we may contemplate the action, the creative act, either on the side of being in which is its origin, or on the side of existence which is its external terminus.* The contemplation of the creative act in its relation to God gives us the conception of the highest degree of the beautiful, that is, the sublime. Thus Longinus gives as the best and fullest expression of the sublime, the passage from Genesis, "*Dixitque Deus: Fiat lux. Et facta est lux;*" — "And God said, Let there be light, and there was light." God spoke and it was, he commands and it stands fast. When contemplated in existences, which are the extrinsic form or terminus of the creative act, it gives rise to the conception of the beautiful in a lower form, to the beautiful proper, as distinguished from the sublime. The conception of this same judgment as superintelligible and supernaturally presented gives rise to the conception of the marvellous, which our philosophers generally underrate, and fail to explain.

God is our first cause, and our final cause. Hence in creation we must distinguish two cosmic cycles, the procession of existences by the creative act of being — not

* We need not tell the intelligent reader that we are here doing little more than translating from Gioberti's *Æsthetics*.

by emanation — from God, and their return, without being absorbed, to him as their final cause or end. God has created all things for the supreme Good, therefore for himself, for he and he alone is the supreme Good. What we call the second cosmic cycle, or the return of existences to God, is their tendency to the supreme Good as the end for which they exist. *Deus est similitudo rerum omnium*, as we are taught by St. Thomas. God is the similitude, or *idea exemplaris* of all things, and therefore all created things, each in its degree and according to its nature, copies or imitates God. To copy or imitate the Divine activity in the first cycle is art; to copy or imitate the same activity in the second cycle is morality, ethics, if in the natural order; sanctity or holiness, if in the supernatural. With this imitation in the second cycle we have now no special concern, for we are now treating of art, not morality, or sanctity.

Art may be defined to be the *imitation* — at an infinite distance, of course — *of the Divine activity as first cause*, or creator, and is therefore, in the order of second causes, *creative*. The aim of the artist, as distinguished from that of the artificer or mechanic, is *to express, embody, or clothe with exterior forms, the ideal present to his intuitive apprehension*. The philosopher contemplates the Ideal as the true, the moralist as the good, the artist as the beautiful. Philosophy is speculative, contemplates the three terms of the Ideal Judgment under the relation of being, and simply presents the truth. Art and morality are both practical; they contemplate the three terms under the relation of activity, and seek to copy or imitate this activity, art in the first cycle, and morality in the second. Since being is primary, the highest rank belongs to philosophy, or rather theology, whose object is the True; since the cycle of procession of existences from God precedes, and must precede, that of their return to him, art takes, and must take, the step of ethics. Nevertheless, under another point of view, as the end, the reason why, of an action must precede in the mind of the actor the action itself, ethics must take precedence of art, and the moral philosopher of the merely practical philosopher. But as the Divine action in the first cycle, by which existences are produced from nothing, that is, the creative activity, is the highest action conceivable by us in the intelligible order,

and that which best reveals the wonderful power of God, that order of genius which is able, as second cause, to copy or imitate it, is unquestionably the highest. If then we speak of genius, certainly, as all the world hold, the artistic is the sublimest, the most beautiful, and the most godlike. It requires a higher order of genius to produce a great poem, picture, or symphony than it does to criticise it. Even we ourselves have the presumption to think that we can form a tolerable judgment of Wordsworth's poetry, but we could not have produced the least worthy of his poems. We do not fear to form a judgment of Beethoven's symphonies, but we could no more have composed any one of them than we could have created a universe. We could not even have written *Alban*, but we can appreciate in some degree its merits and defects. The author of *Alban*, however, is right when he pronounces the creative order of genius the highest, and denies it to us; but he can write novels better than he can judge them. His artistic genius is superior to his philosophical genius, and he would write better novels than he has yet written, if he had a better philosophy of art, or if none at all, and would write more as the blackbird sings.

As art imitates the Divine act in the first cycle as expressed in the ontological judgment, Being — God — creates existences, it will be higher or lower as it takes this act, so to speak, on the side of being or on that of existences, and imitates the Divine act in its primary revelation, or only as it is copied by existences in the order of second causes. In the former case, art is sublime, in the latter case it is at best beautiful, and usually only pretty. Here the ancients excelled the moderns. Modern artists, instead of copying or imitating, so to say, the Divine act at first hand, take it only at second hand, in its pale reflex in the order of second causes, and really express or embody in their productions only the activity of creatures. Doubtless, there is something of the Divine activity in creatures themselves, for God is actively present in all his works, and no creature acts in its own sphere even except by the Divine concurrence; but the activity thus seized is divine only in a participated sense. Hence it is that all modern art is feeble, wants grandeur of conception, freedom and boldness in execution, and is admirable only in petty details. The only exception, if ex-

ception there be, is in regard to music, the only species of art which is not struck with the general *frivolezza* of the modern world.

At the head of what are called the liberal arts, as the highest species of art, we place poetry, not only because it surpasses all the others in expressing the sublime, but because it expresses the sublime and beautiful in the greatest variety of forms, or under the greatest variety of aspects. The other species of art address themselves chiefly to the senses, and do not of themselves interpret to the understanding the Intelligible or Ideal. Music, painting, sculpture, architecture, must be interpreted by the poet before their expression is complete. Left to themselves, their expression is vague, dreamy, confused, revealing the splendor, it may be, but not the resplendent. The poet addresses himself not only to sense and imagination, but also to the intellect and heart. He expresses the true and the good under the form of the sublime and beautiful, but so that the form, instead of concealing, reveals them, — reveals them as clearly, as distinctly, as does the philosopher, but, as the philosopher does not, in their splendor, their grandeur, and their loveliness. Of all God's gifts in the natural order, true poetical genius is the greatest; and it is surpassed only by his gift of heroic virtue in the supernatural order, expressed in the life of the saint.

Having made these preliminary remarks, we may now ask, Is Wordsworth a poet? and if so, what is his rank? There can be no doubt that Wordsworth had true poetic sensibility, and that he aimed at being a poet of the first order. During a long life he devoted himself with praiseworthy assiduity to the cultivation of his poetical powers, and strove hard to produce something that posterity should not "willingly let die." He had, too, some very just notions of the vocation of the poet, and of the noble mission of poetry. He seems fully aware that in all things, even the most common and trivial, as well as in the most extraordinary and grand, there is an ideal element, something divine, — that in the lowest there is something not low, in the familiar something elevated and noble, in the transitory something permanent, in the changing something immutable, in the homely something beautiful, — which it is the province of the poet to seize and embody in his verse. All this is true and just. But he seems to us to conceive

it not unfrequently in a pantheistic sense, as the emanation of the Divine Being, not as God in his creative act. It is, if we may so say, being as quiescent, and not being as creating, that he contemplates. Moreover, he does not disengage the ideal element, and express it in forms of his own creation, wherein lies the essence of all art. Or, if he does so occasionally, he does not generally, nor for more than a moment at a time. He starts with the assumption, which we readily concede, that there is poetry in common and every-day life; but when he undertakes to express the ideal revealed by that life, he copies or imitates its common and every-day forms. Hence he gives us every-day life itself, not its poetry. He imitates its expressions, not its ideal activity. Take as illustrations *The Idiot Boy*, *The Wagoner*, *Peter Bell*, or even *The White Doe of Rylstone*, and the *Sonnets to the River Duddon*. These, though rhymed, are veritable prose, with the exception of now and then a line, and the ideal beauty there may be, and certainly is, in their subjects, receives no new expression, and is expressed only under its natural symbols. The author has not given exterior forms to his intuitions of the Ideal; he has merely transcribed the forms in which he apprehended it. We see no more beauty in these subjects after reading his poems than we did before, and the nature he sings has received no new embellishment; he has added nothing, and they wear for us no new or more vivid forms. He is a painter of what is called the Dutch school.

Nobody can deny that Wordsworth had a remarkable command of fine poetical language, and his verses are often admirable for their harmony and liquid sweetness. He had a delicate sensibility, and a well-tuned ear, and Byron is wrong in insinuating that his language is prosaic. It is generally no such thing, and, so far as poetic diction is concerned, no poet has better understood or more completely mastered the resources of the English language. His feeblest poems, his *Evening Walks*, and *Descriptive Sketches*, have always a sort of soothing and lullaby-baby effect on the reader, which reminds us of *Mother Goose's Melodies*, which we regard as no inconsiderable merit, for we confess to reading those world-famous melodies in our advancing age with undiminishing pleasure. But Wordsworth lacks intellectual strength. He had the tempera-

ment of a poet, but not the intellectual power to be a great poet. He never rises above the creature, even when he attempts to sing the Creator, and what he sings is existence, and quiescent existence even at that. He has rendered a service to English poetry by avoiding the turgid diction of the feeble imitators of Pope and Dryden, and by recalling our poets to the naturalness and simplicity of expression which comport so well with the genius of our language; but he has done our poetry an equal disservice by rendering it tame and feeble.

Wordsworth, like all English poets not of the first order, was too fond of what is called descriptive poetry. Descriptive poetry, where description is the end, is simply no poetry at all. Of course we do not exclude description from poetry, and all great poets, from Homer downwards, abound in descriptions; but their descriptive passages are not introduced for the sake of description. With great poets description is introduced only to illustrate a truth or to heighten an effect. Wordsworth's descriptions are long and wearisome, though no doubt exact; but they serve only a descriptive purpose. They heighten no effect, illustrate no truth, bring home no thought or sentiment. Compare his descriptions with those of Goldsmith in his *Deserted Village*, — a poem we would not exchange for the whole seven volumes of Wordsworth. Scott abounds, in his poems and in his novels, with descriptions of external nature; but, unless he be really the author of *Moredun*, they are never introduced for their own sake, and always serve to heighten or help on the action of the piece, or to explain the situation of the actors. So is it with Byron. There is more description, we were about to say, in *Childe Harold* than in all Wordsworth; but it never annoys, for in it external nature is subordinated to moral and intellectual nature. The spiritual always triumphs over the material, and matter succumbs to mind. In Wordsworth mind succumbs to matter, and with all his pretensions to spiritualism he is in reality only a very ordinary materialist. Take *The Excursion*, intended to be the second part of a grand religious and philosophical poem, and you will find that, if the author regards external nature as symbolical of spiritual truth, he seldom succeeds in interpreting the symbol. His pedler, intended to represent the views of the author, is, no doubt, a very remarkable pedler; but as tire-

some and as little edifying in his long-winded discourses as an Evangelical preacher. His descriptions of woodlands, meadows, lakes, and paddocks with flocks of sheep and herds of cattle, may be very truthful, and the result of much careful observation; but they serve no purpose beyond themselves, bring home no moral truth, illustrate no spiritual dogma, and put us in possession of nothing objectively true, good, or beautiful. They give us indeed glimpses of the author, make us familiar with his moods of mind, and make us acquainted with his manner of looking upon nature and the problem of man's existence and destiny; but they do not raise us to the intelligible or ideal world itself, as existing independently of the poet, or enable us to seize as it were by intuition the solution of the problem about which he discourses in such languid verse. He sings himself, as it was usually of himself, *his* poems, and *his* theory of poetry, that he spoke, with his visitors.

Wordsworth was a man of delicate sensibility, sweet and gentle feelings, perhaps warm and tender affections,—one likely to be held dear in the circle of his intimate friends; but he strikes us as a man of very moderate intellectual powers. He appears to have cultivated his powers with great assiduity, but he always remained intellectually weak. His mind was feeble and fragmentary, and could never grasp the universe as a whole. He had some religious sensibility, some reverence for ecclesiastical establishments, and a vague love of some of the externals of Christianity; but he had no clear, well-defined religious convictions, no strong and earnest faith. He paddles always on the surface, and dwells on the outside of things, and never was there a greater mistake than to suppose that his poems are written in accordance with a profound and world-embracing philosophy. They reveal or conceal no such philosophy; they reveal to us only the phases of the poet's own mind,—his own whims, crotchets, vagaries, dreams, reveries,—his subjective moods or states. His larger poems, where he attempts anything of a little intellectual importance, are failures, though they may contain now and then a passage or a line which the reader values in proportion to the extent of the arid waste he has travelled over before finding it; but we cheerfully admit that several of his smaller poems are really pretty. We remember with pleasure, "The Pet Lamb," "We are

Seven," "Lines on Tintern Abbey," and "Yarrow Revisited," which assure us that, if the poet had been less ambitious, he would have been more successful. His mistake was in believing that he was born to be a *great* poet, and that God had given him a high and solemn poetical mission to accomplish.

It would be easy for any one familiar with Wordsworth's works to select almost any number of detached lines and passages which would seem to impugn this our unfavorable judgment,—lines and passages which secure him no inconsiderable number of admirers, among the cultivated, though chiefly of the dilettanti class,—persons who have no great earnestness of character, and who find their interest in seeking for gems not too thickly strewn. These persons have delicate stomachs, and cannot take strong food in a concentrated form. They must have bread made of unbolted flower, and buy their wheat unwinnowed from its chaff. They are very good, honest, well-meaning people, but they are shocked at strong, earnest tones, or a clear, round, sonorous voice. Every one must speak under his breath, with a half lack-a-daisical air, and split his most frivolous thoughts into halves and quarters before uttering them; as some overnice young ladies are said to have been known to split a pea, and take only a part of it at a time into their sweet little mouths. Among these delicate persons we have found the greater number of Wordsworth's admirers. But a great poet is not merely great in isolated lines and passages, but he is great in the whole. From a poet or writer of the first order of genius you can never make an extract that will not suffer by being torn from its connection. Scott has no separate passages or verses to compare with many we can select from Wordsworth; and yet what poem has Wordsworth written, which, as a whole, you can read with as much pleasure as *The Lay of the Last Minstrel*, or even *The Lady of the Lake*? And yet we do not call Scott a great poet. We can make extracts from Wordsworth which nothing in Coleridge can match, and yet we know no poem of Wordsworth that can match either *Christabel* or *The Ancient Mariner*. No sane man would think of naming Wordsworth in the same day with Pope and Dryden, far less with Chaucer, Spenser, Milton, or Byron, the really great poets, after

Shakespeare, of the English language, and we cannot but think that his popularity is owing to the *frivolozza* of the modern cultivated classes, and to a sort of dreamy and misty German subjectivism, which tends to conceal his poverty of meaning and his want of manly vigor.

We have expressed our judgment freely, but we have no disposition to do battle for it. For ourselves, with all his faults, which are legion, we prefer Byron to Wordsworth, and we doubt if he was much less of a Christian in his real convictions. We are far enough from holding up the character of Byron to admiration; morally, socially, politically, and religiously, we are strongly opposed to him, and we advise no one to read his poems; but he was after all a man, if with the frailties of a man, with the strong and noble qualities of a man, and as to poetical genius, though he often abused it, and terribly abused it, without a peer among modern poets in the whole civilized world. He was our Napoleon of poetry, and apparently has left no nephew to succeed him. Thinking thus of Byron, nobody can expect us to offer incense to the staid and passionless Wordsworth. But if our readers are disposed to differ with us, it is their right, and we shall not quarrel with them. We have no very strong wish to rob them of the idol which they have set up, and which is on their part rather a safe superstition. Let the road be open to them to make their pilgrimages to Rydal Mount, if such be their wish.

What we really wish to impress upon our readers is that the present taste in regard to art in most of its branches, here and abroad, is frivolous. We have in our art, aside from music, no depth of thought, no religious intuition, no conception of the Ideal, no realization of the higher and loftier kinds of the Beautiful. We lose ourselves in the Pretty, and waste our energies in perfecting minute details. The reason of this is, that we have lost religious faith, lost the earnestness of our souls, and have ceased to believe in the beautiful as in the true and the good out of ourselves. No little of what we regard as Wordsworth's failure is due to a false theory, borrowed from the Germans, that the ideal which the artist must seek to realize in forms of his own creation is in the mind itself, and is projected from the soul instead of being simply apprehended by it. Nearly all our modern theories make

the Beautiful subjective, and send the artist into himself to find it. The soul, as the work of God, certainly has its beauty, and a beauty above any other creature known to us, for it was made in the image and likeness of the Creator; but its beauty is derived, and is but a pale reflex of the Beautiful itself. To send the learner to contemplate himself, is to send him to contemplate a created beauty, as much as if you sent him to contemplate mere brute matter. The soul is beautiful, the heavens and the earth are beautiful, all nature is beautiful; but not by the beauty which is shed over it by us, or a beauty projected from our own souls. All things are beautiful by the uncreated beauty of their Creator, which they in their several degrees mirror. The true beauty is the splendor of the Creator, which shines on and through them all. The Ideal is not the soul, it is the soul's Maker, and with which the soul is created to commune. It is up to God, the eternal and infinite Beauty, the soul must be raised; and it must bathe itself in his splendor, if it would work as a true artist.

It is only a profoundly religious age that can produce or appreciate the sublime forms of art. It is not that we are born with feebler genius than our fathers that we fall so far below them in our artistic productions, but that we have not their religious faith, that we seek not beauty in its source, and neglect to commune with the real ideal. There is no God in our philosophy, there is no reality in our conceptions. We are sensists, sentimentalists, psychologists, placing ourselves in the throne of the Highest, and seeking to draw all from our own feeble natures. Such is our religion, such our philosophy, and what but worthless can be our art? Let men return to the ontology of the Catechism which they have learned to despise, and their minds will soon be reinvigorated; genius now remaining unfolded, or developed only to prey upon itself, will expand in a genial element, will open its bosom to the Ideal as the sunflower to the star of day, and will resume its creative power. We live in an atmosphere now where genius cannot thrive. We want that religious and philosophical training which our fathers had, and which the world has not had and never can have under the influence of your Bacons and your Descartes, your Lockes and your Condillacs, your Kants and your Cousins, your Schellings

and your Hegels, your Coleridges and your Wordsworths. Nothing is more frivolous than nearly all modern poetry, and nearly all modern art; and they will sink lower and lower, if we do not return to the theology of the Church and the philosophy taught us by the Fathers and the great Scholastics. An age which is unable to see truth and beauty in the *Summa Theologica*, will never rival Dante or the old cathedrals of Europe. The most it can do will be to copy the old masters, and excel in petty details. We must be men, strong men, living men, before we can be artists.

- ART. VI. — 1. *The Poor Scholar, and other Tales of Irish Life*. By WILLIAM CARLETON. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1854. 24mo. pp. 322.
2. *New Lights, or Life in Galway. A Tale*. By Mrs. J. SADLIER. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1853. 24mo. pp. 443.

WE complain very gravely of Messrs. Sadlier & Co. that they did not send us a copy of *The Poor Scholar* by Carleton. We never read it till a day or two since, but we are so well pleased with it, that we give our friends the publishers a gratuitous notice of it. It is the best thing that we have seen from Carleton, and is a deeply interesting and touching story. It is one that we can read without offence to our better feelings and our graver judgment. It paints in vivid but truthful colors the domestic virtues and affections of the Irish peasantry, without neutralizing them by placing in contrast an exaggerated picture of the vices and defects of the Irish character, of which we have heard more than enough. He is not as favorable to the Irish character as he might be, and omits many noble traits which he might have added; but he evidently has not intended to depreciate his countrymen, and upon the whole he makes one love and respect them.

New Lights, or Life in Galway, we briefly noticed on its first appearance. It is lively, brilliant, interesting, bearing

the traces of a fine and cultivated mind, as do all that we have read of Mrs. Sadlier's writings. Mrs. Sadlier is an Irish lady, with a strong and lively attachment to her country and her race, — for which we honor her, — a most inflexible Catholic, and a very interesting and agreeable lady. We could hardly be severe upon any one of her works, however objectionable it might be to us if written by another. As a critic, we aim to be impartial and just, but we are not exempt from human frailty, and a personal friend is likely to find us less inexorable than an enemy. We can see many beauties in a work written by one we love and esteem, which we might not be able to discover in the work of an author we dislike, or to whom we are indifferent. This we suppose is the case with every literary critic, though not every one will own it, and many a fault has been detected in our own writings by some of our journalists, when they would have seen only a merit if they had not taken a sort of personal aversion to us, perhaps because they had little personal acquaintance with us. But however personally prejudiced we may be in Mrs. Sadlier's favor, we think we hazard nothing in saying that she is one of our very best popular writers, and by her original stories and her translations from the French is making valuable contributions to our still scanty literature.

This *Life in Galway* is designed to depict the character of what is called the New Reformation in Ireland, of which we have heard so much during the last few years, and shows that the number of conversions boasted of has been greatly exaggerated, and that the conversions themselves are not such as the proselyters have much reason to be proud of, for they are in no instance the result of sincere conviction, and are effected by means alike dishonorable and unchristian, — by taking advantage of the poverty and helpless condition of the people. The poor people are destitute of the means of subsistence; they see their children starving before their eyes; and they have no way of obtaining subsistence by their own exertions. To these poor people, half distracted by the pangs of hunger, the sleek Evangelical presents himself, and proffers relief on condition that the parents will let him have their children for his proselyting school, and go themselves to the Protestant meeting, or, as they say in Ireland, to church

instead of chapel. This is offering a premium on hypocrisy, giving a bribe for dishonesty, and employing a force infinitely more detestable than that of the sword. We are unable to conceive anything more dishonorable, or more immoral and corrupting. This mode of proselytizing is of itself sufficient to stamp Evangelicalism as from below, and to prove that its spirit is infernal, not supernal. True religion is never divorced from morality, and it can never consent to advance itself by immoral, dishonorable, or even ungenerous means. Its spirit is always free, noble, magnanimous.

Unhappily, Evangelicalism has no greatness of soul, no tenderness of heart, no sense of honor or justice. It has never been able to propagate itself by moral means, and has always relied on low cunning, corrupting appeals, or the employment of force of some sort. It has not even the manly spirit of the ancient Græco-Roman Gentilism. To it all means are fair, are honorable, are just, that will detach people from the Church, and make them non-Catholics, although hypocrites or infidels. The dragonades of Louis the Fourteenth, and the massacre of St. Bartholomew's, even as represented by the Protestants, were high-minded and praiseworthy in comparison with the daily practices of Evangelicals in the West of Ireland, and even in some of our Atlantic cities. Evangelicalism reverses all the precepts of the Gospel, and makes converts only by arguments addressed to the body, the flesh, the animal man, instead of arguments addressed to the soul, to reason, and conscience. It cannot be generous even in its benevolence, and it will give a morsel of bread to the famishing only in exchange for conscience. It would assist us in our poverty from its abundance to educate and provide for our children, but only on condition that it can rear them up in its own evil ways, that it can make them Evangelicals, and twofold more the children of hell than its own adherents. If we have the spirit to refuse its assistance on such terms, it turns round and accuses us of being opposed to education, as loving ignorance, and as having no regard for the welfare of our children. If we exert ourselves, and from our scanty means, after paying our tax for the support of the public schools, provide schools of our own for our children, it raises the hue and cry against us, denies us the right to educate

our own children as we see proper, charges us with a premeditated design to break down the Common School system of the country, and of delivering over the poor innocent Protestant people body and soul to the Pope.

England under Evangelical influence has never consented to treat Catholic Ireland as having either the natural or the civil right to be Catholic, and for three hundred years has labored in all her intercourse with her to force her to turn Protestant. Her legislation, her administration, her beneficence even, has had this end, and this end only, in view. Hence the reason why Ireland has never been a happy and contented member of the British empire. If she had respected the religion of the Irish, and been contented to govern her according to the principles of common justice, we should never have heard of rebellion as the chronic disease of Ireland. But the Irish people chose to adhere to the religion of their fathers, and hence the Evangelical government of England has felt that it has the right to treat them as brutes, to trample on all their natural rights as subjects, to outrage their dearest and most sacred affections as men, and to make sport of their noblest qualities and their sublimest virtues as Christians. Evangelicalism is laboring with all its might to do the same thing here. There is no hostility in this country to the Irish, simply as such. The hostility to the Irish, which is so general and so deplorable, is hostility to the Catholic Irish, and springs from the Evangelical hatred of Catholicity. The Evangelical finds a brother in the Orangeman, and loves his "rich brogue," if brogue he have. It is the Catholic, not the Irishman, that he regards as an enemy, and he hates the American-born Catholic even more than the foreign-born. All his measures against foreigners, all his Native Americanism, all his pretended love of republicanism, all his talk against the Irish, and about Americans governing America, are directed solely against Catholics, and have for their end to force Catholics to become Evangelicals. The appeal to the Native American sentiment is a device of Satan, and proceeds from no love of true Americanism, but solely from hatred to Catholicity.

Here is a point which we wish such writers as Mr. T. D. McGee would consider. They make a mistake, and defend the Irishman, when it is not the Irishman, but the

Catholic, they should defend; for it is only for the sake of the Catholic that the Irishman is really attacked. Their defence of the Irishman, not of the Catholic, or of the Catholic mainly because he is an Irishman, tends to excite a national feeling against the Irish as Irish, and to enlist against them non-Evangelical, as well as Evangelical Americans; whereas, if they would defend the Catholic alone, or the Irishman only because a Catholic, they would have for their opponents only the Evangelicals, not yet a majority of the American people. The Irish themselves in this country need no special defence, and are best defended, not as Irish, but as Catholics, in common with the whole Catholic population of the country. That Catholic population is made up of native Americans, natives of Ireland, Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Russia, Turkey, and they all have one common enemy, one common interest, and one common defence, and it is bad policy for them to attempt to draw any lines of division among themselves. They all stand on the same platform before God and the country, and should never in their defence separate themselves one from another. The only fault we find with the writers we allude to is, that they defend themselves on national instead of Catholic grounds, and thus do what they can to compel Catholics to divide among themselves according to their several nationalities, or to seek union by making themselves Irishmen. They would give the hegemony among the Catholics to the Irish, which is unjust to the other nationalities.

We say not this because we are unfriendly to the Irish, or because we do not love and respect them as much as we do our own race or nation. We have no great respect for Irish politicians, whether foreign-born or American-born; that is, a class of men with little solid talent, but great volubility, who regard the portion of our population born in Ireland or of Irish parents as their stock in trade, and seek to render themselves politically important by having it believed that they can command the "Irish vote." These men, commonly regarded as representing the Irish body, we hold in no high esteem, and we seldom fail to let them know it, because their influence, as far as influence they have, is injurious to the country. But it is a great mistake to suppose that these

represent the Irish population of this country, or that they are held in any higher esteem by our fellow-citizens of Irish birth or extraction than they are by ourselves. Every people has its demagogues, and after all these Irish demagogues are no worse than our Yankee demagogues, if indeed so bad, and if the Irish people may be influenced by demagogues, everybody knows that the native American people can be influenced still more by them. No people on earth were ever more completely under the control of demagogues than have been and are the descendants of the Puritans in this ancient Commonwealth of Massachusetts. While we confess we do not like Irish demagogues, we are bound to say that we do not consider them as worse than our own, and that we dislike them not because they are Irish, but because they are demagogues, and we dislike all demagogues.

But setting aside the demagogues, and coming to the Irish people themselves, even as we find them in this country, we appeal to every one who knows them intimately, if they do not at least equal, in all the private, domestic, and social virtues, any other portion of our population. Every national character has its defects, and traits not pleasing to people of other nations, and there are traits in the Irish character that we do not like; but when we look at the amiable qualities and solid virtues of the Irish people as a body, we are obliged to confess that they are unsurpassed by any people on the globe. The two works named at the head of this article describe the Irish peasant as he is at home, but they describe him very much as we find him here. Our readers know that we never allow them to forget our American character or our Puritan descent, and that we always scrupulously abstain from everything which might be construed into a flattery of the Irish; but in these times, when so much injustice is done them by our Evangelicals, and every effort is made to excite a native American prejudice against them, it is but common justice to recognize their virtues, and to rebuke the contemptuous tone in which they are too often spoken of. The American national type is derived from the English, and the people of this country will always be an Anglo-American people in their predominant character; but he knows little of the Anglo-American who doubts that his character is mellowed and greatly improved in

its flavor by its contact with the Irish Catholic. There is no portion of our population superior to that in which there is a large infusion of the genuine Irish element. Take even the Irish peasantry who come here, and you are struck with their industry, their quiet and loyal dispositions, their domestic virtues, and their warm and tender domestic affections. Visit their families, and you feel that you are in a pure and healthy atmosphere, and your hearts are melted by a love of parents to children, of children to parents, of brothers and sisters for each other, that you have never found in the families of Puritan origin. They have their vices, no doubt; but what people has not? Their vices attract our notice, not because they are greater or more numerous than ours, but because they are different. Every people is tolerant of its own national vices, and intolerant of the national vices of others. The vices of the Irish are seen at a glance; they are all open, on the outside; the vices of the Yankee are concealed or disguised. The Yankee hides his vices, the Irishman his virtues.

The Evangelicals underrate the intelligence of the Irish peasantry. As a general thing, they do not read as much as the Yankees; they are not acquainted with so many speculative opinions in religion and morals, but they have even more natural shrewdness, and have more real, solid intelligence in all that relates to what is highest and best in human life. Much which we call knowledge, and which they have not, is nothing but acquired ignorance. Nine tenths of the knowledge we Americans boast of is nothing but sheer ignorance dressed in the garb of science. If you rise from the poor and illiterate to the educated and easy class of the Irish population of the country, you will find, as a general rule, that they are better trained and better informed than the corresponding class of Americans of Puritan descent. Their ideas are clearer, and their information more exact. Not a few of the best scholars and business men of the country are Irish, or of Irish descent. In point of manners and the graces and qualities which adorn society, the difference is very great, and by no means to the advantage of the Anglo-American. You never find that ignorance, that coarseness and vulgarity, in the low Irish, that you find in the low Englishman or Anglo-American. There is in the least culti-

vated Irishman or Irishwoman a natural sweetness, an instinctive delicacy of feeling, a propriety and even elegance of expression, that you will hardly find in the same class of any other people. The Englishman is blunt, and in the Anglo-American we find, usually, something hard and angular. Neither will in fact take the highest polish, and neither is pleasing unpolished; but the Irish please us in their least polished state, and are susceptible of the highest polish. You will find in this country no more highly polished society than you will find in Irish American circles. It is well to remember that all the Irish in this country are not servant girls and mud-diggers, though these are not to be spoken lightly of. The great mass of the Irish were, no doubt, poor when they landed here, but they are not all poor now. Many of them and their children have acquired a respectable share of the wealth of the country, and occupy by no means an inferior social position. We have mingled a little in society, but the most charming society we have ever found is that of the better class of Catholics; and among Catholics we have found none more charming than in Irish Catholic families who have retained their faith and are well off in the world. Society in its best sense is never found except among Catholics, or where Catholic influences predominate. We know excellent, amiable, and well-bred people amongst Protestants, but we always miss in them a certain sweetness, freedom, and grace, which we find among Catholics of a corresponding class. The Catholic religion brings out to their best advantage all the social qualities of our nature, and in no people does it do this more effectually than in our Irish Catholic population.

The American people regard poverty as a crime, and after Catholicity their greatest dislike to the Irish is for their poverty. They speak of them as paupers. There are, no doubt, some Irish paupers; but it should be remembered that Massachusetts, for instance, collects by a tax on immigrants some thousands of dollars annually more than she expends for the support of foreign-born paupers. This talk about foreign paupers is all moonshine. In late years the immigrants have brought annually from twelve to fourteen millions of dollars in specie into the country, and everybody knows that the wonderful material progress of the United States, during

the last ten or fifteen years, has been rendered possible only by the extraordinary influx of foreign immigrants. Immigration since 1846 has added to our population not less than three millions, hardly less than four millions of inhabitants, which must be counted as an addition of not less than two thousand millions of dollars to the wealth of the country; for the principal wealth of a country is its population, let political economists say what they may. We may judge our gains by Great Britain's loss, and her loss we may estimate by the high price she is obliged to pay for labor, and the difficulty she finds in recruiting her army. Emigration and the war with Russia will go far to enable us to undersell her in the markets of the world, and deprive her of her commercial supremacy. Then, again, if the immigrants are poor on arriving here, they do not continue poor. The thrift of the German immigrants is acknowledged by all; but the Irish are far less inferior to them in this respect than is commonly supposed, and is superior to that of our native Yankee population. By far the larger part of them ultimately attain to competence, and not a few to wealth. Take the city of Boston, and every observer must be aware that the Irish population are gradually rising in the scale, and that in a very few years they can hardly fail to have their proportionate share of the wealth, and carry on their proportionate share of the business, of the city. This objection of being poor, which weighs so much with a worldly-minded generation, will very soon cease to exist, and the great difficulty will be to obtain an adequate supply of labor.

Politically, again, the Irish do not deserve the sweeping censures brought against them. Escaping from a perennial despotism to a land of professed liberty and equality, they may at first be disposed to run into an extreme of democracy; but they, with the Germans and other Catholics, constitute the strongest and most reliable conservative body in the country. Some few of them may be a little excited and noisy at elections, but the conduct of the Native American party at Louisville in Kentucky proves that, whatever their faults in this respect, they are nothing in comparison with those of our own countrymen. They are free from all the *isms* and fanaticisms of the day, and are never found trying to use the government to carry out the measures of reform which annihilate individual liberty and

the rights of property. You never find them Abolitionists, Maine-liquor-law men, or Know-Nothings. They love personal liberty and they respect authority. You will find them in the coming Presidential election voting to a man on the side of the honor, the good faith, and the true interests of the country. They have a conscience, and can act from principle, which is saying everything in their favor, if we look to the terrible want of principle in all political parties.

As to the readiness of foreign-born Catholics, Irish, Germans, or Poles, to defend the country, we need say nothing. The Mexican war is still remembered, and they compose a large part of our regular army. Their fidelity in time of war to the American flag can no more be questioned than their bravery.

We have made these few remarks because they are due to a class of our population now most grossly abused, and because we would convince the sounder portion of the American people that, in warring against the Catholic Irish, they are warring against themselves and the best interests of the country. We have made them not so much as a Catholic as an American citizen, as remarks which any honest man and true patriot may accept. It were to act like fools and madmen to join with the Evangelicals against our Irish Catholic population, and seek to deprive them of their equal rights, or to drive them from the country. We in common with others a year ago dreaded the influx of infidel foreigners, but the Know-Nothing folly has reassured us, and we have now little to fear from their action. They will henceforth be our political friends rather than enemies, and get up no more Bedini riots. Hence we have no further fear of the non-Catholic foreign-born population of the country. The German infidels even are no longer to be dreaded, and foreign-born radicals will find themselves compelled by the force of circumstances to support a truly conservative policy.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS.

Messrs. D. and J. Sadlier's Publications.

1. Life of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of God ; with the History of the Devotion to Her. Completed by the Traditions of the East, the Writings of the Fathers, and the Private History of the Jews. Translated from the French of the Abbé Orsini, by Mrs. J. Sadlier. Meditations on the Litany of the Blessed Virgin. By the Abbé Edouard Barthe. Translated by Mrs. J. Sadlier. 1854. 4to.

[The style in which this volume is presented to the public does great honor to the publishers. The engravings are well executed and selected from the best models. Like all of Mrs. Sadlier's translations, it is carefully and correctly translated. One can read it without having the thought of its being a translation continually before the mind. The Abbé Barthe's Meditations on the Litany of Loretto, also translated by Mrs. Sadlier, greatly enhance the value of this volume. We most heartily commend it to all those who wish to possess the most valuable Life of the Blessed Virgin which has appeared in this country.]

2. The Life of St. Frances of Rome. By Lady Georgiana Fullerton ; of Blessed Lucy of Navin, of Dominica of Paradiso, and of Anne de Montmorency : with an Introductory Essay on the Miraculous Life of the Saints. By J. M. Capes, Esq. — 3. Catholic Legends : a New Collection, selected, translated, and arranged from the best Sources. — 4. Pictures of Christian Heroism. With Preface by the Rev. Henry Edward Manning, D.D. — 5. The Witch of Melton Hill. A Tale. By the Author of "Mount St. Lawrence," "Mary, Star of the Sea," &c. — 6. Heroines of Charity : containing, The Sisters of Vincennes, Jeanne Biscot, Mlle. Le Gras, Mde. de Miramion, Mrs. Seton, The Little Sisters of the Poor, &c., &c. With a Preface by Aubrey de Vere, Esq. — New York : D. & J. Sadlier. 1855.

Murphy & Co's Publications.

7. A Treatise of Analytical Geometry, proposed by Rev. Benedict Sestini, S. J., Professor of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy, in Georgetown College. Washington : Gideon & Co., Printers. 1852. — 8. Elementary Algebra. By B. Sestini, S. J., Author of "Analytical Geometry." Second Revised and Enlarged Edition. — 9. A Treatise on Algebra. By B. Sestini, S. J., Author of "Analytical Geometry," and "Elementary Algebra." — 10. Rudiments of the Greek Language : arranged for the

Students of Loyola College, Baltimore. Upon the Basis of Wettenhall. — Baltimore : John Murphy & Co. 1855.

[We have examined with much pleasure the mathematical treatises of Father Sestini. They omit nothing that can be desired, and although we sometimes think he dwells too long on a point of comparatively small importance, still, as this is only a matter of taste, it cannot greatly affect the value of his books. We hope to see them used in all the Catholic schools and colleges in the country. We may say the same as regards the Greek Grammar which we have received from the same publishers. It is arranged after Wettenhall, and is, we think, the best Greek Grammar that we have seen. It is small and comprehensive, and will not overcharge the memory of the student with matter which is not necessary to be remembered. Once more we hope these books will be adopted as text-books in all our schools.]

11. The Studies and Teaching of the Society of Jesus, at the Time of its Suppression, 1750 – 1773. Translated from the French of M. l'Abbé Maynard, Honorary Canon of Poitiers, Professor of Rhetoric at Pontlevoy. — 12. The Devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. With an Introduction on the History of Jansenism, by John Bernard Dalgavins, Priest of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. First American from the Second London Edition. — 13. The Immaculate Conception of the Mother of God. An Exposition. By the Right Rev. Bishop Ullathorne. "Tota pulchra es, et macula non est in te." Cantic. iv. 7. With the Approbation of the Most Rev. Archbishop of Baltimore. — 14. The Blessed Sacrament ; or, The Works and Ways of God. By Frederick William Faber, D.D., Author of "All for Jesus," "Growth in Holiness," &c., &c. Republished with Sanction and Corrections of the Author. — Baltimore : John Murphy & Co. 1855.

Dunigan and Brother's Publications.

15. The Mysteries of the Faith : The Incarnation. Containing Meditations, Discourses, and Devotions on the Birth and Infancy of our Lord Jesus Christ. By St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori, Bishop of St. Agatha, and Founder of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. Newly translated from the Italian, and edited by Robert A. Coffin, Priest of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. — 16. The Christian Virtues and the Means for obtaining them. Containing, The Practice of the Love of Our Lord Jesus Christ ; Treatise on Prayer as the great Means of obtaining Salvation ; Directions for acquiring the Christian Virtues ; Rules of Life for a Christian, &c. By St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori, Bishop of St. Agatha, and Founder of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. Newly translated from the Italian, and edited by Robert A. Coffin, Priest of the Congregation of the Most

Holy Redeemer. — 17. *Brooksiana*; or, *The Controversy between Senator Brooks and Archbishop Hughes, growing out of the recently enacted Church Property Bill. With an Introduction by the Most Rev. Archbishop of New York.* — 18. *Life of the B. F. Peter Claver, of the Society of Jesus. Abridged from the Lives of the Saints and Servants of God, by the Fathers of the Oratory.* — *The Catholic Missionary: Father Claver in India.* — *The Life of the Blessed John de Britto, Martyr, of the Society of Jesus.* — *The Jesuits in Paraguay.* — *Life of the Blessed Ignatius Azevedo, and his Thirty-nine Companions, Martyrs, of the Society of Jesus.* — *Life of the Blessed Andrew Bobola, Martyr, of the Society of Jesus.* — 19. *Blind Agnese*; or, *The Little Spouse of the Blessed Sacrament.* By Cecilia Caddell. — 20. *Chateau Lescure*; or, *The Last Marquis.* — 21. *A School History of the United States. From the Earliest Period to the Present Time.* By John G. Shea.

[So far as we have observed, this is a very good abstract of the history of the United States, and a good book for schools. We very cheerfully commend it to our heads of schools.]

22. *Eucharistica*; or a *Series of Pieces, Original and Translated, on the Most Holy and Adorable Sacrament of the Eucharist.* By the Most Rev. W. Walsh, Archbishop of Halifax. — New York: Dunigan and Brothers.

23. *Essai Couronné.* — *Le Canada, Les Institutions, Ressources, Produits, Manufactures, etc., etc.* Par Hector L. Langevin, Avocat. Quebec: Lovell et Lamoureux. 1855.

24. *A Monograph on Mental Unsoundness.* By Francis Wharton. Philadelphia: Kay & Brother. 1855.

25. *The Mind and its Creations: An Essay on Mental Philosophy.* By A. J. X. Hart. Published for the Author. New York: Appleton & Co. 1853.

26. *Sociology for the South; or the Failure of Free Society.* By George Fitzhugh. Richmond: A. Morris. 1854.

27. *Crime: its Cause and Cure. An Essay.* By Cyrus Peirce. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, & Co. 1854.

28. *Bickerton*; or, *The Immigrant's Daughter. A Tale.* New York: P. O'Shea. 1855.

[A very well written Tale, adapted to the times, and the first publication by a most deserving Catholic bookseller.]

29. *The Unholy Alliance : an American View of the War in the East.* By William Giles Dix. New York : Charles B. Norton. 1855.

[Contains remarks on the Eastern war worthy of serious consideration.]

30. "Mene, — Tekel, — Upharsin." *The Bible weighed in the Balance and found Wanting.* By James Blake, M.D., Member of the Royal College of Surgeons, London, and Licentiate of the Royal Lying-in Hospital, Dublin. Boston : Patrick Donahoe. 1855.

31. *Laura and Anna ; or, The Effect of Faith on the Character. A Tale.* Translated from the French. By E. B. H., late of St. Joseph's, Emmitsburg. Philadelphia : P. F. Cunningham. 1855.

32. *The Soul on Calvary, meditating on the Sufferings of Jesus Christ, and finding at the Foot of the Cross Consolation in her Troubles. With Prayers, Practices, and Examples of Various Subjects.* By the Author of "The Elevation of the Soul to God." Baltimore : Hedian and O'Brien. 1855.

33. *The Whole French Language.* By T. Robertson, Author of "Nouveau Cours Pratique, Analytique, Théorique, et Synthétique de Langue Anglaise," "Leçons Pratiques de Langue Anglaise," etc. etc. Edited by Louis Ernst. New York : Roe, Lockwood, and Son. 1855.

34. *Key to the Whole French Language.* By T. Robertson. Edited by Louis Ernst. New York : Roe, Lockwood, and Son. 1855.

Carlton and Phillips's Publications.

35. *Life and Times of Rev. Elijah Hedding, D.D., late Senior Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church.* By Rev. D. W. Clark, D.D. With an Introduction. By Rev. Bishop E. S. James. — 36. *The Life of the Rev. Robert Newton, D.D.* By Thomas Jackson. New York : Carlton and Phillips. 1855. — 37. *The Early Dead ; containing Brief Memoirs of Sunday-School Children.* — 38. *Memoirs of Old Humphrey ; with Gleanings from his Portfolio, in Prose and Verse.* — 39. *A Model for Men of Business ; or, The Christian Layman contemplated among his Secular Occupations.* Revised and modified from the Lectures of Rev. Hugh Stowell, M.A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Salford. With an Introduction by Rev. Daniel Curry. — 40. *Essays on the Preaching required by the Times, and the Best*

Methods of obtaining it; with Reminiscences and Illustrations of Methodist Preaching. Including Rules for Extemporaneous Preaching, and Characteristic Sketches of Olin, Fisk, Bascom, Cookman, Summerfield, and other noted Extemporaneous Preachers. By Abel Stevens. — New York: Carlton and Phillips. 1855.

[Interesting to Methodists, not worth much for Catholics.]

It is impossible for us to read and notice all the new publications sent us by our good friends the booksellers, but we shall always make it a point to publish in a quarterly list the titles of all works sent us, not of an immoral tendency. More than that we cannot promise to do.

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